Formation of the 2nd Pacific Squadron

As mentioned earlier, Russia had significant reinforcements, because not all of its naval forces by January 1904 were concentrated in the Far East. It would seem that the first concern of the high command, as soon as the war began, should have been to accelerate the readiness of the ships under construction and in reserve and to organize a new squadron, especially since Port Arthur was immediately significantly weakened.

But the Russian government and the high command did not allow the idea that the latter could be defeated. Underestimation of the enemy, lack of a clear understanding of the real danger to which our Far Eastern fleet was exposed, being weaker than the Japanese, being in a disadvantageous strategic position, and the expectation of a quick end to the war - created an atmosphere of fatal delusions. Neither the Commander-in-Chief Admiral Alekseev, nor the Army Commander Gen. Kuropatkin, nor even Admiral Makarov, raised this issue in the first months of the war.

Only in the second half of March 1904 did talk begin about strengthening our naval forces; discussion of real measures was put on the agenda only after the death of Admiral Makarov. The disaster with Petropavlovsk made me shake up. It was decided to create the 2nd Pacific Squadron from the remaining and unfinished warships in the Baltic, the formation of which was entrusted to Vice Admiral Rozhestvensky.

However, preparations for the squadron proceeded slowly. There was hope that the Port Arthur squadron, after correcting the Tsarevich and Retvizan, would be able to break through to Vladivostok. It took brutal blows to knock out unfounded optimism and force people to see things in their true light.

Such a blow was the unsuccessful battle on July 28 in the Yellow Sea. Now it became clear that the opportunity to turn events around in the naval theater of war depended entirely on whether it would be possible to provide assistance to the Arthurian squadron before it, along with the fortress, was taken by the enemy or destroyed. It was necessary to hurry with the 2nd squadron.

On August 10, 1904, a meeting was held in Tsarskoye Selo under the chairmanship of the tsar, at which the current situation was discussed. Some ministers found that it was impossible to rush sending a squadron until the equipment and testing of new ships was completely completed; it is necessary to give time for practice and training, leaving the squadron in the Baltic until spring; in addition, without counting on the Port Arthur squadron, strengthen its composition with 7 cruisers, which were supposed to be purchased from Chile and Argentina. Rozhdestvensky alone protested against this, insisting that otherwise the organized apparatus for supplying the squadron en route would have to be disbanded with great difficulty, for which foreign (mainly German) steamship campaigns were brought in. According to Rozhestvensky, it was better to leave immediately and wait for reinforcements in Madagascar. Rozhdestvensky’s insistence had a decisive influence on the meeting and it was decided in the fall of 1904 to send a squadron in the composition that could be assembled by that time, joining it in Madagascar with Chilean and Argentine cruisers.

Note. The question of the purchase of Chilean and Argentine cruisers apparently had a great influence on the decision to send a squadron. Indeed, if this purchase had taken place, it would have been possible to equip and train them well, they would have significantly strengthened the 2nd Squadron. But the purchase failed. England prevented this, since it was not in whose interests to assist the Russians. This outcome could have been predicted earlier. A characteristic phenomenon for Russia’s lightweight strategy under the old regime.

A few days later, the need to speed up the departure of the squadron was confirmed by the commander-in-chief in the Far East.

• 1st Armadillo Detachment. Lin, cor. Prince Suvorov (flag of Adm. Rozhdestvensky). Borodino, Alexander III, Orel.
• 2nd detachment of ironclads. Battleship. Oslyabya (flag of Adm. Felkerzam), Sisoy the Great, Navarin and the cruiser Admiral Nakhimov.
• Cruiser squad. cruisers Almaz (flag of Adm. Enkvist), Aurora, Svetlana, Zhemchug, Dmitry Donskoy.

The squadron had 8 destroyers and a detachment of transports. A little later, a detachment under the command of Cap. was supposed to leave and join her. 1st rank Dobrotvorsky, consisting of the cruisers Oleg, Izumrud and auxiliary cruisers Dnepr and Rion (former steamships of the Voluntary Fleet).

The squadron faced a huge transition under conditions of exceptional difficulty, since it did not have a single base along the entire route from Libau to the Pacific Ocean. She was allowed to use the anchorages insofar as neutral countries would not interfere with this. The supply of coal to the squadron was completely dependent on the integrity of foreign suppliers. The squadron could not receive either a dock or serious repairs in case of accidents.

The squadron's personnel were hastily recruited and had almost no combat training.

In general, the combat readiness of the 2nd squadron left much to be desired. It was not a fully prepared and organized formation that could withstand the Japanese fleet, which had gone through a large combat school and had exemplary organization, practice and combat experience. The relatively large number of ships assembled together satisfied only the external impression of people who looked superficially at combat strength, unable or unwilling to see the shortcomings with which the squadron was so rich; but these shortcomings inevitably had to be reflected in battle.

Upon arrival at Tangier, the squadron split up. Some of the ships whose draft allowed passage through the Suez Canal went this way under the command of Admiral Felkersam. Rozhestvensky with the main forces went around Africa. Both detachments united in Madagascar on December 25, 1904.

The swim, as might be expected, was extremely difficult. The haste in supplying the squadron showed itself in a large number of minor accidents. The issue with coal was equally difficult: neutral states put up all sorts of obstacles (especially England), often preventing it from loading in the roadstead, and the squadron usually had to carry out this operation at sea.

Soon after arriving in Madagascar, Rozhdestvensky received information about the fall of Port Arthur; it turned out that the purchase of Argentine and Chilean cruisers, whose support was the basis for the very plan for sending the 2nd squadron, did not take place; finally, the German coal miners, who had hitherto fed the squadron, refused to supply coal further than Madagascar... The advisability of sending a squadron of such a weak composition, which no longer had any hope of joining the Port Arthur fleet, aroused great doubts both among Rozhdestvensky himself and many ship commanders.

Admiral Rozhdestvensky reported to St. Petersburg that he considered it impossible to linger in Madagascar, that it was necessary, having settled the issue with the coal miners, to rush to go now in order to arrive before the Japanese had time to put their forces in order, without giving them time to equip and prepare resistance and obstacles on the way. He indicated that now his intention was to break through to Vladivostok, at least with losses, and from there act on the Japanese communication routes.

In response, Rozhdestvensky received a directive to wait at all costs for Dobrotvorsky’s detachment to join him, which left with a significant delay. In addition, he was informed that Russia was hastily preparing a new detachment to strengthen the squadron under the command of Admiral Nebogatov, which should leave in early February (it included: the obsolete battleship Nikolai I, coastal defense battleships Ushakov, Senyavin, Apraksin and the old cruiser Vladimir Monomakh).

However, considering that the reinforcements being sent would not add much strength to him, but would delay him very significantly, Rozhdestvensky demanded the right to leave. This was followed by the order to definitely wait for Dobrotvorsky; As for Nebogatov, we don’t have to wait for him.

Petersburg looked at the purpose of the 2nd squadron differently than Rozhdestvensky. She was now entrusted with a task that far exceeded the modest assistance she could hope to show. Twice in the tsar’s telegram addressed to Rozhdestvensky it is indicated that the squadron’s goal is not a breakthrough to Vladivostok, but the capture of the Sea of ​​Japan, i.e. battle with the main forces of the Japanese fleet and their defeat.

Rozhestvensky clearly understood that he was being given an impossible task. But he did not find the courage to declare this openly and categorically. He was nervous and was annoyed in private letters about the hopelessness of the squadron’s further campaign, but officially remained silent.

The stay in Madagascar was dragging on. Misunderstandings with the coal miners, waiting for Dobrotvorsky and correspondence with St. Petersburg delayed the squadron. Despite the fact that she had the opportunity to perform some exercises here, due to the general decline in morale and mood of the personnel and the difficult parking conditions, the combat readiness of the squadron improved very little. The hopes that were placed on the possibility of preparation on the road were not justified.

The situation was complicated by the fact that Rozhdestvensky himself, on whose will and nerves all the hardships of his experiences were discharged, began to noticeably give in. His health deteriorated. In a private letter, he wrote that he did not feel he had the data necessary to cope with his task, and asked to appoint another admiral in advance, so as not to leave the squadron without command...

On February 1, Dobrotvorsky’s detachment joined. On March 3, the squadron went to sea, setting a course for the Strait of Malacca.

After a very difficult transition, involving several loadings of coal in the ocean, the squadron, having crossed the Indian Ocean on April 1, arrived at Cam Ranh Bay (on the Indo-Chinese Peninsula, near Saigon). There she lingered waiting for Nebogatov’s detachment, which arrived on April 24. The meeting took place in b. Van Fong, where the squadron was forced to move from Cam Ran at the request of the French authorities. Thus, all forces united. They had to make the last transition to the theater of military operations.

Now Rozhdestvensky had to decide whether to continue the movement of the squadron to Vladivostok or abandon it, limit himself to demonstrative actions south of Japan, or, finally, return back. If you go to Vladivostok, then which way? The resolution of these issues directed the further course of events.

The squadron, exhausted by the campaign, which took place in incredibly difficult conditions, depressed morally and physically, poorly equipped and poorly prepared, inferior in strength to the enemy, could not count on victory. Almost everyone was aware of this, but Rozhdestvensky himself was more aware of this than others. He was completely depressed by these shortcomings of the squadron and did not believe at all in the favorable outcome of the inevitable battle.

There are indirect indications that Admiral Rozhdestvensky still hoped that prudence would prevail among the high command and that the squadron’s campaign would be cancelled. He and his closest subordinates apparently expected that Petersburg would be satisfied with the fact that the squadron had arrived in the East, giving. an advantageous starting position for concluding peace with Japan.

Note. In his book Reckoning cap. 2nd rank Semenov, who was on the headquarters of Admiral Rozhdestvensky, talks about the meeting that took place during the transition to Kamran on Suvorov. According to him, at this meeting, Rozhdestvensky’s flag officer said: What to do? I will answer sharply - to take advantage of the effect that is undoubtedly caused by our appearance in the South China Sea in full force without losses, and hasten to conclude an honorable peace. Hoping for the success of further naval operations is dreaming of a miracle... Unfortunately, it is not up to us to make such a decision... It’s a pity... Semenov says further. The admiral not only did not express his personal opinion, but did not even make any remarks. It seemed to me, however (maybe I’m wrong) that he was sympathetic to this proposal.

Admiral Rozhdestvensky himself did not find the moral strength to categorically raise the question of abandoning the offensive with the government, being bound by the obligations he had given earlier (it was no one else who insisted on the immediate dispatch of the squadron from Russia, who hurried it on its way; finally slogan thrown by Rozhdestvensky wash away the bitter shame of the homeland, to give revenge to the Japanese for previous failures of the fleet, they were obliged to remain silent). As for the government, it looked at the events under the hypnosis of hope for chance, for a miracle, hoping that maybe Rozhdestvensky would be able to defeat the Japanese, completely incorrectly assessing the really difficult situation that was developing around the 2nd Army, which did not give any chance of victory. squadrons. A number of assurances given to public opinion, and the prestige of power that had fallen after the first failures of the war, encouraged people to rush into adventures.

Thus, a situation arose that retreat was impossible for those persons in whose hands the fate of the squadron lay.

Projects that do not enter the Sea of ​​Japan, be based on the islands of the ocean and from here threaten the messages that were talked about after Tsushima - all these are theories that are practically inapplicable due to the deeper reasons we mentioned above. The squadron had to go. Thus, one of the possible solutions was eliminated.

But how to go? Three roads to Vladivostok opened before Rozhdestvensky, and all three were fraught with difficulties, risk and danger: the Korean, Sangarsky or La Perouse Straits?

In his testimony to the investigative commission, Rozhdestvensky explained his decision as follows: ...The breakthrough to Vladivostok was necessary and urgent. I expected that the squadron would encounter, in or near the Korea Strait, the concentrated forces of the Japanese armored fleet, a significant proportion of armored and light cruisers, and the entire mine fleet. I was sure that during the day there would be a general battle, and at night the ships of the squadron would be attacked by the entire presence of the Japanese mine fleet. However, I could not admit the thought of the complete extermination of the squadron, and, by analogy with the battle on July 28, 1904, I had reason to consider it possible to reach Vladivostok with the loss of several ships. I decided to break through the Korean Strait, and not the Sangar Strait, because breaking through the latter would present more difficulties in navigation and would be fraught with greater dangers, due to the fact that the Japanese, by publications, would secure for themselves the right to resort to the use of floating mines and obstacles in this strait in suitable conditions. places, and because the relatively slow movement of the squadron towards the Sangar Strait would certainly have been accurately tracked by the Japanese and their allies, and the breakthrough would have been blocked by the same concentrated forces of the Japanese fleet that were opposed to our squadron in the Korean Strait. As for the passage in May from Annam to Vladivostok through the La Perouse Strait, it seemed to me completely impossible - having lost some of the ships in the fog and suffered from accidents and wrecks, the squadron could have been paralyzed by a lack of coal and become easy prey for the Japanese fleet.

Note. However, Rear Admiral Nebogatov had a different opinion on this issue:In the event that, for some reason, I was unable to connect with Admiral Rozhdestvensky, and thus would have to go to Vladivostok on my own, I... developed a plan to proceed to Vladivostok, going out into the Pacific Ocean, south of Formosa, bypassing along the eastern side of Japan, keeping a distance of at least 200 miles from it, enter the Sea of ​​Okhotsk through one of the straits between the Kuril Islands, and then, under the cover of very dense fogs that prevail at this time of year, through the La Perouse Strait to reach Vladivostok. The detachment had very large reserves of coal on transports, favorable weather at that time in the Pacific Ocean, the already established experience of loading coal from transports in the ocean, the ability to tow small battleships with transports - all these circumstances allowed me to consider this plan for reaching Vladivostok very likely to be carried out.

Thus, Rozhestvensky went in the most dangerous direction, deciding to cut the knot here. The Japanese fleet was concentrated in the Korean Strait in full force. The 2nd squadron was heading straight towards him.

To ensure a breakthrough and divert the Japanese forces, Rozhdestvensky resorted to a demonstration, ordering the auxiliary cruisers (former Voluntary Fleet steamships) Dnepr and Rion stationed at the squadron to cruise in the Yellow Sea, and Kuban and Terek to cruise in the ocean on the southern side of Japan. But this demonstration was too weak to induce the Japanese to divide their forces and mislead them as to the intentions of the Russian fleet.

Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905

Retired captain 1st rank P.D. BYKOV

Preparation and march of the 2nd Pacific Squadron

The first months of the Russo-Japanese War clearly showed that the tsarist government was unprepared for war.

Underestimation of the enemy's strength and military capabilities and the excessive self-confidence of the tsarist government, which believed that Russia's positions in the Far East were invulnerable, led to the fact that Russia did not have the necessary forces in the theater of war. The results of the first two months of the war at sea were extremely unfavorable for the Russian squadron in Port Arthur. She suffered such losses that the Japanese fleet gained dominance at sea. This forced the tsarist government to take measures to strengthen its naval forces in the Far East.

The need to strengthen the squadron, which was inferior to the Japanese fleet, especially in the number of cruisers and destroyers, was repeatedly pointed out by Admiral S.O. Makarov when he was commander of the fleet. But all his representations and requests were not fulfilled. Later, the issue of strengthening the squadron was reconsidered with the participation of the new commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Skrydlov, who raised the issue of sending large reinforcements to the East. In April 1904, it was decided in principle to send a squadron from the Baltic Sea, called the 2nd Pacific Squadron.

The squadron was supposed to include ships that were nearing the end of construction, as well as some of the ships of the Baltic Fleet, although somewhat outdated in design and armament, but quite seaworthy. In addition, it was planned to buy 7 cruisers abroad.

Due to the fact that the composition of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was not strong enough to solve independent problems, its sending was mainly aimed at strengthening the Port Arthur squadron. The formation of the squadron and its preparation for the transition to the Far East were entrusted to Rear Admiral Rozhestvensky, who then held the post of Chief of the Main Naval Staff and was appointed commander of the squadron. His closest assistants were the junior flagships Rear Admirals Felkersam and Enquist.

Z.P. Christmas

Ship composition of the squadron

The main core of the squadron sent to the theater of operations consisted of four new battleships: “Alexander III”, “Prince Suvorov”, “Borodino” and “Eagle”, of which only the first was tested in 1903, the construction of the rest was completed after the start of the war , and they have not yet passed all the required tests. In particular, the battleship “Eagle” did not have time to test large-caliber artillery. These new modern battleships, which reached a speed of 18 knots, were heavily overloaded before leaving for the Far East, as they had to take on board increased supplies of ammunition and food. In addition, during the completion of the battleships, various auxiliary devices were installed on them that were not provided for in the original design. As a result, the draft was 0.9 m higher than designed, which increased the displacement of the battleships by 2000 tons. The consequence of this was a large decrease in their stability, as well as the survivability of the ships. Of the other battleships, only Oslyabya belonged to the modern ships that had already sailed. But it was a weakly armored ship, which also had 256 mm guns instead of 305 mm.

Battleship “Alexander”III“

squadron battleship “Borodino”

squadron battleship “Oslyabya”

The battleships “Sisoi the Great” and “Navarin” were old ships, and the second had old short-range 305 mm guns. Their speed did not exceed 16 knots. The old armored cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, armed with 203 mm cannons, was attached to the battleships. Thus, the armored ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron had very different armament, protection and maneuverability, not to mention the fact that the tactical qualities of the new ships were reduced due to construction defects, and the remaining ships were of outdated design.

The cruisers that were part of the squadron were even more diverse in their tactical and technical elements. There were only seven cruisers. Of these, the modern ones were “Oleg”, “Aurora”, “Pearl” and “Emerald”. The first and last were not ready by the time the squadron left and caught up with it already on the way. Of the other cruisers, “Svetlana” and “Dmitry Donskoy” were old ships, and “Almaz” was an armed yacht.

CruiserIrank “Dmitry Donskoy”

Of the cruisers, two - “Pearl” and “Emerald” - were of the same type, high-speed (24 knots), but unprotected ships. “Oleg” and “Aurora” had deck armor of 106 mm, but were different in speed. The first gave up to 23 knots, and the second only 20. “Svetlana” had a speed of 20 knots, and “Almaz” - 18. The oldest of the cruisers, “Dmitry Donskoy” had only 16 knots. The weakness and inadequacy of the cruising forces was obvious, so it was decided to assign five armed high-speed steamers to the squadron as high-speed reconnaissance ships - “Ural”, “Kuban”, “Terek”, “Rion” and “Dnepr”, which at different times joined the squadron in Madagascar. The value of these so-called auxiliary cruisers was very small. The squadron included nine destroyers - “Bravey”, “Bodriy”, “Bystry”, “Bedovyy”, “Stormy”, “Brilliant”, “Impeccable”, “Loud” and “Grozny”, which was clearly not enough. The destroyers were armed with three torpedo tubes and reached a speed of no more than 26 knots.

destroyer

Despite the fact that the decision to send a squadron was made in April, its formation and equipment took a very long time.

The reasons for this were the extremely slow pace of completion of new ships and repair of old ships. Only on August 29, work on the squadron was completed so much that it was able to leave Kronstadt for Revel.

Personnel

Ship commanders

The majority of the squadron's personnel arrived on the ships in the summer of 1904, and only the commanders and some specialists were appointed earlier and were on them during construction. Therefore, neither the officers nor the crew had enough time to study their ships well. In addition, on the ships of the squadron there were many young officers released early from the naval cadet corps due to the war, as well as called up from the reserve and transferred from the merchant fleet, the so-called “reserve warrant officers.” The former did not have sufficient knowledge and experience, the latter needed to update their knowledge; others, although they had experience and knowledge of maritime affairs, did not have any military training. This staffing of the ships of the squadron with officers was caused by the fact that there was only enough personnel to fill the most responsible positions on the ships.

Preparation and organization of the squadron

Before leaving the Baltic Sea, the entire squadron never sailed, and only separate detachments of ships made several joint voyages. Therefore, practice in joint swimming and maneuvering was insufficient. During the short period of stay in Reval, the ships of the squadron were able to carry out a very limited number of firings, especially since the amount of practical ammunition received for this was less than expected. There was also not enough torpedo firing from destroyers. The material part of the torpedoes was not prepared, so during the first firing many torpedoes sank.

The organization of the squadron, established at the beginning of the campaign, changed several times and was finally established only after leaving the shores of Indochina. The composition of individual detachments changed, which was partly caused by the situation of the campaign. All this could not but affect the relationships and influence of detachment commanders on their subordinates and on the training of ship crews. In addition, this situation led to the fact that the headquarters of the squadron commander had to deal with resolving various minor issues that could have been resolved by junior commanders. The headquarters of the squadron commander itself did not have proper organization. There was no chief of staff, and the flag captain was only the executor of the commander's orders. There was no coordination in the work of the flagship specialists, and each one worked on his own, receiving instructions directly from the squadron commander.

Thus, when the squadron entered the theater of operations, it did not have sufficient combat training and proper organization.

Organization and conditions of transition

Ensuring the transition of the squadron from the Baltic Sea to the theater of operations, provided that Russia did not have a single base of its own along its entire route (about 18,000 miles), was a very complex and difficult task.

First of all, it was necessary to resolve the issues of supplying the ships of the squadron with fuel, water and food, then it was necessary to ensure the possibility of repairs and, finally, to take measures to protect the squadron from possible enemy attempts to attack en route.

The development of all these measures was carried out directly by Admiral Rozhestvensky from the very beginning of the formation of the squadron.

Due to the fact that the new battleships that were part of the squadron had a draft that did not allow passage through the Suez Canal without unloading, which would take a lot of time, the commander of the squadron decided to go with large ships around Africa, sending other ships through the Mediterranean Sea. The connection of both parts of the squadron was to take place on the island. Madagascar. For greater safety of the transition, Rozhdestvensky did not consider it possible to enter into negotiations with foreign governments regarding the squadron’s entry into any specific ports, since this would make its route known in advance. Therefore, no preliminary agreements on this issue were concluded. There were only negotiations with the French government on some private issues, such as the length of stay of Russian ships in French ports, the points most suitable for the squadron’s anchorage, and the possibility of relations with the squadron en route, etc. Some private issues, such as the security of ships traveling through the Suez Canal, were resolved with other foreign governments. But in general, no diplomatic preparations for the transition were made.

Because of this, the transition of the squadron became extremely complicated due to protests from foreign countries when the squadron entered a particular port, a reduction in the stay period, and the impossibility of performing routine repairs and resting personnel.

A matter of particular importance was the timely supply of coal, water and provisions, since the time of arrival of the squadron to the Far East depended entirely on this. Due to the fact that the use of the Russian merchant fleet for this did not resolve the issue, since the purchase of coal would have to be made abroad, it was decided to involve foreign companies in this.

Thus, the possibility of the squadron moving to the East was made dependent on foreign firms and the conscientiousness of their fulfillment of contracts. As one would expect, such an organization of supplies could not but affect the movement of the squadron to the East and was one of the reasons for its delay on the island. Madagascar.

The squadron commander was so concerned about supplying the squadron with coal that they dominated all others, even to the detriment of combat training. To feed the personnel, the ships took increased food supplies from the port. The delivery of fresh provisions was to be made on the basis of contracts concluded with both Russian and some foreign companies. To repair ships en route, the squadron was assigned a specially equipped ship-workshop “Kamchatka”. This steamer and several other transports with cargo for various purposes formed the floating base of the squadron.

The news of the Russian government sending such large reinforcements as the 2nd Pacific Squadron to the Far East could not be kept secret, and this event was discussed in the pages of both the Russian and foreign press. Therefore, it was very likely to assume that the Japanese would try to create various obstacles of a diplomatic and military nature along the entire route of the squadron’s movement, up to and including a direct attack on the squadron and acts of sabotage.

The possibility of such attempts was taken into account by the Russian Naval Ministry, and it was looking for ways to organize a permanent system of observation and protection of areas where the squadron could expect various surprises. The Danish Straits, the Suez Canal and the Red Sea were considered the most dangerous areas.

After negotiations with various departments, it was decided to entrust this matter to the foreign political agents of the security department of the police department, which willingly took upon itself the organization of protecting the squadron’s route in the Danish Straits. To organize security in other places, special people were sent who were supposed to inform Admiral Rozhdestvensky about the movement of Japanese ships.

All of the above measures did not guarantee uninterrupted supply of the squadron ships, nor provision of parking, repairs and rest, nor. finally, protecting the squadron from the possibility of a surprise attack. The extent to which the established organization for guarding the squadron along the way did not meet its purpose was shown by the incident during the squadron’s passage of the North (German) Sea, known as the “Hullic Incident.”

Departure of the squadron and the Gull incident

The completion of new ships, supply issues, etc. - all this delayed the departure of the squadron. On August 29, the squadron arrived in Revel and, after staying there for about a month, moved to Libau to receive materials and replenish coal reserves; On October 2, the squadron set sail for the Far East. However, not all ships left on October 2. Two cruisers, some of the destroyers and transports were not yet ready and had to catch up with the squadron on the way.

The squadron made its first transition to Cape Skagen (the northern tip of the Jutland Peninsula), where it was supposed to load coal, and anchored. Here Admiral Rozhdestvensky received information about suspicious ships spotted and about an allegedly impending attack on the squadron. Considering the parking at Cape Skagen dangerous under these conditions, the squadron commander canceled the loading and decided to move on. To cross the North (German) Sea, Rozhdestvensky decided to divide the squadron into 6 separate detachments, which were supposed to weigh anchor sequentially and follow each other at a distance of 20-30 miles. The first two detachments were destroyers, the next two were cruisers, then two detachments of battleships. The last to weigh anchor was a detachment of new battleships. Admiral Rozhestvensky considered this dismemberment of the squadron to be the most appropriate from the point of view of protecting the combat core of the squadron - the battleships.

However, the distances established between the detachments were insufficient and did not exclude the possibility of them colliding at night, in case of any unforeseen delays along the way. The lead detachments were not given the task of reconnaissance of the route, which would have given the main forces, who were also marching without security, a guarantee of safety. Communication between the detachments was not organized, although there were opportunities for this. Each of them followed in isolation from the others. Thus, the marching order adopted by Admiral Rozhestvensky in no way met the requirements for organizing the transition of the squadron in wartime.

The detachment of new battleships, on which Admiral Rozhdestvensky held the flag, weighed anchor on October 8 at 22:00. About 0 o'clock. 55 min. On October 9, the detachment was approaching the Dogger Bank area. Shortly before this, the Kamchatka transport workshop reported on the radio that it was being attacked by destroyers.

As Dogger-bapka passed ahead of the detachment of battleships, the silhouettes of some ships without lights were seen, which were crossing the detachment’s course and approaching it. The squadron decided that the battleships were under attack and opened fire. But when the spotlights were turned on, it turned out that fishing boats had been shot. The fire was stopped. However, during the 10 minutes during which the shooting continued, several fishing boats were damaged. Suddenly, on the left abeam of the battleships, the silhouettes of some other ships were noticed, on which fire was also opened. But after the first shots, it became clear that these were the Russian cruisers Dmitry Donskoy and Aurora. On the Aurora, two people were wounded and several holes were made in the surface of the ship.

Having passed Dogger Bank, the squadron headed for the English Channel. On October 13, she arrived in Vigo (Spain). Here the squadron stayed until the conflict between England and Russia, caused by the so-called “Hull Incident,” was resolved.

There is reason to believe that England, which took a hostile position towards Russia and was in an alliance with Japan, deliberately provoked this incident. The purpose of this Anglo-Japanese provocation could be to delay the advance of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, which would worsen Russia's position in the Far East.

After the “Ghull Incident,” the British government threatened to sever diplomatic relations. However, the tsarist government took all measures to eliminate the conflict that arose, agreeing to compensate for losses and provide the families of the dead and wounded with pensions.

Transition of the squadron to the island. Madagascar

On October 19, a detachment of new battleships left Vigo and on October 21 arrived in Tangier (North Africa), where by this time the entire squadron was concentrated. Having loaded coal, provisions and taken on water, the squadron, according to the previously developed plan, was divided into two detachments. The battleships “Sisoy the Great”, “Navarin”, together with the cruisers “Svetlana”, “Zhemchug”, “Almaz” and destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Felkerzam, went through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea to Madagascar, where they were supposed to join the squadron again.

The voyage of this detachment with the transports that joined it on the way took place without any particular complications. By December 15, all ships had reached their destination.

The remaining ships are the battleships “Prince Suvorov”, “Alexander III”, “Borodino”, “Orel”, “Oslyabya”, the cruisers “Admiral Nakhimov”, “Dmitry Donskoy”, “Aurora” with the transports “Kamchatka”, “Anadyr”. “Korea”, “Malaya” and “Meteor”, led by Admiral Rozhdestvensky, went around Africa.

The voyage of the main forces that went around Africa was very difficult. The squadron did not have a single favorable stopover along the way, and coal loading was carried out on the open sea. In addition, wanting to reduce the number of stops, Admiral Rozhdestvensky decided to make long transitions. This circumstance made it necessary to accept coal reserves that far exceeded normal ones. For example, new battleships took double the amount of coal - instead of one thousand - two thousand tons, although for these ships the acceptance of such large reserves was especially difficult due to their low stability. To accept such a large load, it was necessary to place coal in living decks, cockpits, mine artillery batteries and other places, which extremely constrained the lives of personnel. In addition, loading in intense heat on the ocean swell and waves was very difficult and time-consuming. On average, battleships took from 40 to 60 tons of coal per hour, and thus, the parking time was spent on loading and urgent repairs; the personnel, exhausted by hard work in the tropical heat, were left without rest. Moreover, in conditions when all the rooms on the ships were filled with coal, it was impossible to conduct any serious combat training. Finally, on December 16, having overcome all difficulties, the detachment arrived in Madagascar.

Here Admiral Rozhestvensky learned about the death of the 1st Pacific Squadron and the surrender of Port Arthur on December 20.

On December 27, both detachments of the squadron united in Nosi-be Bay (west coast of Madagascar), where the French government allowed the squadron to stay. Here the squadron stayed from December 27 to March 3. The reasons for such a long stay were as follows.

1. The capture of Port Arthur caused a change in the tasks assigned to the squadron and the need to strengthen it.

2. The need to repair some ships in the roadstead.

3. Complications in the further supply of fuel to the squadron.

The situation at the time of the squadron's arrival in Madagascar and the change in the goals of the squadron's campaign

The defeat of the Russian Manchurian Army and the 1st Pacific Squadron, which ended with the surrender of Port Arthur, caused serious concern in the ruling spheres of Russia. By getting involved in this adventure, the government hoped for an easy and quick victory. However, these calculations did not come true. Defeats at Liaoyang and Shahe and the fall of Port Arthur are what the war brought Russia instead of the desired victory.

The moment the 2nd Pacific Squadron arrived in Madagascar coincided with a change in the strategic situation in the Far East. If before the death of the ships of the Port Arthur squadron the 2nd Pacific Squadron could be considered as an auxiliary, reserve squadron, now the situation has changed radically. The fall of Port Arthur raised the question of the advisability of the squadron's further movement, since after Russia lost Port Arthur the squadron was forced to move. to Vladivostok, which was extremely difficult to reach,

Rozhdestvensky believed that due to the changed strategic situation, the squadron’s immediate task was to break through to Vladivostok, at least at the cost of losing some of the ships. He telegraphed this to St. Petersburg. The tsarist government, which decided to continue the war, considered the squadron as a force with which to change the situation in the theater of war, and set Rozhdestvensky the task not of breaking through to Vladivostok, but of mastering the Sea of ​​Japan. However, it was recognized that Admiral Rozhdestvensky’s squadron was not strong enough to achieve this goal, and it was decided to strengthen it with ships of the Baltic Fleet, since the purchase of ships abroad had completely failed. In this regard, Rozhestvensky was ordered to wait for the detachments of Dobrotvorsky and Nebogatov in Madagascar.

The first of these detachments, consisting of two new cruisers “Oleg” and “Izumrud” and destroyers “Gromky” and “Grozny”, was part of the 2nd squadron, but at one time its exit from Russia was delayed due to the unavailability of the ships. The second detachment was given the name 3rd Pacific Squadron. The squadron was formed after Rozhestvensky left. It was headed by Rear Admiral Nebogatov, who, like other junior flagships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, had not previously commanded combat squadrons or detachments.

This squadron included the old squadron battleship “Nikolai I”, coastal defense battleships “General-Admiral Apraksin”, “Admiral Senyavin”, “Admiral Ushakov” and the old armored cruiser “Vladimir Monomakh”. “Nicholas I” was an outdated battleship with weak artillery weapons, as it had only two short-range 305 mm guns. Coastal defense battleships were armed with 256 mm guns, which, although long-range, were not entirely successful in their design. These ships were not intended for ocean navigation, and therefore did not have sufficient seaworthiness and had reduced maneuverability. There was not a single modern ship in this squadron.

EDB “Emperor Nicholas I”

battleship “Vladimir Monomakh” “

Transition from Madagascar to the shores of Indochina

When Rozhdestvensky received news of the fall of Port Arthur and learned about the government’s point of view on the further goals and objectives of the 2nd squadron, he decided to go to the East alone, without waiting for the 3rd Pacific squadron, which he looked at only as a burden. Believing that the Japanese fleet would not have time to repair all the damage received during the blockade of Port Arthur and in the battles so quickly, Rozhdestvensky hoped that he would still be able to break through to Vladivostok, and decided to leave as soon as possible. The government allowed him to do this, but unexpected complications with coal supplies delayed the squadron's departure for almost two months.

Unhealthy climate, unusual heat, heavy repair work, nervousness of the command and constant tension, along with forced inaction due to the lack of coal and shells for practical shooting - all this had an extremely negative impact on the personnel and did not at all contribute to increasing the combat readiness of the squadron.

Discipline, which had noticeably decreased by the time the squadron left, now fell even more. On the ships of the squadron, cases of insulting commanding officers and disobedience became more frequent. There were a number of cases of gross violation of discipline by officers.

The lack of a supply of shells did not make it possible to make up for the most important deficiency—teaching the squadron to shoot. The Irtysh transport, which was loaded with additional ammunition for firing practice, was delayed when the squadron left Libau. There was an accident on it and it was abandoned for repairs. At the same time, the ammunition was unloaded from it, and then, by order of the Naval Ministry, the shells were sent to Vladivostok by rail. But Rozhestvensky was not notified about this. After the repairs were completed, the Irtysh set out to join the squadron, but with a load of coal. Thus, the squadron was deprived of much-needed ammunition for firing training en route. During their stay in Nosi-be, the ships of the squadron conducted only four practical firings from distances not exceeding 30 cable lengths. The results of these shootings were completely unsatisfactory. The squadron's joint maneuvering showed its complete unpreparedness in this regard.

Thus, the combat training of the squadron during the transition and stay on the island. Madagascar did not improve at all and it remained as before unprepared for the task.

When leaving Nosi-be, Admiral Rozhdestvensky did not communicate his further route in order to achieve secrecy of the transition. And at this time, the 3rd Pacific Squadron, which had left Libau in February, was en route to join him. Thus, neither the 2nd nor the 3rd squadrons, going to the East with the same goal, knew where and when they would meet, because the place of their meeting was not determined.

Admiral Rozhdestvensky chose the shortest route - through the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca. Along the way, coal was accepted six times on the open sea. On March 26, the squadron passed Singapore and in April, after a 28-day passage, dropped anchor in Cam Ranh Bay, where the ships had to carry out repairs, load coal and accept materials for further travel. Then, at the request of the French government, the squadron moved to Van Phong Bay. Here, off the coast of Indochina, on April 26, it was joined by the 3rd Pacific Squadron.

The stops in Cam Ranh Bay and then in Van Phong Bay were extremely tense, since, on the one hand, the French government demanded the departure of the squadron, and on the other, a Japanese attack could be expected. During this stay, Admiral Rozhdestvensky sent a telegram to St. Petersburg in which, citing poor health, he asked to be replaced by another commander upon arrival in Vladivostok.

Transition from Indochina to the Korea Strait

After the addition of Admiral Nebogatov’s detachment, the 2nd Pacific Squadron moved on on May 1. Admiral Rozhdestvensky considered the squadron’s immediate task to be a breakthrough to Vladivostok, based on which the squadron was supposed to develop actions against the Japanese fleet.

The squadron could enter the Sea of ​​Japan through the Korean Straits. Sangarsky or Laperuzov. Admiral Rozhdestvensky decided to choose the shortest route through the Korean Strait, the widest and deepest of all the others. However, this route lay past the main bases of the Japanese fleet and, therefore, a meeting with the Japanese before arriving in Vladivostok was most likely. Admiral Rozhdestvensky took this into account, but believed that the passage through the Sangar Strait presented great difficulties in navigation, and besides, the strait could be mined (the depths allowed this). The passage through the Strait of La Perouse in May seemed completely impossible to Rozhdestvensky due to the prevailing fogs, navigational difficulties and lack of coal for this longer passage.

The decision to go through the Korean Strait created the most favorable conditions for the battle for the Japanese fleet, since this battle could take place near Japanese bases. The passage of the Russian squadron through other straits, however, did not guarantee it from meeting the Japanese, but still the latter would have been in less favorable conditions, further from their bases, and would have been able to concentrate only their newest ships and large destroyers. The route through the Korea Strait put the 2nd Pacific Squadron at the most disadvantageous position.

Having decided to go through the Korean Strait, Admiral Rozhdestvensky found it necessary to take measures to divert part of the forces of the Japanese fleet to the eastern shores of Japan and the western shores of Korea and partly mask the moment of the breakthrough. To this end, on May 8 and 9, the auxiliary cruisers Kuban and Terek were sent to the Pacific coast of Japan in order to demonstrate their presence there and thus divert part of the Japanese fleet. For the same purpose, the auxiliary cruisers “Rion” and “Dnepr” were sent to the Yellow Sea, separated from the squadron on May 12 along with transports as the squadron approached the Sedelny Islands. The transports separated from the squadron were supposed to go to Shanghai, the busiest trading port, connected by telegraph cables to all major port cities, including Japanese ones.

The measures taken by Admiral Rozhdestvensky could not give a positive result, but rather unmasked his intentions. It is unlikely that the commander of the Japanese fleet would have allocated significant forces to fight the Russian cruisers, having learned about their appearance. Having received information about the arrival of transports in Shanghai, the Japanese could conclude that the Russian squadron, freed from transports, would take the shortest route, i.e. through the Korea Strait.

After the separation of the auxiliary cruisers and transports, the marching order was established as follows: in the right column were the battleships - 1st armored detachment - “Prince Suvorov” (Rozhestvensky flag), “Alexander III”, “Borodino”, “Eagle”; 2nd armored detachment - “Oslyabya” (Felkerzam’s flag), “Sisoy the Great”, “Navarin” and the armored cruiser “Admiral Nakhimov”; on the left - the 3rd armored detachment - “Nikolai I” (Nebogatov’s flag), coastal defense battleships “Apraksin”, “Senyavin”, “Ushakov”, cruisers “Oleg” (Enkvist flag), “Aurora”, “Dmitry Donskoy” , “Vladimir Monomakh”. The reconnaissance detachment, consisting of the cruisers “Svetlana” (the pennant of captain 1st rank Shein), “Almaz” and “Ural”, walked ahead in a wedge formation - at a distance of 3-4 cabins. from the squadron. The cruisers “Pearl” and “Emerald” stayed on the outer flanks of the lead ships of both columns. The transports left with the squadron walked in the middle of the columns between the battleships: the lead Anadyr, followed by the Irtysh, Kamchatka, Korea, tugs Rus and Svir. The destroyers walked on both sides of the transports, between them and the battleships. The hospital ships “Orel” and “Kostroma” were at the tail of the column at a distance of about 2 miles from the rest of the ships. The progress of the squadron was determined by the progress of the Irtysh transport, which had the lowest speed (9.5 knots). At night, the ships carried distinctive lights facing inward of the formation; On hospital ships, not only all navigation lights were lit, but also additional ones to illuminate Red Cross signs.

Russian squadron

Command structure and tactical organization

Command staff

Squadron commander - senior adm. Z.P.Rozhestvensky (flag on the Suvorov)

Chief of Staff - Capt. 1 rub. K.K.Clapier-de-Colong

Senior flag officers - Lieutenant. E.V.Sventorzhetsky, S.D.Sverbeev 1st, N.L.Kryzhanovsky

Junior flag officers - Lieutenant. A.N. Novosiltsov, midshipmen Prince. G.R.Tsereteli, V.N.Demchinsky,

V.P. Kazakevich

Flagship navigators - regiment. V.I. Filippovsky, cap. 2 r. V.I. Semenov

Flagship artilleryman - regiment. F.A.Bersenev

Flagship miners - cap. 2 r. P.P. Makedonsky, lieutenant. E.A. Leontiev

Flagm.eng.-mechanics - sub. V.A.Obnorsky, sub. L.N. Stratanovich

Flag.cor.engineer - senior judge. E.S. Politkovsky

Flagm. quartermasters - cap. 2 r. A.G. von Witte, A.K. Polis

Chief Auditor - Col. V.E.Dobrovolsky

Junior flagship - candidate adm. D.G. Felkerzam (flag on "Oslyabya")

Flag officers - Lieut. Baron F.M. Kosinsky 1st, Mr. Prince. K.P.Lieven

Flagship navigator - sub. A.I.Osipov

Junior flagship - candidate adm. O.A.Enkvist (flag on "Oleg")

Flag officers - lieutenants D.V.von Den 1-i, A.S.Zarin

Flagship navigator - cap. 2 r. S.R. de Livre

Commander of a separate detachment of ships of the 3rd Pacific Squadron - Candidate of Adm. N.I. Nebogatov (flag on "Nicholas I")

Chief of Staff - Capt. 1 rub. V.A.Cross

Senior Flag Officer - Lieutenant. I.M.Sergeev 5th

Junior flag officers - lieutenants F.V. Severin, N.N. Glazov

Flagship artilleryman - cap. 2 r. N.P.Kurosh

Flagship miner - Lieut. I.I. Stepanov 7th

Flagship navigator - lieutenant colonel. D.N.Fedotiev

Flag mechanic - Lieutenant Colonel. N.A. Orekhov

Chief Auditor - Lieutenant Colonel. V.A. Mayevsky

1st armored detachment

Squadron battleship "Suvorov" - cap. 1 rub. V.V.Ignatius

Squadron battleship "Emperor Alexander III" - cap. 1 r. N.M.Bukhvostov

Squadron battleship "Borodino" - cap. 1 r. P.I.Serebrennikov

Squadron battleship "Eagle" - cap. 1 r. N.V. Jung

With the detachment, the cruiser of the 2nd rank "Pearl" - cap. 2 r. P.P.Levitsky

2nd armored detachment

Squadron battleship "Oslyabya" - cap. 1 r. V.I.Ber

Squadron battleship "Navarin" - cap. 1 r. B.A. Fitingof

Squadron battleship "Sisoy the Great" - cap. 1 rub. M.V. Ozerov

Armored cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov" - cap. 1 r. A.A. Rodionov

With the detachment, the cruiser of the 2nd rank "Emerald" - cap. 2 r. V.N. Ferzen

3rd armored detachment

Squadron battleship "Imper Nicholas I" - cap. 1 r. V.V.Smirnov

Defense battleship "Adm. General Apraksin" - cap. 1 rub. N.G.Lishin

Defense battleship "Admiral Senyavin" - cap. 1 r. S.I.Grigoriev

Defense battleship "Admiral Ushakov" - cap. 1 r. V.N. Miklouho-Maclay

Cruiser squad

1st rank cruiser "Oleg" - cap. 1 r.L.F. Dobrotvorsky

1st rank cruiser "Aurora" - cap. 1 rub. E.R. Egoriev

1st rank cruiser "Dmitry Donskoy" - cap. 1 r. I.N.Lebedev

1st rank cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh" - cap. 1 rub. V.A.Popov

Reconnaissance squad

1st rank cruiser "Svetlana" - cap. 1 r. S.P.Shein

2nd rank cruiser "Almaz" - cap. 2 r. I.I.Chagin

2nd rank cruiser "Ural" - cap. 2 r. M.K.Istomin

Destroyers (fighters)

. "Bedovy" - cap. 2 r. N.V.Baranov

. "Cheerful" - cap. 2 r. P.V.Ivanov

. "Buyny" - cap. 2 r. N.N. Kolomeytsev

. "Fast" - Lieutenant. O.O.Richter

. "Brilliant" - cap. 2 r. S.A. Shamov

. "Brave" - ​​Lieutenant. P.P.Durnovo

. "Impeccable" - cap. 2 rub. I.A.Matusevich 2nd

. "Loud" - cap. 2 r. G.F.Kern

. "Grozny" - cap. 2 r. K.K.Andrzhievsky

Vessels attached to the squadron

Transport workshop "Kamchatka" - capital 2 r. A.I. Stepanov

Transport "Irtysh" (formerly "Belgium") - cap. 2 r. K.L.Ergomyshev

Transport "Anadyr" - cap. 2 r. V.F. Ponomarev

Transport "Korea" - Dr. med. I.O.Zubov

Towing steamer "Rus" (formerly "Roland") - cap. 1 size V. Pernitz

Towing steamer "Svir" - warrant officer G.A. Rosenfeld

Hospital ship "Eagle" - from bay 2 r. Y.K. Lokhmatov

Hospital ship "Kostroma" - Colonel N. Smelsky

In this order, the squadron approached the Korean Strait. The squadron was in the area where the enemy was located, but reconnaissance was not organized. There was no fight against enemy reconnaissance. Of the oncoming steamships, only one was detained; the rest were not even inspected. The location of the squadron was unmasked by hospital ships that had full coverage. Under these conditions, there was no need to talk about any kind of secrecy in the movement of the squadron. Admiral Rozhestvensky refused reconnaissance, because he was sure that, moving through the Korean Strait, he would meet all the forces of the Japanese fleet there. In addition, he believed that the deployment of reconnaissance officers would only help the enemy detect the squadron earlier. In addition, he believed that given the Japanese superiority in speed, he would not be able to use the information received by reconnaissance to perform any maneuver.

Refusal of intelligence was completely wrong. Admiral Rozhdestvensky’s reference to the desire to maintain the secrecy of the squadron’s movement does not stand up to criticism at all, since the squadron could easily have been detected by the enemy by the hospital ships that were with it, which in fact happened.

There was no compelling justification for leaving six transports with the squadron, since they did not carry any vital cargo. In the battle, the inevitability of which Rozhdestvensky foresaw, they were only a burden, distracting the cruisers for their defense. In addition, the presence of the low-speed transport Irtysh reduced squadron speed. Thus, at this last stage of the movement of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, Admiral Rozhdestvensky did not take any measures to conceal the movement, did not organize reconnaissance of the enemy, and did not speed up the movement of the squadron itself.

On the night of May 13–14, the 2nd Pacific Squadron entered the Korea Strait. Due to the large number of ships included in the squadron, its marching order was very complex. The squadron marched in formation of three wake columns. The side columns were made up of warships, the middle one - from transports. At the head of the squadron were the cruisers of the reconnaissance detachment, behind, at a distance of about a mile, two hospital ships. Due to such a complex formation, the ships inevitably had to fire at night to prevent the possibility of a collision. On the ships, distinctive lights were lit on the sides facing inward and in the wake; The masthead lights were extinguished. On hospital ships sailing at the tail of the squadron, all lights were open, which made it possible for the enemy to detect the squadron and determine its course and progress.

Moving in such a compact formation, the squadron entered the area where the enemy was located, whose proximity it knew from intercepted radiograms.

On the night of May 14, the ships were ready for battle. The artillery crew rested in places provided for by the combat schedule.

The 2nd Pacific Squadron at that time included 4 new squadron battleships, 4 older ones, 3 coastal defense battleships, an armored cruiser, 8 cruisers of the 1st and 2nd ranks, an auxiliary cruiser, 9 destroyers and 2 hospital ships. The flag of Admiral Rozhestvensky was on the squadron battleship “Prince Suvorov”. The junior flagships, rear admirals Nebogatov and Enquist, were: the first on the battleship “Nicholas I”, and the second on the cruiser “Oleg”.

Rear Admiral Felkerzam died on May 11, but his flag on the battleship Oslyabya was not lowered.

The tactical data of the ships that were part of the 2nd squadron were very diverse. The most powerful ships were the 4 new Borodino-class battleships. These ships were intended for navigation in limited areas, and heavy overloading of coal in excess of the norm, associated with long passages, sharply reduced their combat qualities, since the armor belt was immersed in water and the stability of the ship decreased. The battleship Oslyabya was very different from them - a seaworthy ship, but weak in armor and artillery (Oslyabya was armed with 10-inch guns). Three battleships - “Sisoi the Great”, “Navarin” and “Nicholas I” had nothing in common either with each other or with the previous ships. Of these, the last two had old, short-range guns. Finally, the three small coastal defense battleships of the Admiral Ushakov type were not intended for squadron combat on the high seas, although they had modern 10-inch guns. Of the 8 cruisers, only two were of the same type.

The Japanese armored squadron, which consisted of the same number of armored ships as the Russian one, was more of the same type. It consisted of three Mikasa-class battleships, one Fuji-class battleship, six Asama-class armored cruisers and two Nisshin-class armored cruisers. With the exception of the last two, all the ships were built with the expectation that they would have to fight with Russia, and taking into account the characteristics of the Far Eastern theater.

According to their tactical data, the Japanese battleships were significantly stronger than the Russians, as can be seen from the following table.

Fleet	Armor (in %) with armor thickness		Unarmored area
	More than 152 mm	Less than 152 mm
Russian battleships
Japanese battleships

Fleet	Artillery		Ship speed, knots
	Weight of ejected metal in min. (pounds)	Weight of ejected adult substances per min. (pounds)	Greatest	Least
Russian battleships	19366
Japanese battleships	53520	7493

From a comparison of these figures it is clear that the Japanese ships were better armored and had greater speed. The artillery on Japanese ships had a rate of fire twice as high as that of the Russians, which allowed the Japanese to fire a significantly larger number of shells per minute.

Japanese ships were armed with powerful high-explosive shells with a large amount of explosive, up to 14%. Russian shells had only 2.5% explosive. Consequently, Japanese shells were superior to Russian ones in terms of high-explosive effect. In addition, the strength of the explosive (shimoza) in Japanese shells was approximately twice as strong as the pyroxylin used in Russian shells. All this gave the Japanese great advantages in battle, especially considering that Japanese ships were significantly superior to Russian ships in terms of artillery preparation, and also that Russian ships had an unarmored side area almost 1.5 times larger than Japanese ships (60 versus 39 percent) .

In terms of the number of destroyers, the Japanese fleet was much stronger. The Japanese concentrated 30 large and 33 small destroyers against 9 Russians. In addition, the Japanese fleet had a significant number of various types of obsolete and auxiliary ships.

See the continuation on the website: For advanced - Naval commanders - The Tragedy of Tsushima

In mid-December 1904, when the 2nd Pacific Squadron under the command of Admiral Rozhdestvensky was slowly moving towards the Far Eastern waters, and the Japanese fleet was undergoing repairs after the end of the Port Arthur campaign, a plan for further action was approved in Tokyo at a meeting of Admirals Togo, Ito and Yamomoto . As if foreseeing the route of the Russian squadron, most of the Japanese ships were supposed to concentrate in the Korean Strait. On January 20, 1905, Admiral Togo again raised the flag on the Mikasa.

"The Road to Russia"

A little earlier on land, having learned about the fall of Port Arthur, General Kuropatkin decided to go on the offensive before the liberated army of Nogi approached the main forces of the Japanese. The newly formed 2nd Army was headed by O.K. Grippenberg.

On January 12, 1905, the 1st Siberian Corps occupied Heigoutai, the main stronghold of the Oku army, without firing a shot. On January 16, Grippenberg ordered a general assault on Sandep, but instead of the reinforcements requested from Kuropatkin, he was ordered to retreat, and the commander of the 1st Siberian Corps, General Stackelberg, was removed from office. Having previously telegraphed the Tsar and resigned his command, Grippenberg left for St. Petersburg. This shameful turmoil at the top was keenly felt by ordinary participants in the events: “The faces of the soldiers were gloomy; no jokes or conversations were heard, and each of us understood that at first there was some kind of pandemonium, some kind of disgrace; “Everyone asked themselves the question: what will happen next when they have to walk not along the road between peaceful villages, but along a battlefield under bullets and shells.”

As a result, the Sandepu-Heigoutai operation, called “useless bloodletting,” became a prelude to the Mukden disaster.

The fighting near Mukden took place on February 6-25 and unfolded along a 140-kilometer front line. On each side, 550 thousand people took part in the battle. Japanese troops under the leadership of Marshal I. Oyama were reinforced by the 3rd Army, redeployed from Port Arthur. As a result, their forces amounted to 271 thousand bayonets and sabers, 1,062 guns, 200 machine guns. The three Russian Manchu armies had 293 thousand bayonets and sabers, 1,475 guns, 56 machine guns. The strategic goals of the Japanese command boiled down to the following: with the offensive of the 5th and 1st armies on the right wing of the front (east of Mukden), to divert the reserves of Russian troops and deliver a powerful blow southwest of Mukden with the forces of the 3rd Army. After this, cover the right flank of the Russian troops.

On February 11 (24), the Japanese 1st Army under General Kuroki, which went on the offensive, was unable to break through the defenses of the Russian 1st Army under General N.P. until February 18 (March 3). Linevich. Kuropatkin, believing that it was here that the Japanese were delivering the main blow, by February 12 (25), he sent almost all his reserves to support the 1st Army.

On February 13 (26), the 3rd Japanese Army of General M. Nogi began the offensive. But Kuropatkin sent only one brigade to the area of ​​northwestern Mukden. And only three days later, when the threat of bypassing the right wing of the Russian front became obvious, he ordered the 1st Army to return the reinforcements sent to it to cover Mukden from the west.

On February 17 (March 2) the columns of the 3rd Japanese Army turned to Mukden, but here they met stubborn resistance from Topornin’s troops. Then Oyama moved the 3rd Army further north, strengthening it with reserves. Kuropatkin, in turn, to reduce the front on February 22 (March 7), gave the order for the armies to retreat to the river. Honghe.

On February 24 (March 9), the Japanese broke through the front of the 1st Russian Army, and the threat of encirclement loomed over the Russian troops. “At Mukden,” writes an eyewitness, “Russian troops found themselves as if in a bottle, the narrow neck of which kept narrowing to the north.”

On the night of February 25 (March 10), the troops began a general retreat to Telin, and then to the Sypingai positions 160 versts from the battle site. “From the mountain you could see the entire field, covered with retreating troops, and everyone was walking in some kind of disorderly heaps, and no matter who you asked, no one knew anything not only about someone else’s regiment, but they had also lost their own companies, and everyone was just trying to hurry up.” leave, leave and leave,” recalled the mediocre warrant officer F.I. Shikuts. - General Kuropatkin himself looked at the road along which all sorts of rabble walked: carts, horses, donkeys, soldiers of all sorts, among them there were those who dragged huge bundles of various rubbish on their shoulders and without rifles. This happened when soldiers collected various things from the convoy or robbed the Chinese; and since it was hard to carry all this, they, regretting throwing away the bundle with the looted goods, first threw away the cartridge belt with cartridges and cartridge bags, and then, since it was still difficult to walk, they also threw the rifles and stuck the bayonet in their belts , and so they moved on. Carrying a load and hearing shots, they imagined they were going around the Japanese, and then, abandoning their treasures, they ran away without looking back, but, having come to their senses, they were ashamed to run with a bayonet without a rifle, and they threw the bayonet, and took a stick in return. When there is no one, such a fugitive walks and props himself up with a stick, and if someone new comes across, he begins to limp, as if he had been wounded in the leg, and leans on the stick as if on a crutch. With such fates they made their way even to Harbin, from where they were sent in stages to their units, and the same story began again.” The Commander-in-Chief himself recalled how one of the officials of his headquarters, having approached such an unarmed man, heard from him the question: “Where is the road to Russia?” - and to reproaches of cowardice I received the following answer: “What kind of a fighter am I - I have six children behind me.”

In general, in the Battle of Mukden, the Russians lost 89 thousand people, including about 30 thousand prisoners. The Japanese losses were also great - 71 thousand people. According to many historians, one of the main reasons for the defeat of Russian troops near Mukden was inept, unclear command and control of the troops.

Last bid

“After Mukden, society already loudly condemned the war, they said that they had long foreseen what had happened, that they had always maintained that Japan was an invincible power, that only fools called the Japanese macaques,” recalled N.E. Wrangel, father of the famous white general. The Russian command had one last headquarters left - the 2nd Pacific Squadron, made up of ships of the Baltic Fleet. Its preparations were carried out in the expectation that “we will have no further defeats and an era of victories is coming.” In the ocean, she was joined by another group of ships sent in pursuit, as the sailors themselves put it, “an archaeological composition.” “You don’t have to be a pessimist at all,” one of the participants wrote before the hike, “to clearly see that nothing awaits us except shame and disgrace.” The squadron, which had to cover 18,000 nautical miles almost without calling at ports, without bases or coaling stations, left Libau to help the besieged Port Arthur on October 1, 1904. And on October 4, Z.P. Rozhdestvensky was elevated to the rank of vice admiral with confirmation as chief of the Main Naval Staff.

The squadron's voyage began with an international scandal. On the night of October 8, in the North Sea, British fishing vessels, which were mistakenly mistaken for Japanese destroyers, came under fire. One trawler was sunk, five were damaged, and there were casualties among the fishermen - two killed and six wounded. In the confusion of indiscriminate firing, a shell fired from the flagship battleship "Prince Suvorov" mortally wounded the ship's priest of the cruiser "Aurora", Father Anastasy (it was from this cruiser that they would hit the pediments of the Winter Palace in 1917).

The affected trawlers were assigned to the English port of Gull, so this whole sad story was called the Gull Incident. English newspapers then called the Russian squadron a “mad dog squadron” and demanded its return or destruction. As a result, partial mobilization began in Great Britain, and English cruisers were sent after Rozhdestvensky’s squadron to monitor its movement. But they decided to settle Russian-English relations in accordance with the decision of the 1st International Peace Conference, which took place in 1899 in The Hague. On February 23, 1905, the Russian government paid compensation to the Hullian fishermen in the amount of 65 thousand pounds sterling.

Towards death

During the campaign, which lasted eight months in unprecedentedly difficult conditions, the sailors learned about the outbreak of revolutionary unrest in their homeland, about “Bloody Sunday,” strikes and political murders. “Gentlemen! They have already forgotten about us in Russia,” once said in the wardroom of the cruiser “Aurora” its commander, Captain 1st Rank E.R. Egoriev, looking through Russian newspapers. “Everyone is busy with their own internal routines, reforms, gossip, but they don’t talk about the war.” “Even if supremacy at sea remains ours,” the flagship naval engineer E.S. reasoned in a letter to his wife. Politovsky, “England and America will stand up for Japan and Russia will give in.”

The sailors received news of the death of the 1st Pacific Squadron and the surrender of Port Arthur in the coastal waters of Madagascar. “Damn hole! - wrote one of them. “It’s not for nothing that we sailors always hated her so much!” It was necessary to go out and break through to Chifoo, to Kiao-Chau, just not to sit in this hole and be shot.” The stopover in Nosi-be lasted for 2 months. The position of the squadron was very uncertain. No one knew either the further route or any timing. The same Politovsky wrote that this uncertainty depressed everyone, that maintaining the squadron cost a lot of money. And that, finally, during this time the Japanese were repairing their ships and boilers, thoroughly preparing for the meeting. “Our squadron is the last strength of Russia. If she dies, we won’t have a fleet at all... Probably something similar is going on in the army.”

Rumors began to circulate among the sailors about a return to the Baltic. However, by telegraph, Admiral Rozhdestvensky received an explanation that the task assigned to him, “it turns out, is not at all to break through to Vladivostok with several ships,” but to take possession of the Sea of ​​Japan. In early February, Rozhestvensky held a meeting of junior flagships and ship commanders, where he expressed his opinion that it was impossible to complete the assigned tasks. Senior flag officer Lieutenant Sventorzhetsky wrote at that time that the admiral knew very well that all of Russia was expecting something extraordinary from him, expecting victory and the destruction of the Japanese fleet. But this could only be expected by Russian society, completely unfamiliar with the situation in which the squadron would be located.

“You don’t have to dream about victories. You won't hear about them. You will only hear the complaints and groans of those sufferers who deliberately, not believing in success, went to die,” stated the ship’s doctor of the cruiser “Aurora” V. Kravchenko.

The squadron stationed in Nosi-be left the port on March 3, 1905, and after 28 days of crossing the Indian Ocean, Rozhdestvensky led it to Kamrang Bay. On April 26, off the coast of Indochina, she was joined by a detachment of Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov, who left the Baltic on February 3.

Now one could expect a meeting with the enemy at any moment. Three routes led from the China Sea to Vladivostok: through the La Perouse Strait around Japan, through the Sangar Strait between the Japanese islands, and, finally, the shortest, but also the most dangerous - through the Korea Strait, separating Japan from Korea. Rozhestvensky chose the latter.

From the evening of May 12 and throughout the next day, wireless telegraph stations on Russian ships received radio signals from Japanese reconnaissance cruisers. The squadron moved slowly, and a significant part of the day on the 13th was devoted to evolutions. The squadron thought that the admiral was deliberately delaying it for fear of entering into battle on an unlucky date, since in 1905 May 13 fell on a Friday. “On the night of May 13-14, hardly anyone slept,” the flag captain of the headquarters, Captain 1st Rank Clapier de Colong, later recalled. “It was too obvious to meet the enemy in full force.”

On May 14, one of the Japanese reconnaissance officers discovered the bright lights of the hospital ships of the Pacific squadron, and Admiral Togo aboard the Mikasa went out to meet the long-awaited enemy. Japanese cruisers observing the Russian ships were also spotted from the ships of Rozhdestvensky's squadron. After this, Admiral Rozhdestvensky rebuilt the squadron into two wake columns. When at 13:15 the battleships and armored cruisers of the Japanese fleet appeared, intending to cross the course of the Russian squadron, Rozhdestvensky attempted to rebuild the ships into one wake column. With these actions, the admiral delayed the opening of fire, which began at 13:49 from a distance of over 7 km. The Japanese ships opened fire after 3 minutes, bringing it down on the Russian lead ships. Since the Japanese ships had superior speed - 18-20 knots versus 15-18 for the Russians - the Japanese fleet stayed ahead of the Russian column, choosing convenient positions for firing at the lead ships. When, after 14 hours, the distance between the enemy ships decreased to 5.2 km, Rozhdestvensky ordered to turn to the right, thereby adhering to a course parallel to the Japanese one. It is worth noting that the armor of the Russian ships was weaker - 40% of the area versus 61% for the Japanese, and that the Japanese artillery had a higher rate of fire - 360 rounds per minute versus 134 for the Russian. And, finally, that Japanese shells were 10-15 times superior to Russian shells in terms of high-explosive action. At 14:25, the flagship battleship “Prince Suvorov” was out of action, and Rozhdestvensky was wounded. The fate of the second flagship, Oslyabya, was also decided in the first half hour of the battle: after heavy shelling, a fire started on the ship, and it also failed. Meanwhile, the Russian ships, changing course twice, continued to move in a column without leadership. The squadron was unable to increase the distance between itself and the enemy. After 18:00, command of the Russian squadron was transferred to Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov. During the battle, Japanese ships sank 4 Russian battleships and damaged almost all other ships. None of the Japanese were sunk. At night, Japanese destroyers launched many attacks and sank another 1 battleship and 1 armored cruiser. With darkness, the Russian ships lost contact with each other.

By the morning of May 15 (28), the Russian squadron ceased to exist as a fighting force. The destroyer "Bedovy" with the wounded Rozhdestvensky was forced to surrender to the Japanese.

The tragedy, unprecedented in Russian maritime history, claimed the lives of more than five thousand people. For the first time in its entire existence, the St. Andrew's flag was lowered in front of the enemy. Of the forty ships that made up Rozhdestvensky’s squadron, only the cruiser Almaz and two destroyers made it to the destination of the voyage - Vladivostok. 19 ships were sunk, five surrendered. The Japanese lost three destroyers and 699 people killed and wounded at Tsushima.

“Most of the reasons that caused the defeat,” stated a participant in the battle, “were known to everyone long ago, long before the battle, but we actually became acquainted with the rest of our Russians only in the Tsushima Strait.”

Unaccomplished victory

On May 15, a rumor spread in St. Petersburg that a Russian squadron had defeated the Japanese fleet. “Alas, it soon became known that, on the contrary, our squadron was defeated on May 14, on the very day of the Tsar’s coronation,” recalled Infantry General N.A. Epanchin. - The thought involuntarily flashed: was the battle deliberately started on the day of the coronation? I knew Zinovy ​​Petrovich well and I want to hope that this is not the case.” Emperor Nicholas received the first conflicting information about the Battle of Tsushima on May 16, Monday. The emperor discussed the oppressive news of the unknown at breakfast with the Grand Dukes, Admiral General Alexei Alexandrovich and the aide-de-camp on duty that day, Kirill Vladimirovich, who miraculously survived the Petropavlovsk disaster.

S.Yu. Witte, whom the sad circumstances of the war again brought to the forefront of politics, had a hard time surviving the Tsushima defeat. A few days after the battle, he telegraphed A.N. Kuropatkin: “He was silent under the yoke of darkness and misfortune. My heart is with you. God help you! But after the Mukden disaster, there were changes in the command structure of the Russian army. Kuropatkin “beat him with his forehead, asking him to remain in the army in any position.” He received the 1st Army, from which N.P. came to replace him. Linevich is an elderly general whose pinnacle of military leadership was the dispersal of discordant crowds of Chinese during the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion.

Throughout the spring, the Russian armies in Manchuria were constantly strengthened, and by the summer of 1905 the superiority in forces became noticeable. Against 20 Japanese, Russia already had 38 divisions concentrated in the Sypingai positions. There were already about 450 thousand soldiers in the active army, of which 40 thousand were volunteers. They established a wireless telegraph and field railways; with the completion of the construction of the Circum-Baikal Railway, they now communicated with Russia not by five pairs of trains per day, of which there were three actual military trains, but by twenty. At the same time, the quality of Japanese troops noticeably decreased. The officers with whom the Imperial Japanese Army entered the war with Russia were largely exterminated, and replacements arrived untrained. The Japanese began to willingly surrender, which had previously happened extremely rarely. Mobilized old men and teenagers were already captured. For six months after Mukden, the Japanese did not dare to launch a new offensive. Their army was exhausted by the war and its reserves were running low. Many found that Kuropatkin strategically outplayed Oyama, but it was not surprising to do this, having a huge, almost untouched regular army behind him. Indeed, in the battles of Liaoyang, Shahe and Mukden, only a small part of the Russian army fought against all Japanese ground forces. “The future historian,” Kuropatkin himself wrote, “summing up the results of the Russian-Japanese War, will calmly decide that our ground army in this war, although it suffered failures in the first campaign, but, ever increasing in number and experience, finally reached such strength that victory could be ensured, and that therefore peace was concluded at a time when our ground army had not yet been defeated by the Japanese, either materially or morally.” As for the statistical data on the balance of forces, then, for example, in the report of the same A.N. Kuropatkin (when he was Minister of War) literally says the following: in wartime, Japan can develop its armed forces to 300,080 people, about half of these forces can take part in landing operations. But at the greatest readiness in Japan there are 126,000 bayonets, plus 55,000 checkers and 494 guns. In other words, 181,000 Japanese soldiers and officers faced 1,135,000 Russians. But in reality, as noted above, it was not the regular army that fought the Japanese, but the reserves. This, according to Kuropatkin, was the main flaw of Russian strategy.

Perhaps, in fact, the Battle of Sypingai should have brought victory to Russia, but it was never destined to take place. According to the writer-historian A.A. Kersnovsky, a victory at Sypingai would have opened the eyes of the whole world to the power of Russia and the strength of its army, and the prestige of Russia as a great power would have risen high - and in July 1914 the German emperor would not have dared to send her an arrogant ultimatum. If Linevich had gone on the offensive from Sypingai, Russia would perhaps not have known the disasters of 1905, the explosion of 1914 and the catastrophe of 1917.

Portsmouth World

Mukden and Tsushima made the revolutionary processes in Russia irreversible. Radical-minded students and high school students sent congratulatory telegrams to the Mikado and kissed the first captured Japanese officers when they were brought to the Volga. Agrarian unrest began, and Soviets of Workers' Deputies were created in cities - the forerunners of the Soviets of 1917. American observers believed that Russia's continuation of this war "could lead to the loss of all Russian East Asian possessions, not even excluding Vladivostok." Voices in favor of continuing the war were still heard, Kuropatkin and Linevich urged the government not to make peace under any circumstances, but Nicholas himself already doubted the abilities of his strategists. “Our generals said,” wrote Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich, “that if they had more time, they could win the war. I believed that they should have been given twenty years so that they could reflect on their criminal negligence. No people has won or could win a war by fighting an enemy located seven thousand miles away, while inside the country the revolution was stabbing the army in the back.” S.Yu. Witte echoed him, believing that it was necessary to conclude peace before the Battle of Mukden, then the conditions of peace were worse than before the fall of Port Arthur. Or - it was necessary to make peace when Rozhdestvensky appeared with a squadron in the Chinese Sea. Then the conditions would have been almost the same as after the Battle of Mukden. And, finally, peace should have been concluded before a new battle with Linevich’s army: “... Of course, the conditions will be very difficult, but one thing I am sure of is that after the battle with Linevich they will be even more difficult. After the capture of Sakhalin and Vladivostok they will be even heavier.” The tsar’s august uncle, General Admiral Alexei Alexandrovich, and the Minister of the Navy, Admiral F.K., paid for the Tsushima pogrom with their posts. Avelan, consigned to royal oblivion. Admirals Rozhdestvensky and Nebogatov - who surrendered the remains of the defeated squadron to the Japanese - upon their return from captivity, appeared before a naval court.

At the end of June, peace negotiations opened in Portsmouth, initiated by American President Theodore Roosevelt. Russia needed peace to “prevent internal unrest,” which, according to the president, would otherwise turn into a disaster. But even in bloodless Japan there was a fanatical “war party.” Trying to provoke a continuation of the war, its representatives staged a series of arson attacks on the so-called “shelters” where Russian prisoners were kept.

Roosevelt's proposal was preceded by an appeal to him by the Japanese government with a request for mediation. It seemed that the Japanese themselves were afraid of their victories. There is evidence that back in the summer of 1904, the Japanese envoy in London, Gayashi, through intermediaries, expressed a desire to meet with Witte to exchange views on the possibility of ending the feud and concluding an honorable peace. Gayashi's initiative received approval from Tokyo. But the then retired minister S.Yu. Witte realized with regret that at court his news about the possibility of concluding a “non-humiliating peace” was interpreted as “the opinion of a fool and almost a traitor.” At the same time, it was he who got the role of switchman. In an interview with a Daily Telegraph correspondent, Witte said that, despite the full powers given to him, his role was reduced to finding out on what terms the Mikado government would agree to make peace. And before this meeting, Witte talked about the prospects of war with the head of the Naval Ministry, Admiral A.A. Birilev. He bluntly told him that “the issue with the fleet is over. Japan is the master of the waters of the Far East."

On July 23, the Russian and Japanese peace delegations were introduced to each other aboard the presidential yacht May Flower, and on the third day Witte was privately received by Roosevelt at the presidential dacha near New York. Witte developed the idea before Roosevelt that Russia did not consider itself defeated, and therefore could not accept any conditions dictated to the defeated enemy, especially indemnity. He said that great Russia would never agree to any conditions that would affect honor for reasons not only of a military nature, but mainly of national identity. The internal situation, for all its seriousness, is not the same as it appears abroad, and cannot induce Russia to “renounce itself.”

Exactly a month later, on August 23, in the building of the Admiralty Palace "Nevi Yard" in Portsmouth (New Hampshire), Witte and the head of the Japanese diplomatic department, Baron Komura Jutaro, signed a peace treaty. Russia transferred the Kwantung region with Port Arthur and Dalny to Japan, ceded the southern part of Sakhalin along the 50th parallel, lost part of the Chinese Eastern Railway and recognized the predominance of Japanese interests in Korea and Southern Manchuria. The Japanese's demands for indemnity and reimbursement of costs of 3 billion rubles were rejected, and Japan did not insist on them, fearing a resumption of hostilities in unfavorable conditions for itself. On this occasion, the London Times wrote that “a nation hopelessly beaten in every battle, one army capitulated, another in flight, and a fleet buried at sea, dictated its terms to the winner.”

It was after the signing of the treaty that Witte, in addition to the count title granted by the tsar, acquired the “honorary” prefix Polu-Sakhalinsky to his surname from the noted wits.

Even during the siege of Port Arthur, the Japanese told the Russians that if they were in an alliance, the whole world would submit to them. And on the way back from Portsmouth, Witte told his personal secretary I.Ya. Korostovets: “I have now begun a rapprochement with Japan, we need to continue it and secure it with an agreement - a trade one, and if possible, then a political one, but not at the expense of China. Of course, first of all, mutual trust must be restored.”

In general, access to the Pacific Ocean and a strong foothold on its Far Eastern shores have been a long-standing problem of Russian politics. Another thing is that at the beginning of the twentieth century, Russia’s aspirations here acquired a largely adventuristic character. The idea of ​​access to the Pacific Ocean was not abandoned “even by the Bolsheviks, who at first persistently and systematically sought to break all historical ties with the past Russia,” noted B. Shteifon. But they were unable to change this attraction to the seas, and their struggle for the Chinese Eastern Railway proved this.

It is no coincidence that all three monuments to the “aggressive” and “imperialist” war (Admiral S.O. Makarov in Kronstadt, the destroyer “Steregushchy” in the Alexander Park of St. Petersburg and the battleship “Alexander III” in the garden of the St. Nicholas Naval Cathedral) have been safely preserved to this day, and in 1956, the Soviet government immortalized in bronze the memory of the commander of the legendary cruiser “Varyag” (and aide-de-camp of the retinue of Emperor Nicholas II) Vsevolod Fedorovich Rudnev, decorating the central street of Tula with his bust.

Bridge 100 years long

Naito Yasuo, chief correspondent of the Moscow bureau of the Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun, talks about the reasons for the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, its assessments, results and consequences.

Since the end of the 19th century, the hegemony of the United States and European powers was established in Asia. It was an era of rivalry between states, based on the brutal principle of "winner takes all." Japan, which lagged behind the leading world powers in development, embarked on the path of industrialization in 1894, decided to gain a foothold on the Korean Peninsula and, to achieve this goal, started a war with China. The result of military actions was the rejection of the Liaodong Peninsula in favor of Japan. However, Russia, in alliance with Germany and France, plotting to subjugate all of Asia, intervened and demanded the return of the Liaodong Peninsula to defeated China. Standing up for the interests of the losing side, Russia actually built a colony on the peninsula returned to China. At that time, Japan understood that it had no real levers of influence on Russia, so it was during this period that the national slogan of the Japanese became the expression “gashin-shotan,” which means “giving up the present in favor of the future.” This slogan united the Japanese nation.

In 1900, Russia, using the Boxer Rebellion in China as an official pretext to protect national interests, sent its ground military forces to Manchuria. After the incident was resolved, Russia did not express any desire to withdraw troops from Chinese territory. In the context of Russian expansion to the east, the development of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the construction of military bases in the north of the Korean Peninsula, which Japan declared a zone of its strategic interests, despair grew in Japanese society from the inability to oppose anything to Russia, which was an order of magnitude superior to Japan in economic and military power. Something urgently needed to be done, and Japan, with the support of Great Britain and the United States, began preparations for war with Russia. For Japan, the importance of this war can hardly be overestimated: without exaggeration, it should have determined the existence of the Japanese state.

As for modern points of view on the Russo-Japanese War, it is assessed differently. For example, Mrs. Hosaka Muneko, the great-granddaughter of Admiral Togo, who visited St. Petersburg in the spring of 2004, spoke at meetings that her great-grandfather’s goal was peace and that war was for him only a means to achieve it. He was not a Russophobe and fought only to defend his homeland, for the sake of justice. In her early 40s, Ms. Muneko practices kendo (sword fighting) with her two sons and often repeats to them and herself Admiral Togo’s favorite saying: “The main thing in this life is not to relax!”

The meeting with the great-grandson of Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky, commander-in-chief of the Baltic Fleet and the main opponent of Admiral Togo, Zinovy ​​Dmitrievich Spechinsky, became the most vivid impression for the great-granddaughter of Admiral Togo: “I could not even think that I would meet the descendant of the admiral with whom my great-grandfather fought ! “I sincerely believe that our confrontation is a thing of the past, and we will only look into the future together.”

The memory of this war continues to live in the minds of the Japanese: to this day, residents of those places where prisoner of war camps were located take care of the graves of Russian soldiers and officers. I would also like to remember that, despite the different number of soldiers and officers captured on both sides (the Russian - about 2,000 Japanese soldiers and officers, the Japanese - about 80,000 people), - the attitude towards prisoners and Russia and Japan were very humane. At the end of hostilities, everyone was given the opportunity to return to their homeland.

Such humanity, of course, cannot be compared with what happened 40 years after the Russo-Japanese War, when Stalin, in violation of the Potsdam Conference, interned about 600,000 Japanese soldiers and officers in Siberia, driving them away to forced labor, where many died of hunger and cold.

In Japan, scientists and students, people of different professions and ages from different positions and points of view continue to discuss the consequences of the Russo-Japanese War. The prevailing opinions are that “the nation united, mobilized and therefore was able to win against a stronger country”, “the first victory of an Asian state over a “white” country was an impulse to fight the colonialists in other Asian states”, “due to the outcome of this war in America "The Yellow Peril doctrine emerged, and this subsequently caused a lot of friction between America and Japan."

Vice-President of the Mikasa Preservation Society, retired Vice Admiral Oki Tameo (whose grandfather participated in the battle of Port Arthur and was wounded) assesses the war as follows: “From the point of view of Japanese history, the Russo-Japanese War was inevitable. It was a struggle between newly industrialized capitalist Japan and Russia, which lagged behind Europe, a struggle for hegemony in Asia. Although, of course, we must not forget that the stakes in this war were different: for Russia it was a war of conquest, while for Japan the very existence of the state and the preservation of sovereignty were at stake. That is why Japan, with all its efforts, managed to survive and win. But this victory provided the basis for militaristic forces to drag Japan into World War II. And war is always a tragedy. You don't need a crystal ball to see the future - just look into the mirror of history. Russian-Japanese relations are now at a stage where they need renewal and a focus on the future.”

Although older people in Japan still harbor negative attitudes toward Russia stemming from “Soviet aggression” in World War II, Mr. Oki stresses the importance of a new relationship that will change the future of these countries.

Translation by A. Chulahvarov

Artillery innovations of the Russo-Japanese War according to the “artillery department”

Japanese artillery grenades and bombs with strong explosives - “shimozas” - became perhaps the main problem of the Russian army in the “artillery department”. (“Grenades” were then used to call high-explosive shells weighing up to 1 pound; above that, “bombs.”) The Russian press wrote about “shimoz” almost with mystical horror. Meanwhile, there was intelligence information about it back in the summer of 1903, and then it became clear that “shimose” (more precisely, “shimose”, named after the engineer Masashika Shimose who introduced it in Japan) is a well-known explosive melinite (also known as picrine acid, also known as trinitrophenol).

Russian artillery had shells with melinite, but not for the new rapid-fire field artillery, which played the main role. Under the obvious influence of the French idea of ​​“unity of caliber and projectile”, the generally excellent Russian rapid-fire 3-dm (76-mm) guns mod. 1900 and 1902, which were 1.5 times longer than the Japanese in range and twice as fast in fire, had only a shrapnel shell in their ammunition. Shrapnel bullets, which were deadly against open living targets, were powerless against even light earthen shelters, adobe fanzes and fences. Japanese 75-mm field and mountain guns mod. 1898 could shoot "shimoza", and the same shelters that protected Japanese soldiers from Russian shrapnel could not shelter the Russians from Japanese "shimoza". It is no coincidence that the Japanese suffered only 8.5% of losses from artillery fire, and the Russians - 14%. In the spring of 1905, the magazine “Razvedchik” published a letter from one officer: “For God’s sake, write that it is urgently necessary to immediately, without delay, order 50-100 thousand three-inch grenades, equip them with a highly explosive composition like melinite, supply them with shock field tubes, and here we are we will have the same “shimoses”. Commander-in-Chief Kuropatkin three times demanded the supply of high-explosive grenades. First for 3-dm guns, then for the old 3.42-dm ​​guns available at the theater. 1895 (there were such shells for them), then he asked to at least replace some of the shrapnel bullets with powder charges - they tried to do similar improvisations in military laboratories, but they only led to damage to the guns. Through the efforts of the Commission on the Use of Explosives, the shells were prepared, but they reached the troops after the end of hostilities. At the beginning of the war, Russian field guns “daringly jumped out” into open positions closer to the enemy and immediately suffered heavy losses from his fire. Meanwhile, since 1900, Russian artillery has practiced firing from closed positions at an unobserved target using a protractor. For the first time in a combat situation, this was used by artillerymen of the 1st and 9th East Siberian artillery brigades in the battle of Dashichao in July 1904. And since August (the end of the Liaoyang operation), the bloody experience forced such shooting to become the rule. Inspector General of Artillery, Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich, personally checked the readiness of the rapid-fire batteries sent to Manchuria to fire using a protractor. Accordingly, after the war the question arose about new “optics” for artillery (the Russo-Japanese War confirmed the great usefulness of periscopes and stereo tubes) and communications.

In addition, there was an urgent need for a light, stealthy weapon with a steep trajectory and a strong high-explosive effect of the projectile. In August 1904, the head of the artillery workshops, Captain L.N. Gobyato developed over-caliber “air mines” for firing from a 75-mm cannon with a cut-down barrel. But in mid-September midshipman S.N. Vlasyev proposed firing pole mines from 47-mm naval guns. Major General Kondratenko advised him to contact Gobyato, and together in the fortress workshops they created a weapon called a “mortar” (it was then jokingly called a “frog cannon”). The over-caliber pole finned mine carried a charge of 6.5 kg of wet pyroxylin and an impact fuse from a naval torpedo, was inserted into the barrel from the muzzle and fired with a special shot with a wad projectile. To obtain large elevation angles, the gun was mounted on a “Chinese” wheeled carriage. The firing range ranged from 50 to 400 m.

In mid-August, senior mine officer of the cruiser Bayan, Lieutenant N.L. Podgursky proposed using a much heavier gun - smooth-bore breech-loading mine devices - to fire heavy mines at a range of up to 200 m. The spindle-shaped mine with a caliber of 254 mm and a length of 2.25 m resembled an extremely simplified torpedo without an engine, carried 31 kg of pyroxylin and an impact fuse. The firing range was regulated by a variable propellant charge. The hastily constructed guns provided considerable assistance in this war. After the war, new guns and shells for heavy field and siege artillery were created. But due to a “lack of funds,” such weapons were not available in the required quantities at the start of a new, already “big” war. Germany, focusing on the experience of the Russo-Japanese War, acquired quite a large number of heavy artillery. And when Russia at the beginning of the First World War needed to strengthen its heavy artillery, now allied Japan expressed its readiness to transfer 150-mm cannons and 230-mm howitzers, removing them... from the fortifications of Port Arthur. In 1904, machine guns (considered artillery pieces) “suddenly” became popular, but there was a shortage of them. The shortage was compensated for by various improvisations like the “Shemetillo machine gun” - captain Shemetillo, a participant in the defense, laid 5 “three-line guns” in a row on a wooden frame equipped with wheels; with the help of two levers, the shooter could reload all the rifles at once and fire in one gulp. The consumption of ammunition increased sharply compared to what was expected, and army commander Kuropatkin later said that “we haven’t fired much yet.”

Campaign of the Second Pacific Squadron

October 2 (15), 1904 The Second Pacific Squadron left Libau. She had to make a passage unprecedented in history across three oceans. The length of the journey was about 18 thousand miles.

Providing the squadron with everything necessary along the way became especially important, since Russia did not have a single base during the transition. First of all, the ships needed coal, and special equipment was needed to repair machines and mechanisms. Since the British government, taking a hostile position, was able to put pressure on neutral states, Russia could not use foreign ports. Even France, which was in an alliance with Russia, under pressure from England, did not allow Russian ships to enter its ports. Therefore, the Russian command assigned to the squadron a large number of transports loaded with coal, food, fresh water, as well as a floating workshop, without which a large fleet formation would not have been able to move to such a distant theater of military operations.

Second Pacific Squadron on the march Increase! Increase! Increase! Increase! Increase! Increase! Increase! Increase! Increase!

October 7 (20) The ships sailed into the North Sea. Rozhdestvensky's headquarters, having received information that Japanese destroyers intended to attack the squadron in the near future, created a nervous situation with their instructions. As a result, at Doggerbank on the night of October 9 (22) Russian battleships fired at English fishing vessels, mistaking them for enemy destroyers. One boat was sunk, 5 were damaged, 2 were killed and 6 were wounded. The cruiser Aurora, which carried the wounded, was also damaged by its shells. This incident further strained relations with England and detained the Russian squadron in the Spanish port of Vigo for a week.

October 21 (November 3) The squadron arrived in Tangier. Here the division of the units took place. The main forces, which had a deep draft, could not pass through the Suez Canal, so, accompanied by cruisers and transports, they headed to the Indian Ocean around Africa. The detachment under the command of the junior flagship, Rear Admiral D. G. Felkersam, left for Suez on the same day.

The voyage of the main forces took place in difficult conditions. They were accompanied by English cruisers to the Canary Islands. The situation was so tense that the commander of the Russian squadron ordered to load the guns and be ready to repel the attack. During rare stops, and most often in the open ocean, the ships of the squadron were replenished with coal. Coal loading in tropical conditions exhausted people. Rozhdestvensky, striving for maximum load, ordered coal to be loaded into batteries, various utility rooms, even into some of the officer’s cabins. When these possibilities were exhausted, some ships took coal directly onto the deck. As a result, the fuel supply on the new squadron battleships was more than 2 times higher than the norm. During a storm, such overloaded ships could easily lose their already slight stability and capsize. Therefore, when moving into fresh weather, they had to be sent to the wave in order to save the ships.

Map of the squadron's route

December 27 (January 9, 1905) The main forces of the squadron arrived at Nossi Be Bay on the island of Madagascar, where they soon linked up with Felkersam’s detachment, which had arrived in the area 12 days earlier. Although Felkersam's ships made a shorter and easier passage around Africa, they too required repairs. Thus, the refrigerators on the battleship Navarin failed, the cruisers Zhemchug and Izumrud found themselves with destroyed drives and auxiliary mechanisms. The situation was much worse on the destroyers. Only 2 of them could move independently.

Letter from Sventorzhetsky from Nossi-be Addressed to Pavel Mikhailovich Vavilov, staff captain for the Admiralty, junior clerk of the Main Naval Staff, colleague E.V. Sventorzhetsky in the scientific department Nossi-be. Dear Pavel Mikhailovich, Yesterday the mail from Europe via Djibouti delivered me your letter, for which I am sincerely grateful. This same letter reminded me of one of the best periods of my service, namely service in the scientific department, where sweet and kind colleagues were always the best consolation in moments of professional disappointment. I thank you sincerely for your constant attention to my requests and I am very sorry that my correspondence probably brings you a lot of trouble. Our voyage, in which you are interested, is described in some detail in the admiral's reports; These reports are probably received very regularly and are read with interest...

Even before the connection of the ships, the commander received news of the death of the First Pacific Squadron and the surrender of Port Arthur. Such news could not have a positive effect on the already low morale of the personnel. In this regard, Rozhdestvensky requested new instructions from St. Petersburg. He himself believed that his squadron was too weak to fight the Japanese fleet for supremacy at sea. He saw his task as a breakthrough to Vladivostok, if not all, then at least part of the ships. As reinforcements, he proposed sending help to the Pacific Ocean from the Black Sea. However, in St. Petersburg, not paying attention to the commander’s requests, they decided to send the Third Pacific Squadron to the Far East, again from the Baltic. Its first detachment, consisting of ships of obsolete types, left Libau February 3 (16), 1905 Having no combat value, these ships, at best, could only count on diverting part of the Japanese forces to themselves. They were commanded by N.I. Nebogatov.

March 3 (16), 1905, after a prolonged stay near Madagascar, the Second Pacific Squadron, without waiting for the detachment of Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov, entered the ocean. Her path lay to the shores of Indochina. The transition from Africa to the Far East, apart from minor breakdowns, went smoothly. To preserve the destroyers' vehicles, these ships were towed. March 26 (April 8) passed Singapore. The squadron command hoped to put the ships in order in Kam Rang, but under pressure from the French authorities they were forced to transfer their ships to Van Phong Bay.

Panoramic photography

From left to right: auxiliary cruiser "Dnepr", cruiser "Svetlana", auxiliary cruisers "Ural", "Kuban", hospital ship "Orel", squadron battleships "Prince Suvorov", "Oslyabya", "Emperor Alexander III", "Borodino", "Sisoy" Velikiy", "Eagle", steamship "Svir", squadron battleship "Navarin", floating workshop "Kamchatka", cruiser "Almaz", armored cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov", etc.

April 26 (May 9) The squadron joined forces with the ships of Rear Admiral Nebogatov. Nebogatov was able to catch up with Rozhestvensky's squadron in 2.5 months. Experts recognized such a long journey of his unseaworthy, old ships as exemplary. Thus, 3 more coastal defense battleships, a cruiser and several transports appeared in the Russian squadron.

May 1 (14) The Russian squadron left Van Fong. Although a meeting with the enemy was expected any day, they sailed without reconnaissance, and in order to avoid collisions at night, the ships carried wake and distinctive lights. The squadron commander considered his main task to be a breakthrough to Vladivostok. This could be done through one of the straits - the Korean, Sangarsky or La Perouse. The Japanese, having an advantage in speed, could deploy their forces in any of these directions. Fearing a lack of fuel, the commander of the Russian squadron decided to break through the shortest route - through the Korean Strait. Rozhestvensky believed that there would be losses during the breakthrough, but most of the ships would be able to reach Vladivostok.

8-12 (21-25) May For demonstration in the Yellow Sea and the Pacific Ocean, the commander sent the auxiliary cruisers Dnepr, Rion, Kuban and Terek. By this measure he hoped to divert part of the forces of the Japanese fleet. But the demonstration was not successful. The forces allocated for her were too insignificant. They were unable to mislead the Japanese command. Despite the unfavorable circumstances, the squadron's 18,000-mile passage, unprecedented in difficulty, was successfully completed.

Formation of the II Pacific Squadron at 6 o'clock on May 14, 1905
(reconstruction by V.Ya. Krestyaninov)

May 10 (23) Russian ships took on coal for the last time. On the night of May 14 (27) The squadron entered the Korea Strait.

Recently, the personality of the commander of the Second Pacific Squadron, Vice Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky is of great interest. A number of publications attempt to take a fresh look at his actions in the Battle of Tsushima and to destroy the stereotypes that have developed over decades. At the same time, the pages of encyclopedias and reference books published in recent years are replete with traditional characteristics of the admiral as “one of the main culprits” in the defeat of the Russian squadron, which showed complete mediocrity in military affairs.” To give an objective assessment of the commander’s actions is the task of future historians, but we are trying to schematically outline the life and combat path of the admiral, give his psychological portrait, without resorting to analysis of both his mistakes and far-reaching plans that did not come true due to the will of fate. Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhdestvensky was born on March 17, 1848. From childhood, he felt an attraction to naval service, and as a seventeen-year-old boy he entered the Naval Artillery Classes and made his first practical voyage. In 1870, upon graduating from the Naval School, he was promoted to midshipman, and three years later he completed a course at the Artillery Academy. The knowledge gained there was useful during the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878. Lieutenant Z.P. Rozhdestvensky participated in many military campaigns and clashes with the enemy, in particular, in the famous battle of the active defense steamer Vesta with the battleship Fethi Buland. The military valor of the young officer was awarded the Order of St. George, 4th degree and St. Vladimir 4th degree with swords; he was awarded the rank of captain-lieutenant.

To the personality of Vice Admiral Z.P. Fans currently have an ambiguous attitude towards Rozhdestvensky. Undoubtedly, being the commander of a squadron in such difficult circumstances, he could not win a resounding victory, as was predicted to him by the weak-willed Nicholas P. The Naval Ministry - this huge bureaucratic machine - with the connivance of the emperor, had gone too far into a dead end. Nevertheless, much was within the power of Z.P. Rozhestvensky. Saving some of the combat-ready ships by bringing them to Vladivostok was a completely solvable task. The compilers of the collection do not share the opinion of the author of the article about the complete infallibility of the admiral, allegedly so tightly squeezed in the grip of circumstances. The personality of the squadron commander, both during the time of the sailing fleet and during the Russo-Japanese War, was still one of the significant factors of victory. Characteristic is one unknown episode dating back to the initial period of Rozhdestvensky’s service (1873), described in the memoirs of Admiral G. Tsyvinsky. “Once, while being towed by the Almaz clipper, on a foggy morning we were thrown out of our bunks by a strong push. Jumping up, we saw that on our bowsprit there was a merchant brig strung with its front sails, which had fallen between our two ships and cut off tug It turned out that the brig was calm under sail and almost did not move, but the watch commander on the Almaz, Lieutenant Z.P. Rozhestvensky, obviously missed and did not give him way, hoping to slip with the tug ahead of his bow, but The brig had a slight move and crashed into the tug." The most objective, in our opinion, should be considered the opinion of the historical commission on the description of the war at the Naval General Staff, which says: “In the actions of the Squadron Leader, both in the conduct of the battle and in its preparation, it is difficult to find at least one correct decision. The flagships subordinate to him acted sluggishly and without any initiative. Admiral Rozhdestvensky was a man of strong will, courageous and ardently devoted to his work, a skillful organizer of supplies and economic affairs, an excellent sailor, but lacking the slightest shadow of military talent. The campaign of his squadron from St. Petersburg to Tsushima is unparalleled in history, but in military operations he showed not only a lack of talent, but also a complete lack of military education and combat training - qualities that he was unable to impart to his squadron.”

"Russian-Japanese War" 1904-1905. book seven of PGD. 1917, p.218. "Tsushima Operation".

Since 1890, Zinovy ​​Petrovich successively commanded the clippers (since 1892, 2nd rank cruisers) “Ekazdnik” and “Cruiser”, the gunboat “Threatening”, the 1st rank cruiser “Vladimir Monomakh”, and the coastal defense battleship “Pervenets”. Later he was appointed head of the artillery training detachment, and then the artillery detachment of the Baltic Fleet, where he managed to significantly advance artillery in our fleet. This attracted the attention of Nicholas II, and Z.P. Rozhestvensky was included in the royal retinue. Commanding various ships and formations, Zinovy ​​Petrovich established himself as an expert in maritime affairs, a strict and demanding boss - for him the word “impossible” did not exist.

In 1903, Rear Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky was appointed head of the Main Naval Staff with the rights of a comrade (deputy) manager of the Naval Ministry. He constantly advocated for the creation of a large armored fleet and supported the idea of ​​achieving victory in a naval war by defeating the enemy in a general battle. The outbreak of war with Japan caused the admiral to vigorously strengthen his naval forces. The reputation of an experienced, active sailor with iron willpower largely influenced the decision to appoint Z.P. Rozhdestvensky in April 1905 as commander of the Second Squadron of the Pacific Fleet. Preparing it for the campaign, the admiral learned the true price of this armada and did not console himself with unrealistic hopes of victory, but, true to duty, as the author of the famous “Reckoning”, captain of the second rank V. Semenov, who knew Rozhestvensky closely, noted, he would not yield to anyone the honor of being the first in ranks of people voluntarily heading towards a bloody reckoning. Having received news of the death of the First Squadron in Port Arthur, the admiral decided that the only chance for success was to immediately move forward and break through to Vladivostok. However, by the will of St. Petersburg, the squadron was stuck in Madagascar for a long time. The ships began intensive exercises, going to sea for practical service and maneuvering. But each shell was worth its weight in gold, and reluctantly in one of the orders the admiral wrote: “... we must study tirelessly. We cannot spend a lot of supplies for target practice... If God blesses us with meeting the enemy in battle, then we must take care of combat supplies..."

On the deck of the cruiser "Svetlana". Emperor Nicholas II and Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky during the inspection of the ship in Libau.

Admiral Togo visits Rozhdestvensky at the naval hospital in Sasebo.

The directive sent from St. Petersburg stated that after the death of the First Squadron, the Second was entrusted with a task of enormous importance: to seize the sea and cut off the enemy army from Japan; if the squadron in its current composition cannot fulfill this task, then all combat-ready ships will be sent from the Baltic to help it. Rozhdestvensky replied that with the forces at his disposal, he had no hope of taking control of the sea, that the promised reinforcements would not strengthen the squadron, but would only burden it, and that the only plan that seemed possible to him was to try with the best forces to break through to Vladivostok and from there act on enemy communications. However, “reinforcements” in the form of the Third Squadron of Admiral Nebogatov were nevertheless sent, and, leaving Kamrang Bay with such a burden, Vice Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky lost the smallest share of any hope of success.

On the fateful day of May 14, 1905, after the failure of the flagship battleship Prince Suvorov, when almost everyone in the conning tower was injured, control was moved to a protected post. Despite the fact that Rozhdestvensky was wounded in the head, back and right arm (not counting abrasions from small fragments), he behaved quite cheerfully. To better observe the progress of the battle, the admiral headed for the middle right 6-inch turret, but a fragment that hit his left leg broke the main nerve, and his foot was paralyzed. The commander was carried into the tower, already damaged and not rotating. Sometimes he raised his head and asked questions about the progress of the battle, and then again sat silent and dejected. Brief glimpses of consciousness and flashes of energy, interspersed with oblivion, illuminated his soot-black face, covered with streaks of dried blood. When the Buiny came aboard the crippled Suvorov on its own initiative, artillery warrant officer Courcelles (who later died heroically) demanded that the admiral be transferred aboard the destroyer. With great difficulty, the commander, having torn his uniform, was pulled out of the tower (its door was jammed) and lowered in his arms, almost thrown onto the destroyer, which caused rejoicing among the surviving sailors of the Suvorov. However, the general condition of the admiral - loss of strength, oblivion, interspersed with delirium and brief glimpses of consciousness - made him incapable of leading the already agonizing squadron. Transferring command to Nebogatov, the admiral adamantly declared: “Go in a squadron! Vladivostok! Course NO 23°!” But fate decreed otherwise: the helpless admiral, transferred to the destroyer Bedovy, along with some members of his staff, was captured by the Japanese on a surrendered ship.

In Sasebo, Rozhdestvensky underwent surgery to remove a piece of bone stuck in his broken skull. In early September, the prisoners were taken to Kyoto and housed in a temple. In conversations with officers, the admiral often spoke about the need to radically reorganize the naval department and improve the combat training of personnel. He expressed the idea that the war had opened his eyes to many things, and it would be a deliberate crime not to use the experience acquired at such a high price.

After peace was concluded, former prisoners of war returned to their homeland. On November 3, 1905, Rozhdestvensky left Osaka on the Voluntary Fleet steamship Voronezh and arrived in Vladivostok ten days later. Everyone who met him here was filled with hope that the admiral, who had fully experienced the squadron’s way of the cross from Libau to Tsushima and was miraculously saved, would revive the Russian fleet. Even the former commander-in-chief of the armed forces in the Far East, General A.N. Kuropatkin, during a personal meeting, stated that “again, all hope for you is that you will come, tell the truth, the whole truth... if they listen...” On the way to St. Petersburg, hundreds and thousands of people at stations and stops enthusiastically greeted the admiral, welcoming and seeing off his train with a thunderous “hurray”; The blood shed for the Fatherland and severe wounds made him a martyr and a national hero in the eyes of his compatriots. “Force did not take away and God did not give happiness!” - Rozhdestvensky answered them bitterly, touched by such a cordial reception from ordinary people.

But in the capital the admiral received a more than cold reception. When it became clear that he was going to leave no stone unturned from the officials who sent the squadron to its death, who considered the naval department their “compensated fiefdom,” a powerful coalition of enemies formed against him. They made every effort to ensure that the reports prepared by Rozhdestvensky about the campaign and battle were not published; at the same time, the newspapers were replete with tall tales about the battle. The admiral's opponents had to at all costs preserve in the public consciousness the picture of the battle that armchair strategists had hastily constructed based on hasty reports from Western correspondents. Russia's hope for victory was closely connected with the squadron's campaign and with the name of Rozhdestvensky, and the Tsushima defeat had a negative impact on the admiral's reputation in the eyes of the public. The works of many publicists clearly showed that the blame for the Tsushima defeat cannot be entirely attributed to Rozhestvensky alone; nevertheless, the admiral, who felt guilty, resigned and asked him to judge in order to alleviate his moral suffering. The former commander took all the blame for the Tsushima disaster, but the court acquitted him of being seriously wounded in battle.

Since 1906, the admiral devoted himself to public work as part of the “Special Committee for Strengthening the Military Fleet with voluntary donations. In particular, it is he who should be considered the godfather of the future famous “Novik”, since Zinovy ​​Petrovich opened the “green street” for financing its construction. However, the admiral's separation from active service steadily undermined his mental and physical strength. The prediction of the doctor who treated the admiral in captivity turned out to be prophetic: “If in St. Petersburg they let him go to work, he will come to life... If they hand him over to the archives, he will not stand it.” The admiral was ill for a long time, and in 1908, telegraph agencies even erroneously reported his death abroad. Zinovy ​​Petrovich celebrated the New Year 1909 with his family and friends. He lived in house No. 8 on Ertelev Lane (now Chekhov Street) and felt quite cheerful. Having seen off the guests, the admiral fell at three o'clock in the morning on the threshold of his room and died, struck by a heart attack. Two days later the funeral service took place in the Admiralty Cathedral of St. Spiridonia and burial at the Tikhvin cemetery of the Alexander Nevsky Lavra; The last debt to the admiral was paid by the highest ranks of the Naval Ministry.

Personality of Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky, his service, unprecedented transition to the Far East and the Battle of Tsushima are the heritage of our and world history.