Events in the USSR in 1956 radically changed the course of development of the state. This year has been full of successful discoveries, political announcements and the adoption of important laws. If you analyze the course of events, you can see a certain logical connection in the chronology.

Event #1

On February 13, 1956, the Soviet Antarctic was opened. The construction of the facility was carried out in the shortest possible time. The shock construction began on January 5, 1956, when the Soviet ship Ob approached the Antarctic coast. By February 13, the ship's crew had built 21 buildings for research and accommodation for expedition members, as well as an airfield. They could already fly over vast distances, so travel by air was much faster than by water. The grandiose construction ended the day before the opening of the fateful 20th Congress of the CPSU. Logical? Undoubtedly! We tried not to make it in time!

February 1956: an event in the USSR that changed attitudes towards Stalin

Soviet life from the early 1930s until Stalin's death in 1953 was full of horrors. Repressions, deaths, denunciations, executions, destruction of the best military before the start of the war, exaltation of the personality of Joseph Stalin. Such moments were obvious excesses and were not prescribed in the Marxist-Leninist theory, which in its essence was quite interesting and democratic.

The congress opened on February 14, 1956. More than 1,400 delegates representing all republics of the Union took part in its work. The importance of this event was that the 19th Congress took place back in the 1930s. It was necessary to reboot all spheres of life in Soviet society. The congress delegates condemned the political excesses that took place during Stalin's reign. It was emphasized that Stalin did not follow Lenin in implementing the provisions of Marxist-Leninist theory. At this congress, a creative rethinking of the life of the USSR in the last 20 years took place. The delegates agreed on important decisions of the Council of Ministers regarding the gradual increase in wages and strengthening the development of agriculture. The so-called thaw began in cultural life. The apogee of the congress and the entire political life of the state over many years came It was on this day that Nikita Khrushchev made his famous report on the debunking of the cult of personality.

Kuibyshev - a city of mysticism and faith in God

Atheism... Godlessness... 1956... Events in the USSR in Kuibyshev proved to many supporters of the absence of heavenly powers the error of their views. "Zoya's Standing" is a miracle that shocked the whole city. Important events in the USSR in 1956 did not always become public knowledge. For example, only the residents of Kuibyshev, the internal affairs bodies and the church knew about “Zoya’s standing”. What happened on the evening before the New Year in an ordinary Soviet family? The girl wanted to meet New Year with friends, dancing, etc. Her mother dissuaded her from such a celebration, because the Nativity Fast had not yet ended. It is clear that the youth of that time did not respect church orders. The mother went to church to pray, and a party started at home. Girlfriends came with their boyfriends, but Zoya's boyfriend Nikolai was a little late. It turned out that she had no one to dance with. The girl took the image of St. Nicholas in her hands, saying: “I will dance with this Nicholas!” Almost immediately after this, a glow appeared in the room, the girl was petrified in the literal sense of the word. The peculiarity of this fact was that she did not die, because her heartbeat was palpable. A pilgrimage literally began from all over the city to Zoya’s house, so police guards were stationed there. Church dignitaries also came and read prayers over Zoya. "Zoya's Stand" lasted 128 days and ended on May 6, 1956, Easter. After this event, atheism in Kuibyshev ended - people began to go to church, pray and undergo baptism. The year 1956 was marked by such a sensation.

Events in the USSR: football

Football went on as usual. The USSR Championship was already held in several divisions. This year the geography of championship participants has expanded to include teams from remote Soviet republics and teams Far East. In the major league, the standings at the end of the season were, of course, topped by the capital's clubs. Spartak became the champion with 34 points. Dynamo Moscow fell behind by 6 points, and CDSA by as much as 9 points. Who do you think became the best non-Moscow club? Right! Dynamo (Kyiv) took 4th place in the tournament. “Trudovye Reservy” (Leningrad) and “ODO” (Sverdlovsk) were relegated to the first league.

Football events in the USSR in 1956 were not limited to the championship. The Summer Olympics were held in Melbourne, Australia. The main favorites of the football tournament, despite the participation of German, British, Yugoslav teams (all of these countries sent young people), were the national teams of the USSR and Bulgaria. In addition to these teams, several frankly weak teams took part in the tournament. The Soviet team played 5 matches (4 wins and a draw). In the tournament, our players beat German youth, Indonesia (they had to have a replay), and Bulgaria. In the final they beat the Yugoslav team with a score of 1:0.

Transformations in labor legislation

The significant events of 1956 are not limited to football, the Congress of the CPSU and the opening of a station in Antarctica. Important changes have been adopted in labor legislation. On May 26, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On the establishment of a six-hour working day for persons aged 16 to 18 years” was signed. On July 14, 1956, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the Law “On State Pensions,” which provided for a slight increase in pensions for those entitled to them, as well as the possibility of assigning pensions to collective farm workers if they had a passport and the ability to confirm their work experience.

Treaty with Japan

Let's talk about what happened in the USSR in 1956. Among foreign policy events, it is worth recalling reconciliation with Japan. To this day, it is widely believed that World War II is not officially over because the successors of the USSR did not sign a peace treaty with Japan. On October 19, Soviet and Japanese diplomats held negotiations, which resulted in the signing of the Declaration on the End of the State of War between States. The countries restored diplomatic relations and exchanged ambassadors.

Development of virgin lands

As we have already noted, many events in the USSR in 1956 left a significant mark on history. The development of virgin lands is one of them. In the Central Asian republics, much land that could potentially become sown was not cultivated. To do this they had to be processed. In 1956, a decree of the Council of Ministers “On the development of virgin lands” was issued. The trip to explore virgin lands has become the most popular Komsomol route in the country. Already in 1956, more than 50 thousand people visited these works for the benefit of the Soviet homeland.

Aircraft manufacturing

In 1956, Soviet engineers surprised the whole world with a new model of a passenger airliner. We are talking about the TU-104 jet aircraft. This model was demonstrated at air shows. The airliner made its first regular flight on the route Moscow - Omsk - Irkutsk. Fast, convenient and inexpensive are the main principles in Aeroflot's work. Soviet engineers never ceased to amaze the world with new achievements.

Conclusion

Probably the most intense important points It was February 1956. Event number 1 in the USSR, of course, determined the development trends of the state for the years to come. Many resolutions of the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Council, issued in 1956, implemented the decisions taken at the congress. 1956 became one of the most important and fruitful years in the history of the USSR.

The Hungarian events of 1956 in the responses of two Russian scientists

Member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee M. A. Suslov, who at the end of October 1956 was with A. I. Mikoyan in Hungary, trying unsuccessfully to influence the course of the dramatic events that unfolded there, soon after returning to Moscow received a new assignment from the party. On November 6, he was to speak at a ceremonial meeting of the Moscow party nomenklatura and workers' representatives on the occasion of the next anniversary of the October Revolution. The next day, the Pravda newspaper, quoting his speech, wrote that all Soviet people “rejoice at the victory won by the Hungarian workers over the counter-revolution.” Although the flow of disinformation indeed overwhelmed the pages of the Soviet press in those days, Suslov and his fellow party leaders were clearly wishful thinking.

Sources indicate the ambiguity of Soviet society's perception of Hungarian events. Yes, the majority of Soviet citizens did, to one degree or another, accept the statements of official propaganda on faith. The most effective propaganda argument in favor of the need for a forceful solution was the thesis that the Soviet Army, by its intervention in Hungary, allegedly prevented a new big war. Since in 1956 the Second World War was in the memory of people even of younger generations (both in the USSR and in the West), this argument was actively used in foreign policy propaganda, and N. S. Khrushchev most readily resorted to it, including conversations with foreign correspondents. Many Soviet citizens who took official dogma seriously saw what was happening primarily as an attempt to remove Hungary from the Soviet sphere of influence. According to their logic, “we must free Hungary from those forces that want to take it away from us,” “we paid with blood for Hungary in 1945. Why on earth should it be given to the Americans?” . The Hungarian events, therefore, were perceived by part of society as a kind of continuation of the Great Patriotic War, and Soviet military actions as a legitimate response to the encroachments of some forces to revise the gains achieved by the USSR in the fight against fascism. The existence of such sentiments worked as one of the decisive arguments in favor of a forceful method of resolving the Hungarian issue. “Our party will not understand us,” Khrushchev said on October 31 at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. A significant part of ordinary party members really feared the weakening of the sovereign power of the USSR, and saw the Hungarian events as a symptom of such a weakening. Power Soviet Union and the Soviet Army, the strength of the achieved geopolitical conquests of the USSR in Eastern Europe were considered as a guarantor of preventing a new world war.

Be that as it may, official propaganda did not convince everyone of the correctness of the chosen methods for resolving the Hungarian crisis; various sources (including reports from lower party authorities to higher authorities) record doubts about the need for a forceful approach, statements that others do not need impose their will, interfere in the internal affairs of other nations (“even without us they could have sorted it out”). There was an opinion that the Hungarian issue should be resolved peacefully (“otherwise we are killing people in vain”), a forceful solution was associated with unjustified human casualties, both on the Soviet and Hungarian sides. Thus, the range of moods and assessments in Soviet society was quite wide.

Historians know of many cases of protest by Soviet citizens against the policies of their leadership in Hungary. We can mention the Moscow and Leningrad students who distributed leaflets and paid for it with several years in prison, and about a high school student from Yaroslavl, Vitaly Lazaryants (by the way, the son of the director of a large plant), who went to a demonstration on November 7 with a poster “Hands off Hungary!” . One of the forms of protest behavior was the damage to monuments to Stalin. University youth turned to studying the experience of the Hungarian revolution (including the workers' councils in Hungary) in the context of a critical understanding of modern Soviet reality. The inconsistency of this reality with the spirit of Marxist teaching is revealed, alternative ideas are expressed, which at that time, as a rule, did not go beyond the framework of the socialist worldview (even in cases where radical methods of their implementation were allowed).

KGB intelligence reports recorded sharply critical statements made in a narrower circle by a number of prominent cultural and scientific figures. Among the latter, Lev Landau (1908-1968) is a world-famous physicist, academician, and future Nobel Prize laureate.

Landau called what was happening in Hungary a revolution. Everything that happened is a “noble deed”, a “most heartwarming event”, when the “heroic people” are fighting for freedom, including boys aged 13-16 who rushed to the barricades. “The real descendants of the great revolutionaries... I am ready to kneel before Hungary... Hungarian heroism deserves admiration,” he said among his friends. The Hungarian people, the outstanding physicist believed, rebelled “against their enslavers.” And not only against the “small Hungarian clique”. Landau spares no emotion when characterizing Soviet leaders (“the criminals running the country decided to splash themselves with blood”). The “puppet” Kadar also gets it from him (“ours ordered it - and he sits”).

At the same time, what is important, the academician was consistent in condemning the imperialist policies inherent not only in the Soviet Union. He was sharply critical, for example, of England, France and Israel, which had colluded with them, for the military action against Egypt, which nationalized the Suez Canal. “As much as the Egyptians are admired, the Israelis are vile, vile lackeys... I, as a rootless cosmopolitan, have complete disgust for them.” There was obvious irony in Landau’s response: in the late 1940s, during the unbridled anti-Semitic campaign unleashed by Stalin, he, like many other Soviet intellectuals of Jewish origin, was accused of sympathizing with Israel and the circles of the international Jewish financial oligarchy that patronized this young state , not too tied to one or another national soil.

Another interesting evidence of the attitude of part of the Soviet intelligentsia to what was happening in and around Hungary is the diary of Sergei Sergeevich Dmitriev (1907-1991), a professor at Moscow University, one of the recognized experts in history Russia XIX V. It was published in the Russian magazine " National history"in 1999-2000.

Always interested in events in the countries of the Soviet bloc, a thoughtful professor-historian could draw a conclusion about the unfavorable state of affairs even from the most meager newspaper reports. On June 12, 1953, just a few days before the mass protests in the GDR, Dmitriev noted a significant fact in his diary. The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, he writes, “recognized the presence of serious mistakes, one might say, in all areas of politics and life in the eastern zone of Germany... In short, recognition of the complete inconsistency of the policy of introducing socialism in a few years. The result of this policy was, obviously, the desolation of the GDR, the mass exodus of the population (labor!!!) to West Germany. Now they are trying to win back the naive and gain lost trust from those who remained with the help of a kind of NEP? Who will believe such experimenters over the people?” “The same experiments,” the professor continued his thoughts, “are being carried out on the peoples of a number of countries in Eastern Europe. But the Germans had somewhere to run; the existence of two Germanys made it possible for the Germans, who found themselves in the position of experimental animals” (1999. No. 5. P. 150). Other nations did not have this opportunity.

The Hungarian events coincided with the Pablo Picasso exhibition in Moscow, the first after the Iron Curtain was slightly opened with the beginning of the “Thaw”. It was possible to organize it despite the resistance of party orthodoxies largely thanks to the efforts of Ilya Ehrenburg. November 3, returning home after visiting art exhibition, a professor who repeatedly wrote in his works about the response in Russia to the tsarist intervention in Hungary in 1849, made a not too long, but extremely expressive note: “The main topic of all conversations is the events in Hungary. Apparently, if not today, then tomorrow the open military intervention of the USSR against Hungary will begin. They will crush the Hungarian people and once again flood the land of Hungary with blood” (2000. No. 2. P. 149). In general, the premonition did not deceive the Moscow historian.

Dmitriev called November 4 “Black Sunday.” In his diary, he not only recorded the event, but gave it a clear assessment: “Today the fact of the USSR’s military intervention against Hungary became obvious and was publicly proclaimed by the government of the USSR. Of course, not without the help of a small fig leaf. Such a leaf appeared at the wave of our conductor’s baton, seemingly popping up in Budapest, the revolutionary workers’ and peasants’ government of Hungary, headed by Janos Kadar... It’s a shame to be Russian. It’s a shame because although the Hungarians are suppressed not by the Russian people, but by the communist power of the USSR, the Russian people are silent, they behave like a people of slaves... Their conscience is asleep, their consciousness is deceived, there is no protest in them against these black deeds... A nation cannot be free, which suppresses other peoples…” (2000. No. 2. P. 149). As one can judge from these records, the conscience of part of the Russian intelligentsia was by no means asleep.

In the notes relating to the anniversary of the October Revolution, there was a mention of the meeting at which Suslov spoke on behalf of “the entire Soviet people”: “Shameful days for our country. The forces of the Soviet army, judging even by our official newspapers, still continue to strangle Hungary and flood its soil with Hungarian blood. And the hypocrites, gathered yesterday for a ceremonial meeting at the Sports Palace on the occasion of the 39th anniversary of the October Revolution, applauded the words of speaker Suslov about the suppression of the counter-revolution in Hungary” (Record dated November 7, 2000. No. 2. P. 149).

While the Hungarian radio listener could often get information from Western “voices,” the vast majority of Soviet citizens did not have this opportunity - the distance affected them, which made it possible to jam transmissions from abroad. Living in Moscow, Professor Dmitriev was cut off from any sources of information other than the official ones. He resolutely refused to take the stereotypes of party propaganda on faith:

“You read the newspapers and despair takes over. Shameless lies, disinformation, suppression of what is generally known, the most blatant, blatant distrust of the reader, disrespect for him... One thing is indisputable. The general popular uprising in Hungary had a national liberation character. The uprising essentially won a complete victory - it swept away the old government and the old ruling party... and created new authorities and other parties. The armed intervention of the USSR suppressed this uprising. But she suppressed it only by force, brute material force, weapons and superiority of forces. It took almost a month to suppress... What are the results? With the help of weapons and at the cost of blood, the external unity of the socialist camp led by the USSR was preserved. All that was left of the idea of ​​coexistence was rubble. There is no need to talk about the moral and political unity of the socialist camp” (Records dated November 24 and December 11, 2000. No. 2, pp. 150-151). And on November 27, the following entry was made: “It is better not to write about the affairs of unfortunate Hungary. It’s a shame to be Russian” (2000. No. 2. P. 150).

Academician Landau was even more critical of official Soviet information (“who, the executioners, should we believe?”). Unlike the vast majority of his compatriots, he had the opportunity to listen to Western radio broadcasts regularly at home and, it must be said, was sometimes ready to accept at face value unverified information about what was happening in Hungary - in fact, it was not only , as Landau believed, state security officers.

Still, the facts that leaked into the press, through the censorship sieve, provided food for thought, the logic of which did not at all coincide with the official line. Thus, having read the speech of the Czechoslovak leader A. Novotny at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in early December in Pravda, Dmitriev made his own conclusions:

“Novotny is a 100% Stalinist (like all true Stalinists, he calls himself, of course, a Leninist). His assurances about in perfect order in Czechoslovakia it’s sickening to read. However, how do they differ in particular from similar assurances of the Hungarian Gere regarding Hungary - assurances made at the very last days before 23.10. 1956? Or from Malenkov’s assurances in the report at the 19th Congress of the CPSU in October 1952? Nothing, really. And what real prosperity and excellent order are in Hungary and the USSR became clear in the first case, starting from 10.23.1956, and in the second, starting from 5.3. 1953 (the day of Stalin’s death - A.S.) everything is gradually becoming clearer” (Record dated December 12, 2000. No. 2. P. 151).

In comparison with Novotny, who never deviated one iota from the Moscow line, the Italian communist leader P. Togliatti not only had an incomparably higher intelligence, but, more importantly, was placed in completely different conditions at home, which forced him to show much more mental intelligence. balancing act, justifying the need for Soviet intervention in Hungary. Togliatti's speech at the VIII Congress of the ICP (December 1956) was sharply distorted, “combed” by Pravda, and adjusted to the general propaganda rank. Experienced historian and source scholar S. Dmitriev could not help but notice this: “In a retelling, with omissions, with ellipses, Pravda published today Tolyatti’s speech at the congress of the Italian Communist Party. Everything that is of direct interest and importance to Soviet communists in this speech has been replaced by ellipses. This is an organ of the CPSU Central Committee, afraid to directly convey to the communists of the USSR what the communist of Italy thinks!” (Record dated December 11, 2000. No. 2. P. 151).

The professor also responded to criticism in the Soviet press of the main Tito ideologist E. Kardelj, who, speaking in the Assembly of Yugoslavia on December 7, distanced himself from Soviet policy in Hungary and outlined his understanding of the role of workers' councils under socialism. Dmitriev saw the essence of the differences between the leaders of the two countries, first of all, in the desire of the Yugoslavs to publicly declare their views to the whole world. The meaning of the article by Yu. Pavlov (pseudonym of academician G.P. Frantsov) in Pravda dated December 18, according to the historian, is as follows:

“Why tell the truth when it is not profitable for us to tell it? – asks the author of the Moscow article Kardelya. Now we need unity... If the truth can interfere with it, then we need (at least for a while - Pavlov consoles the gullible truth-lovers) not to tell this truth, not to write about it. Judgments about the truth cannot be made the property of everyone... One should privately, in one’s own circle, without washing dirty linen in public, agree among one another on what is considered “the truth” for today. And then present this manufactured truth as Truth-Truth to the entire public. In short, criticism cannot be tolerated behind the closed doors of party caucus meetings. Let Tito, Kardel and everyone else bring their views to the attention of Khrushchev, Suslov, Novotny, Enver Hoxha and other leaders and leaders. Let them convey their views in a closed letter to M. Thorez or someone else. But how can you publicly declare your views to the whole world?” (Record dated December 19, 2000. No. 2. P. 151-152).

The Soviet leaders' confidence in the need to lead the people along the path to communism does not imply faith in the common sense of the people, Dmitriev argues. How, in fact, can we allow every communist (and especially every citizen) to seek the truth and consciously judge politics? The masses, according to the logic of the party leaders, must work, increase production and not meddle in something other than their own business, that is, in politics. This means that they do not need the kind of truth that can lead them out of obedience and obedience, which is disadvantageous to the interests of ensuring the leading role of the Communist Party.

Serious reflections on the anti-democratic nature of the Soviet system (the essence of which is in no way changed by all the declarations on the participation of the masses in government) run as a leitmotif through the diaries of S. Dmitriev. Soon after the 20th Congress of the CPSU (February 1956), he wrote about the undivided triumph of the party bureaucracy, based on the apparatus of the police and army, that “bureaucracy, administration, centralization and trampling of democracy” are still “prevailing and determining, although with 1953, something is being done inconsistently and hesitantly to eliminate them.” According to the deep conviction of the professor, real democratization is impossible while maintaining the one-party system: “there cannot be democracy without real (and not declarative paper) freedom of the press and personal freedom. And it is impossible to provide them with the help of the dictatorship of the apparatus of the only, and what’s more, ruling party” (Record dated June 3, 1956, 2000. No. 2. P. 143-144). Needless to say, how seditious these views were from the point of view of the guidelines of the 20th Congress, which in no way encroached on the monopoly of the ruling party. Well aware of his fundamental differences with the line of the Khrushchev leadership on superficial de-Stalinization, Dmitriev did not hide his skepticism either towards N. Khrushchev’s sensational speech at a closed meeting at the end of the 20th Congress on February 25 (information about which was then read out at party meetings), or towards the resolution of the Central Committee CPSU of June 30, 1956, designed to establish more clearly the boundaries of what is possible in the criticism of Stalin and Stalinism. Khrushchev and his circle, according to the Moscow professor, are trying to reduce everything “to moderate criticism of the past, to suppress any thoughts” about the current “political regime.” Any reasoning about the deformation of the social system in the USSR, that the roots of the cult of personality are laid in the nature of the Soviet system, are declared to be at least deeply erroneous, which means that both of these documents, according to Dmitriev, lead thought away from the facts and only contribute to the revival of those powerful forces that are the bearers of this so-called “cult of personality” (see entry dated July 2, 1956, 2000. No. 2. P. 144).

The Hungarian revolution and the brutal measures to suppress it only confirmed Dmitriev, like Landau, in his ideas about the original essence of the Soviet system, created under Lenin and which did not change at all even after the sensational revelations of Stalin at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. It is not for nothing that Landau reacted more than skeptically to any reasoning like “if Lenin had stood up, then...”.

During the days when blood was shed on the streets of Budapest, there were rumors in Moscow among Landau's entourage that the unrest was about to spread to neighboring Czechoslovakia. The leading physicist saw this as a sign of positive change. What the Hungarians did, in his opinion, “deserves borrowing.” Trying to comprehend the significance of the Hungarian events in a broader perspective, he noted: “I consider what the Hungarians did to be the greatest achievement. They were the first to smash, to truly deal a stunning blow to the Jesuit idea in our time... I think it’s wonderful that this Jesuit myth is dying.” According to Landau, recorded in intelligence reports, the Hungarian revolution opened up an opportunity that was previously difficult to imagine - the possibility of a revolution in one of the countries of the Soviet bloc, and perhaps in the very center of world communism - the USSR. “Just a year ago it seemed ridiculous to think about revolution in our country. But it's not funny. It will happen, it’s not absurd.” Landau assumed that a military coup would take place in the USSR in the foreseeable future. Clearly wishful thinking, he allegedly said: “this is a very real thing now, given such low popularity of the government and the hatred of the people towards the ruling class.” Considering the Soviet system to be the main source of discord on the planet, he added: “If our system cannot collapse peacefully, then the third world war is inevitable with all the horrors that lie ahead... If our system is eliminated without war, it doesn’t matter whether by revolution or evolution , it doesn’t matter, then there will be no war at all... So the question of the peaceful liquidation of our system is essentially a question of the fate of humanity.”

S. Dmitriev assessed the prospects of the Soviet system much more realistically than Landau. At the beginning of November 1956, rumors spread among the Moscow intelligentsia about strikes in Moscow and the Donbass in protest against the reduction in prices for production standards. Considering this phenomenon symptomatic, Dmitriev, however, had no illusions about rapid changes in the Soviet system. Commenting on the fact of the strikes, he wrote on November 7:

“All these are spontaneous manifestations of popular indignation. They have no consciousness, no political slogans. Such manifestations are powerless in the fight against the huge party-Soviet apparatus and all the means of propaganda in its hands.” Dictatorship and democracy, Dmitriev summed up his further thoughts, “are irreconcilable things. If we are for dictatorship, then we need “democracy” only as decoration; Our “democracy” is in fact despotism. And it will be so. Of course, when, as a result of the dictatorship, we crush everything and subordinate it to this dictatorship, then we will organize “democracy” for the human herd, deceived and satisfied with the fact that they are fed and given work” (2000. No. 2. P. 149).

“Consolidation” in Hungary gave everything to the new government more confidence Stalinists in the USSR. Our domestic “guardians of the purity of Marxist-Leninist theory” are “little by little perking up and moving from defense to attack,” Dmitriev recorded on November 20, recalling Gorky’s slogan: “if the enemy does not surrender, he is destroyed.” However, the professor further noted, “if he surrenders, then he is also destroyed, but in a different, slower way” (2000. No. 2. P.150). The atmosphere at party meetings increasingly reminded him of the atmosphere of the devastating “discussions” of 1948-1950, when the USSR fought against “bourgeois cosmopolitanism”: “Stalinists have noticeably perked up everywhere” (Record dated November 29, 2000. No. 2. P. 151).

A month later, on December 30, impressed by the discussion at a party meeting of a closed letter from the CPSU Central Committee condemning the too free “behavior” of the Soviet intelligentsia, he notes: “Home affairs are moving in the direction of ‘tightening the screws’.” Too free behavior, Dmitriev continues, of course, means a manifestation of independent thinking. And “independent thinking” is considered everything that does not coincide letter for letter with the articles in today’s newspapers (2000. No. 2. P. 152). Even those who believe that “the era of liberalism and the game of democracy has not yet been eliminated” are convinced that “liberalism” and “democracy” will exist within very strictly defined limits (Record dated December 12, 1956, 2000. No. 2. C 151). “The overall results of the year are difficult,” the professor stated on December 31 (2000. No. 2. P. 152). Shortly before this, speaking at the December plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Khrushchev outlined his vision of what was happening in the country and the tasks facing the authorities in this regard: “I believe that in our party we did not quite correctly understand the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU. Many thousands of people were released from prison. But there were not only clean ones there. There were some very unclean people there - Trotskyists, Zinovievites, right-wingers, all sorts of trash. Now they too have been released. Some of them have been reinstated into the party. The majority were correctly reinstated in the party, these are honest people, we must surround them with care and attention, but those who are enemies of our party were also reinstated. They are now talking all sorts of nonsense, while our comrades fold their paws and remain neutral. It is not right. Such people must be rebuffed; they must be expelled from the party; if they carry out destructive work in the party, they must be arrested. There is no other way out. We must correctly carry out internal party democracy, workers’ democracy, but we must wage a fierce struggle with our enemies, otherwise we will be unworthy of our position as leaders of the party and the country.”

Words in this case did not diverge from deeds. The slow onset of the Stalinist reaction in the sphere of ideology and culture, and the penitential speeches at party meetings that had once again become fashionable, were also discussed in Dmitriev’s notes dating back to 1957-1958. The press called for the repentance of writers who defended opinions different from the party line, and were sharply criticized for this. According to one of the articles read and immediately commented on by Dmitriev, in essence “there is no difference between the Union of Soviet Writers and the Communist Party. Here and there, complete external unity of opinion is required. Party discipline - obedience to the secretary - is the law for the writers' union (the supposed free and creative association) and for the political party organization." Most of all, the author of the article was outraged by the fact that members of the editorial board of the criticized publication (the Literary Moscow almanac) “were silent about the charges brought against them. They don’t defend themselves (let them try!), they don’t repent (what would be better, that’s all that’s required of them!), but simply remain silent. And this position allows many to pose the question: who should we go with – the Writers’ Union or its silent members? Well, the Hungarian writers and their Union as a whole tried to express their views directly and boldly defend them. And what? Their union was closed, and the members of the Union were sent to prison” (Record dated June 16, 1957, 2000. No. 3. P. 156-157). The very recent experience of Hungarian events (and the activities of the Hungarian Writers' Union were indeed suspended in January 1957) could not help but lead any thinking person to analogies. Of course, Professor Dmitriev was no exception.

There were conversations among the Moscow intelligentsia (Dmitriev also noted them in his diary) that during one of the conversations with cultural figures (it took place on May 13, 1957), Khrushchev noted that the fight against the cult of personality is now “for us already passed.” stage." There, recalling the years of his youth, the speaker spoke about the dangers of children's playing with matches - a game that resulted in fires, and among other things warned listeners that the authorities have ways to combat both fires and dangerous games of matches.

“Sapiente sat,” Dmitriev recalled the saying of the ancients, “A little more, and we will return to the continuation of the publication of Stalin’s works, and at the same time to his entire policy... A general course towards the restoration of the foundations, the essence of what can be conditionally and at the same time very accurately called “ Stalinism”, was completely determined... The cold snap is strong.” At the same time, the professor noted, “the international situation contributes to such “reverse progress” in our domestic affairs” (Records for the first half of 1957, 2000. No. 3. pp. 155-156).

For all his skepticism, Prof. Dmitriev, reflecting on what was happening, comparing the facts, could not deny Khrushchev’s subjective desire to “correct” and “improve” the system associated with the name of Stalin: “Yes, Khrushchev and his entourage have some signs of inconsistent fighters for correcting mistakes and shortcomings (which delicately -soft expressions!) Stalin’s personality cult,” he admitted in an entry dated July 12, 1957 (2000. No. 3. P. 157). But subjective intentions do not lead to the proper results, because behind the updated political declarations and new ideologies (for example, about the “collective leadership” that replaced the Stalinist unity of command) the old mechanism is hidden - the “dictatorship of the proletariat” is actually the dictatorship of the Central Committee, in which the first secretary is like The Pope in the Catholic Church establishes indisputably what is true today and what should be recognized as false. “As long as he is alive and in the post of first secretary, he is infallible,” and only the successor can publicly announce the mistakes of his predecessor and condemn his lifetime cult (See the same entry).

On July 18, 1957, less than a month after the defeat of the internal party opposition of Malenkov-Kaganovich-Molotov, the professor stated with all certainty: “in essence, the system of unity of command has already been completely restored” (2000. No. 3. P. 157). Closely following internal political changes in the USSR, Dmitriev the further, the more he noticed the symptoms of a new cult of personality, implanted by all means of propaganda. At the same time, he noticed that the very same people who, just a year and a half earlier, after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, in accordance with the current party guidelines, were louder than others in favor of exposing Stalin, were often particularly active in creating a new cult. One is closely linked to the other - a place needs to be cleared for a new cult.

“It seems that most of the overthrowers are against Stalin only because he is dead: therefore, firstly, it is not so dangerous to overthrow him; secondly, his overthrow automatically ensures the strengthening of another leader in his empty place. The leader is already there, you just need to finally cover it with the gloss and varnish of the classic leader. The best way to bring proper shine to a new leader is to contrast him with the old leader: denigrating the latter is the necessary varnish for the former. For now, you can still chat and gossip about all this a little (of course, privately, face to face, with your closest people). But the time is already close when this will end “a little”, and people will begin to be exiled and imprisoned for such freedom in thoughts,” writes Dmitriev on May 4, 1958 (2000. No. 4. P. 151).

In the 1930s - early 1950s in Russia, he continues his thoughts, a brilliant experience was made in introducing unanimity, to which the country is now returning after several years of delays. Obviously, the point is not in individuals, but in the fact that the existing order and system cannot do without such experience.

“Stalin did not create order and regime, but order and regime gave birth to Stalin. They give birth before our eyes to a new personality, filling the void created after the death of the bearer and “creator” of the cult of personality. In short, the king is dead, long live the king!” “An increasingly dense crowd of faceless new leaders from satellite friends is formed around the boss... So mother history trudges along and does her job” (2000. No. 4. P. 152).

Observing the policy of the Khrushchev leadership, Dmitriev noted in it some strange, whimsical conglomeration of heterogeneous layers: “we are making noise about the need for a meeting at “ highest level“and at the same time we bully the United States in the most annoying way and conduct anti-American propaganda”; They removed opponents of the 20th Congress from the leadership, “so what? The dogmatists triumph,” and those who try to think independently are labeled revisionists (Records of March 31, 1958, 2000. No. 4. P. 150).

This word, Dmitriev noted, has become one of the most commonly used, it “serves like a baton to crush and throw into dust everyone trying to think and understand” (Records from October 11-12, 1958, 2000. No. 4. P. 153). At the same time, which is typical, no one gave any clear definition of what revisionism is. “If by revisionism we mean everything that today does not correspond to Khrushchev’s last speech, then the boundaries of this concept are expanded to the limit. But it is quite possible that today, something that does not correspond to the last speech, will tomorrow correspond to Khrushchev’s new speech. How then? And there are a lot of performances,” Dmitriev noted on January 5, 1958 (2000. No. 4. P. 149).

After six months it happens significant event– the image of the revisionists is not only personified in the personalities of Imre Nagy and his comrades who find themselves in the dock, but, more importantly, the whole world has seen: revisionism is not just “erroneous” ideas that are subject to criticism and even condemnation, any revisionist “delusion” can be inflate to the scale of a criminal offense punishable by death. It became clear that the methods of eliminating political competitors that became the norm under Stalin are not a thing of the past; they can also be applied by those who publicly renounced the dead leader. The message about the trial in the case of I. Nagy could not fail to evoke a response from the Moscow professor. On June 25, 1958, 10 days after the death sentence was handed down, he wrote in his diary:

“Executing people for political views is inherent in any undemocratic rule: Ivan IV the Terrible, Stalin, the Spanish kings of the past. It is also inherent in modern Soviet rule. They will say: this is the nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat; executions express the strength of the dictatorship. But is power expressed in the fact that guns are used against ideas and executions against critics? “Revisionists”, of course, can be caught, put in camps, shot, doused with slop. But will their views, the ideology of “revisionism” be defeated by such methods? No, Dmitriev answers the question posed to himself, they will only cease to be outwardly detected for some time. And only (2000. No. 4. P. 153).

The trial in the Imre Nagy case showed that the methods of eliminating political competitors that became the norm under Stalin are by no means a thing of the past; they can be demanded and applied by those who publicly renounced the dead leader. Of course, time does not stand still, argues Dmitriev, and the methods of exterminating heretics in the USSR are most often now somewhat different than in 1937-1953. “Previously, people were forced to remain silent by shooting or sending them to concentration camps.” Nowadays, extreme measures are resorted to less often. So Boris Pasternak, expelled from the Union of Soviet Writers after the transfer of the novel “Doctor Zhivago” to the West and put by propaganda on a par with Djilas and Imre Nagy, may not be arrested, everything will end in a noisy study - the professor continued his thoughts in the fall of 1958, in the midst of the anti-Pasternak campaign associated with the awarding of the Nobel Prize to him.

“Now there are different techniques... The techniques are different, but the essence is the same. A dictatorship cannot allow thinking. Well, what techniques are used is a secondary matter. In the end, any technique is good if it leads to achieving the goal. The winners are right, they are not judged. And who could judge them? Are they using “self-criticism” themselves, or what?” (Records dated June 15, 1957 and October 25, 1958, 2000. No. 3. P. 156; No. 4. P. 155-157).

Democratic values ​​are still irresistible, Dmitriev is sure, this is evidenced by the fact that any, even the toughest dictatorship strives to show its superiority over other forms of government, primarily in ensuring democratic freedoms. Western democracy is being denied in the name of some model that claims to be a higher type of democracy. “Heroic attempts are being made to show that we (in the USSR - A.S.) have public opinion, a struggle of opinions, discussions. With the help of artificial methods, they caused “criticism” of the decisions of the Lenin Prize Committee in the press... In a word, just like in decent democratic countries! Even different newspapers have “different” opinions! But these are all sparklers; a cold shine like fire, and not the all-burning flame of real criticism, guided by thought and conscience. There cannot be public opinion when the first party secretary alone determines what is good and what is bad.” What kind of real democracy can we really talk about when everything is done without the knowledge of the public and is presented to it post factum, in a ready-made interpretation? (records dated April 30, 1958, 2000. No. 4. P. 151).

In the fall of 1957, a group of young historian teachers was arrested at Moscow University who, taking into account the lessons of the Hungarian events, expressed thoughts “diverging from the generally accepted and approved consensus.” This is how we “little by little strengthen our unanimity in Russia and our moral and political unity!” – Dmitriev noted bitterly, commenting on the news of their arrest (Record dated September 17, 1957, 2000. No. 3. P. 158). In the following months, he returns to this topic again and again, each time trying to comprehend the price that society and its citizens are forced to pay for the “moral and political unity” declared by the authorities, which is in fact only apparent. “We cannot deny people the right to think with the heads they have. But you can deprive them of their heads. Is it really possible that the thesis about the moral and political unity of Soviet society rests, on the one hand, on the method of depriving some Soviet people of their heads, and on the other, on the tacitly recognized value of universal hypocrisy? Such moral and political unity is self-deception of the bearers of dictatorship,” it testifies to their weakness, the falsity of their order (Record dated October 25, 1958, 2000. No. 4. pp. 156-157).

“Five years of real and apparent hesitation, the search for a new course, new content and new forms of politics have ended... The one-state power, which seemed to have been shaken with the death of Stalin, after a small struggle for power... was restored again. Khrushchev took Stalin's place, his posts, assimilated the essence of the policy of the deceased, modifying some external techniques, the outer shell of the same policy. Apparently, this situation is natural and natural. It is possible, without much risk of error, to say that no matter who of those who competed for power in the past five years won, the victor would still have restored the same principle of autocracy. In this sense, Khrushchev is no worse or better than his rivals who failed. Most likely he is even better, one might believe, than Beria or Molotov. These two would have repeated Stalin even in external techniques, in methods and forms, much more imitatively than Khrushchev” (2000. No. 4. P. 159).

As a result of the outbreak of the struggle against revisionism, according to Dmitriev, some of the hopes inspired by the 20th Congress of the CPSU were finally buried, and there was a return to varnishing, glorification, and curtailing criticism. “Literature has returned to the fold of glorification, odes and fables”; “The onslaught of dogmatic Stalinists is noticeable in science” (Ibid.). Knowing that the historical process consists of changing stages of development, the historian, however, never lost optimism. Almost 30 years later, in March 1985, in the days when Gorbachev became the head of the USSR, a 78-year-old professor, entrusting his own thoughts to the diary about the need to write the history of the Russian people in the 20th century, remarked: “It didn’t disappear, it didn’t disappear, The Russian people have not been erased both in our time and at the end of the 20th century. He exists, he is, he lives and changes. He will live and change” (2000. No. 6. P. 151).

So, no matter how massive the “brain training” was in the Soviet Union, not everyone succumbed to the temptation to take the easiest path of accepting ready-made ideological clichés, allowed their conscience to be lulled to sleep day after day by repeated formulas about the threat of imperialism to socialist gains, etc. Having found in themselves strength to resist the powerful pressure of the gigantic propaganda machine, Professor S.S. Dmitriev and Academician L.D. Landau (and not only them) thereby preserved the honor of the Russian intelligentsia in the fall of 1956.

For records of their reports from Budapest to Moscow on October 24–30, see: The Soviet Union and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956. Documentation. Editors and compilers: E. D. Orekhova, V. T. Sereda, A. S. Stykalin. M., 1998.

The most significant event on the eve of the Hungarian uprising, the reburial on October 6 of the remains of Laszlo Rajk (a Communist Party leader accused in 1949 in a rigged trial and executed), was not even mentioned in the Soviet press. On the morning of October 24, Soviet newspapers also came out without any information about what had happened in Hungary the day before, on the first day of the uprising. The CPSU bodies in charge of party propaganda obviously proceeded from the unfulfilled assumption that the uprising in Budapest could be suppressed within one day and only after that did it make sense to inform the reader about the unsuccessful attempt of a “counter-revolutionary putsch” supported by the “imperialists.” On October 25, Pravda actually published a TASS report under the characteristic heading “Failure of the anti-people adventure in Budapest.” In the following days, in anticipation of the final “failure” of the anti-communist action, the headlines had to be slightly varied, without changing their meaning at all: for example, on October 26, Pravda published a selection of TASS messages under the heading “To the failure of the anti-people adventure in Budapest,” and on October 28, a report newspaper correspondent S. Krushinsky (without author's signature) “The collapse of the anti-people adventure in Hungary.” Meanwhile, such monotonous, same-type headlines not only indicated a lack of journalistic skill, but clearly inadequately reflected the dynamics of events in Hungary. This was immediately noticed by the editors of the main Hungarian communist newspaper. On October 30, the editorial office of Pravda was visited by the secretary of the USSR Embassy in Hungary and the correspondent of Szabad Nép, who expressed disagreement with the opinion of the newspaper and transmitted the issue of Szabad Nép dated October 29 with a polemical article by M. Molnár (see: Molnár Miklós. Válasz a Pravdának // 1956 sajtója. Oktober 23. – November 4. Válogatás. Bp., 1989. 133-134.o.). They suggested that Pravda issue a short report that when preparing its article, the newspaper had inaccurate information from Hungary. This is all the more important, they said, since the position of Pravda is perceived in Hungary as the opinion of the entire Soviet people. The editor-in-chief of Pravda P. Satyukov and his deputy D. Kraminov reported that day to the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee P. Pospelov that their newspaper “does not consider it advisable to enter into controversy” with Szabad Nép (See: The Soviet Union and the Hungarian Crisis 1956. Documents. M., 1998. pp. 453-454). The situation in Hungary at the end of October - beginning of November (the widespread collapse of party-state structures, which were replaced by spontaneously emerging national committees and workers' councils) forced Pravda to abandon not its assessment of the events as a "counter-revolutionary adventure", but from previous overly optimistic statements about her allegedly already occurring “crash.” For several days, the main newspaper of the CPSU informed extremely sparingly about what was happening in Hungary and only on November 3 carried out massive propaganda preparations for the decisive military action planned for the next day to overthrow the government of I. Nagy, which had not justified Moscow’s trust, publishing a whole selection of materials. The TASS report “On the situation in Hungary” stated that “the last days in the capital and provinces were marked by outrages and rampant counter-revolutionary gangs. The premises of many public and party organizations were destroyed, massacres and murders of public figures were committed.” Corresponding with this publication was the editorial article “Friendship and unity of socialist countries are indestructible,” in which the well-known Declaration of the CPSU of October 30 on the fundamentals of relations with socialist countries was interpreted in such a way as to lead the reader to the idea of ​​the inevitability of Soviet military intervention in the interests of saving “revolutionary gains” in Hungary. On the morning of November 4, Pravda published a large editorial, “Blocking the Path of Reaction in Hungary.” Such was the aggressive propaganda background against which the opinion of ordinary Soviet citizens about the Hungarian events was formed. On the dynamics of events in Hungary in October-November 1956 and the reaction of the USSR leadership to what was happening in this country, see: Stykalin A.S. Interrupted Revolution. The Hungarian crisis of 1956 and the politics of Moscow. M., 2003.

From the latest literature on the response in the USSR, primarily in Russia, to the Hungarian revolution, see: Aksyutin Yu. V. Khrushchev’s “thaw” and public sentiment in the USSR in 1953-1964. M., 2004. pp. 186-198 (2nd, corrected and expanded edition - 2010). See also a number of documents published in collections: N. S. Khrushchev’s report on Stalin’s personality cult at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. Documentation. Rep. editor K. Eimermacher, resp. compiled by V. Yu. Afiani. M., 2002; Sedition. Dissent in the USSR under Khrushchev and Brezhnev. 1953-1982 Declassified documents of the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor's Office of the USSR. Edited by V. A. Kozlov and S. V. Mironenko. Rep. compiled by O. V. Edelman. M., 2005.

On the response to the Hungarian events in the Baltic states, see, for example: Zubkova E. Yu. Power and the development of the ethno-conflict situation in the USSR, 1953-1985. // Domestic History, 2003. No. 4. It should be noted that in Vilnius and Kaunas on Saturday, November 2, the Catholic holiday - the day of remembrance of the dead, mass processions took place, threatening events to go beyond the control of the authorities. The demonstrators, who knew about the Hungarian uprising from Radio Free Europe broadcasts available in Lithuania, marched through the streets of Vilnius with the banner of an independent Lithuania; in the following days, 250 people were arrested for participating in the demonstration. The situation in neighboring Latvia was also tense; the response to the Hungarian events in this republic was recalled even at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee in 1959 when discussing the issue of “nationalist excesses” in the Communist Party of Latvia. See: Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. 1954 – 1964. T.1. Rough minutes of meetings. Transcripts. M., 2003. S. 372, 374.

Numerous cases of expression of solidarity with the uprising in Hungary took place among the 120 thousand Hungarian population of Transcarpathian Ukraine. See: Dupka Gy. – Horváth S. 56 Kárpátalján. Dokumentumgyűjtemeny. Bp. – Ungvar, 1993.

Meeting on January 5, 1957 at a reception at the GDR embassy with a correspondent of the Italian newspaper Messagero, Khrushchev told his interlocutor: “Remember what I tell you: with its intervention in Hungary, the Soviet Army saved the world. She worked hard for everyone, including you. You should thank her. If she had not intervened, the threat of war would have loomed over everyone.” See the translation of the report on the meeting with Khrushchev sent to the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee from the USSR Embassy in Italy: Russian State Archives modern history(RGANI). F.5. Op.30. D.225. L.73. Khrushchev said approximately the same thing at the New Year's reception in the Kremlin to the French star couple who visited Moscow - Yves Montand and Simone Signoret (See: Simona Signoret. Moszkvai újév. 1957 // Tobias Áron (Szerk.). In memoriam Nagy Imre. Emlékezés egy miniszterelnökre . Bp., 1989. 371-380.o.). Meanwhile, when discussing the issue of preparing a decisive military action on October 31 at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, Khrushchev assured his colleagues in the party leadership that “ great war there won’t be” (The Soviet Union and the Hungarian crisis of 1956. Documents. P. 480). The point was that the United States would not actively intervene in the Hungarian conflict. On the US position in connection with the Hungarian events, see: Gati Ch. Frustrated Expectations. Moscow, Washington, Budapest and the Hungarian uprising of 1956. M., 2006.

Apologetics for Soviet actions, however, did not exclude critical statements. Those who were nostalgic for the Stalinist regime, although they fully supported the Kremlin’s harsh reaction to the Hungarian events, at the same time saw the origins of these events in Khrushchev’s revision of Stalin’s foreign policy, rapprochement with the Tito regime in Yugoslavia and especially in the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU. The Central Committee of the CPSU received a letter from a worker at the Gorky Automobile Plant addressed to the magazine Kommunist. It was about the fact that Khrushchev, having inherited Eastern Europe from Stalin, immediately “banqueted” Hungary in the company of the “spy Tito” (See: N. S. Khrushchev’s report on Stalin’s cult of personality at the 20th Congress of the CPSU ... S. 593). The Hungarian events were thus regarded by part of society as the result of the capitulatory policy of the Soviet leadership after the death of Stalin.

See: Stykalin A. S. Hungarian events of 1956 and Soviet society // Conflicts and compromises in the history of world civilizations. Digest of articles. Rep. editor N.I. Basovskaya. M., 2009. P.183-197. From the latest literature, see also: Kozlov V.A. Mass riots in the USSR under Khrushchev and Brezhnev. 1953 – early 1980s 3rd edition, corrected. and augmented. M., 2010. The title of the chapter is indicative, in which public sentiments in the USSR are placed in the context of Hungarian events and are examined in comparison with sentiments in Hungary: “The frozen “thaw” or why not “like in Hungary.” See: Ibid.: pp. 272 ​​– 285.

See memoirs: Pustyntsev B. What do we remember about Hungary in 1956? // Star. St. Petersburg, 2006. No. 10. The issue of “cleansing universities of unhealthy elements” was discussed at the Presidium Central Committee See the publication of the declassified KGB case about the mood of L. Landau: “According to agents and operational equipment...” Certificate from the KGB of the USSR about Academician L. D. Landau. December 1957. Publication by S. S. Ilizarov // Historical Archive, 1999. No. 3. P. 151-161. Also published with abbreviations: Obshchaya Gazeta, 1999. No. 47. P.15. Landau’s statements recorded by KGB agents are given below in the text according to the publication of the “Historical Archive” without indicating the pages of the journal publication.

Another Russian intellectual, Leningrad biology professor A. A. Lyubishchev, reflecting on the Kadar government at the end of December 1956, drew historical parallels: Franz Joseph in 1849 could still lay claim to the role of the legitimate ruler of Hungary, “Kadar from any point of view cannot be considered a legitimate ruler” (Lyubishchev A. The Hungarian tragedy. Publication by M. D. Golubovsky // New Time, 1991. No. 43. P. 41).

Records relating to 1956-1958, see: Domestic History, 2000. No. 2-4. Further quotes from the diary of S. S. Dmitriev are given with the day of recording, journal number and page indicated in the text in parentheses.

According to the testimony of contemporaries, including the famous politician V.L. Sheinis, some students in Moscow and Leningrad drew information about Hungarian events from the Polish and Yugoslav press, which had a certain distribution in the USSR in the fall of 1956. This press gave a more complete and less biased picture of what was happening in Hungary. At the end of 1956, the distribution of these publications was also sharply limited by the competent authorities.

To be fair, it should be noted that E. Kardelj’s speech at the session of the Federal People’s Assembly of Yugoslavia on December 7 was published in the USSR - in the main party theoretical journal (Kommunist. 1956. No. 18. P. 35-51) along with a polemical article by one of the most liberal ideologists of the CPSU head. department of science and culture of the CPSU Central Committee, specialist in the political economy of socialism A. Rumyantsev, future vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences (Rumyantsev A. Socialist reality and the “theories” of comrade E. Kardel // Ibid. pp. 11-34).

Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee of June 30, 1956 “On overcoming the cult of personality and its consequences” see: Pravda. 1956. July 2.

In relation not to the USSR, but to the countries of the Soviet bloc, similar thoughts were developed in December 1956 by A. A. Lyubishchev: “Before the Hungarian uprising, the possibility of active internal resistance to the Soviet regime was apparently considered excluded. The Hungarians showed that struggle is possible” (Lyubishchev A. Hungarian tragedy. P. 43). As is clear from KGB reports, the Hungarian events forced many to think about the possibility of protests by the proletariat in the USSR. Thus, in the city of Vladimir, a communist with 35 years of experience, invited to the city Komsomol conference, “instead of telling young people about the labor and military exploits of his generation, began to express the provocative thought that the working class had risen in Hungary and this could happen in Soviet Union" (See: Aksyutin Yu. V. Khrushchev's "thaw" and public sentiment in the USSR in 1953-1964. P. 193). It can be assumed that the prospects for unrest among the proletariat were assessed in society with a certain wariness - there were fears of civil war (and older generations still remembered civil war 1918 – 1920). The lack of objective information about what was happening in Hungary only increased fears of a highly dramatic development of events.

May 13, 1957 // Source, 2003. No. 6. P. 77-88. Among the creative intelligentsia, which until then had harbored some illusions regarding Khrushchev’s position, they responded immediately. “It smelled of arrests, especially since Khrushchev said in his speech that there would have been no rebellion in Hungary if two or three loudmouths had been imprisoned in a timely manner,” recalled writer V. Kaverin (Thaw 1957-1959. Pages of Russian Soviet Literature. M ., 1989. P.375).

About the so-called “case of L. Krasnopevtsev” see: Questions of History, 1994. No. 4. Belonging to a slightly younger generation of graduates of the history department of Moscow University, poet and famous biographer of F. M. Dostoevsky Igor Volgin, born in 1942 (grandson of the historian Academician V. P. Volgina) wrote that the Hungarian events gave him and his friends, Moscow high school students from elite schools, “an ambivalent feeling. On the one hand - oddly enough - sincere sympathy for the rebels. I wished them victory. In the absence of any alternative information, I instinctively felt: our tanks in Budapest are evil, there is some kind of monstrous lie in all this. But, on the other hand, I did not at all want the socialist camp to be weakened or, God forbid, to collapse altogether. I understood that the rebels were fighting for a just cause, for freedom, but I did not approve of the fact of armed struggle” (Quoted from: Polikovskaya L.V. “We are a premonition, a forerunner...” Mayakovsky Square: 1958-1965. M., 1997. P.37-38). Among the students in Moscow and Leningrad, however, there were more radical opinions. Some young people were inclined to view the performances of their Hungarian peers as a role model, a guide to action. Thus, in 1957, a group of participants in a seminar of literary translators at the Gorky Literary Institute reacted very violently to the official version of the Hungarian events - everyone jumped up from their seats shouting: “A revolution took place in Hungary. We also need a revolution like in Hungary” (See: Pyzhikov A. Origins of dissidence. Youth after the XX Congress of the CPSU // Free Thought-XXI, 2003. No. 12. P. 78-79). See also: Student unrest in the USSR (late 1956). Introductory article: Yu. G. Burtin, K. A. Lyubarsky // Questions of History, 1997. No. 1. Still, the mood of many intellectuals of different generations was characterized by a feeling of their own helplessness. The famous philosopher (at that time primarily an orientalist) Grigory Pomerantz recalls that he, like many in his circle, experienced burning shame before the Hungarians, but this natural feeling of protest was suppressed by the consciousness of helplessness, so everything resulted in the clinking of glasses (Pomerantz G A basket of flowers for a Nobel laureate // October, 1990. No. 11. P. 143-144). Thus, disagreement with Soviet policy in Hungary only in rare cases took the form of open protest.

However, it was not only the conservative Dmitriev and the liberal Landau, but also some intellectuals who sympathized with the socialist idea who condemned Soviet policy in Hungary. Thus, Professor A. Lyubishchev wrote on December 25, 1956: “The Hungarian uprising is not a counter-revolution, but a real popular and, moreover, progressive uprising, despite the fact that perhaps even a fairly significant number of counter-revolutionary forces and simply bandits attached themselves to it.” . Progressive, because, contrary to all declarations, power in Hungary, as in the USSR, does not belong to the workers and peasants, but to “the new Stalinist class of party oligarchs, and the overthrow of this class is a progressive task, even if it is accompanied by some temporary strengthening of capitalist elements.” After the socialist idea in its real embodiment has degenerated into Stalinism, “if it turns out that instead of the antithesis “communism or fascism,” the peoples and the intelligentsia will face the antithesis “Stalinism (extremely similar to fascism) or capitalism,” then the peoples will not hesitate to become on the side of capitalism, since the capitalist, for all his shortcomings, is responsible with his own pocket for the mistakes made, and our party bureaucrats are absolutely not responsible for anything.” Not only under Stalin, but also now. After all, although “the USSR has always maintained that socialism is being built thanks to the desire of the masses, it turns out that if the masses speak out sharply against the socialist dictatorship, the Soviet government begins to argue with tanks and courts-martial.” Khrushchev, Lyubishchev continues, is trying to blaspheme Stalin without condemning Stalinism, but the Hungarian revolution forces thinking people to take this necessary step. The significance of the Hungarian events, Lyubishchev summarized, is that this is “the first terrible blow to Stalinism on an international scale, important precisely because it was inflicted not by capitalists, but by workers and progressive youth” (Lyubishchev A. Hungarian tragedy. P. 42- 43).

Thanks to a team of authors from the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces and the published book “The Classification of Secrecy Has Been Removed,” it became possible to speak openly about the events that took place several decades ago outside the USSR, and about the role of our compatriots in these events.

Employees of the Institute of Military History prepared and published the All-Russian Book of Memory. Despite the fact that this work is based on the “List of states, cities, territories and periods of hostilities with the participation of citizens of the Russian Federation,” which was published in the Appendices to the Federal Law on Veterans of December 16, 1994 and the law “On Amendments and Additions to Federal Law "On Veterans" of January 2, 2000, the authors were forced to include in their book the name lists of military personnel who died during the Cuban missile crisis and after it in Cuba in 1962-1964. And also during the entry of troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968 ( these countries, for unknown reasons, do not appear on the List, but the development of events in them significantly influenced the military-political situation in the world).

The authors, whose competence no one doubts, have already come to the conclusion that one of the main directions of Soviet military participation in events taking place abroad was the participation of our military personnel in hostilities as a result of actions by the country's top political leadership aimed at preserving the unity of the socialist camp , keeping the allies in the Warsaw Pact Organization. The theater of action in this case was Europe, namely Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968).

The 50-60s in Eastern Europe, and specifically in the countries of the socialist camp, were marked by a number of events that led to the use by the Soviet Union of not only political means, but also military force.

On May 14, 1955, in response to the formation of the North Atlantic NATO bloc, the European socialist states signed the “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance” in Warsaw, called the Warsaw Pact.

However, the events that occurred a year and a half after its signing in Hungary, as well as the events in Czechoslovakia that took place more than thirteen years later, were of a clearly political nature, indicating the presence of certain forces in these countries. Events in 1956 in Hungary and 1968 in Czechoslovakia also showed the whole world that the Soviet leadership sought to maintain the unity of the resulting military-political bloc at all costs.

The consequence of this was the use of the Armed Forces of the allied forces, including the Soviet Union, in these countries.

Let's draw some parallels of events:

Hungary-1956, Operation Whirlwind Czechoslovakia-1968, Operation Danube

Prerequisites for the entry of troops:

In Hungary: - The XX Congress of the CPSU, where, in addition to exposing the cult of personality, the thesis about the diversity of forms of transition to socialism was proclaimed, which gave support to the reform forces;

Strengthening opposition protests;

In connection with the events in Poland, the struggle “for the democratization of socialism” - widespread rallies with the threat of escalating into armed clashes, students of the Budapest technical university held a mass demonstration involving tens of thousands of residents demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and the establishment of more equal relations with the Soviet Union;

Separate groups of radical youth took possession of several warehouses with small arms, and an attempt was made to seize the radio building. For the first time shots were fired.

For Czechoslovakia:

Unprecedented in the history of the communist movement, profound changes in the country. The growing crisis and political conflicts within the CPC at the end of 1967, which led to the removal of the First Secretary of the Presidium of the CPC Central Committee A. Novotny and the election of A. Dubcek;

Economic crisis of 1962-1963;

The protracted nature of the political crisis (including the escape of General Ian Cheyne to the United States after a failed military coup attempt);

Dubcek allowed the creation of a number of new political clubs and abolished censorship;

In the field of foreign policy, it was decided to pursue a more independent course. The leaders of the CPC included the concept of socialism “with a human face” in the “Program of Action”;

The reformist programs of Dubcek's leadership led, from the Soviet point of view, to dangerous situation in one of the key countries of Eastern Europe;

Refusal of the Czechoslovak delegation to attend the meeting of the leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland and the USSR in Warsaw (July 1968);

Letter of appeal from a group of party and government officials of Czechoslovakia to the governments of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries with a request for international assistance;

Forecasts at the Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, reformers will win in the Czechoslovak leadership (September 9, 1968).

Measures taken by the USSR: In Hungary:

10/23/1956 at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee N.S. Khrushchev spoke in favor of sending troops to the Hungarian capital. In a telephone conversation with the leadership of Hungary, he raised the question of “the desirability of an official written appeal to the government of the USSR” with a request for military assistance;

10/23/1956 at 11 p.m., Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky. gave the order to the command of the Special Corps to move troops to Budapest, where they were to establish control over key objects of the capital and restore public order in it. And with part of the forces to provide cover of the border of Hungary with Austria - but without opening fire;

With the introduction of troops, the organization of security for the buildings of the Central Committee, parliament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, banks, airfield and weapons depots began. Armed detachments continued to operate in the city;

Complete disarmament of the Hungarian army;

The main garrisons of the Hungarian troops were blocked. For Czechoslovakia:

On August 13, 1968, in Uzhgorod, a meeting of members of the Military Council took place with the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.A. Grechko, who pointed out the need to bring all equipment into combat condition in the near future, to be ready to carry out a multi-kilometer march in mountainous and forested conditions terrain. He warned that troops are expected to be sent into Czechoslovakia in the near future... It is possible that NATO troops may invade Czechoslovakia from the West, then we will have to act based on the situation.."

There were all the prerequisites that in August 1968 the world was once again teetering on the brink of global war.

A group of troops was created, which included formations of the Warsaw Pact countries - the GDR, Poland, Hungary and the People's Republic of Belarus.

The decision to send troops was made at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on August 16, 1968 and approved at a meeting of the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries in Moscow on August 18, 1968 under the leadership of General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev.

Forces and assets involved at stage 1: In Hungary:

290 tanks, 120 armored personnel carriers, 156 guns. The main garrisons of the Hungarian troops are blocked.

On October 29-30, 1956, units of the special corps were withdrawn from Budapest in an organized manner. However, the Hungarian government continued to insist on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country, and announced its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact Organization.

10/30/1956 N.S. Khrushchev gave the order to liquidate the rebellion in Hungary. Operation Whirlwind was led by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact states, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev. The formation commanders received the order to send troops from the Minister of Defense G.K. Zhukova.

When the troops of the 2nd stage were brought in to strengthen the corps units, another division from the territory of the USSR entered Budapest. Two armies from the Carpathian Military District: combined arms - General Mamsurov and mechanized - General Babajanyan. Their task was to cover the border, prevent possible aggression from the West, and thereby provide the rear for the Soviet troops operating in Budapest. Additionally, the following were raised on combat alert:

A mechanized division of a separate mechanized army stationed in Romania.

In total, five divisions of Soviet troops were raised on combat alert, consisting of: 31,550 men, 31,550 tanks and self-propelled guns, 615 guns and mortars, 185 anti-aircraft guns, 380 armored personnel carriers, 3,930 vehicles. At the same time, our aviation was put on alert: fighters - 159 and bombers - 122.

For Czechoslovakia:

The first echelon numbered

Up to 250 thousand, total number - up to 500 thousand people.

About 5 thousand tanks and armored personnel carriers.

Three fronts were formed - based on the departments and troops of several military districts and groups of forces.

The entry date was set for the evening of August 20, 1968. According to the order on the formation of the Main Command of Operation Danube, Army General I.G. Pavlovsky was appointed commander in chief.

The combat alert was announced at 11 p.m. "Orders for interaction for Operation Danube" were developed. Combat vehicles Soviet and Union production without white stripes was subject to “neutralization.” In case of resistance, stripless tanks and other military equipment were subject to destruction without warning. When meeting with NATO troops, it was necessary to stop and not shoot without a command.

At 00.00 on August 21, troops of the USSR, Bulgaria, Poland, East Germany and Hungary crossed the Czechoslovak border from four directions at twenty points from Cvikov to Nemetsk. Within 24 hours, objects in the Prague and Brno areas were already under the control of the Allied forces. The main efforts were aimed at seizing the buildings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the government, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, as well as the building of the radio and television station. According to a pre-developed plan, columns of troops were sent to the main administrative and industrial centers of Czechoslovakia. Formations and units were located in all major cities. Military garrisons of the Czechoslovak army in cities and populated areas, warehouses with weapons and ammunition were blocked by Allied forces. Particular attention was paid to protecting the western borders of Czechoslovakia, capturing airfields, and blocking Czechoslovak military units. The rapid and coordinated entry of troops into Czechoslovakia, as well as the establishment of control over Czechoslovak territory, made it possible to minimize the losses of our troops.

A special role belonged to the Commander-in-Chief of the combined armed forces of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.I. Yakubovsky.

Actions of national extremists:

Within Hungary:

Shelling of our troops, organizing ambushes, throwing grenades and Molotov cocktails at the bodies of armored personnel carriers and tanks. Extremists played a major role not only in fanning the national psychosis, but also in creating hotbeds of armed struggle.

By November 11, 1956, pockets of resistance in Budapest were suppressed, and Operation Whirlwind ended. For Czechoslovakia:

Construction of barricades on the path of advance of tank columns, armored personnel carriers, vehicles, throwing them with petrol bottles and grenades, shelling from buildings and ambushes, laying rubble and mining them. The operation of underground radio stations, the distribution of leaflets and appeals, armed attacks on military personnel, the distribution of weapons and ammunition, attempts to disable communications and transport, poisoning of water, destruction of monuments to Soviet soldiers in the cities and villages of Czechoslovakia.

The irretrievable losses of USSR soldiers and officers in Hungary amounted to 707 people, 1.5 thousand military personnel were injured. A significant number of tanks, armored personnel carriers and other military equipment were shot down and damaged (data needs clarification).

According to initial statistics, irretrievable losses in Czechoslovakia amounted to 98 people (according to updated data, the figure exceeds 100 people), 87 military personnel were injured, including 19 officers, 87 people died in disasters and died from diseases. Over 10 units of tanks were destroyed, over 350 units of automobile equipment were damaged (the data needs clarification, since on the second day, namely on August 23, at a meeting, the army commander, Lieutenant General A.M. Mayorov, announced the figures: 7 combat vehicles were set on fire, more than 300 vehicles were damaged, 12 people were killed, 76 were injured of varying severity).

United Nations response:

Within Hungary:

The UN called an emergency meeting of the Security Council to discuss the issue of the Soviet attack on Hungary. For Czechoslovakia:

On August 21, 1968, a group of countries (USA, England, France, Canada, Denmark and Paraguay) spoke at the UN Security Council demanding that the “Czechoslovak issue” be brought to a meeting of the UN General Assembly, seeking a decision on the immediate withdrawal of troops from the Warsaw Pact countries. The situation in Czechoslovakia was also discussed in the NATO Permanent Council, where bellicose statements were made. Large-scale maneuvers were launched on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany to test various scenarios the beginning of the European war. Facilities mass media The West has sharply intensified its propaganda campaign. All this affected the attitude of Czechoslovak citizens towards Soviet soldiers. In Kromeriz, at the headquarters of 3 MED CHNA were distributed a large number of anti-Soviet leaflets calling for armed resistance to the Allied forces. However, the task of fulfilling international duty was completed.

None of the responsible leaders, when considering the issues of “protecting the interests of the Soviet Union,” raised questions about what price this protection would be achieved. And here and there short notes flashed: “Reward the military. Provide for the families of the victims.” Basically, all this remains only on paper.

At this point, officials usually consider the case closed and the event forgotten. But it is not forgotten by the relatives and friends of the victims who received a “funeral” in peacetime. It should not be forgotten by our compatriots, all of us - fellow citizens of those young people who will never have to grow old, military personnel who gave their lives in the performance of military duty. After all, a person lives in the memory of him...

Direct participants in Operation Whirlwind in Hungary in 1956 draw their own parallels to the events in Hungary and Czechoslovakia:

Kochegura Anatoly Kuzmich, participant in Operation Whirlwind in Hungary, in 1956 - private, rifleman of the 8th regiment of the company of the 3rd battalion of the 112th rifle regiment of the rifle division, PP 33513, Southern Group of Forces. He has a "War Participant" certificate.

"... On October 23, 1956, we were alerted, and in a formed convoy of vehicles we arrived at the railway station, where T-34 tanks were loaded onto the railway platform, and the personnel were loaded into heated vehicles." and the train moved towards the border with Romania. At one of the stations on the territory of Romania, 11 km from the Hungarian border, the train stopped. The equipment was also unloaded there. We were lined up in units. The commander of the rifle company, Lieutenant Kondolov, originally from Stalingrad region, said that we had arrived to provide fraternal assistance to the people of Hungary. Also, the battalion political officer, Major Korotchenko and the regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel Tumanov (all of them were front-line soldiers), spoke in front of the formation, who announced that our mission was to fulfill an international duty. Afterwards, the command was received to receive ammunition. Each of us received 120 rounds of ammunition for an AK-47 assault rifle and two grenades. We were informed that on October 23, students of the University of Budapest organized a demonstration demanding the democratization of the social system in the country and the withdrawal Soviet troops from Hungary. Several youth groups took possession of warehouses with weapons, which were distributed, and tried to seize the building of the national radio. The shooting began. Measures taken by the police were unsuccessful. The wounded and dead appeared.

In Moscow, a decision was made to send Soviet troops into Hungary.

As part of a column, we crossed the border and took up positions on a large bridge across the river. Tissu in the city of Szeged. Our company was entrusted with the task of protecting the bridge from mining and putting it out of action by counter-revolutionaries. A military guard was set up, in the middle of the bridge - 2 tanks and a platoon of soldiers, also 2 tanks on each side and machine guns.

After some time, units of a rifle division from the Odessa Military District under the command of Colonel Dubrovin crossed the bridge. In the city of Szeged, all communications were taken under protection, including the post office, telegraph, radio center, and administrative buildings. In this large city, plants and factories did not work under the influence of counter-revolutionary elements who intimidated workers through direct threats, reprisals and murders. The Hungarian army was disintegrated, the military personnel left their units without permission. Units of the Hungarian Army, with the participation of one regiment, in the absence of ammunition, tried to resist the national extremists in Budapest. The internal troops and state security also failed to cope with the tasks.

Our soldiers were ambushed, grenades and Molotov cocktails were used.

Border guards on the border with Austria and Yugoslavia were removed. Armed attacks on Soviet military personnel by counter-revolutionaries began. In the city of Beteshaba, crowds of people organized an armed uprising. In Budapest, several families of Soviet officers were slaughtered. In those conditions, it was possible to influence only with weapons and tanks.

According to the “special officer” Captain Limarev, a woman of Hungarian nationality who commanded an armed gang was identified and detained.

In the area of ​​the bridge, counter-revolutionaries installed machine guns on the roofs of houses. As a result of shelling from our company, four soldiers and an officer were killed. This happened on the 4th day of our stay. We opened fire, the tanks fired several salvos from tank guns.

In addition to fulfilling the main task assigned to us, we were involved in checking passing vehicles. On the Romanian side, we detained a driver and a car with a group of people transporting a large box filled with banknotes.

In public places and on houses there were signs: “Occupiers, get out,” “Russians, go home,” etc.

When assigning combat missions, junior commanders, primarily political officers, were informed of the situation: “In Budapest, our column was fired upon, the fire came from a residential building. As a result of retaliatory measures, we managed to capture a group of young people of about 30 people who were armed. These were young people were 18 years old, there were even teenagers..."

At the end of October, according to the political officer, Khrushchev ordered the liquidation of the rebellion in Budapest. Operation Whirlwind began on November 4, several hundred Soviet soldiers and officers were killed in clashes with counter-revolutionaries. In Budapest, our tanks and cars were set on fire. Landed troops from the Carpathian and Moscow Military Districts were fired upon by counter-revolutionaries while the paratroopers were still on parachutes in the area of ​​Lake Balaton and the border with Austria.

The fighting took place during October-November 1956. We buried our fallen comrades there, on the territory of Hungary, and Romania too.

During the deployment of troops on October 24, as a result of armed attacks by terrorists on our soldiers, several dozen Soviet soldiers of the special corps who were in Hungary were killed. At the same time, there was a command - not to open fire first. In the following days, over a hundred of our soldiers died.

After the end of hostilities, our division remained part of the Southern Group of Forces.

In 1968, I served in the GSVG PP 92846. As head of the secret unit of a mobile missile and technical base as part of the 1st Guards. TA. Its formations took part in Operation Danube in Czechoslovakia, and its commander, Lieutenant General K.G. Kozhanov was awarded the Order of Lenin.

Due to my position, I had access to some classified documents about the events taking place in Czechoslovakia. And after the units returned to their “winter quarters” in the GSVG, I had to communicate a lot with the direct participants in Operation Danube. From their stories, the situation seemed very familiar to me and similar to the events in Hungary in 1956, where I personally happened to take part..."

Ovcharenko Alexey Ivanovich, currently lives in the Rostov region, Aksai district, village of Rassvet (in 1956, senior sergeant, mechanic-driver of tanks "T-34", "PT-76", with a class gradation of the military specialty "Master" , as part of a tank regiment of a mechanized division of the rifle corps of the Carpathian Military District. He was awarded the medal "For Military Merit" and has a certificate of "War Participant".

In 1953 I was called up for active duty military service. He ended up serving in Austria, where the Soviet Army troops were located at that time. After completing tank “training,” I served in a tank unit of a tank division with a military specialty as a mechanic-driver of a T-34 tank, on which I served for almost a year under tail number “226.”

In 1955, our troops began to withdraw from Austria. Our regiment was redeployed to the territory of the Soviet Union in Transcarpathia as part of a mechanized division.

In the summer of 1956, we received new equipment, and I mastered the PT-76 twin-screw amphibious tank with powerful weapons at that time.

Around October, we began to prepare for demobilization, and after some time, a farewell to the unit’s banner took place in a solemn atmosphere. And literally three hours later (this was approximately October 23) some movement began in the unit. The officers did not walk on foot while in position; they only moved by running. And after a while the alarm was announced. Everyone, including me, took their places, as planned and worked out over years of service. Our crew received the task of placing themselves at the disposal of the reconnaissance battalion. At that time I was a driver mechanic for the commander of the 5th tank company. (I would give a lot to meet him.) Then there was formation by crews, by divisions. The commanders announced that our unit was being sent, in accordance with combat orders, to Hungary to fulfill its international duty of providing fraternal assistance to the Hungarian people and suppressing the counter-revolutionary rebellion.

The situation in the country got out of control, physical reprisals against communists began, groups of people, under the leadership of counter-revolutionaries, seized warehouses with weapons, which were distributed without encountering any obstacles. We received ammunition for small arms and standard ammunition for tank weapons. We handed over our personal documents to the foreman.

At midnight on October 24, we left the “winter apartments” in columns in the direction state border with Hungary. At dawn, the column stopped in the forest near the border, everyone was lined up, the commanders gave instructions and set specific tasks. And the next command: “By the cars.” While on the move, in the direction of the cities of Szolnok, Jasbereni, Debrecen, the commander was informed by radio that there were already killed and wounded ahead among our soldiers who were part of the vanguard. When it was already completely light, through the eyepieces of the panoramas we noticed how flashes appeared and disappeared from tall buildings in some town. The front-line commander immediately determined that there was shelling from automatic weapons. But we had an order: “Don’t shoot.” And about an hour later, a command from headquarters came over the radio: “Respond fire with fire.” During a short stop, the communications officer told our company commander that indeed such an order had come from the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal Konev. By that time, part of the armed population had gone into the mountains and forests to wage a guerrilla war against us. Some remained in cities and towns for armed resistance. Basically, they were young people, impudent and armed.

We rarely saw Hungarian troops; military camps were blocked by our troops. In Buda and Pest, across the bridge we saw burnt buses and cars. In some places bursts of automatic weapons were heard. Basically, the attacks on our troops were carried out by counter-revolutionaries, who used young people and students.

Some time later, already on November 9, our military intelligence officers reported that a group of rebels from among armed youth would soon arrive on the northern outskirts of Budapest in the area of ​​Csepel to carry out sabotage against our soldiers.

We took a position and began to wait. Taking advantage of the seemingly calm situation, the loader, opening the hatch, crawled out halfway and wanted to empty the half-empty empty cartridges from the container. At this time, automatic fire rang out and he was wounded. We returned fire towards the forest area where the shooting came from. And after driving a few hundred meters along the way, an explosion occurred. A grenade explosion on the tank damaged the “caterpillar”, and we radioed for support. Our loader had to be pulled out through the lower hatch and take up defensive positions. I remembered well that the last cartridge must be saved. The tank commander took over the responsibilities of the entire crew. Fortunately, we didn’t have to wait long; two armored personnel carriers with infantry arrived, dispersed and began combing the area.

In the evening, at a kind of rest stop, the special officer reported that in Budapest that day a soldier blew up a grenade and himself when a crowd surrounded him and wanted to tear him to pieces. In another case, a barrel with remaining gasoline was thrown from the roof onto the tank turret, as the commander was standing in the hatch. The entire crew died. All these events took place in the month of November. On the territory of Hungary, in the area of ​​​​the village of Alyponemedy near Budapest, we had to bury the dead soldiers and officers of the Soviet Army - our comrades in arms.

Soon we moved to the area of ​​Lake Balaton, where our troops landed. We easily overcame water obstacles using our armored vehicles.

When the situation began to stabilize, our unit was left in Hungary. So my fellow soldiers and I got a new “winter apartment”, where I stayed for another 6 months.

After a while, I said goodbye to the unit’s banner for the second time. Now the demobilization has really begun. Thus, I served for three years and eight months. He was awarded the medal "For Military Merit".

Meeting the dawn of the day when we entered Hungary remained in my memory for the rest of my life.

After 12 years, the whole country became aware of the entry of our troops into Czechoslovakia. When I read the TASS statement, on the second day I went to the military registration and enlistment office and wrote a statement so that I, as a master of tank driving, would be sent to any tank unit in Czechoslovakia as a volunteer. A few days later I went back to the military registration and enlistment office. Imagining the events in Czechoslovakia, I could not find a place for myself. But they told me I had to wait, they would call me. At that time I was 34 years old, and apparently I was not destined to take part in international assistance to another people.

Loyalty to military duty and oath will remain in me until the end of my days. Feelings of pride in our army and solidarity with participants in military conflicts and local wars, regardless of their age, are inherent and understandable to me and people like me..."

December 12, 2016, 16:37

1956 was one of the landmark and fateful years for the USSR.
Nikita Khrushchev’s closed speech at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956 exposing the “cult of personality of I.V. Stalin” caused a shock in the international communist movement and in Soviet society itself. In fact, a course was set for the “de-Stalinization” of the USSR and the socialist camp, which would soon lead to a split in the latter.

The Hungarian uprising began in October. On October 23, 1956, “student rallies for democratic socialism” suddenly developed into a well-organized uprising. These unrest led to the fact that the Hungarian leadership decided to change its foreign policy course, withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, and changed its internal political guidelines. But this did not please the Kremlin, which considered Hungary its satellite. Therefore, on November 4, 1956, Soviet troops entered Hungary.

The following picture speaks about the intensity of the battles on the streets of the Hungarian capital:

According to statistics, in connection with the uprising and fighting on both sides, 2,652 Hungarian citizens were killed and 19,226 people were injured between October 23 and December 31, 1956. The losses of the Soviet Army, according to official data, amounted to 669 people killed, 51 people missing, 1540 wounded.

For modern Hungary, the symbol of those events was “Stalin’s boots” - the remains of a monument to the Soviet leader demolished by a crowd:

Among the countries of the socialist camp, unrest in 1956 also affected Poland, and again due to Khrushchev’s games in “de-Stalinization.” Like Hungary, Poland was only a superficially “Sovietized” country; behind the facade of the PPR there remained the same old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth - a zealously Catholic peasant country with a strong nationalist spirit:

It was calm in Czechoslovakia, Prague celebrates May Day '56 with portraits of communist leaders of different times and peoples:

The development of events in Hungary coincided with the Suez crisis. On October 29, Israel and then NATO members Great Britain and France attacked Soviet-backed Egypt with the aim of seizing the Suez Canal, near which they landed their troops. The second Arab-Israeli war began, which in Israeli historiography is called Operation Kadesh. As a result of this war, the Israelis in just a few days inflicted a crushing defeat on the Egyptian army and captured the Sinai Peninsula, that is, they took control of an area several times larger area of ​​Israel itself.

The Chief of the General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces, Moshe Dayan, played a key role in planning Operation Kadesh. Here he is in a photograph from 1956:

However, the military victory soon turned into a diplomatic fiasco for Israel, England and France. Under pressure from the international community (interestingly, the USA and the USSR presented a united front) they were forced to withdraw troops from Egyptian territory within a few months.

US President Eisenhower forced Britain, France and Israel to withdraw their troops from the Suez Canal after the three states moved against Egyptian President Nasser without an agreement with the US. Although Eisenhower strongly rejected Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal, he was still deeply angered by the high-handed actions of the European powers.

He put massive economic and monetary pressure on Britain to bring about an end to the conflict and the liberation of Egypt. Thus, he consolidated the fall of the European colonial powers, which completely gave way to the “superpower” of the United States.

Suez Canal in '56:

Egyptian President Nasser, 1956:

The finally retired Winston Churchill was awarded the Benjamin Franklin Medal on January 11, 1956. Portrait of a politician in 1956:

Queen Elizabeth II of England visits Nigeria, then a British colony, 1956:

In 1956, Red China experienced an unprecedented rise: Soviet specialists created entire industries there from scratch: automobile manufacturing, aircraft manufacturing, tank building, heavy metallurgy.

60 years ago, the USSR did not buy electronics and cars from China, but itself laid the foundations of heavy industry there, transmitted Newest technologies. The Russians taught the Chinese everything they knew and could do.

Chinese trainees at a heavy machine tool factory in Novosibirsk, photo by S. Fridlyand, 1956:

Meanwhile, Beijing's place on the UN Security Council is taken by Taipei. The Americans covered Taiwan with their fleet and turned the island into their “unsinkable aircraft carrier.”

Military parade in Taipei in 1956:

The Cold War is on the wane, but its echoes are shaking the world.

On May 20/21, 1956, the first air explosion was carried out hydrogen bomb on Bikini Atoll in the Pacific Ocean:

One of the most visible changes in Moscow's foreign policy was the restoration of relations with socialist Yugoslavia, severed in 1948.

Until recently, Josip Tito, considered the “leader of the fascist clique,” ​​was again hospitably welcomed on Soviet soil.
Khrushchev and Tito during the latter’s visit to the USSR, 1956:

By 1956, Khrushchev was already the undisputed leader of the USSR, having pushed aside Malenkov, but his power had not yet become almost uncontrollable, but was balanced by the old “Stalinist guard” in the Presidium of the Central Committee.

1956 became for the USSR a year of new breakthroughs in technological and economic development, a year of great construction projects and big ambitious plans.

Exactly 60 years ago, the country received a nuclear missile shield, thanks to which it continues to be considered a great power today.
The R-5M missile system, put into service on June 21, 1956, became the first domestic missile system with nuclear combat equipment.

The 56th turned out to be very favorable for the country's agriculture. It was this year that there was great success in the virgin lands - the harvest was a record one.

In 1956, Khrushchev put forward the slogan: “Catch up and overtake America,” referring to competition in the production of meat and dairy products. At the meeting, the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee issued a verdict - to move to rapid, widespread and widespread planting of corn. Corn crops began in 1957, and in 1959 they began to expand greatly: 37 million hectares were allocated for them. Corn has virtually replaced traditional grains. The crop was sown even in the northern regions.

By 1956, oil production in the USSR increased approximately 10 times compared to 1913. At the same time, the development of Siberian deposits had not even begun; the main production took place in Baku and the Volga region.

Baku oil workers photographed by German photographer Peter Bock-Schroeder, 1956:

Construction of the Novosibirsk hydroelectric power station in the photograph by S. Fridlyand, 1956:

The Soviet automobile industry in 1956 experienced another (second after the war) “change of generations.” New models were born and put on the assembly line, which would remain basic until the mid- or even late 1960s.

In April 1956, production of small-class cars “Moskvich-402” began, quite modern by European standards of that time.
One of these cars has already managed to get into the frame of S. Fridlyand on one of the central Moscow streets, 1956:

In connection with the end of the Cold War (more precisely, its first episode), there has been some intensification of cultural ties with Western countries. Various delegations became frequent in the USSR and the Soviet people had much more opportunities for direct contacts.

British models surrounded by enthusiastic fans. Moscow, 1956:

A little about fashion.

Business suits of American women in San Francisco, 1956:

Ski fashion 1956:

Beach fashion:

Travel suit, 1956:

And this is how one of the Soviet fashion magazines suggested dressing for fashionistas:

In the pictures it looks no worse than theirs, in my opinion.

Now let’s plunge into the cultural life of ’56.

On February 21, 1956, Elvis Presley made his debut on the American radio charts with the song "Heartbreak Hotel". Elvis not only sings, but also dances rock and roll:

The rising star is met with mixed reactions from American society. The conservative press calls him "a plague sent by the Communists to corrupt the youth of America." IN southern states obscurantists crush Elvis records with tractors.

Filmography and gossip chronicle of 1956.

"Bus Stop" with Marilyn Monroe:

Gina Lollobrigida in the 1956 film Notre Dame:

In 1956, Brigitte Bardot gained worldwide popularity thanks to her role in the film “And God Created Woman”:

In 1956, the fugitive Ingrid Bergman made a triumphant return to Hollywood, which she left in 1949 due to her marriage to Italian director Roberto Rossellini, with the film “Anastasia” about a girl who believed that she was the daughter of Nicholas II. For this work in 1957, the Swede received a second Oscar and Golden Globe statuette:

Audrey Hepburn as Natasha Rostova "War and Peace", 1956:

Sophia Loren attends the Cannes Film Festival in 1956:

Marlene Dietrich in Monte Carlo, 1956:

Wedding of Grace Kelly and Prince Rainier, 1956:

Marilyn Monroe? No, this is the British actress Diana Dors, who, by the way, was also a Hollywood sex symbol. 1956:

In 1956, Soviet cinema experienced a new heyday.

In the musical comedy “Carnival Night” by Eldar Ryazanov, the star of Lyudmila Gurchenko, the future legend of Soviet cinema, broke out for the first time:

The film became the leader of Soviet film distribution in 1956 with total number tickets sold amounted to 48.64 million, and Lyudmila Gurchenko became a style icon for millions of Soviet women for many years.

One of the most daring films of 1956 was the drama “Forty-First” by Grigory Chukhrai about the love of a red sniper and a White Guard officer with a logical tragic ending. Oleg Strizhenov and Izolda Izvitskaya, “Forty-First”:

At the X International Film Festival in Cannes (1957), this film was awarded the prize “For original screenplay, humanism and romance.”

In 1956, the film “Spring on Zarechnaya Street” (directed by Marlen Khutsiev) was shot, which became one of the most popular films of the 1950s, attracting 30.12 million viewers at the Soviet box office.

Nikolai Rybnikov and Nina Ivanova, “Spring on Zarechnaya Street”:

The film "Different Fates" about young Leningraders is interesting with a lot of everyday details. In Leningrad in 1956 there are still wooden platforms:

Filming was underway Quiet Don", which will be completed next year:

And the children of several subsequent generations will watch the film "Old Man Hottabych", produced at the Lenfilm studio in 1956 by director Gennady Kazansky based on the fantastic children's story of the same name by Lazar Lagin.

Moscow 1956 in the film "Old Man Hottabych". Wonderful view from the roof of the Beijing Hotel:

It’s hard to believe now, but in 1956 Moscow ended in the south right behind Moscow State University! In place of the current endless reinforced concrete jungle, there were then endless fields.

View of the current Michurinsky Prospect from the main building of Moscow State University, photo by J. Dupaquier:

Other Largest cities The USSR has changed even more since then. For example, Tashkent.

The main avenue of Tashkent in 1956 in the photograph by J. Dupaquier:

In 1956, the construction of standard five-story buildings using the industrial method began in full swing in the USSR. The idea was borrowed from France, but the design was redesigned taking into account the specifics of the USSR by the Soviet architect Lagutenko.
Tens of thousands of people began to move from barracks and basements to houses that were relatively comfortable at that time, later nicknamed “Khrushchev buildings.”

"Housewarming", photo from the magazine "Ogonyok", 1956:

Of course, we can’t help but look at what the people of the USSR looked like 60 years ago and what they wore.

Vacationers near the Voroshilov sanatorium (Sochi), 1956:

More Sochi in the photo of Peter Bock-Schroeder, 1956:

Ordinary Soviet people came to look at the main square of the country (the author of the photo, Frenchman J. Dupaquier, designated them in the caption as “provincials”):

One of the Moscow streets:

Simple Soviet boys in a photograph by German photographer Peter Bock-Schroeder, 1956:

Kindergarten on a walk in Leningrad, J. Dupaquier, 1956:

It was only in the movie "Hipsters" that Soviet people of the 1950s dressed all in gray))

Odessans 1956:

Nowadays, few people remember what the Soviet school uniform looked like 60 years ago. Even those who managed to grow up in the late USSR were not caught up in these white collar jobs.

Moscow schoolchildren at the Central Park of Culture and Culture named after. Gorky, J. Dupaquier, 1956:

Students in the library of Tomsk University, photo by S. Fridlyand, 1956:

At the Bolshoi Theater, 1956:

Muslims praying in the center of Tashent in the photograph by J. Dupaquier, 1956:

Now let's take a quick look at the life of cities in 1956.

11 years after the war, Berlin still lies in ruins:

Soviet "Victory" on the streets of Helsinki in 1956:

The most atmospheric Parisian traffic in 1956:

The following double-decker trolleybuses drove around Barcelona in 1956:

There are still double-decker trams in Glasgow:

In Istanbul in 1956, before the era of bridges and tunnels, boat people were one of the city's main signs:

Avenida Juarez in Mexico City, almost Broadway, 1956:

Racial segregation still reigned in the southern United States.
Separate entrance for "colored" department store in Mobile, Alabama, 1956

A model American family of the mid-1950s does not listen to rock and roll, but goes to church.

Segregated tobacco farmer Marshall Joyner and his family bowed their heads in prayer before dinner, Greenville, North Carolina, July 1956:

Saigon 1956:

Bangkok had already entered an era of prosperity, but highways and skyscrapers in 1956 were still like the moon, and cars (then entirely imported) shared narrow streets with pedicabs:

Taipei in 1956 was still completely archaic:

In Shanghai in 1956, cars have almost disappeared, but there are still many boats:

60 years ago in Greece it was possible to film the 19th century without scenery:

In the USA, the era of “automotive baroque” reached its culmination; cars were not just large, but luxurious, shining with an abundance of chrome parts and bizarre curves of lines. At the same time, the model range seemed simply endless: 40 automobile brands exhibited several new models every year.
Mandatory attributes of the car were panoramic windows and “fins” on the rear wings.

The “fins” on the rear wings imitated rocket stabilizer wings; some companies took the rocket fashion even further.

And on the other side of the ocean, manufacturers competed to see who could make the car more compact.

FIAT Multipla Taxi, 1956:

The design of the European cars was by no means rocket-like, but simply round-bellied. And they were on the assembly line not for a year or two, as in the States, but many times longer.

Renault Dauphine was produced from 1956 to 1968 (photo from 1956):

The pretentiousness of American cars contrasted with the laconicism of the new architectural design.

Sunrise Shopping Center in Florida, 1956:

Shopping center in Edina, Minnesota, 1956:

An American experiment with an analogue of our Khrushchev buildings dates back to the mid-50s.

Pruitt-Igoe Social Neighborhood, St. Louis, Missouri, USA. Officially opened in 1956:

The American experiment with “social neighborhoods,” as we know, was a complete failure. They quickly turned into ghettos.

Civil aviation is developing rapidly around the world. The first models of jet airliners have already appeared, but propeller-driven aircraft like the famous Constellation (1956) still dominate the skies:

Stewardess on board a BOAC aircraft, Britannia, 1956:

The USSR was also rushing upward. Very soon the first artificial Earth satellite will fly into space. In the meantime, for the Soviet people of 1956, civil jet aviation was “space” technology.

On September 15, 1956, the Tu-104 jet airliner made its first regular flight on the Moscow–Omsk–Irkutsk route:

The slender, handsome Tu-104s were a huge technological leap compared to the Soviet propeller-driven aircraft fleet of those years. At that time, the “oldies” Li-2 of pre-war design and post-war IL-14 were still flown throughout the USSR.
IL-14 plane at Vilnius airport in the photograph by J. Dupaquier, 1956:

The 16th Summer Olympic Games were held in Melbourne, Australia, from November 22 to December 8, 1956:

During the artistic gymnastics competition, the Soviet flag was raised 11 times in one hour and the Soviet anthem was played. USSR athletes took home 11 gold, 6 silver and 5 bronze medals, becoming absolute world champions.

Olympic champion in artistic gymnastics Larisa Latynina, Melbourne, 1956:

USSR women's artistic gymnastics team, Melbourne, 1956:

Great attention was paid to sports in the USSR.

Parade of athletes during the opening ceremony:

If you were born in 1956, you will never know how many children in our country were born at the same time as you. And also how many marriages and divorces happened in the Soviet Union this year and how many residents of the great country moved to another world. You will also not know how many citizens in general were the happy owners of a sickle and hammer-shaped Soviet passport (with a cover of dark green rather than red). Because you won’t know that there are no statistics in the USSR yet. The population census was carried out in 1939, and the next one will only be in 1959. But if it had not been for the events of 1956, it would never have happened.
The year 1956 is a turning point, its beginning and end are like different eras. Quite a bit of time passed after Stalin’s death, but there was mass grief for the “leader of the peoples” and the question in the eyes of “How to live on?” remained in the past - we live and will live! Between the winter and spring of this year there is a milestone: the 20th Congress, which agitated and split society. The spring of 1956 is the beginning of the legendary Khrushchev “thaw”. But we still have to get to spring.

—The Chukchi were given an apartment on the 9th floor. - Like? - they ask him some time later. - My legs hurt, walking high on the ninth. - But the elevator is... The Chukchi were given an apartment on the 9th floor. - Like? - they ask him some time later. - My legs hurt, walking high on the ninth. - But there is an elevator. - Yes, there is, but it says there that it is designed for 4 people. It's a long wait for three more. Type: Sadistic poems

—IN Voronezh region There is a camp "Golden Ear". This is a children's camp. Previously, there was a castle on the site of this camp. A rich gentleman lived there. U n... In the Voronezh region there is a camp "Golden Ear". This is a children's camp. Previously, there was a castle on the site of this camp. A rich gentleman lived there. He had a servant Belina. One day he ordered her to wash his white shirt. Belina washed it, but when she hung it up to dry, she accidentally dropped the shirt. The master became terribly angry, he cut off Belina's head and buried it under a tree. He made a cross on a tree. (Last year I was in the camp - the cross really exists, there is a mound under the tree). After that, Belina became completely white - hair, body, everything. Now she walks around the camp at night and if she sees someone awake in a white shirt after midnight, she will strangle him...

ratings: 0

Type: