The first 4 hours of the Great Patriotic War.

For the first time, the events of the first day of the war are told directly at the sites of the main hostilities. The film contains a lot of new information unknown to the viewer. For example, that the first soviet city was recaptured from the Germans on June 23, 1941! About the fierce battles in the Vladimir-Volynsky region, about the feat of the garrisons of Soviet fortified areas, about the fact that the Soviet Air Force was not destroyed, as the almost official myth says, as well as about other little-known pages of the war.

Beginning of the Great Patriotic War

Get up, huge country,
Stand up for mortal combat
With fascist dark power,
With the damned horde!

On the fifth day of the war, the whole country sang this song with lyrics by Lebedev-Kumach and music by Aleksandrov.

And the war began at dawn on June 22, 1941. Fascist Germany treacherously, without declaring war, attacked the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Its aircraft carried out massive attacks on airfields, railway junctions, naval bases, military bases and many cities to a depth of 250-300 km from the border.

Here it is necessary to remember that in 1941 the Soviet Union was going to celebrate the 24th anniversary of the Great October Revolution.

Over these 24 years, our country has achieved a lot. Automobile factories were built in Moscow, Gorky, and Yaroslavl. Tractor factories appeared in Leningrad, Stalingrad, Kharkov, and Chelyabinsk. All of them could make tanks. Our aviation set world records for flight range. The Soviet state could resist any other state, but it was difficult for us to fight with all of Europe.

Nazi Germany and its satellites concentrated large contingents of troops against the Soviet Union - 190 divisions (including 19 tank and 14 motorized) and a large number of military equipment: about 4,300 tanks and assault guns, 47.2 thousand guns and mortars, 4,980 combat aircraft and over 190 warships. And all this force was thrown at our country. From the ice of the Arctic to the Black Sea, the war burned with fire, destroyed cities and burned villages, and killed civilians.

Under Plan Barbarossa, Germany wanted to defeat the Soviet Union in six weeks. At the same time, the main forces of the Red Army were supposed to be destroyed, preventing their withdrawal into the depths of the country. But the plans of the fascist command from the very beginning of the war were thwarted by the courage and heroism of our army and the entire people.

First hit

The first to receive the enemy's blow were the border troops and divisions located near the border. We had more than 500 border outposts along our western border. Hitler's command allocated no more than 30 minutes to destroy the outpost. But the outposts fought for days and weeks, and the Brest Fortress, located on the border at the confluence of the Mukhavets River and the Bug River, fought with the enemies for more than a month. All this time, the defenders of the Brest Fortress pinned down an entire fascist German division. Most of the defenders of the fortress fell in battle, some made their way to the partisans, and some of the seriously wounded and exhausted were captured. The defense of the Brest Fortress is a vivid example of the patriotism and mass heroism of Soviet soldiers. Representatives of 30 nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union fought among the defenders of the Brest Fortress.

But, despite heroic resistance, the covering troops were unable to detain the enemy in the border zone. In order to preserve strength, Soviet troops were forced to retreat to new lines.

Nazi troops quickly advanced 400-450 km to the north-west, 450-600 km to the west, 300-350 km to the south-west, captured the territory of Lithuania, Latvia, part of Estonia, a significant part of Ukraine, almost all of Belarus, Moldova, invaded the western regions Russian Federation, reached the distant approaches to Leningrad, threatened Smolensk and Kyiv. A mortal danger loomed over the Soviet Union.

Based on the current situation, the Soviet command at the end of June decided to switch to strategic defense on the entire Soviet-German front. The troops of the first strategic echelon were given the task of preparing a system of echeloned defensive stripes and lines in the directions of the enemy’s main attacks, relying on which, through persistent and active counteraction, to undermine the offensive power of the enemy, stop him and gain time to prepare a counter-offensive.

Feat of the army and people

The treacherous attack of Nazi Germany aroused the anger and indignation of the Soviet people. In a single impulse, he rose to defend his homeland. At rallies that spread throughout the country, Soviet people branded the fascist barbarians with shame and vowed to brutally punish the invaders who broke in. Military registration and enlistment offices were stormed by thousands of boys and girls, men and women - communists, Komsomol members and non-party members. They demanded immediate dispatch to the front, submitted an application with a request to be sent behind enemy lines, to partisan detachments.

The misfortune that befell the Fatherland united the entire people like never before. The entire people, the entire huge country rose up to fight to the death for a holy and just cause. Each day passed, both at the front and in the rear, was measured by the answer to the question: What did you do for the front, for victory? The efforts of the entire people - soldiers, workers, collective farmers, intelligentsia - were subordinated to one goal - to defend the Motherland from the fascist barbarians. And for this he spared neither his strength nor his life.

The word patriotism has acquired a special meaning and significance. It required no translations or explanations. Love for the Motherland knocked in the heart of every Soviet person: whether he was standing in a workshop for five days at a machine or going to ram an enemy plane, whether he was donating his personal savings to the defense fund or blood for wounded soldiers.

Already in the first days and weeks of the war, thousands of exploits and boundless self-sacrifice of the bravest Soviet soldiers were written in its chronicles. At that time, the names of most of these courageous people who fought to the last bullet, to the last drop of blood were not yet known.

The results of these days and weeks, the most difficult for the Soviet people and their soldiers, already testified to the first failures in the implementation of Hitler’s plans for a “lightning war.”

The enemy failed to destroy the main forces of the Soviet Army in border battles, as he had hoped. The resistance of our troops grew every day. And deep in the rear, reserves for the front were being prepared at an accelerated pace. It was incredibly difficult to form, arm and train new regiments and divisions of the Soviet Army, but every day an increasingly powerful stream of fresh reserves went to the front. It significantly outnumbered the enemy's reserves, which were sent to the front to make up for the losses they had suffered.

Hundreds of industrial enterprises were on wheels at that time - they were relocated from threatened areas to the deep rear of the country. It took time to install equipment and put it into operation at new locations. The most active part of the working class and specialists of operating enterprises joined the ranks of the Soviet Army. Only a small part of qualified workers and specialists remained at the enterprises, without whom it was impossible to begin mass production of military products. Hundreds of thousands of women and teenagers replaced those who went to the front.

But these difficulties were overcome in the shortest possible time. The production of weapons, military equipment, ammunition and various equipment for the defenders of the Motherland increased every day.

Socialist workers also showed massive labor heroism. Agriculture. Collective and state farms donated a huge number of tractors and vehicles to equip troop reserves. There are even fewer men left in this sector of the economy than in industry and transport. And in the countryside, women and teenagers became the decisive force. It was they who had to harvest the crops from the vast sown areas. Mostly removed by hand. In front-line areas, harvesting was often carried out under enemy fire. And, nevertheless, with the help of hundreds of thousands of townspeople, students and schoolchildren, agricultural workers also coped with the most important task for the front and the whole country - they put into state bins such an amount of food, without which there would have been a successful war.

Throughout its course, the war showed that the courage and heroism of the Soviet people turned out to be an invincible force that was able to prevent a grave crime against humanity.

Illustration copyright RIA Novosti Image caption Semyon Timoshenko and Georgy Zhukov knew everything, but took the secrets to the grave

Until the very beginning of the war and in the first hours after it, Joseph Stalin did not believe in the possibility of a German attack.

He learned that the Germans were crossing the border and bombing Soviet cities at about 4 a.m. on June 22 from Chief of the General Staff Georgy Zhukov.

According to Zhukov’s “Memoirs and Reflections,” the leader did not react to what he heard, but only breathed heavily into the phone, and after a long pause, he limited himself to ordering Zhukov and the People’s Commissar of Defense Semyon Timoshenko to go to a meeting in the Kremlin.

In a prepared but undelivered speech at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in May 1956, Zhukov argued that Stalin forbade opening fire on the enemy.

At the same time, in May-June, Stalin secretly transferred 939 trains with troops and equipment to the western border, called up 801 thousand reservists from the reserves under the guise of training, and on June 19, by secret order, he reorganized the border military districts into fronts, which was always done and exclusively a few days before the start of hostilities.

“The transfer of troops was planned with the expectation of completing the concentration from June 1 to July 10, 1941. The disposition of troops was influenced by the offensive nature of the planned actions,” says the collective monograph “1941 - Lessons and Conclusions” published by the Russian Ministry of Defense in 1992.

A legitimate question arises: what was the cause of the tragedy of June 22? Usually referred to as "mistakes" and "miscalculations" of the Soviet leadership. But upon careful examination, some of them turn out to be not naive delusions, but the consequence of thoughtful measures with the aim of preparing a pre-emptive strike and subsequent offensive actions Vladimir Danilov, historian

“There was surprise, but only tactical. Hitler was ahead of us!” - Vyacheslav Molotov said to the writer Ivan Stadnyuk in the 1970s.

“The trouble was not that we had no plans - we had plans! - but that the suddenly changed situation did not allow us to carry them out,” reported Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky in an article written for the 20th anniversary of the Victory, but which was published only in the early 90s -X.

Not “the traitor Rezun,” but the President of the Academy of Military Sciences, General of the Army Makhmud Gareev, pointed out: “If there were plans for defensive operations, then the groupings of forces and means would be located completely differently, the management and echeloning of material reserves would be structured differently. But this was not done in the border military districts."

“Stalin’s main miscalculation and his guilt lay not in the fact that the country was not prepared for defense (it did not prepare for it), but in the fact that it was not possible to accurately determine the moment. A preemptive strike would have saved our Fatherland millions of lives and, perhaps, would have led much earlier to the same political results that the country, ruined, hungry, and having lost the color of the nation, achieved in 1945,” believed the director of the Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, academician Andrei Sakharov.

Clearly aware of the inevitability of a clash with Germany, the leadership of the USSR until June 22, 1941 did not see itself in the role of a victim, did not wonder with a sinking heart “whether they will attack or not,” but worked hard to start the war at a favorable moment and carry it out “smallly.” blood on foreign territory." Most researchers agree with this. The difference is in details, dates and, mainly, in moral assessments.

Illustration copyright RIA Novosti Image caption The war broke out unexpectedly, although a premonition was in the air

On this tragic day, on the eve and immediately after it, amazing things happened that did not fit into either the logic of preparation for defense or the logic of preparation for an offensive.

There is no explanation for them based on documents and testimonies of participants in the events, and it is unlikely that one will appear. There are only more or less plausible guesses and versions.

Stalin's dream

Around midnight on June 22, having agreed and authorized Tymoshenko and Zhukov to send a controversial document known as “Directive No. 1” to the border districts for their signatures, the leader left the Kremlin for the Near Dacha.

When Zhukov called with a report of the attack, the guard said that Stalin was sleeping and did not order to wake him up, so the chief of the general staff had to shout at him.

The widespread opinion that the USSR was waiting for an attack by the enemy, and only then planning an offensive, does not take into account that in this case the strategic initiative would be given into the hands of the enemy, and the Soviet troops would be placed in obviously unfavorable conditions Mikhail Meltyukhov, historian

Saturday June 21st passed in incredible tension. There were a stream of reports from the border that the approaching roar of engines could be heard from the German side.

After the Fuehrer's order was read to the German soldiers before the formation at 13:00, two or three communist defectors swam across the Bug to warn the "camaraden": it will begin tonight. By the way, another mystery is that we know nothing about these people who should have become heroes in the USSR and the GDR.

Stalin spent the day in the Kremlin in the company of Timoshenko, Zhukov, Molotov, Beria, Malenkov and Mehlis, analyzing incoming information and discussing what to do.

Let's say he doubted the data he was receiving and never took concrete steps. But how could you go to bed without waiting for the ending, when the clock was ticking? Moreover, a person who had the habit, even in a calm everyday environment, of working until dawn and sleeping until lunch?

Plan and directive

At the headquarters of the Soviet troops in the western direction, up to and including the divisions, there were detailed and clear cover plans, which were stored in “red packets” and were subject to execution upon receipt of the appropriate order from the People's Commissar of Defense.

Cover plans are different from strategic military plans. This is a set of measures to ensure the mobilization, concentration and deployment of the main forces in the event of a threat of a preemptive strike by the enemy (occupying fortifications with personnel, moving artillery to tank-threat areas, raising aviation and air defense units, intensifying reconnaissance).

The introduction of a cover plan is not yet a war, but a combat alert.

During the one and a half hour meeting that began at 20:50 on June 21, Stalin did not allow Timoshenko and Zhukov to take this necessary and obvious step.

The directive completely confused the troops on the border Konstantin Pleshakov, historian

In return, the famous “Directive No. 1” was sent to the border districts, which, in particular, said: “During June 22-23, a surprise attack by the Germans is possible. The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions […] at the same time be in full combat readiness to meet a possible attack […] other measures should not be carried out without special orders.”

How can one “meet the blow” without carrying out the measures provided for in the cover plan? How to distinguish provocation from attack?

Late mobilization

Incredible, but true: general mobilization in the USSR was announced not on the day the war began, but only on June 23, despite the fact that every hour of delay gave the enemy additional advantages.

The corresponding telegram from the People's Commissar of Defense arrived at the Central Telegraph at 16:40 on June 22, although since the early morning the state leadership, perhaps, had not had a more urgent task.

At the same time, the short text, just three sentences long, written in dry clerical language, did not contain a word about the treacherous attack, defense of the homeland and sacred duty, as if it were a routine conscription.

Theater and concert evening

The command of the Western Special Military District (by that time actually Western Front) led by Army General Dmitry Pavlov spent Saturday evening in the Minsk House of Officers at a performance of the operetta “Wedding in Malinovka”.

Memoir literature confirms that the phenomenon was widespread and widespread. It’s hard to imagine that big commanders in that atmosphere would go out and have fun without orders from above.

There is numerous evidence of the cancellation on June 20-21 of previously issued orders to increase combat readiness, the unexpected announcement of days off, and the dispatch of anti-aircraft artillery to training camps.

Anti-aircraft divisions of the 4th Army and the 6th Mechanized Corps of the Western OVO met the war at a training ground 120 km east of Minsk.

The orders to the troops to send artillery to the firing ranges and other ridiculous instructions in that situation caused complete bewilderment of Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky

“The regiment was declared a day off on Sunday. Everyone was happy: they had not rested for three months. On Saturday evening, the command, pilots and technicians went to their families,” recalled former pilot of the 13th Bomber Aviation Regiment Pavel Tsupko.

On June 20, the commander of one of the three ZapOVO air divisions, Nikolai Belov, received an order from the district air force commander to put the division on combat readiness, cancel vacations and dismissals, disperse equipment, and at 16:00 on June 21, it was canceled.

“Stalin tried to make it clear by the very condition and behavior of the troops in the border districts that calm, if not carelessness, reigns in our country. As a result, instead of misleading the aggressor with skillful disinformation actions regarding the combat readiness of our troops, we actually reduced it to an extremely low degree,” the former chief of the operational department of the 13th Army headquarters, Sergei Ivanov, was perplexed.

The ill-fated regiment

But the most incredible story happened in the 122nd Fighter Aviation Regiment, which covered Grodno.

On Friday, June 20, high-ranking officials from Moscow and Minsk arrived at the unit, and at 6 pm on Saturday, an order was announced to the personnel: to remove the I-16 fighters from the I-16 fighters and send weapons and ammunition to the warehouse.

Illustration copyright RIA Novosti Image caption It took several hours to reinstall the removed machine guns on the I-16.

The order was so wild and inexplicable that the pilots started talking about treason, but they were silenced.

Needless to say, the next morning the 122nd Air Regiment was completely destroyed.

The Soviet Air Force grouping in the western direction consisted of 111 air regiments, including 52 fighter regiments. Why did this one attract so much attention?

What's happened?

“Stalin, contrary to obvious facts, believed that this was not a war, but a provocation of individual undisciplined units of the German army,” Nikita Khrushchev said in a report at the 20th Congress of the CPSU.

The obsessive thought of some kind of provocation, apparently, was indeed present in Stalin’s mind. He developed it both in “Directive No. 1” and at the first meeting in the Kremlin after the start of the invasion, which opened at 05:45 on June 22. He did not give permission to return fire until 06:30, until Molotov announced that Germany had officially declared war on the USSR.

The now deceased St. Petersburg historian Igor Bunich claimed that a few days before the start of the war, Hitler sent a secret personal message to Stalin warning that some Anglophile generals might try to provoke a conflict between the USSR and Germany.

Stalin allegedly remarked with satisfaction to Beria that this was impossible in our country; we had brought order to our army.

True, it was not possible to find the document in German or Soviet archives.

Israeli researcher Gabriel Gorodetsky explains Stalin's actions by panic fear and the desire to not give Hitler a reason for aggression at any cost.

Stalin really drove away every thought from himself, but not about war (he was no longer thinking about anything else), but about the fact that Hitler at the very last moment would be able to get ahead of him Mark Solonin, historian

“Stalin drove away any thought about war, he lost the initiative and was practically paralyzed,” writes Gorodetsky.

Opponents object that Stalin was not afraid in November 1940, through the mouth of Molotov, to harshly demand from Berlin Finland, Southern Bukovina and the base in the Dardanelles, and in early April 1941 to conclude an agreement with Yugoslavia that infuriated Hitler and at the same time had no practical meaning.

Demonstration of defensive preparations cannot provoke a potential enemy, but it can make you think again.

“When dealing with a dangerous enemy, we should probably show him, first of all, our readiness to fight back. If we had demonstrated to Hitler our true power, he might have refrained from war with the USSR at that moment,” the experienced staff officer believed Sergei Ivanov, who later rose to the rank of army general.

According to Alexander Osokin, Stalin, on the contrary, deliberately pushed Germany to attack in order to appear in the eyes of the world as a victim of aggression and receive American help.

Critics point out that the game in this case turned out to be very dangerous, Lend-Lease did not have a self-sufficient meaning in the eyes of Stalin, and Roosevelt was guided not by the kindergarten principle of “who started?”, but by the interests of US national security.

Shoot first

Another hypothesis was put forward by historians Keistut Zakoretsky and Mark Solonin.

In the first three weeks of June, Timoshenko and Zhukov met with Stalin seven times.

According to Zhukov, they called for immediately bringing the troops into some incomprehensible “state of full readiness for war” (preparations were already carried out continuously and at the limit of strength), and, according to a number of modern researchers, for a preemptive strike without waiting for the completion of the strategic deployment .

Truth is stranger than fiction, because fiction must stay within the bounds of probability, but truth cannot. Mark Twain

Zakoretsky and Solonin believe that in the face of Berlin’s obvious aggressive intentions, Stalin did listen to the military.

Presumably at a meeting on June 18 with the participation of Tymoshenko, Zhukov, Molotov and Malenkov, it was decided to start a preventive war not sometime, but on June 22, the longest daylight hours of the year. Not at dawn, but later.

The war with Finland was preceded by. According to researchers, the war with Germany should also have begun with a provocation - a raid on Grodno by several Junkers and Dorniers purchased from the Germans. At the hour when residents have breakfast and go out into the streets and parks to relax after a week of work.

The propaganda effect would have been deafening, and Stalin could well have sacrificed several dozen civilians in the higher interests.

The version explains almost everything quite logically.

And Stalin’s refusal to believe that the Germans would strike almost simultaneously (such coincidences simply do not happen, and what Hitler intends to do in the following days is no longer important).

And mobilization began on Monday (the decree was prepared in advance, but they did not bother to redo it in the confusion of the first morning of the war).

There are two wills in the field Russian proverb

And the disarmament of the fighters based near Grodno (so that one of the “vultures” would not be accidentally shot down over Soviet territory).

The deliberate complacency made the fascist perfidy even more blatant. The bombs were supposed to fall on a peaceful Soviet city in complete prosperity. Contrary to popular belief, the demonstration was not addressed to the Germans, but to its own citizens.

It also becomes clear that Stalin did not want to blur the effect by introducing a cover-up plan ahead of time.

Unfortunately for the USSR, the aggression turned out to be real.

However, this is only a hypothesis, as the authors themselves emphasize.

Great mystery Great Patriotic War. Eyes are open Osokin Alexander Nikolaevich

What did German aircraft bomb at dawn on June 22, 1941?

I have already written several times in my books about the mysteries of aviation actions on the first day of the war, that to this day it is not known exactly which cities were the first to be subjected to German bombing on the morning of June 22, 1941, that of the four cities named Molotov in his radio speech on June 22 (Zhitomir, Kiev, Sevastopol, Kaunas), in the recently published General Staff report for that day only Kaunas is mentioned. And according to Churchill (according to information from a British agent at the German embassy), Molotov, when meeting with Ambassador Schulenburg on that day, told the latter: “Your planes bombed 10 defenseless villages today.”

The colossal number of Soviet aircraft destroyed on that day (1,200 - according to officially recognized Soviet data, 1,800 - according to individual researchers) is still explained in different ways: by their lack of combat readiness (dismantling due to maintenance), and by the lack of pilots (at the same time, the flight crew was sent on layoffs and vacations), and the lack of fuel in the tanks (in some places the gas tanks turned out to be filled with water!), and even a direct ban on shooting down German planes.

The superiority of German aircraft in terms of tactical and technical characteristics is also cited as the reason for the defeat of Soviet aviation on the first day of the war, since the bulk of Soviet aviation allegedly consisted of outdated types of aircraft. However, in last years it became known that in the border districts there were already from 1,500 to 2,000 aircraft of new types (Yak-1, LaGG-3, Il-2, Pe-2, Su-2, but most of all there were high-altitude high-speed fighters MiG-3) .

It was reported that the border airfields of the Air Force were located very close to the border - at a distance of 8 - 30 km (by the way, this coincides with the 7.5-kilometer zone introduced in 1939, in which the Soviet Air Force was prohibited from detaining German intruders without warning the border troops) .

It was alleged that 66 Soviet border airfields were subjected to the first attack. For the first time, this number, as well as the number of 1,200 aircraft destroyed on them, was named in the official publication “History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941–1945.” Volume 2" (M.: Voenizdat, 1961. P. 16).

It was Molotov’s words “ten defenseless villages” that gave me the idea that I am going to develop further. But weren’t these airfields, which are most often named after nearby villages (such as Vnukovo, Sheremetyevo, Bykovo, Tushino, etc.)? It is quite logical that the Germans began their attack on the USSR with a strike on Soviet airfields, and primarily on those where the latest aircraft were based, capable of successfully resisting massive German air raids. And I was able to find a document that made it possible to document this assumption. Such a document turned out to be “Operational report of the General Staff of the Red Army No. 01 at 10:00 a.m. on June 22, 1941,” signed by the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Army General Zhukov (by the way, this is the first report of the General Staff in this war and the only one signed personally by Zhukov for the first five days of the war, since on the afternoon of June 22 he will fly to Kiev and in the evening he will arrive with Khrushchev at the front office of the Southwestern Front in Tarnopol).

I counted the settlements mentioned in it, including the cities subjected to German bombing, and there were exactly 33 of them. This figure aroused my suspicion - exactly two times less than the number of airfields that German aircraft bombed on June 22. This multiplicity suggested that Zhukov, and perhaps Timoshenko, decided not to immediately expose their heads by reporting that the Germans had attacked all 66 airfields that had new aircraft, since Stalin would have immediately realized that in the end all new aircraft were destroyed.

There is another option for the appearance of the number 66. The famous historian M.I. Meltyukhov, in the 3rd edition of his book “Stalin’s Lost Chance,” reports that according to German data, “At 3:15 a.m. on June 22, 1941, 637 bombers and 231 fighters German Air Force (868 aircraft in total, remember this figure. - A.O.) launched a massive attack on 31 Soviet airfields. In total, on this day, 66 Soviet airfields were subjected to air strikes, where 70% of the air forces of the border districts were located.” If this is the case, the German data almost exactly confirms the Soviet data (a simple coincidence is unlikely here). So I decided to put together new information the first report of the General Staff with data from the two most serious sources about Soviet aviation on the first day of the war: “Air Force grouping as of 06.22.41. Aviation regiments of the Red Army Air Force on 06/22/41" (00000654.xls) and "The Red Army in June 1941" (statistical collection).

OPERATIONAL REPORT OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED ARMY No. 01

At 04.00 on June 22, 1941, the Germans, without any reason, raided our airfields and cities and crossed the border with ground troops.

1. Northern front. The enemy violated the border with a flight of bomber aircraft and entered the area of ​​Leningrad and Kronstadt. In an air battle, our fighters shot down 2 aircraft.

Up to 17 enemy aircraft tried to get to the Vyborg area, but, not reaching it, they turned back.

In the Kuolajärvi area, a German soldier of the 9th Infantry Motorized Regiment was captured. The rest of the front is calm.

2. Northwestern Front. The enemy opened artillery fire at 04.00 and simultaneously began bombing airfields and cities Vindava, Libau, Kovno, Vilna and Siauliai. As a result of the raid, fires broke out in Vindava, Kovno and Vilna.

Losses: 3 of our planes were destroyed at the Vindava airfield, 3 Red Army soldiers were wounded and a fuel depot was set on fire; at 04.30 there was an air battle over the areas of Kaunas and Libau, the results are being clarified. From 05.00 the enemy conducted systematic raids in groups of 8 - 20 aircraft on Ponevezh, Shavli, Kovno, Riga, Vindava, the results are being clarified. The enemy's ground forces have gone on the offensive and are striking in two directions: the main one - from the area of ​​Pillkallen, Suwalki, Goldap with forces of three to four infantry divisions and 200 tanks in the direction of Olita, and the strike providing the main group - from the area of ​​Tilsit on Taurage, Jurbarkas with forces of up to three four infantry divisions with an unknown group of tanks.

As a result of border battles, the enemy attack on Taurage was repulsed, but the enemy managed to capture Jurbarkas. The position in the direction of the main enemy group is being clarified. The enemy, apparently, is striving to attack Olita, Vilna to reach the rear of the Western Front, ensuring its actions with a blow to Taurage, Siauliai.

3. Western Front. At 04.20 up to 60 enemy aircraft bombed Grodno And Brest. At the same time, the enemy opened artillery fire throughout the entire Western Front.

At 05.00 the enemy bombed Lida, disrupting the army's wire communications.

From 05.00 the enemy continued continuous raids, attacking cities with groups of Do-17 bombers accompanied by Me-109 fighters Kobrin, Grodno, Bialystok, Brest, Pruzhany. The main targets of attack are military camps.

In air battles in the Pruzhany area, 1 enemy bomber and 2 enemy fighters were shot down. Our losses are 9 aircraft.

Sopotskin and Novoselki are burning. With ground forces, the enemy is developing an attack from the Suwalki area in the direction of Golynka, Dąbrowa and from the Sokołów area along railway to Volkovysk. The advancing enemy forces are being clarified. As a result of the fighting, the enemy managed to capture Golynka and reach the Dombrov area, throwing back units of the 56th Infantry Division to the south.

Intense fighting is taking place in the direction of Sokolow and Wolkowysk in the Cheremkha area. With his actions in these two directions, the enemy is obviously trying to cover the northwestern group of the front.

The commander of the 3rd Army with the introduction of a tank division seeks to eliminate the enemy breakthrough to Golynka.

4. Southwestern Front. At 04.20 the enemy began shelling our border with machine-gun fire. Since 04.30 enemy planes have been bombing cities Lyuboml, Kovel, Lutsk, Vladimir-Volynsky, Novograd-Volynsky, Chernivtsi, Khotyn and airfields near Chernivtsi, Galich, Buchach, Zubov, Adam, Kurovice, Chunev, Sknilov. As a result of the bombing in Sknilov, a technical warehouse was set on fire, but the fire was extinguished; 14 aircraft were disabled at the Kurowice airfield and 16 aircraft at the Adam airfield. Our fighters shot down 2 enemy aircraft.

At 04.35, after artillery fire in the Vladimir-Volynsky and Lyuboml areas, enemy ground forces crossed the border, developing an attack in the direction of Vladimir-Volynsky, Lyuboml and Krystynopol.

At 05.20, in the Chernovitsa area near Karpeshti, the enemy also launched an offensive.

At 06.00, an enemy parachute landing of an unknown number was dropped in the Radzechów area. As a result of the actions of ground troops, the enemy occupied, according to unverified data, Parkhach and Vysotsko in the Radymno area. Up to a regiment of enemy cavalry with tanks operating in the direction of Rava-Russkaya penetrated to the UR. In the Chernivtsi area, the enemy pushed back our border outposts.

In the Romanian sector, 2 enemy aircraft were shot down in air battles over Chisinau and Balti. Individual enemy aircraft managed to break through Grosulovo and bomb airfields Balti, Bolgrad and Bulgarian. As a result of the bombing, 5 aircraft were destroyed at the Grosulovo airfield.

Enemy ground forces on the Lipkana and Reni front tried to cross the river. Prut, but were repulsed. According to unverified data, the enemy in the Kartal area landed troops across the river. Danube.

Front commanders have put into effect a cover plan and, through active actions of mobile troops, are trying to destroy enemy units that have crossed the border.

The enemy, having forestalled our troops in deployment, forced units of the Red Army to take battle in the process of occupying their initial position according to the cover plan. Using this advantage, the enemy managed to achieve partial success in certain areas.

Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army

Army General ZHUKOV

(TsAMO. F. 28 (16). Op. 1071. D. 1. L. 2–5. Original)

I wrote down the names of all the settlements mentioned in the report of General Staff No. 01 in connection with the bombing and the information found about the air regiments located in them.

Airfields in populated areas, indicated in the operational report of General Staff No. 01

In 16 settlements (with a “?” sign - no information and a “+” sign - there are mentions in various memoirs) according to the indicated sources, there were no Soviet airfields. In my opinion, this does not mean at all that they were not there. Most likely, the data on the basing of a particular air regiment indicates only its main airfield, and some regiments, by decision of their commanders or commanders of divisions, corps, armies and even districts (for example, OdVO), were transferred to reserve field airfields on June 20–21. From the memoirs of eyewitnesses published in the press, published in books, and also on the Internet, I became aware of another whole line Soviet border airfields not listed in the first report of the General Staff, which at dawn on June 22, 1941 were attacked by German aircraft: Zubov, Buchach, Khotin, Novograd-Volynsky (marked with a +), Mitava, Keidany, Zabludov, Dolubovo, Velitsk, Kolki, Kivertsy, Mlinov, Dubno, Stanislav, etc. From this it follows that the Germans launched the first strike on a much larger number of Soviet airfields than indicated in the General Staff report No. 01, it is quite possible that there were actually 66 of them. (Although it can be assumed that those who hit for these bombings, Soviet pilots, as well as representatives of other branches of the military, call the first all German raids, which were the first for them on this day.) And the number 33, perhaps, means the number of airfields on which the new type of aircraft were based, attacked in the first raid of German aviation .

In the table “Aviation regiments of the Red Army Air Force as of June 22, 1941,” given on the website www.soldat.ru/files/f/00000654.xls, I found data on the number of MiG-3 fighters as of June 22, 1941 in the air regiments of the Red Army Air Force.

TOTAL: 784 MiG-3 (of which 342 are not in the western districts)

15 MiG-3 (four aircraft have 1–5 MiG-3 each)

TOTAL: 799 MiG-3

It turned out that all border airfields that had MiG-3 fighters were attacked by German aircraft at dawn on June 22, 1941, while out of 16 airfields, only three airfields with MiG-3 located in the Leningrad Military District, and one in ORVO.

I also counted the number of other (except MiG-3) aircraft of new types in the air force regiments of the western districts and summarized the results in a table (a small number of MiG-1 aircraft are included in the total number of MiG-3 aircraft).

Number of new aircraft (without MiG-3) 22.6.41 in air regiments of the KA Air Force

The total number of new types of aircraft in the western border districts attacked on June 22, 1941 (PribOVO, ZapOVO, KOVO, OdVO):

799 MiG-3+ 44 LaGG-3 + 131 Yak-1+ 265 Pe-2 + 77 Il-2 + 203 Su-2 + 121 Yak-2, Yak-4 = 1,640 units.

A total of 1,640 aircraft of new types, but there were also quite modern bombers Il-4 and DB-3f (939 units) and SB (1,336 units).

There are reports that 70% of new types of Soviet aircraft were destroyed on the first day. If this is so, then their number will be about 1,148 units, which is very close to 1,200 - the number of Soviet aircraft destroyed on the first day of the war (so maybe the Germans destroyed 1,200 new aircraft, and 1,800 in total?)

While counting the number of MiGs in the air regiments of the Red Army on June 22, 1941, I also counted how many aircraft of all types there were in the air regiments of the five western border districts. It turned out that 8,178 units. Of these, the aviation of only one district was not subject to German air attacks - Leningrad, whose air regiments had 1,721 aircraft that day. This means that there were 6,457 aircraft at the airfields of the four remaining western border districts. A German source indicated that the 66 Soviet airfields attacked that day contained 70% of the Soviet aviation of the border districts. That is, 4,520 aircraft (most likely, the remaining aircraft were dispersed to alternate field airfields, or they were long-range bombers and were located quite far from the border).

If on the first day 1,200 Soviet aircraft were destroyed, the losses of aviation in the border districts amounted to 26.5%, but if 1,800, then 40%. These were unheard of losses.

Analysis of the tables above allows us to draw the following conclusions:

1. All border airfields of the western Soviet districts, where fighters and new types of aircraft were located, were attacked by the Germans on the morning of June 22. From the above-mentioned (p. 483) 868 aircraft that took part in the first raid (there is information that on June 21 they carried out exactly 868 sorties - preparations were underway for the attack on June 22), it follows that on average 20 bombers flew at each Soviet airfield accompanied by 7 fighters. If we take into account that, according to German information, on June 22, 1941, German Air Force aircraft made 2,272 sorties, it turns out that these aircraft carried out an average of three raids.

2. Of the new aircraft, the MiG-3 was the most common among the troops along the western border, most likely due to the fact that at that time it was the only high-altitude serial fighter capable of countering the bombers in service with England (aircraft with similar altitude capabilities Germany did not). They were distributed as follows: ZOVO - 235 aircraft, LVO - 173, PribOVO - 139, KOVO - 122, OdVO - 127 aircraft. An important detail is that not a single MiG-3 was allocated to guard Moscow and Baku on June 22, 1941. Obviously, Stalin understood that it would not be possible to fly from London to Moscow (2,485 km) with a bomb load (including return). Not a single MiG-3 was allocated for air defense of Baku oil fields either. Apparently, the leader considered that the I-16 and I-153 Chaika would cope perfectly with the old-type bombers flying from British air bases in the Middle East.

3. From these tables the plan of the Luftwaffe command emerges. It knew how many and what kind of aircraft the Soviet Union had allocated for a joint operation against Great Britain. Since, by agreement with Stalin, German planes flew over Soviet territory in the last two pre-war days, transferring their planes to Iraq, and landed at border Soviet airfields, the Germans knew exactly at which airfields there were MiGs and other new Soviet fighters capable of intercepting German bombers. That’s why they struck the very first blow at dawn on June 22 against them. On the other hand, it is very likely that the priority destruction of the MiG-3 high-altitude interceptors was one of the points in Churchill’s agreement with Hitler (through Hess) on a joint attack on the USSR.

4. It turned out that at almost all airfields of the Soviet border districts, the air regiments in approximately equal numbers included new MiG-3s, obsolete I-16 aircraft, as well as I-153 biplanes (serial production of which began in 1939). ). Why the regiments, when receiving new equipment, did not completely switch to new aircraft is unclear, because this seriously complicated the supply and maintenance of aircraft, led to a shortage of pilots, etc. Perhaps one of the reasons is the extensive experience in piloting the I-16 and I-153 and the lack of such experience in piloting the MiG-3, which is also much more difficult to control.

But, according to my assumptions, there was another reason. I believe that this was due to the preparation of a joint attack on England with Germany. In 1940–1941 Germany was experiencing an acute shortage of aircraft. Even for the war against the USSR, by June 22, 1941, the German command allocated no more than 3,600 aircraft (and according to V.A. Belokon - 2,600) against 8,178 Soviet ones (the last figure was obtained by me as a result of counting all aircraft from the western districts only) . At that time, German aircraft regularly bombed England, but the target detection posts of the British air defense, equipped with radars, promptly informed the Air Force of the direction of the next enemy raid and the distance from its bombers to protected objects. This allowed the British command to direct their planes precisely towards the approaching German bombers and very effectively counter them.

I believe that the idea of ​​​​using the obsolete Soviet fighters I-16 and I-153 could be so that in a raid on the islands at the time of landing, the huge number of aircraft participating in it would not allow British radar operators to distinguish reflections from obsolete ones on their screens Soviet and from the latest German aircraft. And the use of a huge number of such Soviet fighters in the East during a joint operation against the British Empire would be even more effective.

It is possible that to ensure such massive raids, the secret order of the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko No. 0362 dated December 22, 1940 “On changing the order of service for junior and middle commanding personnel of the Red Army Air Force” appeared. By this order, all command, navigator and technical personnel from the aviation unit (detachment) and below were transferred to the category of junior command personnel, therefore all positions in them had to be filled by sergeants and foremen. Because of this, all aviation schools and colleges that previously graduated junior lieutenants and junior military technicians began to graduate sergeants (“the sergeant period” was six months before the start of the war and a whole year during it).

5. On October 2, 1940, Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee No. 1854-773ss “On increasing the range of fighters and organizing their production at factories” was adopted. Its first paragraph said: “Set a range of 1,000 km for all single-engine fighter aircraft being introduced into mass production and newly designed. at 0.9 maximum speed. The specified range must be ensured by the capacity of the tanks located inside the aircraft.” (The next paragraph of the resolution established a range of 2,000 km for twin-engine fighters.) Such a decision could have been made to ensure the transfer of new Soviet fighters to the shores of the English Channel - after all, the distance from the new border of the USSR (Lithuania - Latvia - Western Belarus) to the strait is 800–900 km (by the way, from the old border it was 1,100 – 1,200 km). Its main goal is the non-stop transfer of new fighters at maximum speed. (It should be noted that the MiG-3's original flight range of 700 km was increased to 1,200 km by June 22, 1941.)

6. There were at least two options for using the mass of Soviet I-16 and I-153 fighters against England:

- during Operation Sea Lion, a flight from coastal airfields or simply suitable sites for take-off in a straight line to the straits, a minimal (to London) deepening over the territory of England, then a turn and return to the original airfield; the purpose of the flight is only to distract and maximally clog the screens of English radar stations with targets; since the pilots of these aircraft were not going to conduct any battles, then air combat masters were not required;

- using them as projectile aircraft in an unmanned version (we must not forget that in Germany work was already in full swing on the creation of V-1 projectile aircraft, which had a similar combat mission). Of course, it was not about installing any guidance systems on these aircraft; it was possible to use only a small starting device, and on the route - a regular autopilot. Instead of a pilot, machine guns and ammunition, explosives could be loaded (about 300 kg). The simultaneous launch of several thousand of these aircraft and their explosion at the end of the flight would not only completely disable the British radar detection system, but would also turn such a massive fighter raid into a giant artillery barrage, after which it would be possible to begin landing sea and airborne troops. (It should be recalled that in 1939–1940 the Soviet aviation industry produced more than 3,000 I-153 biplane fighters and more than 4,000 I-16 fighters.)

7. The reality of this option is also confirmed by the fact that in the USSR, from the mid-1930s, at the Ostekhbyuro (under the leadership of V.I. Bekauri), later at NII-20, with the participation of plant No. 379, work was underway to create a radio control system for aircraft - at first bombers TB-1, and then TB-Z (see Appendix 11). In those years such an aircraft was called telemechanical and was controlled by radio from an escort aircraft. Initially, a variant was developed for lifting such an aircraft by a pilot who, after lifting and putting the aircraft on course, jumped out of it with a parachute. A more advanced version made it possible to take off without a pilot, “route flight to a target and return to the airfield under radio control” (as stated in the report on its successful state tests dated 4/4/41 - see Appendix 11). This means that, as befits a projectile aircraft in battle, it flies only in one direction. It is known that in addition to TB-Z, means of radio and telemechanical control of DB-3F and SB aircraft were developed. So we cannot exclude the possibility of an attempt to make both the I-16 and I-153 unmanned aircraft.

8. It is impossible not to recall that during Molotov’s visit to Berlin and after it, the world press called the construction of aircraft factories in the USSR, which also work for the benefit of Germany, one of the most important topics of the negotiations held there (see p. 254). This means that the issue of Germany using the air power of the USSR in the fight against the British Empire was considered very seriously. Therefore, Molotov’s delegation included two deputy people’s commissars of the aviation industry and, as will be shown below, almost the entire top leadership of the Soviet Air Force.

In this regard, it should be noted that during the month preceding Molotov’s trip to Berlin and the month after the end of the negotiations, Stalin made a number of important decisions on aviation. The main one is decision PB No. 22/94 dated November 5, 1940 “On the Red Army Air Force,” the key point of which was the creation of long-range bomber aviation and the increase by the end of 1941 of front-line aviation (bombers and fighters) to 100 air regiments with increasing the number of its aircraft to 22,171 (6,750 aircraft more than before). During this period, a number of resolutions were also adopted on the organization of the production of combat aircraft and aircraft engines in the western regions of the country - in Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (PB decisions No. 21/99 dated 8.10.40, 21/ 240 from 10/18/40 and 21/372 from 11/28/40).

9. Taking into account the previous conclusions, the arrival of the German Aviation Commission in the USSR on April 2–17, 1941 looks completely different (see pp. 361–381). It is quite possible that the commission checked how work was progressing on the production of two aircraft specifically for Operation Sea Lion: the high-altitude high-speed fighter MiG-3 and the three-seat dive daytime front-line bomber Pe-2 without pressurized cabins and a turbocharger (it was initially developed in this form) .

By the way, by that time the flight range of both aircraft had been increased to 1,200 km, which means they could fly from PribOVO to England, strike, fly over the English Channel and land at one of the German airfields. The reason for the transformation of a daytime high-altitude escort fighter into a dive bomber is not very clearly explained in historical and memoir literature. Some authors believe that after the visit of our representatives to Germany and familiarization with Hitler’s technology, it was recognized that such a fighter was not really needed. We should also not forget that simultaneously with the Pe-2 bomber, the Pe-3 heavy fighter was produced for the air defense of Moscow on the same basis during the war years. The two-seat Pe-3 fighter with the first Soviet aircraft radar "Gneiss-2" (chief designer V.V. Tikhomirov) in 1942 became the first Soviet night fighter.

The purpose for which the modification of the Messerschmitt Bf-109A (in common parlance - Felix) was developed, the main task of which was considered to be the ability to withstand the English Spitfire-V fighter, but it turned out that its development began immediately after its appearance MiG-3.

While working with the documents of the pre-war decisions of the Politburo on aviation at the RGASPI, I discovered a number of declassified documents marked “Special Folder”, allowing us to understand Stalin’s strategic plans.

From the appendix clause 88 (OP) of the Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars, approved by the Decision of the PB of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks No. 30 of April 8, 1941 “On the capital construction plan of NPOs for 1941”:

“...7. Approve the following distribution of funds for the construction of gasoline tanks:

LVO - 8 O79 tr.

PribOVO – 25,121 tr.

ZAPOVO – 8,048 tr.

Kiev Special Military District - 12,991 rubles.

Odessa - 6,995 tr.

Total: – 150,000 tr.

…12. Approve the following distribution of funds for the construction of operational airfields by district:

Leningrad Military District - 24,274 thousand rubles.

Baltic Special Military District - 23,800 rubles.

Western Special Military District - 25,110 rubles.

Kiev Special Military District - 39,288 rubles.

Odessa Military District - 10,637 tr.

Total: – 150,000 tr.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Molotov)

Secretary of the Central Committee (Stalin)"

(RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. Storage unit. 33. L. 158)

Another important document was discovered - on the distribution of fuel and lubricants between military districts before the war - Appendix No. 10 to the Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks No. P33/197 dated 6.6.41 “On the types of state material reserves and the plan for the accumulation of these reserves for 1941" (OP):

Mobile location location reserves of fuel and lubricants for non-commercial organizations by 1.1. 1942 in tn.

(RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. Item 34. L. 135)

From the first document it is clear that out of seventeen Soviet military districts, a third of all allocated capital investments were allocated to the five western border districts for the construction of gasoline tanks, that is, the proportion was approximately maintained. The majority (82%) of funds were allocated to these five districts for the construction of new airfields. And this is quite understandable: there is a war in Europe. But the allocated amount was distributed quite unexpectedly among these five districts, which is clearly seen from the table in which I have compiled this new data. For clarity, I calculated the percentage for each of the five western border districts of the total amount allocated to all five and indicated it in brackets. In addition, I indicate the number of German divisions deployed against each of these districts. 24 divisions that were in reserve were not included in the calculation.

Distribution of air resources and funds between western districts

Noteworthy is the fact that although only 10% of the air regiments of all those located in the western districts were located in PribOVO, 20% of the funds were allocated for the construction of operational airfields in this district, and twice as much - 40% - for the construction of gasoline tanks.

In my opinion, it is logical to explain this by the maximum proximity of the Baltic states to the English Channel, where Soviet air regiments intended to participate in the Great Transport Operation were supposed to be transferred, and therefore fuel was delivered. In addition, part of this gasoline was to be used to refuel German aircraft transferred from East Prussia through the USSR to the Middle East during a joint transport operation.

The distribution of mobile gasoline reserves by district not only testifies in favor of this explanation, but also suggests that the main efforts of Soviet aviation in the war for some reason should have been directed to the south, since the mobile reserve of aviation gasoline for the southern direction was 5.8 times higher than the mobile reserve of PribOVO , 2.8 times the mobile reserve of the PribOVO and LVO combined and 1.28 times the total mobile reserve of all other western districts.

The distribution of Soviet air regiments (10% each in the north-west and PribOVO and 60% in the south in KOVO and OdVO) can be explained by the fact that, according to an agreement between Hitler and Stalin, the main striking force during the landing on the British Isles was to be Luftwaffe aircraft, and during an attack on British bases and during further hostilities in the Middle East - Soviet Air Force aircraft.

If we assume that Soviet air regiments were to be located in proportion to the German forces concentrated against them in the north-west and south, then in PribOVO, for the above reason, there were half as many air regiments, and in KOVO and OdVO one and a half times as many as required.

The discovered documents completely deny the hypothesis that in June 1941 Stalin was preparing a strike on Germany, and show the complete lack of evidence of both the Hitler-Ribbentrop-Goebbels and Rezuno-Suvorov-Solonin statements about this.

It turns out that Joseph Vissarionovich was looking in a completely different direction at that time!

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June 22, 1941, a date that the whole country knows and remembers. It meant the beginning of the Great Patriotic War (WWII). On this day, the Nazi invaders invaded the territory of the USSR without declaring war. Even before the offensive, the border troops warned the command about approaching tanks. Stalin rejected the possibility of invasion, relying on the non-attack pact between the USSR and Germany. Joseph Vissarionovich ordered to destroy the enemy, without crossing state borders, because this could be a provocation and would undoubtedly lead to war.

At half past four in the morning, German troops launched an artillery attack on the border outposts. Then came a military invasion. The fire was directed at the most significant objects: airfields, communications centers, military garrisons, command posts and industrial facilities.
Molotov, in his address to the people of the USSR, called on the Soviet people to give a tough rebuff to the enemy. And in conclusion, he noted that victory will be ours in any case.

Hitler planned the attack on the USSR in advance. In his book, he wrote that the peoples inhabiting the territory in the east must be destroyed. And their place should be taken by representatives of the higher (Aryan) race.
German army Before the attack on the USSR, it managed to improve its technical equipment. The Soviet Union began rearmament and technically, the Red Army was inferior to the Wehrmacht army. Germany, adhering to the Blitzkrieg tactics, planned to capture Moscow, namely the main command post, with lightning speed. The command staff of the USSR was weak and inexperienced. The Germans noted this fact.

Since communications were destroyed at the very beginning, the army was in a state of chaos. The command had no idea what was happening at the front. Starting from June 22, 1941, the Air Force of the Soviet Union was practically destroyed. Helplessness air force led to the suicide of the commanding lieutenant general (June 23). Kopets commanded a group of bombers. After a while, General Rychagov, who was the commander of the aviation of the North-Western Front, was shot. So, in just one day, aviation was almost completely damaged.

The next day, a general mobilization of all citizens liable for military service was announced. Martial law was declared in the western regions of the country.
Undoubtedly, the victory of the Soviet Union was due to the stupid self-confidence of the German command. But Stalin’s stupid self-confidence led to the army’s absolute unwillingness to repel an external threat.

An air defense fighter conducts surveillance from the roof of a house on Gorky Street. Photo: TASS/Naum Granovsky

75 years ago, on June 22, 1941, the troops of Nazi Germany invaded the USSR. The Great Patriotic War began. In Russia and some countries of the former Soviet Union, June 22 is the Day of Remembrance and Sorrow.

June 22, 1941 for the USSR and its capital Moscow was determined in Berlin a week before this date - on Saturday, June 14, at a meeting of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces of Nazi Germany. On it, Adolf Hitler gave the last orders to attack the USSR from 04 am on June 22, 1941.

On the same day, a TASS report on Soviet-German relations was circulated, which stated:

“According to the USSR, Germany is as steadily observing the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact as the Soviet Union, which is why, in the opinion of Soviet circles, rumors about Germany’s intention to break the pact and launch an attack on the USSR are devoid of any basis.”

However, June 22, 1941 for the world’s first state of workers and peasants could have come a month or a week earlier. The leaders of the Third Reich initially planned to invade Russia at dawn on Thursday, May 15th. But on April 6, together with the troops of the allies - Italy and Hungary - the Germans entered Yugoslavia. The Balkan campaign forced Hitler to postpone the conquest of Moscow.

Until noon on June 22, 1941 (and there is hundreds of archival evidence of this), Moscow did not know about the German invasion.

04:30. According to documents, 48 ​​water sprinklers rolled out onto the streets.
05:30. Almost 900 janitors started working. The morning was fine, sunny, painting the “gentle light of the walls of the ancient Kremlin.”
From approximately 07:00. In parks, squares and other places where people usually gather, “outdoor” hawker trade began to unfold, summer buffets, beer halls and billiards opened - the coming Sunday promised to be very warm, if not hot. And in places of mass recreation, an influx of citizens was expected.
07:00 and 07:30. (according to the Sunday schedule - on ordinary days half an hour earlier). Dairy shops and bakeries opened.
08:30 and 09:00. Grocery stores and grocery stores have started operating. Department store stores, except for GUM and TSUM, were closed on Sundays. The range of goods is essentially normal for a peaceful capital. The "Molochnaya" on Rochdelskaya offered cottage cheese, curd mass, sour cream, kefir, yogurt, milk, cheese, feta cheese, butter and ice cream. All products are of two or three varieties and names.

It’s an ordinary Sunday in Moscow

Gorkogo Street. Photo: TASS/F. Kislov

Gastronome No. 1 "Eliseevsky", the main one in the country, put on the shelves boiled, half and uncooked smoked sausages, frankfurters, sausages from three to four types, ham, three types of boiled pork. The fish department offered fresh sterlet, lightly salted Caspian herring (zalom), hot smoked sturgeon, pressed and red caviar. There was an abundance of Georgian wines, Crimean Madeira and sherry, port wines, one type of vodka and rum, and four types of cognac. At that time there were no time restrictions on the sale of alcohol.

GUM and TSUM exhibited the entire range of the domestic clothing and footwear industry, calico, drapes, Boston and other fabrics, costume jewelry, and fiber suitcases of various sizes. And jewelry, the cost of individual samples of which exceeded 50 thousand rubles - a fifth of the price of the legendary T-34 tank, the IL-2 victory attack aircraft and three anti-tank guns - ZIS-3 76 mm caliber guns according to the "price list" of May 1941. No one could have imagined that day that the Central Department Store of Moscow would turn into army barracks in two weeks.

From 07:00 they began to prepare the Dynamo stadium for the big “mass event”. At 12 o'clock there was to be a parade and athletic competition.
Around 08:00, 20 thousand schoolchildren were brought to Moscow from cities and districts of the region for a children's holiday, which began at 11 o'clock in Sokolniki Park.

There were no “fermentations” of school graduates around Red Square and the streets of Moscow on the morning of June 22, 1941. This is the “mythology” of Soviet cinema and literature. The last graduation ceremonies in the capital took place on Friday, June 20.

In a word, all 4 million 600 thousand “ordinary” residents and about one million guests of the capital of the USSR did not know until lunch on June 22, 1941 that the biggest and bloodiest war with the invaders in the history of the country had begun that night.

01:21. The last train, loaded with wheat, which the USSR supplied under an agreement with Germany on September 28, 1939, crossed the border with Poland, absorbed by the Third Reich.
03:05. 14 German bombers, taking off from Koenigsberg at 01:10, dropped 28 magnetic bombs at a roadstead near Kronstadt, 20 km from Leningrad.
04:00. Hitler's troops crossed the border in the Brest area. Half an hour later they launched a large-scale offensive on all fronts - from the southern to the northern borders of the USSR.

And when at 11 o’clock in the Sokolniki park the capital’s pioneers greeted their guests, the pioneers of the Moscow region, with a ceremonial line, the German advanced 15, and in some places even 20 km into the interior of the country.

Solutions at the highest level

Moscow. V.M. Molotov, I.V. Stalin, K.E. Voroshilov (from left to right in the foreground), G.M. Malenkov, L.P. Beria, A.S. Shcherbakov (from left to right in the second row) and other members of the government head to Red Square. TASS photo chronicle

Only the top leadership of the country, the command of military districts, the first leaders of Moscow, Leningrad and some other large cities - Kuibyshev (now Samara), Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg), knew that the war was going on in the rear in the first half of the day on June 22, 1941. Khabarovsk.

06:30. Candidate member of the Politburo, Secretary of the Central Committee and First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Alexander Sergeevich Shcherbakov convened an emergency meeting of key leaders of the capital with the participation of senior officers of NGOs, the NKVD and directors of the largest enterprises. He and the chairman of the city executive committee Vasily Prokhorovich Pronin by that time had the rank of general. At the meeting, priority measures were developed to ensure the life of Moscow in wartime.

Directly from the city committee by telephone, orders were given to strengthen the security of water supply systems, heat and electrical energy, transport and, above all, the metro, food warehouses, refrigerators, the Moscow Canal, railway stations, defense enterprises and other important facilities. At the same meeting, the concept of camouflaging Moscow was “roughly” formulated, including the construction of models and dummies, the protection of government and historical buildings.

At the suggestion of Shcherbakov, from June 23, a ban was introduced on entry into the capital for anyone who did not have Moscow registration. Residents of the Moscow region, including those who worked in Moscow, also fell under it. Special passes were introduced. Even Muscovites had to correct them when going to the forest to pick mushrooms or to a suburban dacha - without a pass they were not allowed back into the capital.

15:00. At the afternoon meeting, which took place after People's Commissar Molotov spoke on the radio and after Shcherbakov and Pronin visited the Kremlin, the capital authorities, in agreement with the generals of the Moscow Military District, decided to install anti-aircraft batteries at all high-altitude points of the capital. Later, at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR, created the next day, June 23, this decision was called “exemplary.” And they sent a directive to the Military Districts to ensure anti-aircraft protection of cities following the example of the capital.

Prohibition on photography

One of the remarkable decisions of the second meeting of the Moscow leadership on June 22, 1941: an appeal was formulated calling on the population to hand over their personal cameras, other photographic equipment, photographic film and reagents within three days. From now on, only accredited journalists and employees of special services could use photographic equipment.

This is partly why there are few photographs of Moscow in the first days of the war. Some of them are completely staged, such as, for example, the famous photograph by Yevgeny Khaldei “Muscovites listen to Comrade Molotov’s address on the radio about the beginning of the war on June 22, 1941.” On the first war day in the capital of the Union at 12 o'clock in the afternoon (the time of the live broadcast of People's Commissar Molotov's speech) it was +24 degrees C. And in the photo - people in coats, hats, in a word, dressed for autumn, as in the twentieth of September, when , presumably this photo was taken.

By the way, the clothes of the people in that staged photo are very different from the T-shirts, white canvas boots and trousers in which in another photo on June 22, 1941, Muscovites are buying soda on Gorky Street (now Tverskaya).

At the same morning meeting on June 22, 1941, which was chaired by Alexander Shcherbakov, a special resolution was adopted - “to prevent and suppress panic” in connection with the invasion of Hitler’s troops in the USSR. The party secretary and de facto owner of the capital advised all leaders and, especially, artists, writers, and newspapermen to “stick” to the position that the war would end in a month, a maximum of a month and a half. And the enemy will be defeated on his territory." And he turned Special attention to the fact that in Molotov’s speech the war was called “sacred”. Two days later, on June 24, 1941, having overcome a protracted depression, Joseph Dzhugashvili (Stalin), at the instigation of Lavrentiy Beria, appointed Shcherbakov (in addition to existing positions and regalia) as the head of the Sovinformburo - the main and, in fact, the only source of information for the masses in the years Great Patriotic War.

Sweeps

Muscovites enroll in the ranks of the people's militia. Photo: TASS

One of the results of the last meeting of the Moscow leadership, which took place after 21:00, was the decision to create fighter battalions. They, apparently, were initiated in the Kremlin, because a day later the general leadership of the units was entrusted to the deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, head of the NKVD Lavrentiy Beria. But the country’s first fighter battalion came under arms precisely in Moscow, on the third day of the war, June 24, 1941. In the documents, the destroyer battalions were designated as “volunteer formations of citizens capable of owning weapons.” The prerogative of admission to them remained with party, Komsomol, trade union activists and other “verified” (as in the document) persons who were not subject to conscription for military service. The task of the extermination battalions was to fight saboteurs, spies, Hitler's accomplices, as well as bandits, deserters, looters and speculators. In a word, everyone who threatened order in cities and other populated areas during wartime conditions.

On the fourth day of the war, the Moscow fighter plane made its first raids, choosing to begin with the workers' closets and gateways of Zamoskvorechye and the barracks of Maryina Roshcha. The “cleansing” was quite effective. 25 bandits with weapons were captured. Five particularly dangerous criminals were eliminated in a shootout. Food products (stewed meat, condensed milk, smoked meats, flour, cereals) and industrial goods, stolen before the start of the war from one of the warehouses in the Fili region, were seized.

The leader's reaction

General Secretary of the CPSU (b) Joseph Stalin. Photo: TASS

In Moscow - not only the city committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the city executive committee, but the entire highest government of the USSR. According to the “reflected” documents, Stalin was informed about the invasion of Nazi troops almost immediately - around 04:35-04:45. He, as usual, had not yet gone to bed, and, according to one version, was at the “nearby dacha.”

The subsequent (second) report on the advance of the Germans along the entire front made a strong impression on the leader. He locked himself in one of the rooms and did not leave it for about two hours, after which he allegedly went to the Kremlin. I did not read the text of Vyacheslav Molotov’s speech. And he demanded that he report to him about the situation at the fronts every half hour.

According to the testimony of a number of military leaders, this was precisely what was most difficult to do - communication with the active units conducting fierce battles with German troops was weak, if not completely absent. In addition, by 18-19 hours on June 22, 1941, according to various sources, a total of 500 thousand to 700 thousand soldiers and officers of the Red Army were surrounded by the Nazis, who, through incredible efforts, with a terrible shortage of ammunition, equipment and weapons, tried to break through the "rings" of the Nazis.

However, according to other, also “reflected” documents, on June 22, 1941, the leader was on the Black Sea, at a dacha in Gagra. And, according to the USSR Ambassador to the USA Ivan Maisky, “after the first report of the German attack, he fell into prostration, completely cut himself off from Moscow, remained out of touch for four days, drinking himself into a stupor.”

Is that so? Or not? It's hard to believe. It is no longer possible to verify - documents of the CPSU Central Committee have since been massively burned and destroyed at least 4 times. For the first time in October 1941, when panic began in Moscow after the Nazis entered the outskirts of Khimki and a column of Nazi motorcyclists passed along Leningradsky Prospekt in the Sokol area. Then at the end of February 1956 and the end of October 1961, after the revelations of Stalin’s personality cult at the XX and XXII Congresses of the CPSU. And finally, in August 1991, after the defeat of the State Emergency Committee.

And is it necessary to check everything? The fact remains that in the first 10 days of the war, the most difficult time for the country, Stalin was neither heard nor seen. And all orders, orders and directives of the first week of the war were signed by marshals and generals, people's commissars and deputies of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR: Lavrenty Beria, Georgy Zhukov, Semyon Timoshenko, Georgy Malenkov, Dmitry Pavlov, Vyacheslav Molotov and even the "party mayor" of the capital Alexander Shcherbakov.

Appeal from Nakrom Molotov

12:15. From the studio of the Central Telegraph, one of the leaders of the Soviet state, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, made an appeal on the radio.

It began with the words: “Citizens and women of the Soviet Union! The Soviet government and its head, Comrade Stalin, instructed me to make the following statement. Today, at 4 o’clock in the morning, without making any claims to Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country...” The speech ended with the famous words that became the idiom of the entire Great Patriotic War: “Our cause is just! The enemy will be defeated! Victory will be ours!".

12.25. Judging by the “log of visits”, Molotov returned from the Central Telegraph to Stalin’s office.

Muscovites listened to the People's Commissar's speech mainly through loudspeakers installed on all city streets, as well as in parks, stadiums and other crowded places. Performed by announcer Yuri Levitan, the text of Molotov’s speech was repeated 4 times at different times.

Muscovites are listening to a message about the attack of Nazi Germany on our Motherland. Photo: TASS/Evgeny Khaldey

Moreover, from approximately 09:30. until 11:00 there was allegedly a serious discussion in the Kremlin about who should make such an appeal? According to one version, all members of the Politburo believed that Stalin himself should do this. But he actively pushed back, repeating the same thing: the political situation and the situation on the fronts “are not yet clear,” and therefore he will speak later.

As time went. And delaying information about the beginning of the war became dangerous. At the leader’s suggestion, Molotov became the one who would notify the people of the start of the holy war. According to another version, there was no discussion because Stalin himself was not in the Kremlin. They wanted to entrust the “All-Union Elder” Mikhail Kalinin to tell the people about the war, but he even read from a piece of paper, stuttering, syllable by syllable.

Life after the start of the war

The news of the invasion of Hitler's troops on June 22, 1941, judging by archival documents (reports of NKVD employees and freelance agents, police reports), as well as the recollections of eyewitnesses, did not plunge residents and guests of the capital into despondency and did not change their plans too much.

After the announcement of the start of the war, Moscow-Adler passenger trains departed from the Kursk station exactly on schedule. And on the night of June 23 - to Sevastopol, which Nazi aircraft brutally bombed at 05:00 on June 22. True, passengers who had tickets specifically to Crimea were dropped off in Tula. But the train itself was only allowed to go to Kharkov.

During the day, brass bands played in parks, in theaters full halls there were performances. Hairdressers were open until the evening. The beer halls and billiard rooms were practically packed with visitors. In the evening the dance floors were not empty either. The famous melody of the foxtrot "Rio-rita" was heard in many parts of the capital.

A distinctive feature of the first military day in Moscow: mass optimism. In conversations, in addition to strong words of hatred towards Germany and Hitler, they heard: “Nothing. A month. Well, a month and a half. We’ll smash, crush the reptile!” Another metropolitan sign of June 22, 1941: after the news of the Nazi attack, people in military uniform were allowed to skip the line everywhere, even in pubs.

Anti-aircraft artillery guarding the city. Photo: TASS/Naum Granovsky

An impressive example of the efficiency of the Moscow authorities. By their order, at screenings in cinemas after 14:00 on June 22, 1941, before feature films (and these were “Shchors”, “If Tomorrow is War”, “Professor Malok”, “The Oppenheim Family”, “Boxers”) they began to show educational short films like “Blackout of a residential building”, “Take care of your gas mask”, “The simplest shelters from air bombs”.

In the evening Vadim Kozin sang in the Hermitage garden. In the "Metropol" and "Aragvi" restaurants, judging by the "expense sheets" of the kitchen and buffet, sandwiches with pressed (black) caviar, hall herring with onions, fried pork loin in wine sauce, kharcho soup, and chanahi (lamb stew) were especially popular ), lamb cutlet on the bone with a complex side dish, vodka, KV cognac and sherry wine.

Moscow has not yet fully realized that a big war is already underway. And on the fields of its battles, thousands of Red Army soldiers have already fallen, hundreds of civilians of Soviet cities and villages have died. Within a day, the city registry offices will notice an influx of fathers and mothers asking to replace the name Adolf on the birth certificates of their sons with Anatoly, Alexander, and Andrey. Being Adolfs (in common parlance - Adiks), who were born en masse in the second half of 1933 and at the end of 1939, in June 1941 it became not only disgusting, but also unsafe.

A week later . In the capital of the USSR, cards will gradually be introduced for food, household essentials, shoes and fabric.
In two weeks. Muscovites will see newsreel footage of Soviet villages, towns and cities burning, and women and young children lying near their huts, shot by the Nazis.
Exactly in a month. Moscow will survive the first raid of Hitler's aircraft, and will see firsthand, not in the movies, the mutilated bodies of fellow citizens who died under the rubble, destroyed and burning houses.

In the meantime, on the first day of the war, in Moscow everything is approximately the same as in the textbook poem by Gennady Shpalikov “On the dance floor in the Forty-First Year”: “It’s okay that Poland doesn’t exist. But the country is strong. In a month – and no more – the war will end... "

Evgeny Kuznetsov