INTRODUCTION

The Battle of Stalingrad, one of the greatest battles of the Great Patriotic War, was a turning point during the Second World War. Interest in Stalingrad does not wane, and the debate among researchers continues. Stalingrad is a city that has become a symbol of suffering and pain, which has become a symbol of the greatest courage. Stalingrad will remain for centuries in the memory of mankind. The Battle of Stalingrad is conventionally divided into two periods: defensive and offensive. The defensive period began on July 17, 1942 and ended on November 18, 1942. The offensive period began with a Soviet counteroffensive on November 19, 1942 and ended with victorious salvoes on February 2, 1943. At certain stages, more than 2 million people took part in the battle.

DEFENSIVE FIGHTS

(on distant approaches from July 17 to August 10, 1942, on close approaches - from August 10 to September 13, 1942)

By mid-summer 1942, the battles of the Great Patriotic War had reached the banks of the Volga. In the plan for a large-scale offensive in the south of our country (the Caucasus, Crimea), the command of Nazi Germany includes Stalingrad (Hitler's directive No. 41 of April 5, 1942). Goal: to take possession of an industrial city whose enterprises produced military products (Red October, Barrikady, Traktorny factories); reach the Volga, along which in the shortest possible time it was possible to get to the Caspian Sea, to the Caucasus, where the oil necessary for the front was extracted. Hitler plans to implement this plan with the forces of Paulus’s 6th Field Army in just a week - by July 25, 1942. From July 14, 1942, by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Stalingrad region was declared in a state of siege. July 17, 1942 was the day the Battle of Stalingrad began. The Kletsky, Surovinsky, Serafimovichsky, Chernyshkovsky districts of our region were the first to meet the enemy. Well-prepared, armed, and outnumbering ours, Hitler's army, at the cost of any losses, sought to get to Stalingrad, and the Soviet soldiers, at the cost of incredible efforts, had to hold back the onslaught of the enemy. The forces of the advancing enemy were opposed by the Stalingrad Front1. It was created by decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on July 12, 1942. It included: 62nd, 63rd, 64th, 21st, 28th, 38th, 57th combined arms armies, as well as 8 - I'm an air army.

The complexity of the situation also lay in the fact that our troops experienced an acute shortage of anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery, and a number of formations lacked ammunition. Most of the divisions that arrived from the Headquarters Reserve did not yet have combat experience; other divisions were exhausted in previous battles. The open steppe nature of the area allowed enemy aircraft to carry out attacks on Soviet troops and inflict great damage in people, weapons and military equipment. The battles for the main line of defense were preceded by battles of the forward detachments. They also included cadet regiments. Having just left the walls of military schools, the young officers went on their first attack as ordinary soldiers.

17. Radical turning point - Staling., Battle of Kursk, Battle of the Dnieper

During the year from November 1942 to November 1943, a radical change was made in the course of the Great Patriotic War, when the strategic initiative passed into the hands of the Soviet command, the armed forces of the USSR went on a strategic offensive.

The main events of the second period of the war were:

3) Battle of the Dnieper (September-November 1943);

4) Liberation of the Caucasus (January - February 1943).

The historic counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Stalingrad began on November 19, 1942. Troops of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts surrounded 22 enemy divisions with a total number of 330 thousand people. In December, on the Middle Don, a group of troops was defeated, trying to break through the cauldron from the outside and help the encircled. Thus, as a result of successful military operations, the 6th German Army under the command of Field Marshal Paulus was completely blocked and surrendered. The defeat of the fascist troops at Stalingrad was very important during the Second World War.

The final stage of the Battle of Stalingrad developed into a general offensive of the Soviet troops. In January 1943, a second, this successful attempt was made to break the siege of Leningrad. For seven days, troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts covered the 15-kilometer section occupied by German forces. The Nazis resisted desperately, clinging to every line and populated area, transferring reserves and counterattacking, but they were unable to survive. On January 18, at 9:30 a.m., a long-awaited meeting of Soviet troops took place in the area of ​​workers’ settlements, and by the end of the day, the entire southern coast of Lake Ladoga was liberated from German troops.

In order to unite the efforts of the troops and navy defending Novorossiysk and the Taman Peninsula, on August 17 the Novorossiysk defensive region (NOR) was created, which received the task of preventing the fascist German troops from breaking through to Novorossiysk either from land or sea. The defenders of Novorossiysk thwarted the plans of the Germans, and they failed to completely capture the city, although the enemy forces were many times superior.

At the beginning of 1943, the Soviet command developed an operation plan to liberate Novorossiysk. This plan included an amphibious assault that landed on the outskirts of Novorossiysk - Stanichka on the night of February 4, 1943. Soviet paratroopers managed to occupy an area on the shore measuring 4 km long and 2.5 km. deep down. After reinforcements arrived on ships of the Black Sea Fleet, the area called Malaya Zemlya was expanded to 28 km. Only through a large concentration of troops, the Germans managed to stop the expansion of the bridgehead by our troops.

For seven months, from February 15 to September 16, 1943, Soviet troops held a small piece of land on the shore of Tsemes Bay. The Western Group of Forces of the 18th Army, which defended Malaya Zemlya, played an important role in the liberation of Novorossiysk on September 16, 1943 and the defeat of the Nazi troops operating here. The victory at Novorossiysk marked the beginning of the expulsion of the enemy from the Taman Peninsula and ensured the victorious conclusion of the battle for the Caucasus.

The radical change that began at Stalingrad was completed during the Battle of Kursk and the battle for the Dnieper. The Battle of Kursk (Orel - Belgorod) is one of the largest battles of the Second World War. The German leadership planned to carry out a major offensive operation (“Citadel”) in the Kursk region in the summer of 1943. The Germans hoped to defeat the southern wing of the Soviet troops, thereby changing the situation in their favor. To carry out the operation, up to 50 divisions were concentrated, including 16 tank divisions. On the Soviet side, the troops of Central, Voronezh, Stepnoy and others took part in the Battle of Kursk. Thus, the ratio of forces in favor of the Red Army averaged 1.3 - 1 for all types of weapons and personnel.

The battle lasted from July 5 to August 23. The German offensive at the first stage of the Battle of Kursk ended on July 12 with a tank battle near the village of Prokhorovka - the largest tank battle in history. The defeat of the main enemy groups followed. On August 5, Oryol and Belgorod were liberated. On August 23, the Battle of Kursk ended with the liberation of Kharkov.

The counter-offensive near Kursk grew in August into an offensive by the Soviet Army along the entire front, the troops advanced 300 - 600 km to the west. Left-bank Ukraine and Donbass were liberated, bridgeheads to the Crimea were captured, and the Dnieper was crossed. During the offensive, our command correctly assessed the position of the Dnieper and did not allow Nazi troops to gain a foothold on its opposite bank. To do this, our troops received orders to advance at a high pace, and without giving the Nazis time to consolidate their positions on the river, they took it on the move.

The bridgeheads that were taken on the move were small at first, but during the battles two large strategic bridgeheads were formed on the Dnieper: in the Rechitsa - Korosten - Kiev region (the capital of Ukraine was liberated on November 6, 1943) and in the Kremenchug - Znamenka - Dnepropetrovsk region. Thanks to this, favorable conditions developed for an offensive in Belarus and the complete liberation of Right Bank Ukraine in 1944.

Battle of Stalingrad - Cannes of the 20th century

There are events in Russian history that burn like gold on the tablets of its military glory. And one of them is (July 17, 1942–February 2, 1943), which became the Cannes of the 20th century.
The WWII battle, gigantic in scale, unfolded in the second half of 1942 on the banks of the Volga. At certain stages, more than 2 million people, about 30 thousand guns, more than 2 thousand aircraft and the same number of tanks took part in it on both sides.
During Battle of Stalingrad The Wehrmacht lost a quarter of its forces concentrated on the Eastern Front. Its losses in killed, missing and wounded amounted to about one and a half million soldiers and officers.

Battle of Stalingrad on the map

Stages of the Battle of Stalingrad, its prerequisites

By the nature of the fighting Battle of Stalingrad briefly It is customary to divide it into two periods. These are defensive operations (July 17 - November 18, 1942) and offensive operations (November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943).
After the failure of Plan Barbarossa and the defeat near Moscow, the Nazis were preparing for a new offensive on the Eastern Front. On April 5, Hitler issued a directive outlining the goal of the 1942 summer campaign. This is the mastery of the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus and access to the Volga in the Stalingrad region. On June 28, the Wehrmacht launched a decisive offensive, taking Donbass, Rostov, Voronezh...
Stalingrad was a major communications hub connecting the central regions of the country with the Caucasus and Central Asia. And the Volga is an important transport artery for the delivery of Caucasian oil. The capture of Stalingrad could have catastrophic consequences for the USSR. The 6th Army under the command of General F. Paulus was active in this direction.

Photo of the Battle of Stalingrad

Battle of Stalingrad - fighting on the outskirts

To protect the city, the Soviet command formed the Stalingrad Front, led by Marshal S.K. Timoshenko. began on July 17, when, in the bend of the Don, units of the 62nd Army entered into battle with the vanguard of the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht. Defensive battles on the approaches to Stalingrad lasted 57 days and nights. On July 28, People's Commissar of Defense J.V. Stalin issued order No. 227, better known as “Not a step back!”
By the start of the decisive offensive, the German command had noticeably strengthened Paulus's 6th Army. The superiority in tanks was twofold, in aircraft - almost fourfold. And at the end of July, the 4th Tank Army was transferred here from the Caucasian direction. And, nevertheless, the advance of the Nazis towards the Volga could not be called rapid. In a month, under the desperate blows of the Soviet troops, they managed to cover only 60 kilometers. To strengthen the southwestern approaches to Stalingrad, the South-Eastern Front was created under the command of General A. I. Eremenko. Meanwhile, the Nazis began active operations in the Caucasus direction. But thanks to the dedication of Soviet soldiers, the German advance deep into the Caucasus was stopped.

Photo: Battle of Stalingrad - battles for every piece of Russian land!

Battle of Stalingrad: every house is a fortress

August 19th became black date of the Battle of Stalingrad- the tank group of Paulus’s army broke through to the Volga. Moreover, cutting off the 62nd Army defending the city from the north from the main forces of the front. Attempts to destroy the 8-kilometer corridor formed by enemy troops were unsuccessful. Although Soviet soldiers showed examples of amazing heroism. 33 soldiers of the 87th Infantry Division, defending the heights in the Malye Rossoshki area, became an invincible stronghold on the path of superior enemy forces. During the day, they desperately repulsed the attacks of 70 tanks and a battalion of Nazis, leaving 150 killed soldiers and 27 damaged vehicles on the battlefield.
On August 23, Stalingrad was subjected to severe bombing by German aircraft. Several hundred planes attacked industrial and residential areas, turning them into ruins. And the German command continued to build up forces in the Stalingrad direction. By the end of September, Army Group B already had more than 80 divisions.
The 66th and 24th armies were sent from the reserve of the Supreme High Command to help Stalingrad. On September 13, two powerful groups, supported by 350 tanks, began the assault on the central part of the city. A struggle for the city, unprecedented in courage and intensity, began - the most terrible stage of the Battle of Stalingrad.
For every building, for every inch of land, the fighters fought to the death, staining them with blood. General Rodimtsev called the battle in the building the most difficult battle. After all, there are no familiar concepts of flanks or rear here; an enemy can lurk around every corner. The city was continuously shelled and bombed, the earth was burning, the Volga was burning. From oil tanks pierced by shells, oil rushed in fiery streams into dugouts and trenches. An example of the selfless valor of Soviet soldiers was the almost two-month defense of Pavlov’s house. Having knocked out the enemy from a four-story building on Penzenskaya Street, a group of scouts led by Sergeant Ya. F. Pavlov turned the house into an impregnable fortress.
The enemy sent another 200 thousand trained reinforcements, 90 artillery divisions, 40 sapper battalions to storm the city... Hitler hysterically demanded to take the Volga “citadel” at any cost.
The commander of the Paulus Army battalion, G. Weltz, subsequently wrote that he remembered this as a bad dream. “In the morning, five German battalions go on the attack and almost no one returns. The next morning everything happens again..."
The approaches to Stalingrad were indeed littered with the corpses of soldiers and the remains of burnt tanks. It’s not for nothing that the Germans called the road to the city “the road of death.”

Battle of Stalingrad. Photos of killed Germans (far right - killed by a Russian sniper)

Battle of Stalingrad – “Thunderstorm” and “Thunder” against “Uranus”

The Soviet command developed the Uranus plan for defeat of the Nazis at Stalingrad. It consisted of cutting off the enemy strike group from the main forces with powerful flank attacks and, encircling, destroying it. Army Group B, led by Field Marshal Bock, included 1011.5 thousand soldiers and officers, more than 10 thousand guns, 1200 aircraft, etc. The three Soviet fronts defending the city included 1,103 thousand personnel, 15,501 guns, and 1,350 aircraft. That is, the advantage of the Soviet side was insignificant. Therefore, a decisive victory could only be achieved through military art.
On November 19, units of the Southwestern and Don Fronts, and on November 20, the Stalingrad Front, brought down tons of fiery metal on Bok’s locations from both sides. After breaking through the enemy defenses, the troops began to develop an offensive in operational depth. The meeting of the Soviet fronts took place on the fifth day of the offensive, November 23, in the Kalach, Sovetsky area.
Unwilling to accept defeat Battle of Stalingrad, the Nazi command attempted to release the encircled army of Paulus. But the operations “Winter Thunderstorm” and “Thunderbolt”, initiated by them in mid-December, ended in failure. Now the conditions were created for the complete defeat of the encircled troops.
The operation to eliminate them received the code name “Ring”. Of the 330 thousand who were surrounded by the Nazis, no more than 250 thousand remained by January 1943. But the group was not going to capitulate. It was armed with more than 4,000 guns, 300 tanks, and 100 aircraft. Paulus later wrote in his memoirs: “On the one hand there were unconditional orders to hold on, promises of help, references to the general situation. On the other hand, there are internal humane motives - to stop the fight, caused by the disastrous state of the soldiers."
On January 10, 1943, Soviet troops began Operation Ring. has entered its final phase. Pressed against the Volga and cut into two parts, the enemy group was forced to surrender.

Battle of Stalingrad (column of German prisoners)

Battle of Stalingrad. Captured F. Paulus (he hoped that he would be exchanged, and only at the end of the war did he learn that they had offered to exchange him for Stalin’s son, Yakov Dzhugashvili). Stalin then said: “I am not changing a soldier for a field marshal!”

Battle of Stalingrad, photo of captured F. Paulus

Victory in Battle of Stalingrad had enormous international and military-political significance for the USSR. It marked a radical turning point during the Second World War. After Stalingrad, the period of expulsion of German occupiers from the territory of the USSR began. Having become a triumph of Soviet military art, strengthened the camp of the anti-Hitler coalition and caused discord in the countries of the fascist bloc.
Some Western historians, trying to belittle significance of the Battle of Stalingrad, put it on a par with the Battle of Tunisia (1943), El Alamein (1942), etc. But they were refuted by Hitler himself, who declared on February 1, 1943 at his headquarters: “The possibility of ending the war in the East through an offensive is no longer exists…"

Then, near Stalingrad, our fathers and grandfathers again “gave a light” Photo: captured Germans after the Battle of Stalingrad

The defensive period of the Battle of the Volga lasted four months, during which the Soviet Army carried out two successive strategic defensive operations in the Stalingrad direction.

The first was carried out on the approaches to Stalingrad in the period from July 17 to September 12, 1942 by troops of the Stalingrad and South-Eastern fronts. During it, the main strike group of the Wehrmacht on the Soviet-German front was bled dry and plans to capture Stalingrad on the move were thwarted. In fierce defensive battles that unfolded in the large bend of the Don, and then on the Stalingrad contours, Soviet troops crushed the offensive power of the enemy and held the hero city, although the Nazis managed to break through to the Volga north of Stalingrad, and also reach directly to its outskirts. During stubborn battles on the approaches to Stalingrad, the defending Soviet troops were forced, under pressure from superior enemy forces, to leave the enemy an area of ​​more than 30 thousand square meters. km, moving to a depth of 150 km. 14 districts of the Stalingrad region were occupied, including 9 completely and 5 partially.

The second strategic operation of the Soviet troops included the defensive battle of the South-Eastern (Stalingrad) Front in Stalingrad itself and to the south of it, as well as private offensive operations of the Stalingrad (Don) Front north of the city with the common goal of defending Stalingrad and preparing the conditions for the Soviet Army to launch a decisive counter-offensive here . As a result of this operation, which lasted two months - from September 13 to November 18, Soviet troops completed the main task set by the Supreme High Command. At the cost of enormous effort, thanks to the heroic resistance and perseverance of Soviet soldiers, supported by the entire country, an important strategic facility in the south, the largest military-industrial center of the country and a communications hub was held, although the enemy managed to break into five districts of Stalingrad and capture one completely. The largest district of the city, Kirovsky, remained in the hands of Soviet troops.

The defenders of Stalingrad withstood repeated assaults on the city by numerically superior enemy forces and retained an important operational-strategic springboard for the deployment of the counteroffensive of the Soviet Army, which began in the Stalingrad direction on November 19, 1942.

During both strategic defensive operations of the Soviet troops, the Wehrmacht suffered huge losses. The Nazi army lost about 700 thousand killed and wounded, over 2 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1 thousand tanks and assault guns and over 1.4 thousand combat and transport aircraft in the fight for Stalingrad in the summer to autumn of 1942. (259)

The bloody battles of the Soviet troops during the defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad resulted in heavy losses of personnel. The intensity and duration of the struggle required a huge expenditure of material and technical resources. In total, 172.2 million rifle cartridges, 3.8 million mines, over 3 million ground artillery rounds and more than 500 thousand anti-aircraft artillery rounds were expended. During this time, 5,540 wagons of ammunition alone were sent to the Stalingrad direction.

A large number of trained strategic reserves of the Headquarters were involved in the defense of Stalingrad. From July 23 to October 1, 1942 alone, 55 rifle divisions, 9 rifle brigades, 7 tank corps and 30 tank brigades arrived in the Stalingrad direction. In addition, the main flows of marching reinforcements were directed in the summer and autumn of 1942 to this decisive direction of the struggle.

In the fire of the battles of the Battle of Stalingrad, the Nazis’ plans to crush the USSR in 1942 and expand the front of aggression to other areas of the world burned out. “The whole world watched the battle on the Volga with bated breath. In Washington and London, in Paris and Belgrade, in Berlin and Rome - everywhere people felt and understood: the outcome of the war was being decided here. This was clear to both our enemies and our allies... - noted General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev in his speech at the opening of the monument-ensemble to the heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad on Mamayev Kurgan on October 15, 1967. - In this battle, not only were Selected Nazi troops were ground up. Here the offensive impulse fizzled out, the moral spirit of fascism was broken" (260). The historical significance of the military feat of the heroes of Stalingrad lies in the fact that on the banks of the Volga the victorious march of the aggressor, which began in 1939, was finally stopped.

The heroic defense of Stalingrad turned out to be insurmountable. With unprecedented steadfastness and tenacity in defending the hero city on the Volga, the Soviet Armed Forces made a significant contribution to the struggle to create a fundamental turning point in the war in favor of the states of the anti-fascist coalition.

The success of the defense of the city on the Volga testified to the indestructible strength of the Soviet Army, created by the labor and intelligence of the Soviet people, trained by the Communist Party.

Defending the great gains of October on the fields of the Battle of Stalingrad, defending the socialist Motherland from the terrible threat posed by German fascism, the Soviet Armed Forces inspired the millions of peoples of Europe enslaved by Hitler's Germany to fight for their national and social liberation.

The great feat of the defenders of Stalingrad was adequately appreciated by the Soviet people and the Communist Party. Specially established in December 1942 in memory of the heroic struggle on the Volga, the medal “For the Defense of Stalingrad” was awarded to 754 thousand participants in the Battle of Stalingrad - soldiers of the Soviet Armed Forces, partisans, workers of the city and region. The legendary warrior city was awarded the honorary title “Hero City”.

Prominent political figures from a number of countries highly appreciated the feat of the defenders of Stalingrad. “The United States is well aware of the fact,” F. Roosevelt wrote to J. V. Stalin in August 1942, “that the Soviet Union bore the brunt of the struggle and the greatest losses throughout 1942, and I can report that we are very admiring the magnificent resistance that your country has demonstrated.”

Sincere feelings of appreciation and gratitude of the peoples of the world to the courageous defenders of Stalingrad were expressed in statements and messages from representatives of public circles and press organs of many states. Thus, the Lebanese newspaper Sadi al-Shaab, at the height of the defensive battle on September 10, 1942, wrote: “This city with a large population is no longer only a Russian city. Stalingrad is the city of all people, one of the citadels of civilization.

The city on the Volga raised the question of Hitler's imminent end. The city on the Volga has become a cemetery where enormous dark forces, attracted from all sides by the Nazis, find their graves to serve as cannon fodder for the guns installed on the banks of the Volga. All this strengthens our love for Stalingrad and at the same time strengthens our peace of mind: war on the streets of Stalingrad ensures peace on the streets of Cairo, Alexandria, Beirut, Damascus and Baghdad!

The feeling of deep gratitude to the Soviet Army for its heroic struggle during the Battle of Stalingrad was expressed by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of England G. Pollitt: “... The Red Army is doing grandiose deeds that have made the very name “Stalingrad” immortal.” No other army in the world could have done what the Red Army did. And we understand this in England.”

The defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad was a major milestone on the road to victory. He prepared the necessary conditions for the Soviet Army to launch a counteroffensive with the goal of decisively defeating the enemy at Stalingrad and thereby created a favorable environment for intensifying the actions of the allied armies on all other fronts of the world war.

But the significance of this period of the battle is determined not only by its military-political results for the further course and outcome of the world war. It marked a major stage in the development of Soviet military art and became a remarkable school of the military art of Soviet military leaders, the combat skills of the broad masses of soldiers and the officer corps of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

In the battles of the defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad, the combat experience accumulated by the Soviet Army in the first, most difficult year for the Soviet Union, of the struggle against Nazi Germany and its accomplices in aggression was creatively used.

In the difficult, often unequal struggle on the Don and Volga banks, Soviet military art withstood severe testing and proved its superiority over the military art of the Wehrmacht on the fields of gigantic battles.

The defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad once again confirmed the need for a deep construction of strategic defense, the advance creation of well-equipped defensive lines in depth and the timely occupation of them by troops. In the battles of Stalingrad, Soviet troops gained experience in wide maneuver of forces and means on an operational and tactical scale. This period of the battle on the Volga is very instructive in its skillful combination of operational defense with active offensive operations in certain directions in order to divert enemy forces from threatened directions. In this regard, the experience of private offensive operations of the Stalingrad Front, carried out in September 1942, showed how important such actions are for ensuring the success of the defense of such an important strategic object as Stalingrad.

The defense of Stalingrad gave a lot of new things in matters of combined arms combat tactics, and above all in the organization and conduct of street fighting.

A new phenomenon in the conditions of battles in a large city was the conduct of artillery counter-preparations against enemy troops preparing to attack. The fight in Stalingrad showed that the involvement of the bulk of the army's artillery in counter-preparation and its duration of up to 30-40 minutes in a number of cases ensured the infliction of significant losses on the enemy, led to the disruption of its battle formations and created favorable conditions for counterstrikes and counterattacks.

In general, the experience of the defense of Stalingrad made it possible not only to reveal and basically eliminate shortcomings in the organization and conduct of defense by Soviet troops, but also to outline ways to improve it. The lessons of the defensive period of the Battle of the Volga, which stemmed from a critical generalization of the experience of the actions of the Soviet troops, influenced the development of the military art of the Soviet Army and were widely used by it in further armed struggle. In a number of issues, the experience of the Stalingrad defense did not lose relevance for the theory of military art in the post-war period.

The Soviet soldier made a worthy contribution to Soviet military art during the period of the Stalingrad defense. Patriotism, selfless courage, perseverance, high combat skill, heroism - this was what was characteristic of all the defenders of Stalingrad, brought up by the Leninist party.

Success in the defense of Stalingrad was ensured by the combat skill of the commanders of corps, divisions, regiments, battalions, companies and batteries. It was the result of the high morale and fighting spirit of the defenders of the city on the Volga, which the army party organizations, members of the military councils of fronts and armies, heads of political agencies, and the entire numerous apparatus of political workers of units and formations daily strengthened among the soldiers with their educational and organizational work.

Communists and Komsomol members were the cementing force that united the broad masses of soldiers in the fight for Stalingrad. As in other battles of the war, they were always located where it was most difficult, where the success of the battle was decided.

Paying tribute to deep respect for the defenders of the hero city, L. I. Brezhnev said: “Humanity remembers them as heroes of Stalingrad. But they came here from all over the country, and our whole country stood behind them.

At the call of the Motherland, at the call of the party, Soviet people came here to defend the freedom and honor of their people, to defend the gains of the Great October Revolution. If the sons of Russia and Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states, the Caucasus and Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia had not stood shoulder to shoulder in the trenches of Stalingrad, there would have been no Stalingrad victory.

If the factories of the Urals and Siberia had not worked day and night, if the workers of the collective farm fields had not performed their seemingly imperceptible feat every day, there would have been no Stalingrad victory.

The Motherland did everything so that the heroes of Stalingrad fulfilled their duty with honor" (261).

More than three decades have passed since the Stalingrad soldiers blocked the path of the aggressor on the Volga line. But interest in the events and problems of the Battle of Stalingrad and its most difficult part - the heroic defense of the Volga bastion, shown throughout the world during the war, continues today.

And this is quite understandable. The results and military-political significance of the finale of the Stalingrad defense were worthily noted and well remembered by the friends of the Soviet Union, all progressive people of the earth. They were and continue to be assessed in their own way by the now obvious enemies and hidden enemies of peace and socialism.

For international reaction, for anti-communists and anti-Sovietists of all stripes, the iron steadfastness of the defenders of Stalingrad was a deep disappointment; it finally buried their hopes of dealing with the world’s first socialist state at the hands of the German fascists. After the war, they took the path of outright falsification of events.

If in the statements of many state and military leaders during the last war and in the literature of the first post-war years the Battle of Stalingrad was rightfully called the decisive battle of the world war, then soon overt tendencies began to appear in the West to reduce the sound of this battle, to erase the memory of Stalingrad as a symbol from the consciousness of today’s generation indestructibility of the USSR, to consign to oblivion the historical feat of the defenders of the hero city on the Volga. And over time, these trends took shape in a certain system of falsification of the history of the Battle of Stalingrad. This falsification has its own methods and directions.

One of these methods of falsification is a tendentious presentation of the fighting at Stalingrad through the prism of the works of memoirists and historians from among former Nazi generals. Articles and books devoted to the Battle of the Volga describe in detail only the actions of the Nazi troops, mainly on the offensive, with obvious sympathy for them and Hitler’s generals in particular. At the same time, the successes of the Wehrmacht are immoderately extolled and German military art is praised. Only Hitler is criticized, on whom all the blame for failures and defeats falls. Against this background, the Soviet Army is mentioned in passing, very fragmentarily and distortedly. Its heroic defensive battles are presented as a continuous chain of defeats, often with direct anti-Soviet attacks.

The falsification of the Battle of Stalingrad is characteristic primarily of American, English and West German historiography. It is widely reflected not only in illustrated publications specifically designed for the ideological indoctrination of the younger generation, but also in research works, encyclopedias, memoirs and other works on the history of the Second World War.

Very typical in this regard is the book of the English military historian A. Seaton, “The Russian-German War 1941 - 1945,” published in 1971. When considering the Battle of the Volga, the book openly focuses only on the Wehrmacht: “Preparation of the Wehrmacht for the 1942 campaign,” “To the Volga and the Caspian Sea”, “Offensive on Stalingrad” - these are the titles of the chapters of the book in which the enemy’s successes are extolled. At the same time, all information taken from Nazi German sources and memoirs of former Nazi generals is recognized as reliable without a shadow of a doubt, and factual data from Soviet military-historical works are immediately qualified as not inspiring confidence. The losses of the Wehrmacht during its offensive in 1942 are shown and presented to the reader as scanty, although the author cannot help but know that 95 percent of all losses at this stage of the world war were suffered by the Nazi troops on the Soviet-German front.

Instead of paying tribute to the heroic feat of the Soviet Army, which inflicted irreparable losses on the Wehrmacht in defensive battles, prepared the conditions for the decisive defeat of the enemy at Stalingrad and thereby created a favorable environment for intensifying the actions of the allied armies on all other fronts of the world war, the English historian is trying to discredit it warriors, to belittle Soviet military art. The book unfoundedly claims that in the Soviet troops between the Don and the Volga in July - August 1942, complete disorganization, mass desertion, disintegration of formations and similar absurdities reigned.

Many reactionary historians of the West continue to act as successors to Hitler's generals in their desire to belittle the Soviet military art demonstrated during the defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad. Among the falsifiers of the history of the Stalingrad defense, there are those who continue to claim that if the United States had not provided assistance to the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease, the Nazis would have won the “final victory” at Stalingrad. And the American historian R. Ferrell even stated that supposedly without such help, “the Russians would have been forced to make a separate peace with Germany.”

The attempts of reactionary bourgeois historians to turn historical facts on their heads and to dispel the unfading glory of Stalingrad are a gross distortion of one of the most important events of the war. But no matter how zealous the bourgeois falsifiers are in their desire to consign to oblivion the feat of the defenders of Stalingrad, the historical truth about it is invincible, just as the hero city itself on the Volga turned out to be invincible.

“Much can be smoothed out in the memory of generations. But the glory of the heroic days of the Stalingrad defense will never die. Stalingrad is a history that does not go irretrievably into the past, but helps us in everyday life and struggle, and therefore its pages should be consulted again and again.” These words of a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A. N. Kosygin, said during a ceremonial meeting in Volgograd on July 11, 1965, dedicated to the presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal to the hero city, convincingly indicate that that the truth about Stalingrad will live forever in the memory of the people, will always serve to educate generations in the heroic traditions of the Communist Party, the Soviet people and their Armed Forces.

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Target: introduce students to one of the important battles in the history of the Great Patriotic War, identify the stages, and find out the significance of the Battle of Stalingrad during the Great Patriotic War.

Tasks:

• introduce the main events of the Battle of Stalingrad;
• reveal the reasons for the victory of the Soviet people in the Battle of the Volga;
• develop skills in working with a map, additional literature, selecting, evaluating, analyzing the material being studied;
• to cultivate a sense of patriotism, pride and respect for compatriots for the accomplished feat.

Equipment: map "Battle of Stalingrad", handouts (cards - assignments), textbook by Danilov A.A., Kosulina L.G., Brandt M.Yu. History of Russia XX - early XXI centuries. M., “Enlightenment”, 2009. Video clips from the film “Stalingrad”. Students prepare messages in advance about the heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad.

Predicted results: Students must demonstrate the ability to work with a map, video clips, and a textbook. Prepare your own message and speak to an audience.

Lesson plan:

1. Stages of the Battle of Stalingrad.
2. Results and significance.
3. Conclusion.

DURING THE CLASSES

I. Organizational moment. Greeting students

II. New topic

The topic of the lesson is written down.

Teacher: Today in class we must analyze the main events of the Battle of Stalingrad; characterize the significance of the Battle of Stalingrad as the beginning of a radical turning point in World War II; reveal the reasons for the victory of the Soviet people in the Battle of the Volga.

Problem task: Slide 1. Some Western historians and military leaders say that the reasons for the defeat of Hitler’s army at Stalingrad are the following: terrible cold, mud, snow.
Can we agree on this? Try to answer this question at the end of the lesson.

Assignment to students: While listening to the teacher’s story, draw up a thesis plan for the answer.

Teacher: Let's look at the map. In mid-July 1942, German troops rushed to Stalingrad, an important strategic point and the largest center of the defense industry.
The Battle of Stalingrad falls into two periods:

I – July 17 – November 18, 1942 – defensive;
II – November 19, 1942 – February 2, 1943 – counter-offensive, encirclement and defeat of German troops.

I period. July 17, 1942 Units of the 62nd Soviet Army came into contact in the Don bend with the advanced units of the 6th Army of German troops under the command of General Paulus.
The city was preparing for defense: defensive structures were built, their total length was 3860 m. Anti-tank ditches were dug in the most important directions, the city's industry produced up to 80 types of military products. Thus, the tractor plant supplied the front with tanks, and the Red October metallurgical plant supplied it with mortars. (Video clip).
During heavy battles, Soviet troops, showing steadfastness and heroism, thwarted the enemy’s plan to capture Stalingrad on the move. From July 17 to August 17, 1942, the Germans managed to advance no more than 60-80 km. (See map).
But still the enemy, albeit slowly, was approaching the city. The tragic day came on August 23, when the German 6th Army reached the western outskirts of Stalingrad, surrounding the city from the north. At the same time, the 4th Tank Army, together with Romanian units, advanced towards Stalingrad from the southwest. Fascist aviation subjected the entire city to a brutal bomb attack, carrying out 2 thousand sorties. Residential areas and industrial facilities were destroyed, tens of thousands of civilians were killed. Embittered fascists decided to wipe the city off the face of the earth. (Video clip)
On September 13, the enemy, having brought into battle an additional 9 divisions and one brigade, began an assault on the city. The defense of the city was directly carried out by the 62nd and 64th armies (commanders - Generals Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov and Mikhail Stepanovich Shumilov).
Fighting began on the streets of the city. Soviet soldiers fought to the death, defending every five Volga lands.
"No step back! Fight to the death! - these words became the motto of the defenders of Stalingrad.
The famous Pavlov's house became the personification of the courage of the Stalingrad residents.

Student message:“There is no land for us beyond the Volga” - this phrase of sniper Vasily Zaitsev became a catchphrase.

Student message: In one of the battles in mid-October, Matvey Putilov, a signalman at the headquarters of the 308th Infantry Division, performed an immortal feat.

Student message: As a symbol of immortal glory, the name of the marine Mikhail Panikakh entered the history of Stalingrad.

Student message: The height dominating the city is Mamayev Kurgan, during the Battle of Stalingrad it was the site of the most fierce battles, a key defense position, listed in reports as height 102.

Student message: During the defensive stage, the city residents showed persistence in the fight for the city.

Student message: Paulus launched his last offensive on November 11, 1942 in a narrow area near the Red Barricades plant, where the Nazis achieved their last success.
Find the results of the defensive period in the textbook, page 216.
By mid-November, the Germans' offensive capabilities had dried up.

II. The counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Stalingrad began on November 19, 1942. As part of this strategic plan, an operation was carried out to encircle Nazi troops near Stalingrad, codenamed “Uranus”.

Watching a video clip. The guys complete the task - fill in the gaps in the text. ( Annex 1 )

Questions:

• Which fronts took part in Operation Uranus?
• In which city did the main units of the Soviet army unite?

Field Marshal Manstein, the shock tank group, was to provide assistance to Paulus.
After stubborn battles, Manstein’s divisions approached the encircled troops from the southwest to a distance of 35-40 km, but the 2nd Guards Army, which arrived from the reserve under the command of General Malinovsky, not only stopped the enemy, but also inflicted a crushing defeat on him.
At the same time, the advance of the Goth army group, which was trying to break the encirclement in the area of ​​Kotelnikov, was stopped.
According to the “Ring” plan (General Rokosovsky led the operation), on January 10, 1943, Soviet troops began the defeat of the fascist group.
On February 2, 1943, the encircled enemy group capitulated. Its commander-in-chief, General Field Marshal Paulus, was also captured.
Watching a video clip.
Exercise. Place on the map “The defeat of German troops at Stalingrad” ( Appendix 2 )

• The direction of attacks of Soviet troops;
• The direction of the counterattack of Manstein's tank group.

All actions of the Soviet troops during the Battle of Stalingrad were coordinated by Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov.
The victory in the Battle of Stalingrad marked the beginning of a radical change in the course of not only the Great Patriotic War, but also the entire Second World War.
– What is the essence of the concept of “radical change”? (The Germans lost their offensive fighting spirit. The strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Soviet command)
– Let’s return to the problematic task: Some Western historians and military leaders say that the reasons for the defeat of Hitler’s army at Stalingrad are the following: terrible cold, mud, snow.
Slide 8.
– Can we agree on this? (Students' answers)
Slide 9. “The Battle of Stalingrad is truly a golden page in the military history of our people,” wrote the commander of the Stalingrad Front, General Eremenko. And one cannot but agree with this.

Poem(read by student)

In the heat, factories, houses, train stations.
Dust on the steep bank.
The voice of the Fatherland told him:
“Don’t hand over the city to the enemy!”
Gulko rolled in the bloody darkness
The hundredth attack wave,
Angry and stubborn, chest-deep in the ground,
The soldier stood to death.
He knew that there was no turning back -
He defended Stalingrad...

Alexey Surkov

III. Bottom line

To consolidate the material, complete the task on cards (work in pairs).
(Appendix 3 )
Stalingrad is a symbol of courage, perseverance, and heroism of Soviet soldiers. Stalingrad is a symbol of the power and greatness of our state. At Stalingrad, the Red Army broke the back of the Nazi troops, and under the walls of Stalingrad the beginning of the destruction of fascism was laid.

IV. Reflection

Grading, homework: paragraph 32,

Literature:

1. Alekseev M.N. Wreath of Glory "Battle of Stalingrad". M., Sovremennik, 1987
2. Alekseev S.P. A book to read on the history of our Motherland. M., “Enlightenment”, 1991
3. Goncharuk V.A."Memorable icons of heroic cities." M., “Soviet Russia”, 1986
4. Danilov A.A., Kosulina L.G., Brandt M.Yu. History of Russia XX - the beginning of XX? century. M., “Enlightenment”, 2009
5. Danilov A.A., Kosulina L.G. Workbook on the history of Russia, grade 9. Issue 2..M., “Enlightenment”, 1998
6. Korneva T.A. Non-traditional lessons on the history of Russia of the twentieth century in grades 9 and 11. Volgograd “Teacher”, 2002

Introduction

The Battle of Stalingrad made a decisive contribution to achieving a radical turning point during not only the Great Patriotic War, but also the entire Second World War.

As a result of the Battle of Stalingrad, the Soviet Armed Forces wrested the strategic initiative from the enemy and retained it until the end of the war.

The defeat of the fascist bloc at Stalingrad shocked the whole of fascist Germany and undermined the confidence of its allies.

The battle included the Wehrmacht's siege of Stalingrad, a standoff in the city, and a Red Army counteroffensive that resulted in the Wehrmacht's VI Army and other German Allied forces in and around the city being surrounded and partially destroyed and captured. According to rough estimates, the total losses of both sides in this battle exceed 2 million people.

For the Soviet Union, which also suffered heavy losses during the battle, the victory at Stalingrad marked the beginning of the country's liberation, and the victory march across Europe that led to the final defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945.

The victorious outcome of the Battle of Stalingrad had enormous military and political significance. It made a decisive contribution to achieving a radical turning point not only in the Great Patriotic War, but also in the entire Second World War, and was the most important stage on the path to victory over the fascist bloc. Conditions were created for the deployment of a general offensive of the Red Army and the mass expulsion of the Nazi invaders from the occupied territories of the Soviet Union. The victory at Stalingrad raised the international authority of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces even higher and was a decisive factor in the further strengthening of the anti-Hitler coalition.

The outstanding victory on the banks of the Volga and Don clearly showed the whole world the increased power of the Red Army and the high level of its military art. During the Battle of Stalingrad, strategic defensive and then offensive operations of a group of fronts were brilliantly carried out with the aim of encircling and destroying a large enemy group. The history of wars has never seen operations of such a scale.

For many years, the Battle of Stalingrad has attracted the close attention of the widest circles of the domestic and world public, people of science and art, civil and military, and, above all, true patriots of their homeland, who cherish the memory of its glorious dramatic past, who are sick of its present and are concerned future. The bibliography of the Battle of Stalingrad numbers many hundreds of historical studies, memoirs of its participants, essays by war correspondents, and works of fiction. There are works of historians of the Soviet period, works of foreign historians and works of modern foreign researchers.

Defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad

On the eve of the second year of the Great Patriotic War, the situation in the Soviet Union remained difficult. Its material and human losses were enormous, and the territories captured by the enemy were vast. However, the strategy of Nazi Germany’s “blitzkrieg” war against the USSR failed. In a grandiose armed confrontation on the outskirts of Moscow, Red Army troops defeated the main Wehrmacht group and drove it back from the Soviet capital. The Battle of Moscow has not yet finally decided the outcome of the struggle in favor of the USSR, but it marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the course of the Patriotic War and the Second World War.

According to the plans of the German command, the forty-second year was supposed to be the decisive year in the war, because Hitler was confident that the United States and England would not attempt to land their troops in Europe this year; he still had a free hand for actions in the east.

However, the defeat near Moscow and the losses in the summer of 1941 inflicted by the Red Army on the invaders could not but have an impact. Despite the fact that by the spring of '42, Hitler's army had increased in number and received significant technical equipment, the German command did not find the strength to attack along the entire front.

Hitler undertook a campaign in the Caucasus with the aim of seizing oil sources and access to the Iranian border, to the Volga. He apparently hoped that at a distance from the center of the country, the resistance of the Soviet troops would not be so thorough.

By entering the Caucasus, Hitler hoped to drag Turkey into the war, which would give him another twenty to thirty divisions. By reaching the Volga and the Iranian border, he hoped to drag Japan into the war against the Soviet Union. Only this can explain such a broadcast nature of his directive for the spring-summer campaign of 1942.

Let us turn to the text of this directive, known as Directive No. 41. The introduction itself does not contain an analysis of the current situation on the Soviet-German front, but propaganda idle talk.

The directive begins with these words: “The winter campaign in Russia is approaching its end. Thanks to the outstanding courage and readiness of the soldiers of the Eastern Front for self-sacrifice, our defensive actions were crowned with great success by German weapons. The enemy suffered huge losses in men and equipment. In an effort to exploit his apparent initial success, he spent this winter most of the reserves intended for further operations.

“The goal,” says the directive, “is to completely destroy the forces still at the disposal of the Soviets and to deprive them, as far as possible, of the most important military-economic centers. “First of all, all available forces must be concentrated to carry out the main operation in the southern sector with the goal of destroying the enemy west of the Don, in order to then capture the oil-bearing areas in the Caucasus and cross the Caucasus ridge.”

And here comes a disclaimer. “The final encirclement of Leningrad and the capture of Ingria are postponed until a change in the situation in the encirclement area or the release of other sufficient forces for this purpose creates the appropriate opportunities.”

This reservation shows that Hitler, having forces greater than those with which he began his campaign in Russia, did not dare to carry out operations along the entire front, but concentrated everything in the south.

As General Chuikov wrote: “The Directive is a document of a secret nature, a document that a limited circle of people had the right to familiarize itself with, it is a document in which there is no place for propaganda formulations. He must accurately and soberly assess the situation. We see that in its premise the German command completely incorrectly assesses our forces, and is trying to portray its defeat near Moscow as a military success. Underestimating our strength, Hitler at the same time overestimates his own.

Hitler's policy, adventurous in its essence, could not be built on the basis of deep foresight and calculation. All this fully affected the formation of the strategic plan, and then the development of a specific plan of operations for 1942. Difficult problems arose before the creators of the fascist strategy. The question of how to attack, and even whether to attack at all, on the Eastern Front became increasingly difficult for Hitler's generals.

Preparing the conditions for the final defeat of the Soviet Union, the enemy decided first of all to seize the Caucasus with its powerful sources of oil and the fertile agricultural regions of the Don, Kuban and North Caucasus. The offensive in the Stalingrad direction was supposed to ensure, according to the enemy’s plan, the successful implementation “in the first place” of the main operation to conquer the Caucasus. This strategic plan of the enemy very much reflected the urgent need of Nazi Germany for fuel.

So, the German military command no longer had confidence in the success of the offensive - the miscalculation of the Barbarossa plan in relation to the assessment of the forces of the Soviet Union was obvious. Nevertheless, the need for a new offensive was recognized by both Hitler and the German generals. The Wehrmacht command continued to strive for the main goal - to defeat the Red Army before the Anglo-American troops began fighting on the continent of Europe. The Nazis had no doubt that the second front, at least in 1942, would not be opened in a completely different way than a year ago; the time factor could not be overlooked. There was complete unanimity on this.

In the spring of 1942, writes G. Guderian, the German high command was faced with the question of in what form to continue the war: to attack or defend. Going on the defensive would be an admission of our own defeat in the 1941 campaign and would deprive us of our chances of successfully continuing and ending the war in the East and West. 1942 was the last year in which, without fear of immediate intervention by the Western powers, the main forces of the German army could be used in an offensive on the Eastern Front. It remained to decide what should be done on a front 3 thousand kilometers long to ensure the success of an offensive carried out by relatively small forces. It was clear that along most of the front the troops had to go on the defensive.

The specific content of the plan for the summer campaign of 1942 at a certain stage and to some extent was the subject of discussion among Hitler's generals. “The commander of Army Group North, Field Marshal Küchler, initially proposed an offensive on the northern sector of the Soviet-German front with the goal of capturing Leningrad. Halder ultimately also favored resuming the offensive, but, as before, continued to consider the central direction decisive and recommended launching the main attack on Moscow with the forces of Army Group Center.

The fascist German high command decided to launch a new offensive on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, hoping to defeat the Soviet troops here in successive operations piecemeal. Thus, although Hitler’s strategists first began to show hesitation when planning the 1942 campaign, nevertheless, as before, the highest military and political leadership of the Third Reich came to a common point of view.

On March 28, 1942, a secret meeting was held at Hitler's headquarters, to which only a very limited circle of people from the highest headquarters were invited.

According to the plan of Hitler's military-political leadership, the fascist German troops in the summer campaign of 1942 still had to achieve the military and political goals set by the Barbarossa plan, which were not achieved in 1941 due to the defeat near Moscow. The main blow was supposed to be delivered on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front with the aim of capturing the city of Stalingrad, reaching the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus and the fertile regions of the Don, Kuban and Lower Volga, disrupting communications connecting the center of the country with the Caucasus, and creating conditions for ending the war in their favor . Hitler's strategists believed that the loss of Donbass and Caucasian oil would seriously weaken the Soviet Union, and the entry of Nazi troops into Transcaucasia would disrupt its ties with its allies through the Caucasus and Iran and would help drag Turkey into a war against it.

Based on the assigned tasks, changes were made to the structure of the leadership of troops on the southern wing of the German Eastern Front. Army Group South was divided into two: Army Group B and Army Group A.

For the offensive in the Stalingrad direction, the 6th Field Army was allocated from Army Group B. On July 17, 1942, it included 13 divisions, 3 thousand guns and mortars and about 500 tanks. It was supported by aviation from the 4th Air Fleet.

The capture of Stalingrad was very important to Hitler for several reasons. It was the main industrial city on the banks of the Volga, i.e. a vital transport route between the Caspian Sea and northern Russia. The capture of Stalingrad would provide security on the left flank of the German armies advancing into the Caucasus. Finally, the very fact that the city bore the name of Stalin, Hitler's main enemy, made the capture of the city a winning ideological and propaganda move. Stalin also had ideological and propaganda interests in protecting the city that bore his name.

An assessment of the situation showed that the immediate task should be the active strategic defense of Soviet troops, the accumulation of powerful trained reserves, military equipment and all the necessary materiel, followed by a decisive offensive. These considerations were reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief B.M. in mid-March. Shaposhnikov in the presence of A.M. Vasilevsky. After this, work on the summer campaign plan continued.

The General Staff correctly believed that, while organizing a temporary strategic defense, the Soviet side should not conduct offensive actions on a large scale. Stalin, who had little understanding of the art of war, did not agree with this opinion. G. K. Zhukov supported B. M. Shaposhnikov, but believed, however, that “at the beginning of summer in the western direction, the Rzhev-Vyazma group, which held a vast bridgehead relatively close to Moscow, should be defeated.”

At the end of March, Headquarters again discussed the issue of the strategic plan for the summer of 1942. This was when considering the plan presented by the command of the South-Western direction for conducting a large offensive operation in May by the forces of the Bryansk, South-Western and Southern fronts. “The Supreme Commander-in-Chief agreed with the conclusions and proposals of the Chief of the General Staff, but ordered, simultaneously with the transition to strategic defense, to envisage private offensive operations in a number of areas: in some with the aim of improving the operational situation, in others to forestall the enemy in launching offensive operations. As a result of these instructions, it was planned to conduct private offensive operations near Leningrad, in the Demyansk region, in the Smolensk, Lvov-Kursk directions, in the Kharkov region and in the Crimea.”

How to evaluate the fact that such an authoritative military figure as B. M. Shaposhnikov, who headed the country’s highest military institution, did not try to defend his proposals on an issue on the correct solution of which so much depended? A. M. Vasilevsky explains this as follows: “Many, not aware of the difficult conditions in which the General Staff had to work during the last war, can rightly blame its leadership for failing to prove to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief the negative consequences of the decision to defend itself and attack at the same time. In those conditions when there was an extremely acute shortage of trained reserves and material and technical means, conducting private offensive operations was an unacceptable waste of effort. The events that unfolded in the summer of 1942 showed firsthand that only a transition to temporary strategic defense along the entire Soviet-German front, a refusal to carry out offensive operations, such as Kharkov, would have saved the country and its armed forces from serious defeats, would have allowed We need to switch to active offensive actions much earlier and once again take the initiative into our own hands.

By the beginning of the second year of the war, the Red Army and the country's rear, which supported its struggle, had forces and means, if not sufficient in all respects, then in the main to prevent a new deep penetration of Hitler's troops into vital areas of the Soviet Union. After the successes of the winter offensive of the Red Army, the Soviet people became more confident in the inevitability of the defeat of Nazi Germany. On the eve of the summer-autumn campaign of 1942, there was no negative impact on the struggle of the Red Army and the entire people of the factor of surprise, which took place at the beginning of the war. Temporary factors gradually lost their effectiveness, while permanent factors had a growing influence in all areas of the struggle. All The experience of the participation of Soviet troops in the modern big war acquired a more prominent role.

Its first year was a serious exam for the entire command and political staff, the majority of whom acquired both hardening and the skill that is given only by practice. In the fire of war, knowledge was improved and the abilities and talents of those who led the military operations of the troops were tested. The names of many military leaders and political workers became known throughout the country. On the battlefields, the combat and moral power of the Soviet Armed Forces was tested, which in difficult conditions thwarted the plan for a “blitzkrieg” war of Nazi Germany against the USSR. The mass heroism of Soviet soldiers became the norm of their actions in the Great Patriotic War.

At the same time, by the spring of 1942, the Red Army lacked trained reserves, and the formation of new formations and associations was significantly limited by the level of production of the latest types of weapons. Under these conditions, the most appropriate use of available forces and means acquired special importance, since the enemy had greater opportunities to continue an aggressive war. In this regard, the Soviet side received a very real idea of ​​the strength and professional qualities of the Wehrmacht troops, of the peculiarities of their actions in offensive and defensive operations.

The Soviet Supreme High Command correctly assessed the overall balance of forces in the USSR's war against Nazi Germany, but the immediate prospects for the development of the armed struggle depended on making the right strategic decisions.

For May-June 1942, the Soviet Supreme High Command outlined a temporary transition to strategic defense with the task of completing the ongoing reorganization of troops and re-equipping them with new military equipment, as well as replenishing reserves. To give the defense an active character, the plan provided for a series of offensive operations in certain directions, primarily in the Crimea and near Kharkov, with the aim of preemptive strikes to disrupt the enemy’s preparations for the summer offensive. However, in the spring of 1942, events began to develop unfavorably for the Red Army.

On May 8, after preparation, the enemy again went on the offensive, in which the main forces of the 11th Nazi Army, supported by the 8th Air Corps and the 4th Air Fleet, participated. At the same time, the enemy landed a small boat landing force in the area of ​​the Feodosia Bay. Having broken through the defenses of the Crimean Front troops, the Germans launched a successful offensive.

It became increasingly obvious that the enemy had managed to regain his strength and was stubbornly striving to take over the strategic initiative he had lost. The enemy's armed forces not only repelled the attacks of Soviet troops, but also launched active offensive operations. The position of the troops on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, where the German command concentrated a significant part of its reserves, especially deteriorated. In May and June, the enemy additionally transferred a number of divisions here, including from France.

The course of the struggle became increasingly unfavorable for the Red Army. Almost simultaneously with the retreat from Crimea, an unsuccessful operation for Soviet troops unfolded in the Kharkov region.

Despite the heroic resistance of the defenders, the enemy troops, taking advantage of their enormous superiority in tanks, artillery and aviation, had already advanced 20 kilometers into the depths of our defense in the Izyum and Barvenkovo ​​directions by noon, penetrating the southern outskirts of Barvenkovo ​​and the Gola Dolina area.

Hitler's pilots, supporting ground troops, showed great activity that day, flying about 200 sorties. Aviation on the Southern Front was able to carry out only 67 sorties.

The events associated with this offensive were widely discussed in historical literature and in the memoirs of prominent Soviet military leaders. As General Chuikov wrote: “This offensive ended in tragic failure. The Nazi offensive on the Volga, Voronezh and the Caucasus was planned much earlier; it gave the enemy the opportunity to break our defenses and develop it in depth and breadth. Hitler’s command successfully took advantage of the current situation.”

What were the reasons for this failure? Former Hitler general Kurt Tippelskirch writes: “For the planned German offensive, the Russian attempt to stop it was only a welcome beginning. The weakening of the defensive power of the Russians, which was not so easy to achieve, should have significantly facilitated the first operations. But additional preparations were required, which took almost a whole month before the German armies, having regrouped and replenished everything necessary, were able to begin the offensive.

On the evening of May 17, the command of the South-Western direction requested reinforcements from Headquarters for the Southern Front. Reserves were allocated, but they could arrive in the combat area two or three days later, i.e. May 20-21. Taking this into account, the General Staff made a proposal to immediately suspend the operation. However, the Headquarters considered that the measures taken by the directional command were capable of rectifying the situation. On May 18, the situation on the Barvenkovo ​​ledge deteriorated sharply, and A. M. Vasilevsky again raised the question of stopping the operation. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the commander-in-chief of the direction again rejected this persistent recommendation.

Only on May 19, the Military Council of the Southwestern Front realized the full depth of the danger that had arisen and began to take measures to repel the advancing enemy, but time had already been lost. In the evening of this day, the Headquarters decided to stop the offensive and turn a significant part of the forces of the 6th Army of the Southwestern Front to repel the enemy attack and restore the situation. But, as the subsequent course of events showed, this decision turned out to be late.

On May 23, the troops of the army group "Kleist" and the 6th Army of Paulus, advancing in converging directions, united in the area 10 km south of Balakleya. The Kharkov group of Soviet troops, operating on the Barvenkovo ​​ledge, was surrounded west of the river. Seversky Donets. In the following days, from May 24 to May 29, these troops, with heavy fighting in separate detachments and groups, broke out of encirclement and crossed to the eastern bank of the Seversky Donets. The 28th Army of the Southwestern Front, unable to withstand the enemy onslaught, retreated to starting line.

The serious failure of Soviet troops in the Kharkov area had far-reaching consequences. The Nazis achieved results here that dramatically changed the balance of forces on the southern wing of the front.

Thus, in May and June 1942, events at the front developed, if not in full accordance with the general plan of the German high command, then, in any case, on the whole they were unfavorable for the Soviet side. Carrying out the planned operations, stage by stage, the enemy was consistently approaching the implementation of a decisive offensive on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front.

The unsuccessful outcome of the struggle on the Kerch Peninsula and especially near Kharkov in May 1942 turned out to be very sensitive for the entire South-Western strategic direction. The enemy again managed to seize the initiative. Having broken through the front of the Soviet troops, by mid-July he reached the big bend of the Don. The situation in the Stalingrad direction became sharply more complicated.

The Soviet Supreme High Command took a number of urgent measures to organize defense in this direction. It promoted the 62nd, 63rd, and 64th armies from the reserve, deploying them at the Babka, Serafimovich, Kletskaya, Verkhnekurmoyarskaya line. On July 12, the Stalingrad Front was created. In addition to the three above-mentioned reserve armies, it included the 21st, 28th, 38th, 57th combined arms and 8th air armies of the former Southwestern Front, and from July 30 - the 51st Army of the North Caucasus Front. True, most of these armies were badly battered in previous battles and had a large shortage of personnel, weapons and military equipment. The front commander immediately brought the 28th, 38th, and 57th armies into his reserve. Soon, on the basis of the 38th and 28th armies, the formation of the 1st and 4th tank armies of mixed composition began. The Stalingrad Front received the task, defending in a zone 530 km wide, to stop the enemy’s further advance and prevent him from reaching the Volga.

The army's defensive line system included a support line, a main defense line and an army line. This formation was determined by the transition to defense in the absence of direct contact with the enemy. The leading edge of the support strip was 15-20 km away from the main strip. The main defense line had a depth of 4-6 km. The army line was prepared only within the width of the defense zone of the second echelon division (up to 15 km). The total depth of the army defense, taking into account the location of the reserves, reached 30-40 km. In the directions of the enemy's probable attack, six anti-tank areas were created, each of which contained one or two anti-tank artillery regiments. An army anti-aircraft artillery group covered the crossing of the Don.

All units and formations prepared areas of stationary barrage fire and concentrated fire in front of the front edge, in the depths of the defense, at the junctions of division units and with neighbors. The basis of the engineering equipment of the area were separate trenches for a rifle squad, a mortar, and a gun. In front of the front edge, wire and mine-explosive barriers were installed with a density of up to 800 anti-tank and 650 anti-personnel mines per 1 km of front.

Thus, the defense in the Stalingrad direction in the summer of 1942 had a number of characteristic features. It was organized in a short time and on a broad front. Compared to the defense in the Battle of Moscow, the depth of operational and tactical defense increased somewhat, and tactical densities increased. Artillery and anti-tank reserves became stronger. However, the area was not sufficiently prepared in terms of engineering. The lack of trenches and communication passages reduced the stability of the defense. The army line was equipped and occupied by troops in only one sector, which amounted to about 17% of the width of the army's defense zone. Anti-tank and especially air defense were weak.

The defensive actions of the Soviet troops in the Stalingrad direction lasted for 125 days. During this period, they carried out two consecutive defensive operations. The first of them was carried out on the approaches to Stalingrad in the period from July 17 to September 12, the second in Stalingrad and to the south from September 13 to November 18, 1942.

By the end of June, the Nazi command completed preparations for the attack on Stalingrad. Army Group B was supposed to encircle Soviet troops west of the Don and link up with Army Group A in the Stalingrad area. Initially, the forces among these groups were distributed as follows. Group A, commanded by Field Marshal List, included the 1st Panzer, 17th and 11th German field armies, as well as the 8th Italian.

Group B was commanded by Field Marshal von Bock. It included the 4th Panzer, 2nd and 6th Field Armies and the 2nd Hungarian. In addition, the 3rd and 4th armies of the Romanians were approaching from the depths.

In total, the enemy concentrated in the zone from Kursk to Taganrog about 900 thousand soldiers and officers, 1260 tanks, over 17 thousand guns and mortars, 1640 combat aircraft. This accounted for 50% of the enemy's tank and motorized formations located on the Soviet-German front, and 35% of all his infantry forces.

On our side, this strike group was opposed by troops of the Bryansk, Southwestern and Southern fronts. The total number of our troops on these three fronts was 655 thousand people. We had 740 tanks, 14,200 guns and mortars, and over 1 thousand combat aircraft.

On the morning of June 28, the 2nd German field and 4th tank armies and the 2nd Hungarian army went on the offensive against the left wing of the Bryansk Front.

Stalingrad was still far away, the Germans rushed to Voronezh, but the battle of 1942 began, gradually drawing more and more forces into the bloody mill.

On July 17, at the turn of the Chir and Tsimla rivers, the forward detachments of the 62nd and 64th armies of the Stalingrad Front met with the vanguards of the 6th German Army. Interacting with the aviation of the 8th Air Army, they put up stubborn resistance to the enemy, who, in order to break their resistance, had to deploy 5 divisions out of 13 and spend 5 days fighting them. In the end, the enemy knocked the forward detachments from their positions and approached the main defense line of the troops of the Stalingrad Front.

The Soviet command managed to uncover the enemy grouping, determine the direction of its main attack, and also carry out a number of measures to improve the defense, including the regrouping of part of the forces and assets of the 62nd Army on its right flank. The resistance of the Soviet troops forced the Nazi command to strengthen the 6th Army. By July 22, it already had 18 divisions, numbering 250 thousand combat personnel, about 740 tanks, 7.5 thousand guns and mortars. The troops of the 6th Army supported up to 1,200 aircraft.

As a result, the balance of forces increased even more in favor of the enemy. For example, in tanks he now had a twofold superiority. By July 22, the troops of the Stalingrad Front had 16. In such conditions, the battle began in the big bend of the Don, which lasted from July 23, when the enemy reached the main defense line of the troops of the Stalingrad Front, until August 10. The enemy tried to encircle and destroy them in the large bend of the Don with enveloping attacks on the flanks of the 62nd and 64th armies, reach the Kalach area and break through to Stalingrad from the west. To solve this problem, he created two strike groups: the northern one.

Having left its 2nd Army near Voronezh, the Nazi command turned the 4th Tank Army in a southeastern direction to Kantemirovka. At the same time, the enemy’s 1st Tank Army from Army Group “A” launched an offensive on July 8 from the Slavyansk, Artemovsk area to Starobelsk, Kantemirovka, delivering a second blow to the Southwestern and Southern Fronts. By mid-July, troops of the 6th and 4th Tank Armies reached the big bend of the Don and occupied Bokovskaya, Morozovsk, Millerovo, Kantemirovka, and formations of the 1st Tank Army reached the Kamensk area. “The battle is unfolding in the south...” General Halder noted in his diary. - In the western sector the enemy is still holding out, there are few successes. Troops of the 1st and 4th Tank Armies, moving from the north, reached the Donets near Kamensk. To the north of here the enemy is scattered into small groups, which are destroyed by mobile formations advancing from the north in cooperation with infantry divisions.” During these offensive operations, the enemy sought to encircle and destroy the troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts. But he failed to accomplish this.

The headquarters of the Soviet Supreme High Command, having unraveled the plan of the German command, took measures to withdraw troops from the threat of encirclement. The troops of the Southwestern Front, surrounded by the enemy from the northeast and east, retreated across the Don to Stalingrad with heavy fighting. The troops of the Southern Front retreated from Donbass to the lower reaches of the Don to take up defense along its left bank from Verkhne-Kurmoyarskaya to Rostov. In the face of a superior enemy, it was necessary to retain troops to organize defense in more favorable conditions. To do this, it was necessary to gain time by losing space.

At dawn on July 23, the northern, and on July 25, the southern strike groups went on the offensive. Using superiority in forces and air supremacy in the air, the enemy broke through the defenses on the right flank of the 62nd Army and by the end of the day on July 24 reached the Don in the Golubinsky area. As a result, up to three Soviet divisions were surrounded. The enemy also managed to push back the troops of the right flank of the 64th Army. A critical situation developed for the troops of the Stalingrad Front. Both flanks of the 62nd Army were deeply engulfed by the enemy, and its exit to the Don created a real threat of a breakthrough of fascist German troops to Stalingrad.

In order to restore the situation, the front commander, with the permission of the Supreme Command Headquarters, brought into the battle the 1st and 4th Tank Armies, which had not yet completed their formation, which, together with the 13th Tank Corps, attached to the 62nd Army, were given the task of defeating the enemy group that had broken through. However, the counterattack of the tank armies was organized hastily and was carried out at different times, with weak artillery and air support and the absence of air cover. The 1st Tank Army went on the offensive on July 27, and the 4th Tank Army two days later. During fierce three-day battles, they inflicted heavy damage on the enemy and delayed his advance. The 13th Tank Corps broke through to the encircled troops and, with the assistance of the 1st Tank Army, ensured their access to the main forces of the 62nd Army. On July 30, the enemy was stopped on the right flank of the 64th Army, where a counterattack was launched by the 23rd Tank Corps and two rifle divisions. However, the situation again became complicated due to the fact that at that time fascist German troops broke through the defenses of the Southern Front and rushed to the North Caucasus.

On July 28, 1942, People's Commissar of Defense J.V. Stalin addressed the Red Army with order No. 227, in which he described with stern directness the current situation on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, demanded to strengthen resistance to the enemy and stop his advance at all costs. “The most stringent measures were envisaged against those who showed cowardice and cowardice in battle. Practical measures were outlined to strengthen morale and discipline among the troops. “It’s time to end the retreat,” the order noted. -- No step back!" This slogan embodied the essence of order No. 227. Commanders and political workers, party and Komsomol organizations were given the task of bringing to the consciousness of every soldier the requirements of this order.”

The stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops forced the fascist German command to turn the 4th Panzer from the Caucasus direction to Stalingrad on July 31. On August 2, its advanced units approached Kotelnikovsky. In this regard, there was a direct threat of an enemy breakthrough to the city from the southwest. Fighting broke out on the southwestern approaches to it. To strengthen the defense of Stalingrad, by decision of the front commander, the 57th Army was deployed on the southern front of the outer defensive perimeter. The 51st Army was transferred to the Stalingrad Front.

The period from August 5 to 10 was perhaps one of the most intense during the defensive battle. Nazi troops managed to reach the outer defensive perimeter and eliminate the bridgehead of Soviet troops on the right bank of the Don in the Kalach area. At Abganerov on August 6, the enemy broke through the outer line and advanced to a depth of 12-15 km. On August 9-10, the forces of three rifle divisions and the tank corps of the 64th Army launched a counterattack on it. The peculiarity of this counterattack was that it was delivered by a compact group to the enemy’s flank on a 9-km front. This made it possible to achieve a threefold superiority in forces over him. The counterattack was preceded by 30 minutes of artillery and short air preparation. As a result of the counterattack, the enemy who had penetrated our defenses was defeated, and the lost position was restored. The fascist German troops in this sector of the front went on the defensive and subsequently did not take active action here for a whole week.

The situation in the 62nd Army zone was difficult. On August 7-9, the enemy pushed her troops beyond the Don River, and encircled four divisions west of Kalach. Soviet soldiers fought in encirclement until August 14, and then in small groups they began to fight their way out of encirclement. Three divisions of the 1st Guards Army, arriving from the Headquarters Reserve, launched a counterattack on the enemy troops and stopped their further advance.

Thus, the enemy’s plan to break through to Stalingrad with a swift strike on the move was thwarted by the stubborn resistance of Soviet troops in the large bend of the Don and their active defense on the southwestern approaches to the city. During the three weeks of the offensive, the enemy was able to advance only 60-80 km. Based on an assessment of the situation, the fascist German command made significant adjustments to its plan. It decided to reach the Volga and capture Stalingrad by striking in converging directions from the Trekhostrovskaya, Vertyachiy area to the east with the forces of the 6th Army and from the Abganerovo area to the north with the forces of the 4th Tank Army. Having carried out internal army regroupings and moved up reserves from the depths, the enemy began the struggle to capture bridgeheads in the small bend of the Don.

As a result of intense fighting on the distant approaches to Stalingrad from July 17 to August 17, the German 6th Army pushed back Soviet troops to the left bank of the Don, first in the area from Vertyachiy to Lyapichev, and then in the Trekhostrovskaya area. Having retreated to the eastern bank to the outer defensive contour, Soviet units and formations continued to put up stubborn resistance, not allowing the enemy to cross the Don.

On August 19, fascist German troops resumed their offensive, launching attacks in the general direction of Stalingrad. On August 22, the 6th German Army crossed the Don and captured a 45 km wide bridgehead on its eastern bank, in the Peskovatka area, on which six divisions were concentrated. On August 23, the enemy's 14th Tank Corps broke through to the Volga north of Stalingrad, in the area of ​​the village of Rynok, and cut off the 62nd Army from the rest of the forces of the Stalingrad Front. In this regard, on August 30, by decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the 62nd Army was transferred to the South-Eastern Front.

The day before, enemy aircraft launched a massive air strike on Stalingrad, carrying out about 2 thousand sorties. In air battles over the city on August 29, Soviet pilots and anti-aircraft artillery shot down 120 German aircraft. However, they failed to protect Stalingrad from enemy air attacks. As a result, the city suffered terrible destruction - entire neighborhoods were turned into ruins or simply wiped off the face of the earth.

On August 20-28, troops of the 63rd, 21st, 1st Guards and 4th Tank Armies launched counterattacks from the north on the flank of the 6th German Army, captured and expanded a number of bridgeheads on the right bank of the Don. And although they failed to eliminate the enemy’s breakthrough to the Volga, the position of the defenders of Stalingrad became somewhat easier. The enemy had to redirect large forces to repel attacks from the main forces of the Stalingrad Front from the north. Therefore, he was forced to suspend his attack on Stalingrad, limiting himself to reaching the northwestern outskirts of the city.

On August 23, the 4th Tank Army penetrated the defenses of the South-Eastern Front to a depth of 25 km. However, counterattacks from the reserves of the 57th and 64th armies stopped the enemy's further advance. After the regrouping, the fascist German troops resumed the offensive and on August 29 broke through the front of the 64th Army north-west of Abganerov, threatening the troops of the 64th and 62nd armies with access to the rear. By order of the front commander, the 64th and 62nd armies were withdrawn to the internal perimeter on September 2. Fierce fighting at this line continued until September 12.

During the first stage of the defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad, the troops of the Stalingrad and South-Eastern fronts not only delayed the enemy’s 6th and 4th tank armies for a considerable time, but also inflicted significant damage on them in manpower and equipment.

Close interaction between the military branches played a major role in thwarting the plans of the German command. Thus, Soviet aviation, despite the enemy’s numerical superiority in the air, protected ground troops from attacks by his aircraft, bombed crossings where the Nazis tried to cross the Don, exhausted the enemy’s forces and slowed down the rate of advance of his group. During the struggle on the distant approaches to Stalingrad, Soviet pilots carried out 16 thousand combat sorties and destroyed at least 20% of the aircraft of Richthofen's 4th Air Fleet operating in the Stalingrad direction. Soviet aerial reconnaissance had previously established the concentration of an enemy tank group south of Stalingrad, which significantly helped the troops of the 64th Army in disrupting the enemy offensive.

The bombers bombed the columns of Nazi vehicles. At the same time, the artillery and tanks stationed in shelters opened massive fire. In just three days, more than 5 thousand sorties were flown into the area of ​​the tank group. The enemy attacks were thwarted. New Soviet formations approached the battlefield. The exit of the enemy's 6th and 4th tank armies to the outer perimeter on the approaches to Stalingrad and the transition of the Soviet armies here to a rigid defense marked the end of the defensive battle of the Red Army in the big bend of the Don. Its main result was the disruption of the enemy's plan to capture Stalingrad on the move. As a result of this battle, the Nazi command was forced to reconsider its initial ideas about Stalingrad as the object of an auxiliary attack and transfer significant forces to the Stalingrad direction, initially intended to capture the Caucasus.

Waging a stubborn struggle in the Don steppes, on the distant approaches to Stalingrad, Soviet soldiers showed courage and self-sacrifice in a difficult situation.

In the second half of August, the fascist German command was forced to again change the plan for the attack of its troops on Stalingrad.

This time the enemy decided to launch two simultaneous attacks in converging directions - from the north-west and south-west of Stalingrad. The northern group was supposed to seize bridgeheads in the small bend of the Don and advance towards Stalingrad from the northwest. The southern group struck from the area of ​​Plodovitoe, Abganerovo along the railway to the north, where troops of the 64th and 57th armies held the defense on the enemy’s route to Stalingrad.

The left flank of the German 4th Panzer Army was supported by two Romanian divisions. On August 12, the 24th Tank and 297th Infantry Divisions from the 6th Army were transferred to this army. The enemy also strengthened the northern group due to the 8th Italian Army arriving in the Stalingrad direction. The latter advanced to the Don in the area from Pavlovsk to the mouth of the river. Khoper, replacing the divisions of the 29th Army Corps located here. However, not really trusting the troops of its allies, the Nazi command of the three divisions of the 29th Army Corps included two in the Italian and transferred one to the 2nd Hungarian Army.

During the battles on the outskirts of Stalingrad, the German command became increasingly aware of the growing resistance of the defenders of the Volga stronghold, but the enemy at that time still had no doubts about the successful achievement of the goal facing him. On August 19, 1942, Paulus signed the order “On the attack on Stalingrad.” The 6th Army was tasked with crossing the Don between Peskovatka and Trekhostrovskaya and striking with the main forces in the area north of Stalingrad to the Volga. This attack was to be accompanied on the southern flank by the advance of part of the forces across the river. Rossoshka in its middle reaches, in order to southwest of Stalingrad “to connect with the mobile formations of the neighboring army advancing from the south,” that is, the 4th Tank. The order specified the tasks of army formations to capture the central, southern and northern parts of Stalingrad.

In West German historiography, the plan for the capture of Stalingrad, set out in the order of Paulus, is assessed as flawed in its operational basis. Thus, Hans Doerr considers its main drawback to be planning two strikes simultaneously. The main miscalculation of the German command was, of course, not this, but its general underestimation of the strength of the Soviet resistance.

However, by the time under review, in the Stalingrad direction, the Nazis still had significant superiority in means of armed struggle. By mid-August, the Stalingrad and Southeastern fronts were opposed by the Italian 8th, German 6th and 4th tank armies, totaling about 39 divisions.

The troops of the Stalingrad Front, deployed 480 kilometers away, were seriously weakened in past battles. Only the 63rd, 21st and 1st Guards Armies were satisfactorily staffed. The 33rd Guards and 96th Rifle Divisions that had emerged from encirclement were being reorganized, and the 23rd Tank Corps was being completed. The operational density of defense in the armies was insufficient.

The troops of the South-Eastern Front, defending the strip from Logovskoye to Lake. Sarpa also had insufficient forces and means. There was a particularly large shortage of personnel and weapons in the 64th and 51st armies. The operational density of defense in the armies ranged from 20 to 50 km per division.

The Stalingrad and South-Eastern fronts had fewer forces and means to fight than the enemy. The presence of a large number of vehicles among the Nazis also created an advantage in maneuver.

The heroic defense of Soviet troops in the Stalingrad direction forced Hitler's high command to transfer more and more forces to reinforce Army Group B. In August 1942, the 8th Italian Army was brought into battle on the Middle Don, in September - the 3rd, and in October - the 4th Romanian Army. As a result, the combat strength of Army Group B increased to 80 divisions. At the same time, Army Group A operating in the North Caucasus decreased from July to October from 60 to 29 divisions. To capture Stalingrad, the Nazi command set the 6th Army the task of delivering two strikes: one with the forces of four divisions from the Aleksandrovka area in an eastern direction, the second with the forces of three divisions from the area of ​​st. Sadovaya in the north-east direction, cut the front of the defense of the Soviet troops and capture the city. The remaining troops of the 6th Field and 4th Tank Armies, located north-west and south of Stalingrad, were supposed to conduct pinning actions and secure the flanks of the strike groups.

The troops of the shock group of the 6th German Army crossed the entire interfluve and by 16:00 on August 23 they reached the Volga near the northern outskirts of Stalingrad, in the area of ​​​​the villages of Latoshinka, Akatovka, and Rynok. Following the 16th Panzer Division of von Wittersheim's corps, the enemy's motorized troops also reached the Volga.

In an effort to intensify the blow and cause panic among the city's residents, the enemy, in the second half of August 23, carried out the first massive raid on Stalingrad by aircraft of the 4th Air Fleet. Starting the bombardment of the city at 16:00. 18 min. Moscow time, enemy aircraft - several hundred - carried out over 2 thousand sorties that day. German bombers flew in train after train, dropping thousands of high-explosive and incendiary bombs. Columns of smoke, dust and fire rose above the city. The flames, fanned by a strong wind, engulfed houses, spreading from street to street.

Enemy planes, with fierce bombing, mercilessly destroyed residential buildings, schools, hospitals, museums, theaters, trying to sweep Stalingrad off the face of the earth. On the banks of the Volga, oil storage tanks, pierced by bomb fragments, were blackened, and flaming oil spilled down the river. The piers were burning, and in the Stalingrad roadstead the fire destroyed steamships. On this day, the city suffered significant destruction. Hundreds of civilians died in the fires and under the rubble of buildings. However, the enemy made a mistake, hoping to cause panic among the defenders of Stalingrad. Anti-aircraft artillery guns fired at enemy aircraft. 105 Soviet fighters bravely repelled the air attack, conducting air battles. In just one day, August 23, 120 fascist bombers were shot down in air battles and anti-aircraft artillery in the Stalingrad area. The civilian population fought the fires selflessly. Enemy air raids on the city were repeated incessantly in the following days. Stalingrad became the front.

The breakthrough of German troops to the Volga north-west of Stalingrad created an immediate threat of their capture of the city. The military situation was further complicated by the fact that formations and units of the 62nd Army, covering the northern outskirts of Stalingrad, continued to fight on the left bank of the Don several tens of kilometers from the city. They had to regroup in difficult combat conditions and take up new defensive lines.

The railway lines approaching Stalingrad from the north and northwest were cut by the enemy. The waterway along the Volga was also disrupted. Thus, the situation with communications, through which the fronts and the city were supplied with everything necessary for organizing defense, became even more complicated.

The situation that arose was undoubtedly critical for the defenders of Stalingrad, but none of them thought about surrendering the city to the enemy. On August 23, when German troops broke through the defenses of the outer perimeter and, having made a 60-kilometer throw, found themselves at the northern outskirts of the city, a directive from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was received in Stalingrad, which proposed using the available forces to eliminate the enemy group that had broken through. It ended with the words: “The most important thing is not to panic, not to be afraid of the impudent enemy and to remain confident in our success.”

Defense leaders took all necessary measures to thwart the further advance of fascist troops.

Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky said:

“The morning of the unforgettable tragic August 23 found me in the troops of the 62nd Army. On this day, the fascist troops managed to reach the Volga with their tank units and cut off the 62nd Army from the main forces of the Stalingrad Front. Simultaneously with the breakthrough of our defenses, the enemy launched a fierce mass bombardment of the city on August 23 and 24, for which almost all the forces of his 4th Air Fleet were involved. The city turned into ruins. Telephone and telegraph communications were disrupted, and during August 23 I had to conduct short negotiations with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief openly by radio twice. I could make a detailed report to him about the situation and about our requests late at night on August 24, after the HF telephone connection across the Volga was restored.” A.M. Vasilevsky reported that Stalingrad would remain in our hands, that the front command, the City Defense Committee, V.A. Malyshev and he himself are not only in the center of the city, but also continue to take all measures to defend it from the enemy. The Headquarters representative reported what was required to complete this task.

The German tanks and motorized infantry that broke through were met by troops, as well as armed detachments of Stalingrad workers. The actions of units of the 10th Infantry Division of the NKVD troops were supported by air defense artillery divisions, which occupied firing positions in the immediate vicinity of the city.

As a result of stubborn seven-day battles from August 21 to 27, the troops of the 4th Panzer Army of Hoth, at the cost of significant losses, captured Art. Abganerovo. However, the enemy failed to break through the front of the troops of the 64th and 57th armies.

The command of the 4th Tank Army was forced to regroup its forces in order to continue the further offensive. Hans Doerr in his book “The March on Stalingrad” acknowledges the major failure of the Nazi troops on the southern approaches to the city. “The army,” he writes, “stopped just 20 km from the Volga: again the decisive moment had come not only for the actions of the 4th Panzer Army, but also for the entire battle for Stalingrad.

When the 4th Tank Army went on the defensive at the Tundutovo station on August 20, it was in close proximity to an important piece of terrain that was perhaps decisive for the entire operational area of ​​\u200b\u200bStalingrad - the Volga hills between Krasnoarmeysk and Beketovka.

Krasnoarmeysk was the southern cornerstone of the defense of Stalingrad and at the same time the end point of the only communication linking the western bank of the Volga with Astrakhan by land. At no other point would the appearance of German troops be so unfavorable for the Russians as here.

For the 4th Panzer Army, the decision to stop the offensive in the immediate vicinity of the target in order to try another route to Stalingrad and organize cooperation with the 6th Army was a heavy blow. The army commander gave the order to withdraw parts of the 48th Tank Corps from the front at night and to secretly concentrate it behind the left, bent back flank of the army in the area northwest of the Abganerovo station for a surprise attack in the north direction in the area west of Stalingrad. This meant the refusal to capture a group of heights in the Krasnoarmeysk region, the refusal of the converging attacks on the enemy planned by Army Group B.

From September 12, when the enemy came close to the city, its defense was entrusted to the 62nd and 64th armies. Superiority in forces and means was on the side of the enemy. It was especially significant in the 40-km defense zone of the 62nd Army from the village of Rynok to Kuporosny, where the enemy had an almost double superiority in men and artillery and almost sixfold in tanks. The distance of the front line of the Soviet troops from the Volga did not exceed 10-12 km. This limited their maneuver with forces and means both from the depths and along the front.

On September 13, the enemy went on the offensive along the entire front, trying to capture Stalingrad by storm. Soviet troops failed to contain his powerful onslaught. They were forced to retreat to the city, where fierce fighting broke out on the streets. From September 13 to 26, stubborn fighting took place mainly in the central part of the city. On September 14, the Germans broke through to the station, and in the Kuporosnoye area they reached the Volga. The 62nd Army found itself cut off from the 64th Army. At this critical moment, the 13th Guards Rifle Division was transferred from the left bank of the Volga to Stalingrad, arriving to reinforce the 62nd Army from the Supreme Command Headquarters Reserve. After crossing the Volga, she immediately counterattacked the enemy and drove him out of the city center, and on September 16, from Mamayev Kurgan. Until September 27, there was a fierce struggle for the station, which changed hands 13 times. At the cost of heavy losses, the enemy managed to somewhat push back the troops of the 62nd Army in an area up to 10 km wide. Having received reinforcements, fascist German troops began the second assault on Stalingrad on September 27, which lasted until October 8. This time the enemy's main attack was directed against the troops of the 62nd Army defending the factory villages "Red October" and "Barricades". At the beginning of October, the Germans managed to capture Mamayev Kurgan, factory villages and eliminate the front bulge in the northwestern part of the city, facing their direction. Great assistance to the defenders of Stalingrad during this period was provided by the almost continuous counterattacks of the 1st Guards, 24th and 66th armies north of the city throughout September. Significant enemy forces were pinned down by the troops of the 51st and 57th armies, which launched a private offensive operation south of Stalingrad at the end of September.

On September 28, the Stalingrad Front was renamed the Don Front, and the South-Eastern Front - the Stalingrad Front. This met the objectives of the upcoming counter-offensive of the Red Army at Stalingrad, preparations for which the Supreme High Command Headquarters had been conducting since mid-September 1942. To support the troops defending in the city, a front-line artillery group consisting of 250 guns and mortars was formed on the eastern bank of the Volga. The general management of the combat operations of the Soviet troops in the Stalingrad direction, on behalf of the Supreme Command Headquarters, from the very beginning of the battle was headed by the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Army General G.K. Zhukov and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Colonel General A.M. Vasilevsky.

The resistance of Soviet troops in the Stalingrad area continued to grow. In 12 days, the Germans advanced in the area of ​​the factory villages only 400-600 m. But the enemy, preparing for the “general assault,” also continued to build up its forces. In October, Hitler's headquarters sent 200 thousand reinforcements to the Stalingrad area, up to 30 artillery divisions and about 40 engineering assault battalions, specially trained for combat operations in the city. By mid-October, the Nazis had created a superiority over the 62nd Army in men and artillery by 1.7 times, in tanks by almost 4 times and in aircraft by more than 5 times, and for the third time they sent their troops to storm Stalingrad. They received the order to destroy Soviet troops in Stalingrad and completely take possession of this city, or rather, its ruins, since Stalingrad as a city by this time had practically ceased to exist, it was destroyed.

In order to assist the defenders of Stalingrad, the troops of the Don Front went on the offensive on October 19. To repel it, the enemy was forced to withdraw significant forces from the assault on the city. At the same time, the 64th Army launched a counterattack from the south in the Kuporosny area. The offensive of the Don Front and the counterattack of the 64th Army significantly eased the position of the 62nd Army and did not allow the enemy to complete the capture of the city.

On November 11, fascist German troops made their last, fourth attempt to storm Stalingrad. On this day, they managed to capture the southern part of the territory of the Barrikady plant and make their way to the Volga in a narrow area. The 62nd Army was cut into three parts. Its main forces firmly defended the territory of the Red October plant and the narrow coastal part of the city. Colonel Gorokhov's group defended the area of ​​​​Rynka, Spartanovka, and Colonel Lyudnikov's division held the eastern part of the territory of the Barrikady plant. Thus, by the end of the defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad, the 62nd Army largely held its positions in Stalingrad. The front line by this time ran north of the Tractor Plant, through the Barricades plant and further through the northeastern quarters of the central part of the city. The 64th Army staunchly defended the approaches to the southern part of Stalingrad.

The enemy did not achieve his goal. In fierce battles on the outskirts of Stalingrad and in the city itself, its offensive capabilities were completely exhausted.

The myth about the invincibility of the Nazi Wehrmacht in summer conditions was dispelled. Here, near Stalingrad, Hitler’s strategists could no longer refer to “General Moroz,” who allegedly “stole” their victory in the battle of Moscow in the winter of 1941/42. On the Don and Volga in the summer of 1942, it was a sin for Hitler’s heat-loving warriors to complain about the lack of heat - on some days the air temperature rose above +30°C. So, as the experience of the summer-autumn campaign of 1942 showed, it was not a matter of climatic conditions at all, but something completely different. Having repelled all enemy attacks, Soviet troops created favorable conditions for launching a counteroffensive near Stalingrad.