Biography of Pavel Grachev. Pavel Grachev: “combat general” and “Pasha-Mercedes” Where is Grachev now

On September 23, Army General and Russian Minister of Defense from 1992 to 1996, Pavel Grachev, died of encephalitis in the Vishnevsky military hospital near Moscow. On September 25, he will be buried at the Novodevichy cemetery opposite Boris Yeltsin, the first president of post-Soviet Russia.

Pavel Grachev will be remembered as the man who sent tanks to storm parliament in 1993 and to attack separatist Chechnya in December 1994. He was infinitely devoted to Boris Yeltsin, who offered him the post of Minister of Defense, although he was just a general with one star on his shoulder straps, receiving his unquestioning submission in return. However, he failed to reform the declining army, became embroiled in corruption scandals and had broken all records of unpopularity by the time he resigned in 1996.

To the aid of Boris Yeltsin

Stocky and stocky, unable to speak in public... This former paratrooper and hero of the war in Afghanistan rose to the top thanks to the favor of Boris Yeltsin, who wanted to reward him for his loyalty to the “democratic” camp during the coup attempt by Soviet hardliners in August 1991. And very quickly he found himself executing the most unsightly orders of the head of state.

In October 1993, when communist and nationalist deputies took refuge in the building of the parliament dissolved by Boris Yeltsin for insubordination, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev agreed to turn tanks against the rebels. Before this, fighters from the special forces of the FSB (the new name of the KGB) refused to go on the assault. We are not paid to shoot secretaries, they said. Grachev hesitated at first, but then demanded a written order signed by the president. Yeltsin forced himself to ask twice. Russian tanks drove onto Kutuzovsky Prospekt and opened fire on the parliament in broad daylight under the stunned looks of passersby who had gathered to watch from afar.

Take Grozny “in two hours”

In December 1994, when the president decided to send the army against the separatist Chechen province, Pavel Grachev declared that he could take Grozny “in two hours” with just one airborne regiment. The real state of affairs turned out to be completely different. Tanks ill-suited for urban battles burned, and young conscripts died “with a smile on their lips,” as Pavel Grachev said, who was shown together with President Yeltsin on all television channels on New Year’s Eve.

The operation ended in complete fiasco. Despite the fire superiority, the Russian army suffered losses for a year and a half from a handful of poorly dressed and armed Chechens. The confusion, looting and abuses revealed the true state of the armed forces and became the final blow to the image of General Grachev.

Solution

In August 1996, a withdrawal agreement was signed Russian troops and recognition of the independence of Chechnya. His conclusion was the result of the work of General of the Airborne Forces Alexander Lebed, who soon became the country's Minister of Defense. The new hero of the day accused Pavel Grachev of making money from the sale of goods exported from East Germany tanks to the Croats, Serbs, Bosnians and Azerbaijanis...

Earlier, in 1994, Dmitry Kholodov, a journalist for the Moskovsky Komsomolets tabloid, who said the same thing in his articles, was killed with an explosive device planted in a suitcase. Seven years later, his GRU (Army Intelligence) killers were tried and found guilty. Pavel Grachev, who spoke at the hearing, admitted that he mentioned in conversations with his subordinates the need to solve the problem, but emphasized that he did not think about the worst. All suspicions were cleared from him, and he was able to enjoy a quiet retirement, working until 2007 as a consultant at Rosoboronexport.

Forbes publishes full version the last interview of Pavel Grachev, which the first Minister of Defense of Russia gave to former government colleagues Alfred Koch and Pyotr Aven

Peter Aven and I conducted this interview with Pavel Sergeevich Grachev on October 21 last year. Almost a year ago. As far as I understand, this is his last interview. Pavel Sergeevich gave it to us for our book “Gaidar’s Revolution” and did not want it to be published in the magazine before that (like all the other interviews in our book). However, now, after his death, we consider it our duty to publish it without waiting for the book to be published. There are two reasons for this. The first is obvious: the person is dead and nothing can harm him. Enemies will remain enemies, friends—friends, but the living, direct speech of a person who has already passed away (a person, we note, who was directly related to events of a truly historical scale)—This is an important, valuable evidence that no longer makes sense to hide from contemporaries. And which can be an important lesson for someone.

But this alone would not be enough to decide on this publication. The second reason, in our opinion, is more significant. It lies in the fact that after the death of Pavel Sergeevich, such a stream of accusations and insults fell upon him, such a stream of verbal slop, that we considered it wrong to wait for the book to be published. The book will be published, at the earliest, in six months, and all this time the accusations will hang unanswered, without any opposition to these attacks, the accusations will remain undisavowed, and therefore, in an aura of supposed truth. And we considered our silence (in the presence of an interview in which he personally refuted most of the accusations brought against him quite convincingly) as cowardice. And disrespect for the memory of our comrade and colleague, Hero Soviet Union, Army General Pavel Sergeevich Grachev.

Here I just wanted to make a reservation on three points.

1. We deliberately did not ask Pavel Sergeevich about the case of Dmitry Kholodov. The reason is simple: all the charges against him were not proven in court. And even those defendants who were brought to trial (and who allegedly acted on his instructions) were completely acquitted in all instances. In such circumstances, it makes no sense to start a conversation on this topic with a person who has already suffered monstrous reputational losses as a result of suspicions of involvement in this case. It would have been naive to expect from him any other assessment of his involvement in this tragedy other than the one given by the court.

2. Contrary to the image that has developed in the press (especially zealously circulated now, after his death), he was not a stupid, poorly educated martinet. He graduated with honors from the Ryazan School, the Academy. Frunze and the Academy of the General Staff, spoke decent German and was well versed in such lofty and intricate matters as the entire complex of agreements on military issues with NATO and the USA. Not to mention the fact that as a military specialist he was beyond praise. Boris Nemtsov told me that when he came to Grachev in Grozny during the first Chechen campaign, where he was leading the troops, he found Pavel Sergeevich reading a book about the life of General Ermolov. And I myself, being in his office, saw on the table a volume of Clausewitz that had been read to holes. Thus, I cannot agree with this assessment of Grachev. He was cunning, he often pretended to be a simpleton, but he was sharp-witted and smart, like any Russian peasant, which he was by origin.

3. I would like to remind all his critics that if it weren’t for Grachev’s behavior (namely him, and not anyone else) in 1991 and 1993, then they would not have had such a wonderful opportunity to criticize him, which they already have more than twenty years. He, of course, cannot be considered the creator and builder of a free, post-communist Russia, but he is quite its savior and defender. He is often blamed for not taking Grozny on New Year's Eve 1995. It's right. How true it is that he took it after all! A month later, but I took it! But Grozny was handed over to the militants after his resignation, in August 1996. He was a real hero. He was shell-shocked eight times and wounded many times. He received the Hero of the Soviet Union for “successfully completing combat missions with minimal casualties.” Strain yourself: how many of our commanders had such a clause about losses in their award lists? In the most difficult conditions, he managed to save our army from collapse. Even his detractors admit this. This alone would be enough to erect a monument to him.

So, my subjective opinion. He was thrown out and forgotten as soon as the authorities no longer needed him. He was slandered and slandered. What's new in this? This is what happened to the main character of our book...

—Alfred Koch

Defense Minister Pavel Grachev was no more popular than Gaidar's team. They accused him of everything and what stupid nicknames they came up with. And this despite the fact that Grachev is a real military general. Five years in Afghanistan - from major to major general. Hero of the Soviet Union. The youngest commander of the Airborne Forces.

The army crumbled along with the country. An inevitable and sharp reduction in numbers, lack of housing, the most difficult (and not created by Grachev) problems with the withdrawal of troops from the Warsaw Pact countries, attempts to drag the Russian army into conflicts on the territory of the former republics. The officers who remained on the street inevitably became an active part of the opposition to the B.N. regime. Yeltsin. How could Yeltsin's defense minister remain popular?

At the same time, Grachev completely retained the controllability of the army. And nowhere did the Russian military (contrary to the calls of, say, A. Rutsky) intervene in internal disputes within the CIS states. And a new vector in relations with the long-term “supposed enemy” was also set under Grachev.

Having gone through Afghanistan, Pavel Sergeevich was really afraid of little. Although he risked his life much more than others even after the Afghan war. For example, having every chance of going to court for refusing to storm the White House in August 1991 and for direct participation in the suppression of the coup in 1993. If the putschists had won, Grachev would have been one of the first to be shot.

Knowing everything about the war, Grachev, unlike many civilians who had never smelled gunpowder, really did not want to fight. And he was the main opponent of the First Chechen War - few people remember this anymore. Although it was he who spoke with Dudayev, removed (as much as he could) weapons from Chechnya, and tried to persuade Yeltsin to negotiate. I didn't persuade. And much in modern Russian history Then things could have gone differently.

I always felt at ease with him. And in the government in 1992 (we crossed paths on issues of arms trade, which I oversaw) and now during our interview with Koch. It’s easy because Pavel Sergeevich is not only very brave, but also a very serious, independent and thoughtful person. It was thanks to these qualities that a boy from the Tula village of Rva became an army general. And further. Grachev— an open person. That’s why it was so interesting for us to talk with him.

— Peter Aven, 10/21/2011

August 1991. "Failure of the drunken Politburo"

Peter Aven (P.A.): Pavel Sergeevich, Pasha! You are the last one we have chosen as our interlocutor. Everyone knows that at the time of the putsch you commanded the Airborne Forces, but still say a few words about your biography before August 1991. From the moment of the coup we will begin to ask specific questions. Maybe you can tell us a hitherto unknown truth?

Pavel Grachev (P.G.): I can answer the whole truth. The fact is that I am also finishing writing a book. At first I thought about making one book. Then so many people appeared who wanted to give interviews that it turned from a one-volume book into a three-volume book... And as for 1991... Well, in 1990 I graduated from the General Staff Academy and was appointed to the post of first deputy commander of the airborne forces...

P.A.: Have you been through Afghanistan?

P.G.: Yes. By that time I had already been to Afghanistan twice. A total of five years. From 1981 to 1983, and from 1985 to 1988. There I rose from major to major general and in 1988 received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. He entered the General Staff Academy and successfully graduated in 1990. The question was being decided where to put me - the commander of the army in Chernigov or the first deputy commander of the Airborne Forces. The head of the main personnel department was then my former commander, like a second father, Dmitry Semenovich Sukhorukov. He invited me for a conversation about two or three months before graduating from the Academy and suggested that I return to the Airborne Forces. This was in July 1990. I served as first deputy commander for literally six months, and after Commander Achalov Vladislav Alekseevich left as Deputy Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union, around March 1991, through the efforts of Achalov and Yazov, I was appointed to the post of commander of the Airborne Forces. I, of course, did not expect such a quick appointment...

Alfred Koch (A.K.): And you were also in Afghanistan through the Airborne Forces, right?

P.G.: In Afghanistan, I began (then, after graduating from the Frunze Academy) as the first deputy commander of the separate 345th parachute regiment. From 1981 to 1983. From 1983 to 1985 I was the chief of staff of the airborne division in Kaunas, and in 1985 they invited me again and said that no one but me could fight in Afghanistan. Come on, they say, go to Afghanistan for at least a year. They promised a title, a position, and so on. They completed all this work, but instead of one year I stayed there for more than three years.

And the appointment as commander of the Airborne Forces was unexpected for me... I was on inspection Far East, in Ussuriysk, when Achalov called me and ordered me to urgently arrive. I asked him: “Why such a rush?” He says: “Good news awaits you.” The next day I arrived at his office. He says: “I have been appointed Deputy Minister of Defense, you have been appointed Commander of the Airborne Forces. Let's go to Yazov." Yazov congratulated me, and as always, as a military man, I said: “I will try to justify your trust.” At that time, I did not know that such a grandiose event as the State Emergency Committee was being prepared.

A.K.: Was it already being prepared at that moment? I think not yet...

P.G.: Yazov told me interestingly then that these are the serious events now in Russia, you are our best paratrooper, you are a militant, I hope you will carry out any order to ensure the security of the state.

Yeltsin was then in disgrace, and Yazov, Achalov, and even more so the party elite had a negative attitude towards his activities. I knew Yeltsin only by hearsay. One day, it was the end of March, as far as I remember...

A.K.: Are you already a commander?

P.G.: Yes, I'm already a commander. And then they call me and say: “Boris Nikolaevich will talk to you.” “Pavel Sergeevich, hello, I know about you, heard about you and so on, I want to visit the Tula Airborne Division.” I say: “Here you need permission from the Minister of Defense.” “What, you can’t do it yourself?” I say: “Of course, I can’t do it myself, but I’ll call and ask.” “Call Yazov, Achalov.” I called Achalov and said: “Vladislav Alekseevich, so and so, Yeltsin wants to visit the Airborne Forces, in particular the Tula Airborne Division.” He thought for a moment and said: “Now I’ll consult with Yazov.” About fifteen minutes later he calls and says: “Well, Yazov has given permission, just be careful when you greet him. There is no need for bread and salt there, there is no need to jump in front of him and so on. Receive him like this, coldly, don’t feed him, don’t give him much water, don’t talk about anything.” I left for Tula within 24 hours, we began to prepare demonstration classes, and the next day Yeltsin arrived with his retinue. I met him with a report. “Well, show me what your paratroopers are.” Well, I showed shooting, parachute jumping, and technique. And in the process of this acquaintance, it seemed to me that he was quite a pleasant, intelligent, independent person. To be honest, I liked him even then, although Achalov repeatedly called me and said: “Look, as we instructed, behave like that.” Well, I answered him: “Vladislav Alekseevich, he is a normal person. Why should I show something other than what the Airborne Forces have?” “Well, look, just don’t feed or water him.” Well, I shot, drove around, then Yeltsin said: “Well, what, lunch?” And I already gave the command to the chief of the rear to make a good lunch in the tent. One tent is supposed to be for command personnel, and the other is for accompanying people and journalists. After all the showings, I took him into the tent, he looked - he naturally liked the table. I asked, “How about some alcohol?” He: “With pleasure!”

Naturally, they immediately snitched on me that I was meeting him too well. Achalov called again and said: “Well, it won’t work out that easy for you.” I say: “Vladislav Alekseevich, you decide as you want. As a hospitable host, I simply have to greet you like this.”

We had a good time with him, drank, and there was a lake nearby, only the ice had moved away. He offered me a swim. We undressed and jumped with him. All the security jumped after us...

A.K.: And Korzhakov?

P.G.: Where would he go? At that time, Korzhakov was a nobody, a senior lieutenant picked up on the street, who was forced out by his own guys. That’s how we hugged after we met and parted as comrades.

After me they called Yazov and Achalov. They expressed partial satisfaction with the meeting with Yeltsin and said that this could not be done. I say: “I’m not a politician, I’m a military man, I’ll do as I’m ordered, and I’m obliged to do my job honestly and conscientiously.” Well, then off we go. I didn’t meet Yeltsin often, but I got to know me very closely - Pet, you remember this - Yuri Vladimirovich Skokov, a very good comrade...

A.K.: Was he then part of the delegation when Yeltsin came for the first time?

P.G.: He was part of the delegation, and at that time he, along with Burbulis Gena, along with Petrov, was such a close person to Boris Nikolaevich...

A.K.: Do you think they deliberately courted you?

P.G.: Undoubtedly! It was not easy, but Yeltsin decided - and met. We mainly kept in touch with Yuri Vladimirovich Skokov.

Yeltsin was wise, cunning, intelligent, he was constantly interested in how things were going in the Airborne Forces, what problems, this and that. Well, I kind of pretended that I wasn’t paying attention, that I wasn’t noticing that they were courting me: I just liked him and decided to be friends.

Well, what next? Then, somewhere in June-July 1991, Achalov called me, we went to Yazov. Yazov greeted him calmly and said: “Kryuchkov wants to meet you.” I say: “Why is this?” “Well, you’re such a smart commander, so he wants to get to know you.” I think: “This is no accident: the KGB chairman wants to meet and get acquainted with some commander.” And I answer: “When should I go?” “Go now, he’s waiting for you.” I come there, to Lubyanka: it’s uncomfortable, of course. Have you been there?

P.A.: Been...

P.G.: Have you been to his office? Uncomfortable, of course.

P.A.: I’ve already been to another time - with Putin, with Patrushev...

P.G.: I was quickly met at the gate, so kindly taken up in the elevator, kindly into the reception area, before I had time to enter the reception area, the door opens and he greets me. This is how it seemed to me: quiet, modest...

A.K.: Knight of the Cloak and Dagger...

P.G.: Yes Yes Yes. Well, he took me into the office and invited some other deputy. I sit, trembling. Even though I’m a paratrooper, I’m uncomfortable, of course. This office is heavy...

A.K.: With Felix, perhaps?

P.G.: Yes, yes, yes, everything was there. The tea is there, all of it. “Are you going to drink?” "No, I will not".

“The situation in the country is unclear. Mikhail Sergeevich fell ill at the wrong time. Politburo without a leader. There is some unrest among the people.” I listen so carefully. “You see, a situation is possible when...” He began from afar and said: “I, like, wanted to ask you, perhaps a situation will arise when the support of the Armed Forces will be needed.” I say: “Whose?” “Well, how? To prevent confusion." I say: “What does the Airborne Forces have to do with it? There is Yazov, there is the Armed Forces. What does the Airborne Forces have to do with it?”

A.K.: There are internal troops...

P.G.: He says: “The Airborne Forces, along with the internal troops, are our elite troops, so they can be useful.” I say: “For what purpose?” “Well, maybe people won’t understand this matter. It will be necessary to take protection of the most important objects. Well, actually, I invited you in order to work out a possible plan for the peaceful transfer of power from Gorbachev to the Politburo in the event of its inability to continue working.” I was still surprised. I say: “I don’t know such plans. I know how to shoot and fight.” - "It's OK".

A.K.: Good story: Use the army for a peaceful transition. It’s just not needed for a peaceful transition...

P.G.: He says: “We will give you two more people and send you to a country residence. At the same time, you can relax there and draw up a possible plan of action. They're smart guys." I call Yazov and say: “So and so.” He: “Do what Kryuchkov says.” - “Well, there is.” The next day we agreed where to meet. There, on the corner in Khimki, in short, there was a car, two young guys. I remember one last name - Zhizhin. He is my fellow countryman.

P.A.: Deputy Head of the First Main Directorate of the KGB. Took an active part.

P.G.: Two nice guys...

A.K.: What did you wear?

P.A.: In the planning of the State Emergency Committee.

P.G.: Yes Yes Yes. I got into their car. I let go of my car. They say: “Perhaps we will spend the night there.”

A.K.: Young guys?

P.G.: Young.

P.A.: Somewhere my age, younger than Pasha...

P.G.: We arrived at a luxurious dacha in the forest. The table is set, there is only one waitress, no one is there. “This is where we will work.” I say: “What do you need?” They said: "Plan for a peaceful transition." I say: “What do I have to do with it?” “If anything happens, we’ll squeeze in the role of the Airborne Forces.” "It's clear". They thought, wondered, took out their documents on the transfer of power in various African countries, tried them on: nothing fit. I sit and remain silent. I see that the guys are not very active, because they themselves are, in principle, confused...

A.K.: Or maybe they, in some kind of Aesopian language, tried to lead you to set a task for yourself: to develop a plan for how to capture Moscow quickly and as bloodlessly as possible? And you pretended that you didn’t understand what they wanted from you?

P.G.: Undoubtedly!

A.K.: It's clear…

P.G.: In short, we worked there for three days and worked and couldn’t come up with anything smart. The only role, as I insisted, of the Airborne Forces should be that, if possible, enter Moscow and take under protection so that the main buildings are not destroyed, as in 1917...

A.K.: Post office, telegraph, telephone, bridges...

P.G.: Television, radio, telegraphs, post offices, city hall office buildings, the White House and so on. Three days later they reported this piece of paper to their Kryuchkov. I say: “Give me a copy, I’ll report it to mine.” Literally a few hours later, a dissatisfied Yazov calls: “Well, what were you doing there?” I say: “Well, they drew it like this, I don’t know what they want...” “No, this plan won’t work, or else.” “Well, I don’t know what.” In short, he was unhappy. “Well, be ready to introduce divisions.” I say: “If you order it, I’ll enter it, where will I go?” Well, this seems to have calmed down. Two weeks passed after that. I thought that was it. Well, then, what August was it?

P.A.: It was the 17th.

P.G.: A day before, Achalov calls me and says: “Order. Prepare two divisions for a possible entry into Moscow, listen to the radio and watch TV.” I gave the command to the Tula division to prepare to march on its own and to the Bolgrad division to land at the Chkalovsky airfield.

A.K.: Which division is the second?

P.G.: Bolgradskaya. Bolgrad is a city near Odessa. Bolgrad 98th Division.

When they started playing Tchaikovsky on TV, Achalov called me: “Bring in the Tula division.” I say: “For what task?” “Take protection of the most important objects, etc.” These objects were pre-drawn. I gave the command: “Forward.” The division made quick work of it. After some time, Yeltsin called: “Where are your troops?” I say: “One division is going to Moscow, and the other is in Odessa, ready to land at the Chkalovsky airfield.” “Are you going to shoot at me,” he says? I say: “Boris Nikolaevich, what does shooting have to do with it? Nothing like that: no one will shoot.” “Can you update me as things progress?” - "Please". - “How long will it take to call me?”...Such a conversation is normal. At that time he was afraid that...

A.K.: Will there be shooting?

P.G.: Nope... He was afraid that the command would be given to capture him. Him personally. We approached Moscow, stood (including at the White House, where Yeltsin was located), and took the mayor's office under guard. Here Meadow fell into conflict. He calls me... I say: “Calm down, why are you yelling?” He: “What kind of troops?” I say: “Your building, the mayor’s office, has been taken under guard.” “I don’t need this security, we can handle it ourselves.” "So what do you want?" “Take it away.” “Okay, if you don’t want to, don’t. Just don’t blame the consequences when they start smashing you and everything else.”

P.A.: The tankers who killed the three guys, were they yours?

P.G.: No. The commander of the Moscow district, Nikolai Vasilyevich Kalinin, on the orders of Yazov, introduced the Taman and Kantemirov divisions. The tanks crushed the Kantemirovsky division...

P.A.: And no one else gave you any commands? How did you stand, how did you stand? That is, there was no command to capture Yeltsin or anyone else?

P.G.: No, no one gave me the command to “capture”. All this time I was talking with Boris Nikolaevich through Skokov. He believed me that I would not storm him with this battalion of mine at the White House...

P.A.: Well, there wasn’t a team, was there?

P.G.: And there was no team, yes...

A.K.: Why wasn't there a team?

P.G.: Because they were scared... They realized that events were not unfolding the way they wanted. They thought that there would be universal support, but they were not supported, nothing and no one.

A.K.: How did they screw it up so bad?

P.G.: But they screwed up...

A.K.: Did the KGB monitor public opinion all the time?

P.G.: What's the point? It was an unprepared act.

P.A.: Pash, you helped Boris Nikolaevich a lot in this situation. You negotiated with Skokov, but in principle you carried out the commands you received. Didn't you receive any commands about the capture from your command?

P.G.: No, there was a command in the morning: “Seize the White House.”

P.A.: Was there a team?

P.G.: Yes, it was the next morning.

P.A.: 18th?

P.G.: I’m lying, the team was there the night before, on the 17th. Achalov called and said: “Well, this is the situation, it will still be necessary to capture Boris Nikolaevich.” I say: “Give me a written order. This is blood, they will start shooting everywhere. They won’t give it up without a fight.” “You will have a written order.” “If it happens, I will do it; if it doesn’t, that means I won’t.” After that, I immediately at the Airborne Forces headquarters, here in Sokolniki, gathered my men, deputies, and said: “So and so.” They are experienced people, they all went through the Afghan war. In short, we talked and our decision came down to the fact that no matter what the order was, do not shed blood and do not storm anything.

A.K.: Have you agreed with each other?

P.G.: Themselves... Yes... They called their special forces, surrounded us so that we would not be captured. Yuri Vladimirovich Skokov came to us. I say: “Yur, tell Boris Nikolaevich that even if I have an order to storm you, I will not. Because blood will be shed, it will still be a failure of this drunken Politburo, and I am the main militant. It’s easy for me to die, but I have a family, I have children. They will also begin to be captured and so on. No, we all have families, I won’t.” He says: "Thank you." I sent Lebed there with him. I say: if necessary, Swan will be with you. Lebed behaved somewhat incorrectly with Boris Nikolaevich. Yuri Vladimirovich calls me and says: “Get Lebed out of there, because he is too decisive in the sense that if there is an order, he will personally seize and so on.”

P.A.: Will it be exciting?

P.G.: I then called him back and sent him to the Chkalovsky airfield. “Alexander Ivanovich, you are an indispensable person for receiving the landing of the 98th Bolgrad Division.” Then they call me again: “We need to grab it in the morning. At seven o'clock". I repeat myself again: “If there is no written order, I will not take any action.” It’s seven in the morning and I don’t take any action. Here Chief of Staff Podkolzin, a general, you probably know someone like this, tells me: “Pavel Sergeevich, we are all in favor of not storming, but you still call the Minister of Defense and ask: will there be an order or not. We need to clarify the task in a military way, so that there are no misunderstandings later.” I call the reception. There, in the reception room, some man replies that the Minister of Defense is resting and asked not to wake him. I think: “Wow, this is the time, and he’s resting.” I called Achalov, and the receptionist there also said: “Vyacheslav Alekseevich is resting, he asked not to disturb him.” I say: “Tell me that this is Grachev, they say, about the written order. We seemed to have agreed, we’re sitting and waiting...” They say: “We’ll pass it on.” I say: “That’s it, we won’t storm, we’ll wait.”

A.K.: So they didn't give a written order?

P.G.: Exactly! They didn't even verbally clarify the task at seven in the morning. And at eight in the morning the call. Achalov: “Well, commander, have you already captured everything there?” I say: “I didn’t even try.” "How why?" “Because I told you, give me a written order. There is nothing, no confirmation. You are sleeping, the Minister of Defense is sleeping. You're putting me on trial. To be shot! “Well, okay, you won’t get over it that easily.” We breathed such a sigh of relief: it won’t work... They drifted away.

This means that by morning everything became clear to them, it became clear that there would be no order. Well, the men and I drank cognac there...

A.K.: Without sparing a cognac?

P.G.: No regrets! And somewhere around 9-10 in the morning they finally gave up.

A.K.: We know what happens to those who don't give up. Yesterday, the crowd tore one person who did not surrender into pieces...

P.G.: Who is this?

A.K.: Gaddafi.

P.A.: Pash, you really described the situation with the putsch very clearly. The putsch has passed. How do you assess the state of the Armed Forces in 1991? The country was falling apart. The economy was falling apart...

“I say: “Dzhokhar, what the f... are you doing there?”

P.G.: In 1991, formations and units on Russian territory were still combat-ready. Especially these Moscow units - the Kantemirovskaya division, the Tamanskaya division, the Airborne Forces, others, air defense - everything in general was still in good condition. Salaries have not been delayed for months yet...

P.A.: And outside of Russia? Tajikistan, Ukraine?

P.G.: Outside Russia - yes, the collapse has already begun. But the Armed Forces on Russian territory were troops of the second strategic echelon. Worse armed, weaker officers, etc. Because all the troops of the first strategic echelon that should meet the enemy at the border are the Baltic district, the Belarusian district, the Ukrainian district, the Transcaucasian district - they were all in the hands of independent states, and at that time they were not even part of the CIS.

P.A.: That's later...

P.G.: This is later, but all the strongest troops were, of course, in these republics. What do we have? Only the Moscow district and the Far Eastern, maybe...

P.A.: In principle, did the entire Soviet army function normally?

P.G.: At that time the Armed Forces were still functioning.

P.A.: In Russia - yes. And in Ukraine, in Belarus?

P.G.: Yes, and they were combat-ready, no need to say anything, they were equipped, well-equipped...

A.K.: Here's my question. I read a lot of all kinds of interviews with various kinds of heroes and anti-heroes regarding when the creeping, as they say, flow of weapons into the hands of the Chechens on the territory of Chechnya began. As far as I understand, this began to happen in the summer of 1991?

P.G.: This is later, when we, our government (which included Pyotr Olegovich), through the efforts of our friends Seryozha Shakhrai and Andryukha Kozyrev, convinced Boris Nikolayevich not to talk to Dudayev. And especially Rutskoi Sasha shouted: why talk to him, who is he? So Dudayev, when he was elected president, began to talk about independence. He started talking about independence not because he wanted to separate from Russia. He, as a mountain man, was simply hurt by the fact that he, who was popularly elected, was not taken into account, was not invited to the Kremlin and was told that you were 100 percent the scum of society. And he was a general of the Soviet Army, an excellent pilot, and division commander. I talked with him a lot. He said: “Pash, no one wants to talk to me. I’m the president, no matter how bad I am, and so on. The people chose me. If they don’t want to talk to me, then to hell with you. I will raise the question of separation from Russia to the people.” How many times have I informed governments. I say: “We need to talk to him.” Everyone is hostile: Boris Nikolaevich has no business accepting Dudayev!

A.K.: Why was there such selective hostility towards Dudayev? Why were everyone else who spoke about separatism, including Shaimiev, calmly accepted? The same Murtaza Rakhimov?

P.G.: Their separatism was so soft and easy. None of them raised the question of secession.

A.K.: Well, first of all, I did. Nevertheless, I want to understand the sequence: did they stop wanting to meet with Dudayev after he started declaring separatism, or did he start declaring separatism because no one wanted to talk to him?

P.A.: It all went in parallel.

A.K.: Nevertheless. What happened before? Chicken or egg?

P.G.: At first he began to claim greater autonomy. He didn't talk about complete separation.

A.K.: So in this sense he was not much different from other regional leaders?

P.G.: Absolutely, absolutely. But these regional leaders were accepted and talked to. But with him - no.

A.K.: So I ask: why was the decision made not to accept Dudayev?

P.G.: Don't know. I always thought it was stupid.

P.A.: Many people have worked here. Including Khasbulatov.

A.K.: Khasbulatov considered himself the main Chechen and was against negotiations with Dudayev?

P.G.: Yes, and Sasha Rutsky can be asked why he was appointed responsible for Chechnya, but he did not go there. He said: “Why the hell do I need some Dudayev. I, the vice-president, will go to talk to some Dudayev.” This played a very negative role in Dudayev’s behavior. I went to him when I wanted to take him out The educational center in 1993 from Chechnya, when everything was already tense there. They hadn’t captured anyone or anything yet, but sparks were already flying. And the Russians began to be oppressed in Chechnya.

A.K.: By 1993 they already had weapons. All these warehouses were stolen. No?

P.G.: It hasn't happened yet.

A.K.: There were already some documents on the Internet, photocopies of all sorts of orders posted...

P.G.: Yes, they won’t write anything on the Internet. When I arrived in 1992, I said: “Dzhokhar, what are you doing?” We went to his house. All these guys, Basayev and all the others, were sitting there. They treated me normally.

A.K.: Were you strangers before this?

P.G.: I only knew Dudayev.

A.K.: Did you know him from Afghanistan?

P.G.: Yes. They sat me down and set the table “with a sag.” I say: “Dzhokhar, what the f... are you doing there?” He says: “Nobody wants to talk to me. Rutskoi told me to fuck off on the phone. If I don’t react in any way, my guys won’t understand me, and the people won’t understand.” I say: “You know, I came, I need to withdraw the troops from you.” "For what? Why is it bad for them to live here?” I say: “You know, they have already started shooting at our troops, there are already wounded, terror has begun against our families, and so on.”

A.K.: There were many Russians in Grozny, all of them were evicted, and some were killed...

P.G.: I say: “I’ll probably withdraw the troops.” - “No, I won’t let you take me out.” I say: “How can you not give it? I will shoot." - “You will shoot, and we will shoot.” - “What are you doing?” In short, to sum it up, his resentment towards our attitude towards him led to all this.

P.A.: Did he let you withdraw your troops?

P.G.: Gave. But without weapons. No, we took away some of the weapons. We decided to split it 50/50, for which a criminal case was opened against me: “Why didn’t you withdraw everything?” These prosecutor’s dogs of ours didn’t understand that I was grateful that I had taken out so much and that I had taken out half a warehouse of small arms. Well, of course, I left a lot...

A.K.: What year was this?

P.G.: Or the end of 1992, or the beginning of 1993. You need to look at this, these documents are also there. They started attacking me: “You left everything to Dudayev.” - “Be grateful that I removed all the heavy weapons.” I first took out all the artillery. I knocked out the bolt wedges of all the guns and slowly took them out. Next: I also quietly removed all the mobile radio stations. I took everything that was needed.

A.K.: That is, you actually carried out the withdrawal of troops from Chechnya?

P.G.: Under the guise of exercises.

A.K.: In fact, realizing that you are in enemy territory?

P.G.: Somehow I couldn’t believe that it was the enemy. I was offended by our leadership, which inspired Boris Nikolaevich that the path of hostility was the right one.

P.A.: You were very close to Boris Nikolaevich. You and Kozyrev were the closest political advisers...

P.G.: Come on, Kozyrev was not the closest!

P.A.: And who did Yeltsin listen to most at that moment?

P.G.: Of the ministers?

P.A.: Yes!

P.G.: To no one!

A.K.: And not from the ministers? Personally, who was the closest? Korzhakov?

P.G.: Korzhakov has not yet gained strength.

P.A.: Then who?

P.G.: Well, he really took Petrov into account, Skokov...

P.A.: Lobov?

P.G.: No with Lobov, who is Lobov? Then they were: Petrov, Skokov, Gaidar, Galya Starovoitova, deceased, yes. Well, in principle, Yeltsin still consulted with me. But only when we went hunting in Zavidovo, and the two of us spent two days there and discussed all the issues. Then, little by little, they began to invite Petrov. He happily arrived, saw a herd of deer and shot about 15 of them with his machine gun. Yeltsin gathers us and says: “There is a murderer among us. Petrov, get out of order. Get out of here, you will never go hunting with us again.”

P.A.: Pash, Kozyrev told us a lot that the main problem was that Rutskoi was pushing Yeltsin to interfere in the internal affairs of the republics. Rutskoi tried to get troops into Transnistria, troops into Tajikistan, and wanted to intervene everywhere with the help of the Russian army. Kozyrev says, for example, that he stopped the march of the Lebed army on Chisinau.

P.G.: Well, maybe, I don't know.

P.A.: As if Rutskoi was trying to send Russian units in Transnistria to Chisinau.

P.G.: Of course not. What kind of campaign when the 14th Army was subordinate only to me?

P.A.: Yes, and Kozyrev says that Lebed intrigued you there, tried to play his own games...

P.G.: Was Swan going to Chisinau? What are you doing?

P.A.: This didn’t happen, do you think?

P.G.: In Transnistria there was a tattered, destroyed 14th Army. To Chisinau?! No! Who could he fight with there?

P.A.: Here it is - the 14th Army.

P.G.: Are you kidding. There was no one to fight there. Well, maybe along the diplomatic line, of course, Andrei took some steps...

P.A.: And in Tajikistan? He says that he had another task - to keep the army from scattering. In Tajikistan, everyone was ready to flee, the border guards, first of all, and the army. He told us that he came there and persuaded everyone to stay in their places. What do you have to say about this?

P.G.: I don’t know about the border guards, but about my troops in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and other republics...

P.A.: Nobody ran away?

P.G.: No one even tried to run away. I came and talked with the troops, as for others, such as border guards, they are not subordinate to me...

P.A.: I understand it. But the army remained under complete control?

P.G.: The army was under complete control. Under full. There was not a single movement to the left or to the right.

P.A.: There were no attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan or anyone else? Nothing like that, right?

P.G.: Did not have.

A.K.: So, you withdrew troops from Chechnya, small arms remained in Chechnya, and this greatly complicated the situation in the sense that Dudayev already had his own armed formations that were loyal only to him. Further escalation was a matter of time.

P.G.: Yes. That's how it was.

P.A.: Kozyrev told us that he saved the country from the Yugoslav scenario. Do you think there was no such threat at all?

P.G.: Well, what are you talking about! Of course it wasn't.

A.K.: It also seems to me that this is some kind of, so to speak, alarmist theory that we had a chance to slide into a full-scale war for the restoration of the USSR. I don’t see any serious social groups that would have been willing to fight for this at that time.

P.A.: But this is what Kozyrev told us. We are not specialists, we are economists, and in general we didn’t really know anything about this. By the way, Kozyrev told us another thing: that he was trying to change the foreign policy doctrine. The previous, Gorbachev’s, course was that we are enemies with America and the West, but we are moving towards detente, and Kozyrev tried to become an ally of the West, even more - part of the West. Here in yours practical activities Was there any change in the defensive doctrine and relations with NATO or not?

“The president did not have close relations with anyone”

P.G.: Of course, the doctrine has changed.

P.A.: Towards greater alliance?

P.G.: We have taken a course not yet of alliance with NATO, but of a closer mutual understanding, as it were.

P.A.: The idea was called...

P.G.:"Partnership for Peace". I personally went to Brussels several times. We were deciding the issue of so-called flank restrictions, how much equipment should be there...

P.A.: Kozyrev assures that the topic of non-expansion has never really been discussed.

P.G.: Non-expansion of NATO? I wasn't standing at that time. Although it was said that the states that tried to join NATO cannot escape, let them enter. But there must be a buffer zone between our borders and the former NATO borders. But these countries, even if they try to join NATO, are a buffer zone. NATO troops will never move into this territory.

P.A.: Does this mean Ukraine?

P.G.: No. The Baltic republics, first of all.

P.A.: So there was such a conversation?

P.G.: Yes, sure.

A.K.: And they promised not to enter, not to send troops?

P.G.: Yes. We agreed on this.

A.K.: And were the papers signed?

P.G.: With me - yes.

A.K.: And how do they now explain why NATO troops ended up in the Baltic states?

P.G.: Well, you ask other ministers. This was not the case with me.

P.A.: Kozyrev says there were no legal obligations. He says that Western countries have never promised not to expand NATO.

P.G.: How did they not promise? They promised!

P.A.: Did you promise?

A.K.: And were papers signed on this topic?

P.G.: Well, yes. Agreements.

P.A.: Kozyrev says that no documents were signed on this topic.

P.G.: There are written obligations. Tell him, tell him about the “Agreement on Flank Limitations”, about the “Agreement on the Number of Armed Forces in Various Strategic Directions”. I'm calling this from memory. There are probably even more of these agreements. It clearly states where and how many NATO troops should be stationed. Let me emphasize once again: this is not an obligation not to accept these countries into NATO. NATO members really did not take on such obligations. These are commitments not to station troops there, regardless of whether these countries are NATO members or not.

P.A.: Okay, what about the new members?

P.G.: Nothing was signed about new members, not even this question was raised.

P.A.: So, the most important question “will Poland be a member of NATO” was not asked?

P.G.: With us, Petya, this question did not arise.

A.K.: Well, Poland could be a member of NATO, but it could not be a member of the NATO military organization, like France, for example.

P.G.: There was nothing so serious in Poland, I’ll tell you that. In general, even at that time we had no thoughts about new NATO members. This is only later...

A.K.: And therefore we can say that the West did not seriously take on any obligations?

P.G.: Nobody took it. Neither us nor them. This question was not asked. There was no question about missile defense or anything.

A.K.: But the Conventional Armed Forces Treaty in Europe continued to work?

P.G.: Continued.

A.K.: But it doesn't work!

P.G.: Well, that's another matter. It is now de facto not working. He worked for me. And then, when NATO began to advance, then, in my opinion, even under Medvedev, ours unilaterally liquidated this agreement. Because the West silently advanced...

P.A.: Have you participated in foreign policy discussions? Including NATO? That is, Kozyrev was there in Brussels.

P.G.: Of course, I was there with him. Kozyrev and I often traveled together. But conversations were held with me only on purely military issues. As for politics, of course, I didn’t delve deeply into it.

P.A.: Did Kozyrev himself conduct these negotiations?

P.G.: Yes.

P.A.: Do you think he had a rather distant relationship with Boris Nikolaevich? Were there no relatives?

P.G.: There were some, not like mine. But Boris Nikolayevich respected him, loved him... But the president did not have close relationships with anyone. Maybe except me?

P.A.: You were at one time the most close person to him?

P.G.: As they told me: “You are not the first in Russia, but you are not the second either.”

P.A.: Right. So it was unexpected for you that you were dismissed?

P.G.: Actually, yes. When Russia actually gained its independence in August 1991, after these events we gathered with him and went into the forest. There were six or seven people. Boris Nikolaevich himself suggested: “Let's fraternize. I will never betray you in my life, and let’s swear on blood.” They took a knife, cut each other’s hands, licked the blood...

P.A.: Who was this? You was. Who else was there?

P.G.: Me, Korzhakov, Kozyrev...

A.K.: Kozyrev also cut? Didn't say anything!

P.G.: This, what's his name, the late Victor, KGB? I remembered: Barannikov. Rutskoi was not there. Skokov and someone else, two people...

P.A.: There were no Burbulis genes?

P.G.: I do not remember. We need to ask him. We found a tire there and laid out some drinks and snacks. The tire, apparently from the Belarus tractor, sat down and swore in blood on his initiative. And then he ditched us all. Suddenly. Unexpected why? Because when Yeltsin didn’t win the first round in 1996, this team under the leadership...

A.K.: How did you not win? He won the first round...

P.G.: How did he win the first round if he went to the second? He didn't get 51% of the votes! Zyuganov took second place, and Lebed took third. And then his team, led by Vitya Ilyushin, Yumashev and Tanya [Yumasheva], this trinity, plus the rest of the mafia, they decided to win Lebed’s votes to their side, although Lebed was always against Boris Nikolaevich. They called Swan and said: “Swan, this way and that way, you cast your votes.”

P.A.: Berezovsky came up with this.

P.G.: Berezovsky? May be. “You,” he says, “give the votes, we give you the position.” “Which one?” "Secretary of the Security Council." “Okay, you have voices.” But he set a condition that... Lebed was offended by me, but I fired him after he let loose there, in Tiraspol...

They persuaded Lebed (apparently they did not persuade him for long) and said that Lebed would give his votes in favor of Boris Nikolaevich in the second round against Zyuganov. They gave him a position. However, Lebed insisted that he has the right to give orders to security ministers, including the Minister of Defense. After they agreed, Boris Nikolaevich called me. I immediately realized that something was wrong. We went to the second room, everything was already covered there, we drank one glass, a second, a third, and he said: “Pavel Sergeevich, so I decided to appoint Lebed as secretary of the Security Council.” I say: “How is this so?”

A.K.: According to the second, according to the third... He already had a heart attack, Yeltsin!

P.G.: Yes, he was already poorly controlled, he got drunk quickly. They were already commanded by Yumashev and Tatyana. Tatyana basically even... She was the one who gave him the most. I noticed this right away: she needed him to be drunk the whole way. But that time we were alone. And he was not unlucky, he was quite sober. I say: “How is it, Boris Nikolaevich, a secretary? He ran against you in the elections!” - “But he promised to give votes.” - “How can you give this away? Take it out of your pocket and say to you: “Here, votes.” Maybe the people who voted for him will vote for Zyuganov?” - “No, well, Swan promised.” - “Well, Boris Nikolaevich, your team is not working well. Okay, it's up to you. What do you need from me?” - “Well, you understand, I recently called you the best minister of all times and nationalities.” I say: “Well, you shouldn’t have said that.” - “Why in vain? Well, okay... The thing is, you understand, do you agree to obey the Swan? - "Why is that? According to all documents, I report only to you, and as a member of the government, I also report to the chairman of the government, and then only within the powers of the government.” - “Well, yes, I know, but what are we going to do?” I say: “Boris Nikolaevich, I understand everything. Don't suffer. I'm leaving". Yes... I saw: he was waiting for this answer: “But how will we figure it out? With what wording? I say: “Boris Nikolaevich, well, why invent it?” He says: “Can’t cope with your responsibilities? I only recently called you the best. Due to illness? I say: “Boris Nikolaevich, fear God. I’m as healthy as a bull, an athlete.” - "Yes". I say, "Don't worry." We probably drank two bottles with him, said goodbye, hugged, burst into tears, his tears started flowing. I walked out the door, and there were Yeltsin’s guys already standing there: Tanya, Yumashev and others. They gave me paper and pencil: “Write a report.” And I write: “A report to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the President.” And I write to him: “I ask you to relieve me from the post of Minister of Defense in connection with...” And I think, “in connection with what”? Then, drunk, but sometimes my brain works, I write: “Due to current circumstances.” And he put an end to it. Subscribed. "Give it back." They were delighted and ran in the evening to issue a decree dismissing me from office due to the current circumstances.

P.A.: Funny wording.

P.G.: Until now, some lawyers, especially Lukyanov’s daughter, Katya, are trying...

A.K.: Is there no such article?

P.G.: They say: “Pavel Sergeevich, let us judge this whole case. This is definitely an illegal dismissal. What are the circumstances? For what reason?" To this day she tells me: “You are still de jure the Minister of Defense. We’ll earn so much money and everything else.” “Come on, Katya, you don’t need anything.”

A.K.: Let's go back a little to the beginning. Pavel Sergeevich! What kind of relationship did you have with Gaidar?

“The instigator of the war in Chechnya was Chernomyrdin”

P.G.: Good ones. We somehow hit it off right away. He comes from a military family. I respected him, of course. Of course, his disadvantage is that he did not know production, but the fact that he was savvy with these new market thoughts is unambiguous. And he said smart things. The only thing is that I often didn’t understand his speech, he was a little choked up, and plus his clever economic terms...

P.A.: If you didn’t understand Yegor, then you never understood me at all.

P.G.: Well, I sat with Galka Starovoytova the whole time. That pebble puts her breasts, and I tell her: “What breasts you have!” And she told me: “Fool, listen to what smart people say.” And I answered her: “But I still don’t understand anything he says.” After several meetings, she complained to him and they seated us.

I liked Gaidar. At least he had the ambition. Maybe not enough practice? There was no source in Russia from which to draw, apparently, he drew from the West, from sources not characteristic of Russia. But the fact that he had the desire to build a truly market economy in Russia and have a powerful, strong state is yes. I can at least now confirm this.

P.A.: Was he decisive, brave?

P.G.: Brave, yes. He was not afraid of anything, although he was young. I think he's younger than you, right?

P.A.: For a year.

P.G.: And I liked Peter Aven...

A.K.: Everyone likes Petya...

P.G.: Petya is great, so handsome. His wife and I often went on business trips. No, well done, he spoke well with this Deutsche Bank. The only thing is that, as an intelligent person, he was somewhat absent-minded. And he could leave his jacket and toiletries somewhere in the hotel...

A.K.: Just very rich.

P.G.: I could have left the bag...

P.A.: I was not rich then.

A.K.: But habits have already appeared!

P.G.: I gave him a razor a couple of times to shave. In Dresden, I think. But this is a normal flaw of all smart people. They are all distracted. Why did I gladly agree to talk now? If it had been different, I wouldn't have gone. I respected and respect Peter very much.

P.A.: Thank you, mutually.

P.G.: We never had any quarrels.

A.K.: But there is a question about December 1992. There is, for example, an opinion that Yeltsin had no other choice but to hand over Gaidar. But there is another point of view that there was an opportunity not to surrender him, and Yeltsin simply did not fight for Gaidar. So what point of view do you adhere to?

P.G.: I think I didn’t fight for Gaidar. Because Gaidar, in connection with these numerous reforms that were new and incomprehensible to many, was greatly disliked by the population. Due to the fact that the means are bad mass media the government's point of view was communicated. The fact that he had a team of these informants... is unambiguous.

P.A.: Poltoranin was in charge.

P.G.: So what about Misha? Maybe Misha himself didn’t really understand this. If people were treated properly, then there would be less pressure on them. But when it was already: “Here, Gaidar, all the troubles are from Gaidar, all the bad things are from Gaidar,” then there was nowhere to go. Maybe it was all specially arranged this way so that Misha Poltoranin would run this case? To relieve yourself of responsibility, and then throw off Gaidar and say: “Little white again”! Yes, of course, on purpose. I now understand: the Fuhrer is the Fuhrer, of course, it’s difficult to fully calculate him. And I couldn’t catch him [Yeltsin] when he even removed me...

P.A.: And you didn’t communicate with Yeltsin after that? After he took you down?

P.G.: Well, why didn’t you communicate? He promised me a position. He says: “Give him a good position!” Dali? They didn't give me a damn. About two or three months later, this bearded guy invited me, he was in charge of personnel? Sevastyanov! He says: “Pavel Sergeevich, Boris Nikolaevich told me to find a suitable position for you.” I say: “Well, so what? What position did you find for me?” And I (three months have already passed) forgot about it. “We want to send you as an ambassador.” I say: “Great! I German I know quite well, please, I’m ready to go to Germany, Austria, even Switzerland.” “No,” he says, “these places have been packed for many years.” I say: “Where are you suggesting to me?” He says: “Well, let’s say, to New Zealand.” I say: “Where is this country?” “Well, this is a wonderful country.” “It’s too far, no, I won’t go.” “Well, then there are a few African countries and a few Latin American ones.” I say, “Are you putting me in? Well, I understand: they started to mock me. Why are you pushing me so far?” And he gives me the phrase: “...You need to be hidden from the people for a couple of years.” - “From what people?” - “Well, how: everyone knows that you are the main ideological inspirer of the war in Chechnya.” I say, “What?”

A.K.: This is wrong. Everyone knows that this is not true!

P.G.:"What? Let's bring up the archives then, all my performances! Dear Sevastyanov! Even the Chechens already know that I was the main opponent of this war and practically the only one!”

A.K.: He said something stupid.

P.G.: Then he said this.

A.K.: Then even in the press it was said that you were not the initiator. Deputy Prime Minister Yegorov, deceased, was the initiator.

P.G.: Well, you know, the press was careful: Egorov and several other comrades...

A.K.: Who else, by the way?

P.G.: Doku Zavgaev.

A.K.: No, well, that’s understandable, but he was a clerk, the head of a department...

P.G.: Egorov and Doku mainly. Well, I still won’t say who else, these are all my comrades. It doesn't matter who. “No,” I say, “then tell Boris Nikolaevich that I don’t need your positions.” I left, about a month later Zhenya Ananyev called me and said: “Stop hanging around, come to me as an adviser.” I say: “That’s right, from the marshal’s position to the sergeant’s position. Well, what can I do? Come on, I'll go." That's how I left for a sergeant's position. Nothing. I overcame myself, my pride was gone, so now I feel normal. Then it turned out that many people needed me.

P.A.: What are you doing now?

P.G.: At the Ryazan plant I am the chairman of the board of directors, at the Omsk plant I am a member of the board of directors and chief adviser... I help them as best I can, I don’t particularly complain. Do you want to take me to work with you, or what? No need yet. When I feel bad, I'll call you.

P.A.: You won't feel bad, you're not one of those...

P.G.: So let's be friends for now...

A.K.: Actually, the beginning of the Chechen war interests me.

P.G.: What can I tell you about Chechen war? What are you interested in?

A.K.: This is the story with the Stepashin volunteers, with Avturkhanov, and so on. Why did it end in failure? After all, they actually reached the presidential palace. Why weren't they supported?

P.G.: And who should have supported them?

A.K.: Well, as I understand it, Erin was supposed to support them with internal troops. Or not?

P.G.: As far as I know, he and Erin did not consult either. It was Sergei Vadimovich and his special services who acted. Again, Doku Zavgaev provoked him into all this. Then, of course, my friend from Krasnodar Kolya Egorov, when he became deputy prime minister. These guys secretly decided to organize a campaign against Grozny. They formed a battalion, the Ministry of Defense just gave them as many tanks as they needed: Boris Nikolayevich ordered me. Armored personnel carriers. If serving officers or soldiers want to volunteer, there are many of them, please. The hastily formed, misinformed battalion calmly arrived in Grozny and... relaxed. At this time, the Dudayev boys organized themselves and gave them p...ds properly. The legs barely carried away...

A.K.: In my opinion, they all remained there.

P.G.: Some escaped, but 80% of them were destroyed. It was a rash step. After this campaign there was nowhere to go: the desire to quickly, quickly start a war began.

A.K.: So, after this scam, you think there was no turning back?

P.G.: How was it not? It was possible to admit that they were wrong, that violence should not have been used. After all, no one declared war, no one gave the command to storm... It was necessary to invite the delegation led by Dudayev to your place and begin negotiations. Nobody wanted to. I was the only one who flew there once and before entering the second time. In short, everyone abandoned the peaceful solution. It was humiliating for them. Everyone refused. Go, they say, storm. At first, they blamed everything on me, until the Chechens themselves said: “Grachev had nothing to do with it, he was the only one against the war.” I was made a scapegoat. And this stigma hung on me for a long time. And still some people think that it was I who invented this war...

A.K.: Before his death, Gaidar gave me an interview where he said in black and white: “I know that Grachev had nothing to do with it.”

P.A.: We, our team, and Pavel Sergeevich had an ideal relationship.

P.G.: Yes, perfect. When they began to attack me that it was I who started the war, I meet with Lobov and say: “Listen, Lobov, they are attacking me, why are you silent?” - “What should I do?” “Come on, then we’ll pull up the documents from the archive, my speech and so on, and we’ll publish them. Let the people know that this is Viktor Stepanovich and you decided to start a war!”

A.K.: Was Stepanych for the war?

P.G.: Of course, he removed me from my position. At this meeting, when I said “no,” Viktor Stepanovich stood up, although we had also been friends since those times, and said: “Boris Nikolaevich, we don’t need such a defense minister. I have a proposal to relieve him of his post and appoint someone else.” Then Yeltsin took a break from this meeting. They left: he, Lobov, Shumeiko, Boris Nikolaevich and Rybkin. Solve my question. Ten minutes later, Boris Nikolaevich comes out and says: “Pavel Sergeevich, we will not relieve you of your post, but within ten days we will prepare to conduct hostilities.” Then I said: “Boris Nikolaevich, winter is already upon us, and so on, what could be fighting in conditions where there is no way through, no traffic, fog, aircraft don’t fly, artillery doesn’t know where to hit, and so on.” “When are you proposing?” “In the spring, and before that, negotiate.” I wanted to stall for time: maybe we’ll have time to come to an agreement. No fucking way. I say: “Viktor Stepanovich, you will be personally responsible for this matter.” After that, he and I became cold to each other...

P.A.: This is something new...

A.K.: News, yes. Stepanych always told us that he was against it.

P.G.: The main one was the instigator. The others supported him. Seryoga Shakhrai was silent...

A.K.: Was the main instigator Chernomyrdin? I won't believe it at all.

P.G.: Chernomyrdin, yes. Lobov supported him. I tell Lobov: “Let’s publish my speeches.” He says: “I don’t know; in my opinion, these speeches have not been preserved in the archives.”

A.K.: Oh oh oh. He's lying. Everything is. Still.

P.G.: I say: “What? All performances must be preserved, my dear.” - “Well, we may not find them.” I say: “Everything is clear with you.” Then they fired me. The main one, of course, was Viktor Stepanovich.

A.K.: Here, Pete, is another look at the problem.

P.G.: What's the look? This is not a look. This is true.

P.A.: Listen, Pash, many people read our interviews, there will be a book. What you say now is very important. What else do you think is important to say so that people know about you, about that time, about the army?

A.K.: Especially the early 1990s. The most important.

P.G.: What's important? Well, first of all, this is, of course, the failed State Emergency Committee and the coup, almost a civil war. It was already here, both in 1991 and in 1993. Definitely. Especially in 1993. Because then groups were already spontaneously forming throughout the country. In 1991, the first were for the State Emergency Committee, the second were for Yeltsin, in 1993 some were for Khasbulatov-Rutsky, and the other, opposite group was again for Yeltsin. Therefore the country stood on the edge civil war. And only, I believe, the decisive actions of the Armed Forces prevented this war from breaking out.

P.A.: Please clarify what the role of the Armed Forces was in 1991 and 1993?

P.G.: 1991 The armed forces did not allow... No, it’s correct to say: they did not capture Boris Nikolaevich. This is the most important thing.

P.A.: That is, they did not participate in the conflict at all?

P.G.: They did not participate in the conflict and thereby prevented fighting, first local, and then on an increasingly expanded scale throughout Russia. Although it might not have been so strong, because Yeltsin was not yet well known. And in 1993, only the decisive actions of the Armed Forces in terms of firing six inert shells from a tank at the White House and capturing all these guys - Rutskoi, Khasbulatov, and others, Dunaev, Barannikov, and so on - prevented the start of an all-Russian civil war . Why? Because local leaders, and even some military personnel, were on standby at that time. Who will win? And if the other side won, a fight would immediately begin.

P.A.: Were you sure? Look, Rutskoi called and tried to raise the squadron to the Kremlin. Were you confident that no one would attack the Kremlin?

P.G.: I'm sure, of course! Because by this time I had good commanders in chief. Deinekin Pyotr Stepanovich, my friend, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Semenov, my comrade, Commander-in-Chief ground forces, Prudnikov was the commander-in-chief of the air defense, the fleet was also commanded by our man. The commander of the Airborne Forces was Evgeniy Nikolaevich Podkolzin. I managed to put all my guys in charge, so I was sure that no one would betray.

A.K.: How was the decision made to start shooting at the White House?

P.G.: Elementary. On the night from two to three, around three in the morning, Boris Nikolaevich and Korzhakov came to see me at the Ministry of Defense, and there were several other people there. Well, they gave in a little...

A.K.: The day before there was an assault on Ostankino, where soldiers of the internal troops died...

P.G.: Yes.

P.A.: You gave in a little, you say...

P.G.: A little bit tight, so excited. Boris Nikolaevich says: “Pavel Sergeevich, here the city hall and Ostankino are being captured. To calm down and prevent further development, we need to get these guys in the White House.” Well, as usual, I say: “Boris Nikolaevich, a written decree, and I’m ready for anything.” Here Korzhakov spoke: “What written decree? Boris Nikolaevich, I knew that they would start to be cowardly too!” I say: “Listen, you, shut up.” Well, Yeltsin became furious: “You will have a written decree.” I lied, by the way, it never happened. Later, having sobered up a little (I was already ready, of course, for the assault), he called me at about five in the morning and said: “You see, Pavel Sergeevich... Do you see what the situation is like...” B... me... In the spirit that it seems need to perform oral...

A.K.: By the way, I still don’t understand why they were all so fussy about giving a written order?

P.G.: That's it. Well, I say: “Boris Nikolaevich, of course, I will do it. What needs to be done?" - “Capture all these guys.” Well, I tell him: “Boris Nikolaevich, my 119th parachute regiment is stationed near the White House. No problem". Although there are a lot of snipers there both on the right and on the left. There are houses all around, and the roofs were all occupied by these snipers...

P.A.: Their sniper?

P.G.: Yes, them. I say: “There are no problems, but we will suffer losses.” - "What do you suggest?" I say, “I propose to scare them.” - "But as?" I say: “Yes, I’ll bring the tank to direct fire and inert fire several times. They will run away on their own. At least they will go down into the basements, the snipers will also run away after these shells, and there, in the basements, we will find them.” - “Good.” Well, I take the tank to this stone bridge near the “Ukraine”, I go up to the tank myself, I put the captain as a gunner-operator, a senior lieutenant behind the driver, I go up to the tank, the bullets click like that - click, click, click, click. “At the end of the day,” I think, “they won’t get it.” I say: “Guys, do you see the roofs? Count down. One, two, three, four, five, six, seventh window. This is presumably Khasbulatov's office, they are there. We need to get there through the window. Will you get there? “Comrade Minister, the tank is just firing, it’s normal.” “Are there any shells?” “Combat or something like that?” “What kind of combat? Are you crazy? Let's have some blanks." - "Fine. That’s just it: we just left the shooting range, we were taken straight from live firing.” I say: “Well, go ahead, aim at this window.” And downstairs there are already a lot of people. Here, onlookers love the same thing as when they came to the theater. I say: “Guys, look, you won’t get in, the people will die. Then everything will be torn apart." I say to the captain: “Will you get there?” - “I’ll get there!” Just think, less than a kilometer.” - “Oh, did you see the American embassy behind there? Look, if you hit the embassy, ​​there will be a scandal.” - “Comrade Minister, everything will be fine.” Well, I say: “Fire, alone.” I look at the first one - bang, it just flew into the window. I say: “Are there any more?” - "Eat". - “Here are five more runaways, fire!” He dum, dum, dum. I see everything is on fire. Beautiful. All at once the snipers from the rooftops instantly ran away, as if brushed aside by hand. Well, when the snipers were brushed off and the tanks finished firing, I gave the command to the 119th regiment to storm. They opened the doors and shot there. Well, of course, I had nine killed, there was shooting inside, but they killed a lot of them...

P.A.: How many?

P.G.: A lot of.

P.A.: About two hundred people, they say, in total.

P.G.: Well, maybe so. Nobody simply counted them. A lot of.

P.A.: From two hundred to four hundred the number is called.

P.G.: A lot, in short.

P.A.: Defenders of the White House.

P.G.: Defenders, yes. A lot of.

P.A.: Who were they? Conscripts or what? Just a militia?

P.G.: What kind of soldiers? These are all mercenaries, bandits and everything else.

A.K.: Where did they get their weapons from?

P.G.: And in the government, and in the Supreme Council, and in any building of this kind, there are weapons rooms where there are machine guns and ammunition for the leadership, and if something happens, they dismantle them and go to defend themselves. That's why the weapons were dismantled there.

P.A.: Were there snipers among them too? The same punks?

P.G.: Well, how? Maybe not punks.

A.K.: Among them were career officers. The Terekhov Union of Officers settled there.

P.G.: There were career officers who were sold or who were dismissed from the Armed Forces. They could shoot everything. Well, they piled a lot of them there.

P.A.: That is, the tank officers fired and carried out the order unquestioningly?

P.G.: Without question.

A.K.: But these conversations are that they were paid some kind of money.

P.G.: What money? This will come later, perhaps. What money?

P.A.: To storm the White House.

P.G.: No!

P.A.: As far as I remember, one of the bankers close to the authorities actually visited all the large structures and collected money. Where they then went is unknown.

A.K.: To repair the failure so that it does not fail further. They probably put it in their pocket.

P.G.: We didn't see any money. We thanked these officers in a different way. One way or another, the Khasbulatites raised their hands when they saw that this was serious. That we will still dig them out of there.

P.A.: Was the captain rewarded?

P.G.: They gave us a Hero of Russia. To the senior lieutenant the Order of Courage, in my opinion. Their names were immediately classified and sent to serve in other units. Beautiful picture. And the White House slowly began to burn, burn, burn. Pashka Borodin later says to me: “Pavel Sergeevich, what a fine fellow you are.” -"And what?" - “They gave us so much money there, I’ll do the repairs.” I say: “Pash, how long have you been sleeping?” - “No, no, no, not a penny.” As I understand it, 20 million was spent on repairs?

A.K.: Now this is generally kept silent. In modern times, this is not a sum at all...

P.G.: Today, yes, but in 1993 it was a lot of money!

A.K.: Sing, good story?

P.A.: Powerful story. A person has something to remember. These are fundamental historical events. The country is on the brink of civil war, and suddenly everything is resolved easily and simply. By the way, was Achalov there?

P.G.: Yes. He was there. He was also arrested. Yes, they were all arrested. But then, of course, Korzhakov and Mikhail Ivanovich Barsukov, when all this dangerous business was over, not a single shot was fired, they entered and captured all these “defenders.” I stood the whole time near “Ukraina” and watched as their guys, led by Korzhakov and Barsukov, were led to a bus, which they drove up and took to Matrosskaya Tishina.

P.A.: But there was also a story that was being circulated about the fact that all the time the putsch was going on, troops were called to Moscow, but for some reason they did not arrive on time.

P.G.: Some hotheads thought that our troops drove Mercedes, Toyotas, and so on, and there were also tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles. Their speed, especially in a convoy (there was a huge convoy, several kilometers long), is somewhere on average 20 km/h. And these civilian eagles thought it was very slow, that it was sabotage. Combat vehicles- This is not a means of transportation or a taxi. This is a battlefield weapon: the new tank has a service life of only 200 km! Ay, what can I say! We love to run our mouths! In normal countries, they are transported along the roads by trucks on special platforms to the battlefield. Or by rail. And with us: come on, drive along the highway on tracks! Damn, you're slow! You see, guys, it’s a shame: after 1991, and even after 1993, motherfucker, there were so many winners! So many people tore their shirts...

A.K.: This is not surprising.

P.G.: Yes, I know: victory has many fathers, defeat is always an orphan... How many people shouted in 1991: we are defenders of the White House, we organized the movement... So much rubbish later left the military: we were illegally fired! And now they were setting up some councils, trade unions... I just managed to fight them off. Zhenya Shaposhnikov could not fight back, but I fought back. I think: “Guys, where were you in 1991, when my guys were standing there, and we at headquarters decided not to storm in any case? Even if there is a written order? Who is it: me or you who should have gone to court? Why in 1993 only the army was for Yeltsin? Where is the KGB? Where is their Alpha? Alpha refused to storm. Where is the Ministry of Internal Affairs? And then everyone waved their hands: we are the winners..."

The third such grandiose event that, I believe, took place internationally in these years was the beginning of the negotiation process on Russia’s partnership with NATO. This is already the end of 1992, when the strained, in principle, relations with NATO began to develop into at least negotiations. And I could drink vodka with the American minister and general. Already in a normal, human conversation, be on a first-name basis, already argue about who has what weapons and where to place NATO, and where to place us. Yes, the last time this happened with Zhukov and Eisenhower was in 1945! And then we were allies! In 1993, I flew to Brussels six times, where we met one-on-one. This is what I consider the third achievement.

Fourth, of course, I, as the Minister of Defense, managed to keep the army from disintegrating. Well, this, of course, was not thanks to my talents as a commander, but thanks to my subordinates, especially local commanders, who understood me and believed that sooner or later this whole thing would be established. That is, they did not allow the army to collapse, did not allow the weapons to be stolen, and did not allow the seizure of nuclear weapons.

A.K.: Have there been such attempts?

P.G.: Of course they still exist. Everything was securely stored. This is the fourth one.

And fifth, this may be serious for some: it’s serious for me, and frivolous for others, but during these years we signed an agreement with the current Patriarch Kirill on cooperation between the army and the church. He was then the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, and we became friends then...

P.A.: My wife and I are godfather and godfather. They baptized Shokhin's children together. He is the godfather, and my wife is the mother. So my wife is the godfather of the patriarch!

P.G.: He's a cool guy...

A.K.: In this series, where would you place the Chechen campaign?

P.G.: Chechen campaign? In terms of importance, maybe somewhere after the preservation of Russia, after the fact that the Armed Forces did not collapse... You flew with me a thousand times, I remember you, you just didn’t have a beard...

P.A.: Do you consider Chechen history as your achievement in general?

P.G.: Of course not. This is a general disgrace to our domestic policy.

A.K.: That is, there was a resource for a peaceful solution to the problem?

P.G.: Yes, I could persuade! I could personally bring Dudayev and sit down like this: me, Boris Nikolaevich and Dudayev. Speak!

A.K.: Yeltsin refused?

P.G.: Yeltsin was already ready. But they whispered to him, I don’t know who, some guys, girls who were in charge of domestic policy. I don’t know who he met there.

P.A.: Who was the engine that prevented this potential for peace negotiations from being realized?

A.K.: I just can't figure it out. No matter how many times I ask everyone, everyone points to Egorov. Maybe because he died? Now on to Chernomyrdin. Maybe that's why too...

P.G.: Chernomyrdin in terms of war?

P.A.: This is new information for us.

P.G.: In terms of war, he supported this action, although, in my opinion, even Kozyrev supported it. But he was always timid and indecisive.

P.A.: You're not talking to him now ?

P.G.: No. Well, we saw each other a few times, okay. We have a normal relationship with him. He once invited me to live in America.

P.A.: What is there to do?

P.G.: Live.

P.A.: Live?

P.G.: There is a local council of defense ministers headed by Pari. Kozyrev sent me letters asking me to join this council. They were ready to provide me with apartments, dachas, and a good salary. After I was released from my position here. The first two years they generally attacked, they wrote such letters that you see, they offended you, Pavel Sergeevich, and you did so much to get closer to NATO...

P.A.: You have done a lot to bring closer to NATO and the United States. You and Kozyrev together made this relationship completely different...

P.G.: And after I was removed, literally a month later, letters were signed by Paris, Cheney, and Powell. They specifically wrote: “Pavel, you have done a lot for our relationship. You are now an outcast in your country, no one needs you. We invite you to permanent residence.” I said: “Guys, I still don’t understand your life. There's no one to fuck off there. You can’t fry a kebab.”

A.K.: They call it “barbecue”.

P.A.: Do you often visit your homeland?

P.G.: Where?

P.A.: In the village where I came from.

P.G.: Yes, often, of course. I have plenty of time now. What is it, a two hour drive.

P.A.: Do you have anyone left there?

P.G.: Brother. I renovated his house in the village... And you, Petya, when did you leave the ministers?

P.A.: In December 1992 with Gaidar. More precisely, a week later than Gaidar.

P.G.: They were good guys. At least our team, I’m by no means talking bad about today’s team, but our team was much stronger. She was even stronger in spirit.

P.A.: Spirit and ideas. How do you generally feel about the current reforms in the army?

P.G.: Negative.

P.A.: Why? Do you think the idea is wrong? Is the ideology wrong?

P.G.: First. The army was reduced beyond recognition. According to all military canons, it is necessary to have an army (all countries, including the United States of America, have this) with one soldier per six meters of the border. Along the perimeter if you take it. Calculate how many soldiers are needed if six meters per soldier. This is the first. Second. The necessary amount of front line equipment for containment: tanks, artillery, at one time I also had nuclear artillery, and so on. There is nothing now. Third. The districts were slaughtered, some commands began to appear. How can the commander, the current one, of the eastern zone from Pacific Ocean to command to Baikal? There is no such territory. Even China is half the size. The control system is lost. This is clear. Well, some small things, let’s say. But it is not a small thing: practically all types of support have gone away from the influence of the military: logistics, clothing... All have been replaced by civilians. Civilians are civilians. Came to work at nine, left at six. There is a war there, not a war, please find him. And a military man is always a military man. I think this is absolutely wrong. Well, they are cutting back on the benefits that military personnel previously had. This is medical support, this is sanatorium and resort provision...

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Former chief military adviser to FSUE Rosoboronexport, former Minister of Defense Russian Federation, army General. Hero of the Soviet Union, awarded the Order of Lenin, the Red Banner, the Red Star, "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR", "For Personal Courage", as well as the Afghan Order of the Red Banner. He was a defendant in the case of the murder of journalist Dmitry Kholodov. Died in Moscow on September 23, 2012.
Pavel Sergeevich Grachev was born on January 1, 1948 in the village of Rvy, Tula region. He graduated with honors from the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School (1969) and the Frunze Military Academy (1981). In 1981-1983, as well as in 1985-1988, Grachev took part in hostilities in Afghanistan. In 1986, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union "for performing combat missions with minimal casualties." In 1990, after graduating from the Military Academy of the General Staff, Grachev became deputy commander, and from December 30, 1990, commander of the USSR Airborne Forces.
In January 1991, Grachev, by order of USSR Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov, introduced two regiments of the Pskov Airborne Division into Lithuania (according to some media reports, under the pretext of assisting the republic's military registration and enlistment offices in forced recruitment into the army).
On August 19, 1991, Grachev, following the order of the State Emergency Committee, ensured the arrival of the 106th Tula Airborne Division in Moscow and its taking under the protection of strategically important objects. According to media reports, at the beginning of the putsch, Grachev acted in accordance with Yazov’s instructions and prepared paratroopers together with KGB special forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs troops to storm the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. On August 20, Grachev, together with other high-ranking military officials, announced Russian leadership information about the intentions of the State Emergency Committee. The media also voiced a version according to which Grachev warned Boris Yeltsin about the impending coup on the morning of August 19.
On August 23, 1991, Grachev was appointed chairman of the RSFSR State Committee for Defense and Security with a promotion in rank from major general to colonel general and became first deputy minister of defense of the USSR. After the formation of the CIS, Grachev became Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces of the CIS (CIS Joint Forces), Chairman of the Russian State Committee on Defense Issues.
In April 1992, Grachev was appointed first deputy minister of defense of Russia; in May, he first became acting minister and then minister of defense in the government of Viktor Chernomyrdin. In the same month, Grachev was awarded the rank of army general. Grachev, according to a number of media reports, himself admitted his lack of experience, so he surrounded himself with experienced and authoritative deputies, mainly “Afghan” generals.
The role of Grachev in the operation to withdraw Russian troops from Germany was assessed ambiguously by the media. Noting the complexity and scale of the military operation (it became the largest ever carried out in peacetime), the press also pointed out that, under the guise of preparing and carrying out the withdrawal of troops, corruption and theft flourished. However, none of the senior military officials who served in Germany were convicted, although several trials took place.
In May 1993, Grachev became a member of the working commission to finalize the presidential draft of the Russian Constitution. In September 1993, after presidential decree number 1400 on the dissolution of the Supreme Council, he stated that the army should obey only Russian President Yeltsin. On October 3, Grachev called troops to Moscow, who stormed the parliament building the next day after the tank shelling. In October 1993, Grachev was awarded the Order “For Personal Courage,” as stated in the decree, “for the courage and courage shown in suppressing the armed coup attempt on October 3-4, 1993.” On October 20, 1993, Grachev was appointed a member of the Russian Security Council.
In 1993-1994, several extremely negative articles about Grachev appeared in the press. Their author, Moskovsky Komsomolets journalist Dmitry Kholodov, accused the minister of involvement in a corruption scandal in Western group troops. On October 17, 1994, Kholodov was killed. A criminal case was opened into the murder. According to investigators, the crime was organized by retired Airborne Forces Colonel Pavel Popovskikh to please Grachev, and his deputies acted as accomplices in the murder. Subsequently, all suspects in this case were acquitted by the Moscow District Military Court. Grachev was also a suspect in the case, which he learned about only when the decision to terminate the criminal case against him was read out. He denied his guilt, pointing out that if he spoke about the need to “deal with” the journalist, he did not mean his murder.
According to a number of media reports, in November 1994, a number of career officers of the Russian army, with the knowledge of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, took part in hostilities on the side of the forces in opposition to Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev. Several Russian officers were captured. The Minister of Defense, denying his knowledge of the participation of his subordinates in hostilities on the territory of Chechnya, called the captured officers deserters and mercenaries and stated that Grozny could be taken in two hours with the forces of one airborne regiment.
On November 30, 1994, Grachev was included in the group leading the actions to disarm gangs in Chechnya; in December 1994 - January 1995, he personally led the military operations of the Russian army in the Chechen Republic from headquarters in Mozdok. After the failure of several offensive operations in Grozny, he returned to Moscow. Since that time, he has been subjected to continuous criticism both for his desire for a forceful solution to the Chechen conflict, and for the losses and failures of Russian troops in Chechnya.
On June 18, 1996, Grachev was dismissed (according to some media reports, at the request of Alexander Lebed, who was appointed Assistant to the President for National Security and Secretary of the Security Council). In December 1997, Grachev became the chief military adviser to the general director of the Rosvooruzhenie company (later the Federal State Unitary Enterprise Rosoboronexport). In April 2000, he was elected president of the Regional Public Fund for Assistance and Assistance to the Airborne Forces "Airborne Forces - Combat Brotherhood". In March 2002, Grachev headed the General Staff commission for a comprehensive inspection of the 106th Airborne Division stationed in Tula.
On April 25, 2007, the media reported that Grachev was dismissed from the post of chief military adviser to the general director of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise Rosoboronexport. The Chairman of the Union of Russian Paratroopers, Colonel General Vladislav Achalov, with reference to whom the media disseminated this information, said that Grachev was removed from the post of adviser “in connection with organizational arrangements.” On the same day, the press service of Rosoboronexport clarified that Grachev was relieved of his post as adviser to the director of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise and seconded to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation to resolve the issue of further passage military service back on February 26, 2007. The press service explained this personnel decision by the abolition of the institution of seconding military personnel to Rosoboronexport on January 1, 2007. Information about Grachev’s resignation appeared in the media a day after the death of the first Russian President Yeltsin, who appointed the ex-Minister of Defense to the position of adviser to the state company by a special decree.
In June 2007, Grachev was transferred to the reserve and appointed chief adviser - head of a group of advisers to the general director of the production association "Radio Plant named after A. S. Popov" in Omsk.
On September 12, 2012, Grachev was admitted to the intensive care unit of the Vishnevsky military hospital in Moscow; on September 23, he died. The next day it became known that the cause of death was acute meningoencephalitis.
Grachev had a number state awards. In addition to the Hero's Star and the Order "For Personal Courage", Grachev was awarded two Orders of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner, the Red Star, "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR", as well as the Afghan Order of the Red Banner. He was a master of sports in skiing; headed the board of trustees of the CSKA football club.
Grachev was married and had two sons - Sergei and Valery. Sergei graduated from the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School.

From the very beginning

Born on January 1, 1948 in the village of Rvy, Leninsky district, Tula region, into a working-class family, Russian.

In 1969 he graduated from the Ryazan Higher Airborne School, in 1981 - Military Academy them. Frunze (with honors), in June 1990 - Academy of the General Staff.

In 1969-71 he served as commander of a reconnaissance platoon of an airborne division in Kaunas, Lithuanian SSR. In 1971-72 he was commander of a platoon of cadets at the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School, in 1972-75 - commander of a company of cadets at the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School. From 1975 to 1978 - commander of the training parachute battalion of the training airborne division.

In 1978-81 he was a student at the M.V. Frunze Military Academy.

From 1981 to 1983 he was in Afghanistan: in 1981-82 - deputy commander of the separate 354th parachute regiment as part of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, in 1982-83 - commander of the separate 354th parachute regiment.

From 1983 to 1985 - chief of staff of the 7th division in Kaunas, Lithuanian SSR.

In 1985 he was returned to Afghanistan, until 1988 he was the commander of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division named after the 60th anniversary of the USSR. In total, he served in Afghanistan for 5 years and 3 months. For his services in the Afghan campaign, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (“for completing combat missions with minimal casualties”). The award ceremony took place after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.
After studying (1988-90) at the Academy of the General Staff, he became deputy commander in 1990, and from December 30, 1990 - commander of the Airborne Forces (Airborne Forces).

He demonstrated personal loyalty to the USSR Minister of Defense Dmitry Yazov and called him “father.”

In January 1991, he ensured the implementation of the order of the USSR Minister of Defense Yazov to send two regiments of the Pskov Airborne Division to Lithuania. The pretext was to provide assistance to the military registration and enlistment offices of the republic in the forced recruitment into the army of persons evading conscription. On the eve of the Vilnius events of January 1991, Grachev spoke out in the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper against the use of landing troops in interethnic conflicts. In his opinion, this is the business of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs troops. For this statement he received reprimand from Marshal Yazov, however, without any consequences for his career. At the beginning of 1991, Grachev actually did not participate in directing the actions of the paratroopers in the Baltic states, whose activities were coordinated by General Vladislav Achalov during this period.

On August 19, 1991, following the order of the State Emergency Committee to send troops into Moscow, he ensured the arrival of the 106th Tula Airborne Division in the capital and its taking under the protection of strategically important objects. At the first stage of the coup attempt, he acted in accordance with the instructions of Marshal Yazov: he prepared paratroopers together with the KGB special forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs troops to storm the building of the RSFSR Armed Forces. At the same time, he maintained contacts with the Russian leadership, in particular with Yuri Skokov, with whom he was on friendly terms for a long time.

On the afternoon of August 20, together with other high-ranking military men (in particular, Air Marshal Shaposhnikov, generals Vladislav Achalov and Boris Gromov), he expressed his negative opinion to the leaders of the State Emergency Committee about the plan to seize the White House, and then informed the Russian leadership that the airborne units were not will storm the White House (according to General Achalov, Grachev said he was sick, when Achalov and Gromov, convinced that the storming of the White House would lead to huge casualties, went to report their point of view to a member of the State Emergency Committee, General Valentin Varennikov. According to the recollections of General Alexander Lebed, Grachev conveyed through him to the White House with a message about the time of the proposed assault on the White House - and not information that the Airborne Forces will not participate in the assault).

Not having confidence that the military would carry out the order, the State Emergency Committee canceled the initial decision and the order for the assault was not given. Grachev himself subsequently claimed that he “refused to participate in the storming of the Russian White House.”

After the failure of the coup attempt, Grachev received an offer from Yeltsin to take the post of Minister of Defense of the RSFSR (not provided for by the then state structure of the republic) instead of Konstantin Kobets, who was appointed to this position on August 19. Together with a group of military men, Grachev convinced Yeltsin not to create a republican Ministry of Defense, so that a split along national lines would not occur in the armed forces of the USSR. Instead of the ministry, it was created State Committee Russia for Defense Affairs with a staff of about 300 people is the coordinating body between the USSR Ministry of Defense and Russian government structures.

On August 23, 1991, Grachev was appointed Chairman of the Russian State Committee for Defense Issues with a promotion from Major General to Colonel General and became First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. After the formation of the CIS, Grachev became, accordingly, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces of the CIS (CIS Joint Forces).

At this time, General Grachev acted as a supporter of unified armed forces. He stated that the army should not interfere in resolving the internal problems of the state, no matter how acute they may be. He spoke out against possible purges in the army.

On April 3, 1992, Grachev was appointed First Deputy Minister of Defense of Russia (whose duties were temporarily performed by Russian President Yeltsin). At the beginning of May, Grachev was temporarily entrusted with direct leadership of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with the right to issue directives, orders and instructions on the Armed Forces - with the simultaneous assignment military rank army general.

Under control Russian ministry units of the armed forces stationed in Russia, the Baltic states, Transcaucasia, and some areas Central Asia, outside former USSR. The ministry's senior leadership was formed mainly from Afghan veterans. One of the deputy ministers was the former commander of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, who signed the pre-coup “Word to the People.” Boris Gromov.

One of Grachev's first orders as Minister of Defense was to allow Russian troops located in zones of ethnic conflicts to open fire in the event of an attack on military units. Grachev opposed the accelerated withdrawal of Russian troops from Poland and the Baltic states, justifying this by the fact that Russia does not yet have the resources necessary to solve the social problems of military personnel and members of their families.

In the first time after his appointment, Grachev was almost not criticized by the national-patriotic and communist opposition, many of whose leaders considered him a person ideologically close to them. However, later, especially after the statement in the fall of 1992 about the support of the President by the army, the opposition’s attitude towards Grachev changed to sharply critical. The "Union of Officers" held a "court of honor" against Grachev.
He tried to prevent the weakening of unity of command in the army and its politicization. They were banned from the All-Russian Officers' Assembly, an independent trade union of military personnel, and some politicized officers were dismissed from the army, for example, the leader of the "Union of Officers" Stanislav Terekhov.
In 1993, in his speech at the Supreme Council of Russia after the President’s March statement on the “introduction of a special order for governing the country,” Grachev, like other power ministers, declared his loyalty to the Constitution, but at the same time clearly made it clear that he was on Yeltsin’s side. Before the April referendum, he stated that he would vote in support of the President.

In May 1993, by order of Yeltsin, he was introduced into the working commission for finalizing the presidential draft of the Russian Constitution.
In April 1993, the Russian prosecutor's office began an investigation into corruption in a group of Russian troops in Germany, in which, according to his opponents, Grachev was also involved.

Grachev, as well as other senior military commanders (Shaposhnikov, Kobets, Volkogonov, etc.), were repeatedly accused of privatizing in 1992, at reduced prices, state-owned dachas of the former USSR Ministry of Defense in the village of Arkhangelskoye near Moscow.
In September 1993, after presidential decree N1400 dissolving parliament, Grachev said that the army should obey only President Yeltsin and “will not interfere in political battles until the moment when political passions turn into nationwide confrontation.” On October 3, when bloody riots began in Moscow (the capture of the mayor's office, the storming of Ostankino, etc.), after some delay he called troops to Moscow, who the next day after the tank shelling stormed the parliament building.

Attended the pre-election congress of the People's Patriotic Party (leader Alexander Kotenev) in October 1993 and expressed support for it.
On October 20, 1993, by presidential decree, he was appointed a member of the Russian Security Council.

In the press, both national-patriotic and communist ("Zavtra", "Soviet Russia"), and radical-democratic ("Moskovsky Komsomolets"), Grachev was repeatedly accused of patronizing General Burlakov, whose name is associated with rampant corruption in the Western Group of Forces in Germany. In the newspaper "Zavtra" Grachev was given the nickname "Pasha-Mercedes" - for his love for cars of the corresponding brand. After the murder of Dmitry Kholodov, an employee of the Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper, on October 17, 1994, who had repeatedly written about corruption in the army, the editors of the newspaper actually accused Grachev of this murder: “General democracy is on the alert! Destroying everyone who does not fit into its statutory framework becomes a priority task. Messrs. Grachev, Burlakov and others like them, hiding the big and small sins of their activities in the wide pockets of their striped pants, will sooner or later get theirs, if not from justice, then from the Lord God." Grachev himself suggested that the murder of Kholodov “was intended as a provocation against the Minister of Defense, the GRU and the Armed Forces as a whole.”

In November 1994, a number of career officers of the Russian army (mainly tank crews and pilots from military units of the Moscow Military District), with the knowledge of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, entered into contracts with the Federal Counterintelligence Service and were sent to Chechnya to participate in hostilities on the side of the opposition to Chechen President Johor Dudayev. Several Russian officers were captured by Dudayev. The Minister of Defense, denying his knowledge of the participation of his subordinates in hostilities on the territory of Chechnya, called the captured officers deserters and mercenaries. To confirm his non-involvement in the events in Chechnya, he stated that Grozny could be taken in two hours with the forces of one airborne regiment. Later, the participation of Russian officers in the storming of Grozny was documented. In response to rumors about Grachev's imminent resignation, Boris Yeltsin called him the best defense minister of recent decades.

On November 30, 1994, by decree of the President of the Russian Federation, he was included in the Group for the Management of Actions for the Disarmament of Bandit Formations in Chechnya. In December 1994 - January 1995, from the headquarters in Mozdok, he personally led the military operations of the Russian army in the Chechen Republic.

After the failure of several offensive operations in Grozny, he returned to Moscow. From that time on he was subjected to continuous criticism in the State
Duma and in periodicals across the entire political spectrum - both for belonging to a group of politicians and military men who advocate a forceful solution to the Chechen problem, and for the losses and failures of Russian troops in Chechnya. Responding to criticism, in a television program he called the chairman of the Defense Committee in the State Duma of the first convocation, Sergei Yushenkov, a “bastard,” and human rights activist Sergei Kovalev, a traitor.

Many officers who actively advocated military reform sharply criticized Grachev for actually refusing reforms and for
a policy pursued, in their opinion, only in the selfish interests of the top generals.

Considered an enemy of generals Boris Gromov and Alexander Lebed, who both left the army in 1994-95 largely due to their relationships with Grachev.

At the beginning of May 1995, Grachev approached the government with a proposal to transfer control over the arms trade to his department. He believed that this would allow Russia to maintain its position in the global arms market. For Russia’s loss of traditional arms sales markets and the reduction in the volume of arms exports by $800 million in 1994, Grachev blamed the bloated bureaucratic system and, above all, the Rosvooruzheniye company, which not only does not explain to buyers “who to order weapons and who will supply order,” but also creates a situation where manufacturing enterprises “are not receiving part of their profits.”

With the appointment of Alexander Lebed as Secretary of the Security Council, on June 18, 1996 he was relieved of his post as Minister of Defense.
In February 1997, at a meeting of the State Duma, the head of the Defense Committee, Lev Rokhlin, announced that the former leadership of the Ministry of Defense, without official orders from the government, carried out a free supply to Armenia of 84 T-72 tanks, 40 infantry fighting vehicles, as well as spare parts worth 7 billion rubles. On April 2, he also made a detailed report on this matter at a closed meeting of parliament. According to Lev Rokhlin, the total amount of Russian losses exceeded $1 billion. Based on the results of the inspection, the head of the Main Control Directorate of the President, Vladimir Putin, said that there were indeed violations, but “during the inspection, we did not find documents that would indicate that Grachev gave direct instructions, orders in this regard."

In June 1997, a message appeared about the possibility of Grachev being appointed Russian ambassador to NATO headquarters.
On December 18, 1997, Evgeny Ananyev took up the duties of the chief military adviser to the General Director of the Rosvooruzheniye company, but began to officially perform his duties only on April 27, 1998. (In 2000, the organization was renamed Rosoboronexport).

According to the Kommersant newspaper, the cost of repairing Grachev's office at Rosvooruzheniye amounted to $150,000.

In April 2000, he was elected president of the Regional Public Fund for Assistance and Assistance airborne troops"Airborne Forces - a military brotherhood."

On February 26, 2001, he acted as a witness at the trial in the case of Dmitry Kholodov. Admitted that at one time he ordered Commander of the Airborne Forces Podkolzin to “deal” with Kholodov, but did not mean the murder of the journalist. Grachev also stated that he is confident that the defendants are not involved in the murder.

On March 11, 2002, it became known that Grachev was appointed chairman of the General Staff commission to verify the 106th Tula Airborne Division. According to the Kommersant newspaper, this appointment meant that the likelihood of Grachev returning to the army was very high. (Kommersant, March 12, 2002)

On March 24, 2004, a repeat trial of the murder of journalist Kholodov began in the Moscow District Military Court. The court interrogated Grachev, who again stated that he did not give the order to kill Kholodov. According to the Prosecutor General's Office, the head of intelligence of the Airborne Forces, Pavel Popovskikh, took the statements of Grachev, who called for “to shut up the mouth and break the legs of journalist Kholodov,” as an instruction from his superiors and decided to physically eliminate him. On October 17, 1994, the journalist was given a token from a storage room at the Kazan station, in which there was a diplomat with “sensational documents about the Ministry of Defense.” He brought the case to the editorial office, and when he opened it, there was an explosion that killed him."
He spoke out for a gradual reduction of the armed forces, calculated for the period until 1996. The final size of the Russian army, in his opinion, should be 1-1.5 million people. He believes that the army should be recruited on a mixed basis with a subsequent transition to a contract basis.

Hero of the Soviet Union. He was awarded two Orders of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner, the Red Star, "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR", and the Afghan Order of the Red Banner.

Master of Sports in Skiing.

Wife Lyubov Alekseevna. Two sons. The eldest, Sergei, born in 1970, a serviceman, graduated from the same Airborne Forces School that his father, the youngest, graduated from
Valery, born in 1975 - cadet of the Security Academy of the Russian Federation.

Grachev: Kholodov probably assembled the bomb himself

In the Moscow military court, during the trial of the murder of journalist Dmitry Kholodov, former head of the Ministry of Defense Pavel Grachev said: when he gave the order to deal with journalists who discredit the army, he did not mean their physical elimination. As a Granei.Ru correspondent reports from the courtroom, Grachev emphasized that if any of his subordinates misinterpreted his order, then “this is their problem.”

In response to a direct question whether Grachev gave the order to “deal with” Kholodov, the former minister replied as follows: “Firstly, I don’t see anything criminal in this word “deal with”. Secondly, I did not order the murder of the journalist.” The general explained that at the board meeting they were ordered to deal with every journalist for every article discrediting the army. “To sort it out,” according to Grachev, meant “to talk to every journalist, to find the source of the nonsense” that discredits the army, and “to set the author on the right path.” For this good purpose, the Minister of Defense took journalists with him on all his business trips and reported to them whenever possible. At the board at which he spoke about the need to deal with journalists, representatives of the Airborne Forces command were present, who “heard everything.” As for the accused former head of the airborne intelligence department, Pavel Popovskikh, then, according to Grachev, his position was too low, and he could not attend the board meetings.

At the court hearing, it was announced that Pavel Grachev was a suspect in a separate criminal case for the murder of Dmitry Kholodov, but this case was closed. The former minister’s surprise knew no bounds: “So, a criminal case was opened against me? Does that mean I was a criminal?” Grachev was sure that the investigators interrogated him as a witness, and not as a suspect.

Then they explained to the ex-minister: the suspicions against him were based on the testimony of Colonel Popovsky. The colonel claimed that the minister asked him to deal with the journalists. Grachev turned to Popovskikh and asked: “Did you give such testimony?” The accused replied: "No." At the same time, the former minister admitted that he separately addressed the Airborne Forces command with instructions to talk with Kholodov, since the journalist had repeatedly visited the 45th Airborne Regiment (the commander of the special detachment of this regiment, Vladimir Morozov, and his two deputies are accused in the case) and “wrote well about situation in the regiment."

The former minister also explained why he forbade Kholodov from attending meetings of the Ministry of Defense, interviewing Grachev himself and attending his press conferences. According to the general, after one meeting he met with Kholodov in the foyer and directly asked the journalist why he preferred to write lies about the situation in the army. To this, according to Grachev, Kholodov replied: “I have no complaints against you personally, but I get good money for my articles and will continue to write.” When asked who could confirm these words, the ex-minister replied: “there were people walking around,” but he doesn’t know whether anyone can confirm.

Grachev confirmed that his reaction to Kholodov’s publications was negative. “My colleagues and I” believed that Kholodov’s articles were ordered, Grachev said, they discredited the army, Grachev himself and members of his family, in particular, the minister’s son. In his opinion, the editor-in-chief of MK, Pavel Gusev, could have ordered the articles.

In the fall of 1996, the now retired Grachev was asked for a meeting by media tycoon Vladimir Gusinsky. The former minister "reluctantly agreed." Gusinsky said that he wanted to apologize to Grachev. He suggested doing it publicly, in front of the press. The entrepreneur refused. Then Grachev decided to find out what they were actually apologizing to him for. It turns out that during the events of October 1993, Gusinsky “and his colleagues” decided that Grachev could get into a tank, drive it into the Kremlin and establish a military dictatorship. When this did not happen, Gusinsky decided that “something just didn’t work out for Grachev,” but he could try again. “They decided that I didn’t think it through, didn’t finish it, but I can think it through and finish it,” explained the former head of the Ministry of Defense. And then it was decided to start a campaign to discredit Grachev in the media. The task was entrusted to Pavel Gusev, says Grachev.

According to the former minister, Gusev personally told him that he had found a certain soldier and for $1,000 asked him to tell him that he, the soldier, allegedly saw “these guys (the defendants - Ed.) preparing a suitcase." Grachev is sure that “these guys” could not prepare a crime in this way, because they were too good professionals. He does not know what kind of explosive device was used to kill the journalist. "Maybe Dima
“I made it myself,” Grachev suggested.

Grachev also recalled the scandalous broadcast on Vladimir Pozner’s “We” program in December 1993. 15 minutes before the broadcast, when the head of the Ministry of Defense was sitting in the dressing room, his security guard came running to him and said that Kholodov had come to the checkpoint with some woman. When the woman was asked to open the bag she came with, it turned out that her son’s head was there, she brought it to show it, “so that everyone would know what the rules are in the army.” Having learned about this, Grachev wanted to refuse to participate in the program, but Posner persuaded him to stay. According to Grachev, the woman was not allowed into the studio. Kholodov was there, but did not try to ask him questions about it.

Representatives of the injured party - the parents of Dmitry Kholodov - asked Grachev to remember whether the minister on this program spoke about the internal enemies of the army and whether he mentioned Kholodov among them. Grachev admitted that he mentioned enemies, but he does not remember whether he mentioned Kholodov’s name. Then the victims said: their son was going to go on air with questions to the minister, but he pointed to Kholodov and said - look, he is an enemy of the army. This episode was not aired. Grachev denied this statement. Then the judge spoke and stated that the court had viewed the full recording of the broadcast. Indeed, the head of the Ministry of Defense said there: the army has internal enemies, “for example, Kholodov.”

Representatives of the victims asked Grachev to indicate any article by Kholodov that would contain lies about Grachev and the army. Grachev refused. He added that the lies that Kholodov wrote about the minister’s son were enough, after which he was forced to end his military career. When asked by the victims why Kholodov was not sued, Grachev replied, “it was useless.” According to him, he talked with Kholodov himself and asked his press secretary to influence the journalist, but all this was in vain. “Why didn’t Kholodov sue me?” - asked Grachev. The victims noted that Grachev began to publicly accuse Kholodov only after the death of the journalist.

Finally, Grachev stated that his resignation from the post of Minister of Defense was not connected with the “Kholodov case.” He explained: Lebed, having become Secretary of the Security Council, insisted that the Minister of Defense also report to him. Grachev could not bear this and resigned.

Dmitry Kholodov died on October 17, 1994 in the building of the editorial office of Moskovsky Komsomolets as a result of the explosion of a booby trap that was placed in a “diplomat” briefcase. The prosecutor's office accuses six people of the murder of the 27-year-old correspondent: the former head of the airborne intelligence department Pavel Popovskikh, the commander of the special detachment of the 45th airborne regiment Vladimir Morozov, his two deputies Alexander Soroka and Konstantin Mirzayants, the deputy head of the Ross security company Alexander Kapuntsov and businessman Konstantin Barkovsky. According to investigators, he organized the murder of the Popovskys “out of careerist motives.”

The ease, even swagger, with which the ex-Minister of Defense behaved in the court presence, addressing first the judge, then the accused, then the public, suggests that Pavel Sergeevich has long since recovered from the fright of those days when the public was almost I am sure of the involvement of Pasha-Mercedes in the death of journalist Dmitry Kholodov. Of course, the fear had passed long before the ex-minister’s current appearance in court. But there was caution - as if something might not work out. Therefore, I did not communicate with the press; at the first trial I answered briefly and clearly as a soldier. And suddenly such liberation. He even allowed himself to transparently hint that Kholodov died fulfilling some hellish anti-Grachev plan of MK editor Pavel Gusev and tycoon Vladimir Gusinsky. [...]

Letter to Yeltsin

According to the director of Rybinsk Motors JSC Valery Shelgunov, the day before the results of the competition for the sale of a state-owned stake of 37% of the shares of Rybinsk Motors JSC were scheduled for December 29, 1995, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and Chairman of the State Defense Industry Committee Viktor Glukhikh signed a joint appeal to President Yeltsin asking him to intervene in the situation. The authors of the letter noted that their position is shared by the head of the administration Yaroslavl region, Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative in the region, State Defense Industry Committee, Ministry of Defense, Chairman of the Federation Council, Accounts Chamber, general designers and chairmen of a number of State Duma committees. The letter was signed by Grachev in the hospital and Yeltsin could not personally deliver it to him. It went through the office of the President's aides.

According to the management of Rybinsk Motors JSC, the letter did not fall into the hands of Yeltsin, but went to Viktor Chernomyrdin. In January 1996, V. Glukhikh was removed from his position.

According to Valery Voskoboynikov, a joint letter from Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and Chairman of the State Defense Industry Committee Viktor Glukhikh was the reason for the withdrawal from the loans-for-shares auctions of the Arsenyev Aviation Company Progress, the Ulan-Ude and Irkutsk APO, the Design Bureau named after. Sukhoi.