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Military-Diplomatic Academy. How the FSB is creating a nightmare for military intelligence How to enter the GRU Academy

The training of intelligence officers is carried out by the Military Diplomatic Academy (formerly the Academy of the Soviet Army), and is popularly called the “Conservatory”. The Academy is located near the Oktyabrskoye Pole metro station. The academy has several faculties that train intelligence officers both for work abroad and for service in the intelligence agencies of the country's army.

In Fig. Figure 2.19 shows the organizational structure of the academy with its faculties and specialized departments.

Recruitment of new officers to the academy according to a long-tested scheme (procedure) is carried out, as a rule, at the end of each year. The academy's management sends representatives to the troops and navies to recruit students. Preference is given to combat-ready military units and formations Navy and the Air Force.

Arriving at a division, brigade or army, teachers at the GRU Academy first get acquainted in detail with the personal files of officers under the age of 35 and with military rank no less than a captain. Those officers whose personal files satisfy the teachers of the GRU Academy are called to Moscow for an interview after the start of the new year. Some of them are asked to take entrance exams, which are held from January to May, and in September those who pass the entrance exams begin studying at the academy.

The Military Diplomatic Academy occupies a worthy place in the training of intelligence officers for many types of activities both domestically and abroad. The Academy has highly qualified teaching staff with extensive experience in military intelligence, including abroad - in illegal work.

Practice shows that during the training process, which lasts three years, many students are eliminated due to professional unsuitability for intelligence activities. Special attention is devoted to the study of foreign languages ​​of those countries to which this officer will go.

In Fig. Figure 2.20 shows the technology (algorithm) for selecting, evaluating and “recruiting” officers from military units for training at the academy.

I would like to dwell on certain details of the selection and assessment of future students for the GRU Academy. A GRU representative is tasked with selecting no more than 10 officers, but he has to check about 100 people to find the top ten. A number of future students are recruited from among graduates of military academies. This selection justifies the efforts of GRU representatives, and indeed 90% of them are enrolled in the Military Diplomatic Academy.

One of the stages of verification is that a representative of the GRU Academy comes to the candidate’s apartment and, as a rule, has a normal conversation with him. At the same time, he attaches great importance to the assessment of the candidate’s wife. Sometimes it happens that a wife is not suitable for some reason, such as intelligence or excessive emotionality. And this means that no matter how good the officer himself is, he cannot be an intelligence officer. It must be emphasized that GRU representatives are so experienced that at first glance at the home situation they understand whether they came in vain or whether it makes sense to continue the conversation.


The main criteria that guide the representatives of the selection group are shown in Fig. 2.21.

Upon arrival in Moscow, candidates selected by GRU representatives are tested using a variety of test tests before passing the exams. Some of these tests, and there are enough of them a large number of, shown in Fig. 2.22. Among them there are tests for memory, ability to learn foreign languages, attention, and “noise immunity”. Typically, candidates go through hundreds of tests, from 9am to 5pm, for a whole week.

During testing, the teacher can, for example, say a phrase in an unfamiliar language and ask you to repeat it. Or, for example, he shows dozens of photographic portraits in a row at a fairly fast pace and introduces them by last name: Ivanov, Petrov, Sidorov, Vasiliev... Then the photographs are mixed and quickly shown again, and the officer must put numbers next to the names written in advance, which is now the number Petrov, Sidorov... Or they say a number of words from a line and ask you to repeat them without changing the order of the words.

Practice shows that, as a rule, there is no 100% number of officers who pass the test. That is, some of the selected candidates do not pass the tests. Of course, there are cases where some officers pass all tests with positive results.

That’s why they take into the academy officers who have partially failed the tests. It should be noted that officers who pass all tests with great success are, as a rule, not accepted into the academy. There is a principle in intelligence: a scout should not stand out from others with his excessive abilities.

As I already wrote, after passing the tests, future students are required to pass competitive exams. Most often, exams demonstrate the ability to learn foreign languages.

At the last stage, future students are interviewed, which takes place in a formal atmosphere, usually in a large hall. Academy specialists, including psychologists, are invited to an interview, and various questions of interest are asked. Among them, for example, why did you decide to go into reconnaissance? Or what kind of alcoholic beverages do you drink and how much? Do you love women and how do you feel about them?

There is also one firmly established feature. During the selection process, applicants see only their group with which they will have to study. And all those who take the tests are taken along different corridors to separate rooms.

The academy does not accept people who come on their own, but sometimes there are still “thieves”. These are, as a rule, officers who have high-ranking chiefs of the GRU, the General Staff, the Ministry of Defense, etc. How could one not be happy in this case, especially when the opportunity arises to work in diplomatic missions abroad.

After completing the above procedures, officers become first-year students at one of the faculties of the GRU Military Diplomatic Academy. Students are included in the educational process, with the most serious attention paid to the study of foreign languages. Previously, I already wrote about how and in what way linguists teach foreign languages. I gave my personal example of studying Arabic with captain N. Maiburov and Hebrew with A. Rubinstein.

Unfortunately, some students are practically unable to speak languages ​​such as Arabic, Persian, Chinese, Vietnamese, and then after the first semester they have to be expelled and sent to the troops at the place of their previous or other service. They also study other subjects, including regional studies, special equipment, driving, etc.

The faculty at the academy makes significant efforts to train intelligence officers to the highest quality.

In Fig. 2.23 indicates those main academic disciplines, which should be mastered by future military intelligence officers going on long business trips to foreign countries.

Particular attention is paid to the methods and methods of training each. So, in order to remember 50 words, you need to compose a story with these words, in which the listener himself actively acts. They learn the art of communicating with possible agents and the art of leaving when a “tail” is following you, that is, a representative of the counterintelligence of the host country. Considerable attention is paid to the study of the processes of agent work. This is a closed topic, and it is not customary to disclose the technology for training students in intelligence work. This is a kind of know-how of military intelligence of any country in the world. Still, certain points need to be stated.

So, for example, even in the first year, the whole of Moscow is divided into sectors and each student is assigned his own sector. In the allocated sector, the student must prepare routes with appearances and inspection places. Routes, as a rule, are worked out to the point of automaticity with the goal of timely “detecting surveillance”, which tracks down the “agent” - the academy student. The agent is led by several people who have radio contact with each other. It is important to remember that if the “agent” slows down slightly and some citizens fly out from around the corner a couple of times, then it is better to leave this route.

Or, let’s say, a “listening agent” jumped out of a subway car at the last moment before the doors closed and suddenly discovered that somewhere else another car door had slammed belatedly; again, it’s not worth the risk. But if “you left,” then in any country “outdoor surveillance” will definitely set you up, for example, provoke a fight, or something else. And you will automatically be included in the “Who is Who” directory and become persona non grata, that is, you will be allowed to leave the country within 24-72 hours.

I remember an incident that happened to one of my intelligence friends. This was in the 60-70s in Austria. Our Soviet intelligence officer worked there under diplomatic cover. One day he drank a little and, in order not to get into any unusual situation, decided to catch a taxi and go to his place of residence. And apparently he was already being followed. He stopped a taxi and got into the car. The driver drove off at high speed, and only then did our scout notice that a young beautiful woman was sitting next to him in the back seat.

The scout did not know what to decide: either drive in silence, or stop the car and get out. Before he had time to comprehend what was happening, this young woman tried to sit on his lap and unbutton his blouse, and under the blouse the bra had been removed in advance. Suddenly the driver adjusts the front mirror and sees this couple in all their glory. Then he immediately drives them to the nearest police station. As soon as the car stops, the police open the door and photograph the whole picture.

Experience shows that it is quite difficult for a scout to escape surveillance. Especially in last years, when you can attach a tiny sensor to the car and “outdoor” is no longer needed. While studying at the academy, “outdoor surveillance” is carried out by KGB (FSB) officers. Sometimes, for training purposes, a special command is given to take a “listener” when laying a cache or when moving along a route to meet with “agents”. The committee members take such training very seriously and record everything on video and then pass it on to the academy management.

Choosing a cache is a very serious matter. It is important that approaches to it be successful, and information should be instantly stored and withdrawn.

I will give one example from the practice of my intelligence colleagues. My colleague, with whom I studied at the Military Institute of Foreign Languages, was sent to one of the Arab countries to work illegally. Having received a well-developed “legend”, at the age of 24, this young lieutenant, upon arrival in the country, bought a tent at the market for repairing women’s shoes. This tent was the agents' meeting place and his hiding place. A woman or girl would come and ask to have the heel of her shoe repaired.

The lieutenant took her shoe, unscrewed the heel and took out the report and put another task in there. And this went on for several decades. He went abroad as a lieutenant, and returned home as a colonel. By the way, the training system for illegal officers is carried out according to a different scheme and in other premises available on the balance sheet of the GRU. In Fig. Figure 2.24 shows an approximate scheme for training intelligence officers to work in illegal conditions.

The educational institutions in which future GRU officers were trained are shown in Fig. 2.25.

The final point in the training of intelligence officers is “penetration” of a sensitive facility in Moscow, in this case, one of the “mailboxes”, and legally. And he must come up with a reason for penetration himself. It is known that sensitive enterprises have always been strictly guarded and it is almost impossible to get there without a pass. And how to do this, the future intelligence officer must decide for himself, hang out, look for acquaintances. In addition, he must “recruit” his agent, who can give him the necessary information about the work of the enterprise, the structure of the facility, the decisions made at it, etc.

But with all this, one restriction strictly applies - the listener does not have the right to recruit females. It should also be noted that “recruited agents” do not bear any responsibility, since the GRU does not disclose this information at all. At this point, training at the GRU Military Diplomatic Academy ends, and the graduate is sent to his place of service by decision of a special commission.

In real practice, intelligence officers abroad have to enter into various contacts, the main ones are indicated in Fig. 2.26. In all these situations, intelligence officers must be careful not to jeopardize the fulfillment of the tasks assigned to them by the GRU.

Undoubtedly, the most difficult work goes to illegal officers, who must live in a foreign country and carry out the intelligence tasks assigned to them.

Rz: Many active WSI officers[Polish military intelligence - approx. trans.] trained by the GRU, an organization even more mysterious than the KGB. . .

Victor Suvorov: The GRU was created in 1918 to conduct intelligence operations abroad. The Main Intelligence Directorate has existed under its current name since 1942. Currently, it includes 18 specialized departments. It was military intelligence, and the KGB could be called the secret police, charged with protecting the regime from internal enemies. Even if the KGB conducted operations abroad, its main enemy was still its internal enemies. The simplest comparison looks like this: the KGB is the Soviet analogue of the Gestapo, and the GRU is the Abwehr.

- The GRU also trained officers from other socialist countries. Have you met them, and how many were there?

GRU officers were trained by the Soviet Army Academy. In fact, it was the Military Diplomatic Academy. Neither the first nor the second name reflected its essence. It was regular camouflage.

In fact, it was an intelligence school. In my time there were four departments. Three - for Soviet officers. The first one, which I graduated from, trained intelligence officers who were supposed to work under the cover of civilian organizations - in diplomacy, Aeroflot, and trade missions. The second department trained military attaches, and the third - Soviet officers who conducted operations within the USSR, as well as within the communist bloc - in the People's Republic of Poland, the German Democratic Republic, etc. Finally, the fourth department trained officers from other Warsaw Pact countries. We were isolated from them. However, not only from them. While studying in the first department, I could not communicate with the students of the second and third, not to mention the fourth.

- The GRU and the intelligence services of other socialist countries carried out joint actions. . .

Certainly. All Soviet military plans were closely related to the Warsaw Pact. The Commander-in-Chief of the Internal Affairs Troops was simultaneously the Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. The structure resembled the organization of the Comintern. Theoretically, it consisted of independent parties, but in fact everything was led by Comrade Stalin.

At the police department it was similar, and even worse, because no one was pretending there. All general staffs were directly subordinate to the Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, as well as to the General Staff of the Soviet Army. The same thing happened with their military intelligence. It was under the complete control of the GRU.

- It follows from this that the Polish officers also obeyed him.

Certainly. Let's take Polish military intelligence. Officially, it was part of the general headquarters of the Polish army, but at the same time it was completely controlled by Moscow. The Soviet command only sought to maintain competition between the intelligence services of individual countries, in order to thus obtain information from different sources. So formally, each of these structures acted on its own, but all the threads still led to Moscow. Here was the real center of management of all these services.

There was no such possibility. The Soviet Union even made decisions about who would be the Minister of Defense or the Chief of the General Staff, and without his approval appointments of this kind were simply impossible.

- They say that those who become an officer or a member of the special services will never part with them. How likely is it that those who went through GRU school retained ties with Russian intelligence?

I will answer in the words of President Putin. Once, when he had already become the master of the Kremlin, he was asked if it was true that he was a former security officer. He replied that security officers are never former. It’s the same with GRU officers. There are no former intelligence officers or agents. It's like joining the mafia. It will no longer be possible to leave. On the other hand, I would not like to generalize that all Polish officers trained by the GRU are Russian agents. However, I think that people who worked closely with the Soviet intelligence services, including the GRU, should look for work outside the structures related to state security.

Interviewed by Slawomir Popowski

____________________________________________________________

Viktor Suvorov (real name Rezun) was a Soviet intelligence officer. In 1974 he graduated from the Military Diplomatic Academy and worked for four years in the Geneva GRU station. In 1978 he fled to the UK. He described his experience in books, incl. in "Aquarium" and "Icebreaker", which became world bestsellers. IN former USSR he was sentenced to death in absentia.

InoSMI materials contain assessments exclusively of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the InoSMI editorial staff.

Military Academy (former Military Diplomatic Academy) Ministry of Defense Russian Federation - military educational institution, specializing in the training of military diplomats (military attaches) and military intelligence officers. Military unit 22177. Slang name - “conservatory”.

Story

In the Russian Federation, until September 27, 2011, it was called the state military educational institution higher vocational education"Military Diplomatic Academy". After September 27, 2011 - the federal state-owned military educational institution of higher professional education "Military Academy of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation".

From May 2010 to February 5, 2014, the academy included a branch in Cherepovets (now the Cherepovets Higher Military School of Radio Electronics) as a separate unit.

Structure

Management

The head of the Academy with the military rank of colonel general (admiral), formally holding the position of deputy head of the GRU, has four deputies with the rank of lieutenant generals: the first deputy and deputies for work with personnel, logistics and educational and scientific work.

Faculties

  • 1st Faculty - trains officers to work abroad, as intelligence officers under diplomatic cover (“jackets”, in intelligence slang) and illegal intelligence officers.
  • 2nd faculty - “undercover operational intelligence”. Trains military attaches.
  • 3rd Faculty - “Operational-tactical intelligence”. Trains operational-tactical intelligence officers who are assigned to the headquarters of military districts.
  • A special faculty is for military personnel of “armies of friendly countries.” It has three directions corresponding to the first three faculties.
  • The Academy also operates a Faculty of Foreign Languages, an adjunct course and Higher Academic Courses.
GRU: fiction and reality Nikolay Pushkarev

GRU MILITARY DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY: SELECTION AND TRAINING OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

The training of intelligence officers is carried out by the Military Diplomatic Academy (formerly the Academy of the Soviet Army), and is popularly called the “Conservatory”. The Academy is located near the Oktyabrskoye Pole metro station. The academy has several faculties that train intelligence officers both for work abroad and for service in the intelligence agencies of the country's army.

In Fig. Figure 2.19 shows the organizational structure of the academy with its faculties and specialized departments.

Recruitment of new officers to the academy according to a long-tested scheme (procedure) is carried out, as a rule, at the end of each year. The academy's management sends representatives to the troops and navies to recruit students. Preference is given to combat-ready military units and formations of the Navy and Air Force. Arriving at a division, brigade or army, teachers at the GRU Academy first of all become thoroughly familiar with the personal files of officers under the age of 35 and with a military rank of at least captain. Those officers whose personal files satisfy the teachers of the GRU Academy are called to Moscow for an interview after the start of the new year. Some of them are asked to take entrance exams, which are held from January to May, and in September those who pass the entrance exams begin studying at the academy.

The Military Diplomatic Academy occupies a worthy place in the training of intelligence officers for many types of activities both domestically and abroad. The Academy has highly qualified teaching staff with extensive experience in military intelligence, including abroad - in illegal work.

Practice shows that during the training process, which lasts three years, many students are eliminated due to professional unsuitability for intelligence activities. Particular attention is paid to learning foreign languages ​​of those countries to which this officer will go.

In Fig. Figure 2.20 shows the technology (algorithm) for selecting, evaluating and “recruiting” officers from military units for training at the academy.

I would like to dwell on certain details of the selection and assessment of future students for the GRU Academy. A GRU representative is tasked with selecting no more than 10 officers, but he has to check about 100 people to find the top ten. A number of future students are recruited from among graduates of military academies. This selection justifies the efforts of GRU representatives, and indeed 90% of them are enrolled in the Military Diplomatic Academy.

One of the stages of verification is that a representative of the GRU Academy comes to the candidate’s apartment and, as a rule, has a normal conversation with him. At the same time, he attaches great importance to the assessment of the candidate’s wife. Sometimes it happens that a wife is not suitable for some reason, such as intelligence or excessive emotionality. And this means that no matter how good the officer himself is, he cannot be an intelligence officer. It must be emphasized that GRU representatives are so experienced that at first glance at the home situation they understand whether they came in vain or whether it makes sense to continue the conversation.

The main criteria that guide the representatives of the selection group are shown in Fig. 2.21.

Upon arrival in Moscow, candidates selected by GRU representatives are tested using a variety of test tests before passing the exams. Some of these tests, and there are quite a large number of them, are shown in Fig. 2.22. Among them there are tests for memory, ability to learn foreign languages, attention, and “noise immunity”. Typically, candidates go through hundreds of tests, from 9am to 5pm, for a whole week.

During testing, the teacher can, for example, say a phrase in an unfamiliar language and ask you to repeat it. Or, for example, he shows dozens of photographic portraits in a row at a fairly fast pace and introduces them by last name: Ivanov, Petrov, Sidorov, Vasiliev... Then the photographs are mixed and quickly shown again, and the officer must put numbers next to the names written in advance, which is now the number Petrov, Sidorov... Or they say a number of words from a line and ask you to repeat them without changing the order of the words.

Practice shows that, as a rule, there is no 100% number of officers who pass the test. That is, some of the selected candidates do not pass the tests. Of course, there are cases where some officers pass all tests with positive results.

That’s why they take into the academy officers who have partially failed the tests. It should be noted that officers who pass all tests with great success are, as a rule, not accepted into the academy. There is a principle in intelligence: a scout should not stand out from others with his excessive abilities.

As I already wrote, after passing the tests, future students are required to pass competitive exams. Most often, exams demonstrate the ability to learn foreign languages.

At the last stage, future students are interviewed, which takes place in a formal atmosphere, usually in a large hall. Academy specialists, including psychologists, are invited to an interview, and various questions of interest are asked. Among them, for example, why did you decide to go into reconnaissance? Or what kind of alcoholic beverages do you drink and how much? Do you love women and how do you feel about them?

There is also one firmly established feature. During the selection process, applicants see only their group with which they will have to study. And all those who take the tests are taken along different corridors to separate rooms.

The academy does not accept people who come on their own, but sometimes there are still “thieves”. These are, as a rule, officers who have high-ranking chiefs of the GRU, the General Staff, the Ministry of Defense, etc. How could one not be happy in this case, especially when the opportunity arises to work in diplomatic missions abroad.

After completing the above procedures, officers become first-year students at one of the faculties of the GRU Military Diplomatic Academy. Students are included in the educational process, with the most serious attention paid to the study of foreign languages. Previously, I already wrote about how and in what way linguists teach foreign languages. I gave my personal example of studying Arabic with Captain N. Maiburov and Hebrew with A. Rubinstein.

Unfortunately, some students are practically unable to speak languages ​​such as Arabic, Persian, Chinese, Vietnamese, and then after the first semester they have to be expelled and sent to the troops at the place of their previous or other service. They also study other subjects, including regional studies, special equipment, driving, etc.

The faculty at the academy makes significant efforts to train intelligence officers to the highest quality.

In Fig. 2.23 indicates those basic academic disciplines that must be mastered by future military intelligence officers going on long business trips to foreign countries.

Particular attention is paid to the methods and methods of training each. So, in order to remember 50 words, you need to compose a story with these words, in which the listener himself actively acts. They learn the art of communicating with possible agents and the art of leaving when a “tail” is following you, that is, a representative of the counterintelligence of the host country. Considerable attention is paid to the study of the processes of agent work. This is a closed topic, and it is not customary to disclose the technology for training students in intelligence work. This is a kind of know-how of military intelligence of any country in the world. Still, certain points need to be stated. So, for example, even in the first year, the whole of Moscow is divided into sectors and each student is assigned his own sector. In the allocated sector, the student must prepare routes with appearances and inspection places. Routes, as a rule, are worked out to the point of automaticity with the goal of timely “detecting surveillance”, which tracks down the “agent” - the academy student. The agent is led by several people who have radio contact with each other. It is important to remember that if the “agent” slows down slightly and some citizens fly out from around the corner a couple of times, then it is better to leave this route. Or, let’s say, a “listening agent” jumped out of a subway car at the last moment before the doors closed and suddenly discovered that somewhere else another car door had slammed belatedly; again, it’s not worth the risk. But if “you left,” then in any country “outdoor surveillance” will definitely set you up, for example, provoke a fight, or something else. And you will automatically be included in the “Who is Who” directory and become persona non grata, that is, you will be allowed to leave the country within 24–72 hours.

I remember an incident that happened to one of my intelligence friends. This was in the 60-70s in Austria. Our Soviet intelligence officer worked there under diplomatic cover. One day he drank a little and, in order not to get into any unusual situation, decided to catch a taxi and go to his place of residence. And apparently he was already being followed. He stopped a taxi and got into the car. The driver drove off at high speed, and only then did our scout notice that a young beautiful woman was sitting next to him in the back seat. The scout did not know what to decide: either drive in silence, or stop the car and get out. Before he had time to comprehend what was happening, this young woman tried to sit on his lap and unbutton his blouse, and under the blouse the bra had been removed in advance. Suddenly the driver adjusts the front mirror and sees this couple in all their glory. Then he immediately drives them to the nearest police station. As soon as the car stops, the police open the door and photograph the whole picture.

Experience shows that it is quite difficult for a scout to escape surveillance. Especially in recent years, when you can attach a tiny sensor to the car and the “outdoor” is no longer needed. While studying at the academy, “outdoor surveillance” is carried out by KGB (FSB) officers. Sometimes, for training purposes, a special command is given to take a “listener” when laying a cache or when moving along a route to meet with “agents”. The committee members take such training very seriously and record everything on video and then pass it on to the academy management.

Choosing a cache is a very serious matter. It is important that approaches to it be successful, and information should be instantly stored and withdrawn.

I will give one example from the practice of my intelligence colleagues. My colleague, with whom I studied at the Military Institute of Foreign Languages, was sent to one of the Arab countries to work illegally. Having received a well-developed “legend”, at the age of 24, this young lieutenant, upon arrival in the country, bought a tent at the market for repairing women’s shoes. This tent was the agents' meeting place and his hiding place. A woman or girl would come and ask to have the heel of her shoe repaired. The lieutenant took her shoe, unscrewed the heel and took out the report and put another task in there. And this went on for several decades. He went abroad as a lieutenant, and returned home as a colonel. By the way, the training system for illegal officers is carried out according to a different scheme and in other premises available on the balance sheet of the GRU. In Fig. Figure 2.24 shows an approximate scheme for training intelligence officers to work in illegal conditions.

The educational institutions in which future GRU officers were trained are shown in Fig. 2.25.

The final point in the training of intelligence officers is “penetration” of a sensitive facility in Moscow, in this case, one of the “mailboxes”, and legally. And he must come up with a reason for penetration himself. It is known that sensitive enterprises have always been strictly guarded and it is almost impossible to get there without a pass. And how to do this, the future intelligence officer must decide for himself, hang out, look for acquaintances. In addition, he must “recruit” his agent, who can give him the necessary information about the work of the enterprise, the structure of the facility, the decisions made at it, etc.

But with all this, one restriction strictly applies - the listener does not have the right to recruit females. It should also be noted that “recruited agents” do not bear any responsibility, since the GRU does not disclose this information at all. At this point, training at the GRU Military Diplomatic Academy ends, and the graduate is sent to his place of service by decision of a special commission.

In real practice, intelligence officers abroad have to enter into various contacts, the main ones are indicated in Fig. 2.26. In all these situations, intelligence officers must be careful not to jeopardize the fulfillment of the tasks assigned to them by the GRU.

Undoubtedly, the most difficult work goes to illegal officers, who must live in a foreign country and carry out the intelligence tasks assigned to them.

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MARCH OF HOMELESS OFFICERS November 11, 2003 0 46(521) Date: 11-11-2003 Author: Alexander Brezhnev MARCH OF HOMELESS OFFICERS Several dozen homeless officers of the Russian Armed Forces marched on foot with unfurled banners a distance of four hundred kilometers, trying to attract attention

In Fig. Figure 2.20 shows the technology (algorithm) for selecting, evaluating and “recruiting” officers from military units for training at the academy.

I would like to dwell on certain details of the selection and assessment of future students for the GRU Academy. A GRU representative is tasked with selecting no more than 10 officers, but he has to check about 100 people to find the top ten. A number of future students are recruited from among graduates of military academies. This selection justifies the efforts of GRU representatives, and indeed 90% of them are enrolled in the Military Diplomatic Academy.

One of the stages of verification is that a representative of the GRU Academy comes to the candidate’s apartment and, as a rule, has a normal conversation with him. At the same time, he attaches great importance to the assessment of the candidate’s wife. Sometimes it happens that a wife is not suitable for some reason, such as intelligence or excessive emotionality. And this means that no matter how good the officer himself is, he cannot be an intelligence officer. It must be emphasized that GRU representatives are so experienced that at first glance at the home situation they understand whether they came in vain or whether it makes sense to continue the conversation.

The main criteria that guide the representatives of the selection group are shown in Fig. 2.21.

Upon arrival in Moscow, candidates selected by GRU representatives are tested using a variety of test tests before passing the exams. Some of these tests, and there are quite a large number of them, are shown in Fig. 2.22. Among them there are tests for memory, ability to learn foreign languages, attention, and “noise immunity”. Typically, candidates go through hundreds of tests, from 9am to 5pm, for a whole week.

During testing, the teacher can, for example, say a phrase in an unfamiliar language and ask you to repeat it. Or, for example, he shows dozens of photographic portraits in a row at a fairly fast pace and introduces them by last name: Ivanov, Petrov, Sidorov, Vasiliev... Then the photographs are mixed and quickly shown again, and the officer must put numbers next to the names written in advance, which is now the number Petrov, Sidorov... Or they say a number of words from a line and ask you to repeat them without changing the order of the words.

Practice shows that, as a rule, there is no 100% number of officers who pass the test. That is, some of the selected candidates do not pass the tests. Of course, there are cases where some officers pass all tests with positive results.

That’s why they take into the academy officers who have partially failed the tests. It should be noted that officers who pass all tests with great success are, as a rule, not accepted into the academy. There is a principle in intelligence: a scout should not stand out from others with his excessive abilities.

As I already wrote, after passing the tests, future students are required to pass competitive exams. Most often, exams demonstrate the ability to learn foreign languages.

At the last stage, future students are interviewed, which takes place in a formal atmosphere, usually in a large hall. Academy specialists, including psychologists, are invited to an interview, and various questions of interest are asked. Among them, for example, why did you decide to go into reconnaissance? Or what kind of alcoholic beverages do you drink and how much? Do you love women and how do you feel about them?

There is also one firmly established feature. During the selection process, applicants see only their group with which they will have to study. And all those who take the tests are taken along different corridors to separate rooms.

The academy does not accept people who come on their own, but sometimes there are still “thieves”. These are, as a rule, officers who have high-ranking chiefs of the GRU, the General Staff, the Ministry of Defense, etc. How could one not be happy in this case, especially when the opportunity arises to work in diplomatic missions abroad.

After completing the above procedures, officers become first-year students at one of the faculties of the GRU Military Diplomatic Academy. Students are included in the educational process, with the most serious attention paid to the study of foreign languages. Previously, I already wrote about how and in what way linguists teach foreign languages. I gave my personal example of studying Arabic with Captain N. Maiburov and Hebrew with A. Rubinstein.

Unfortunately, some students are practically unable to speak languages ​​such as Arabic, Persian, Chinese, Vietnamese, and then after the first semester they have to be expelled and sent to the troops at the place of their previous or other service. They also study other subjects, including regional studies, special equipment, driving, etc.

The faculty at the academy makes significant efforts to train intelligence officers to the highest quality.

In Fig. 2.23 indicates those basic academic disciplines that must be mastered by future military intelligence officers going on long business trips to foreign countries.

Particular attention is paid to the methods and methods of training each. So, in order to remember 50 words, you need to compose a story with these words, in which the listener himself actively acts. They learn the art of communicating with possible agents and the art of leaving when a “tail” is following you, that is, a representative of the counterintelligence of the host country. Considerable attention is paid to the study of the processes of agent work. This is a closed topic, and it is not customary to disclose the technology for training students in intelligence work. This is a kind of know-how of military intelligence of any country in the world. Still, certain points need to be stated. So, for example, even in the first year, the whole of Moscow is divided into sectors and each student is assigned his own sector. In the allocated sector, the student must prepare routes with appearances and inspection places. Routes, as a rule, are worked out to the point of automaticity with the goal of timely “detecting surveillance”, which tracks down the “agent” - the academy student. The agent is led by several people who have radio contact with each other. It is important to remember that if the “agent” slows down slightly and some citizens fly out from around the corner a couple of times, then it is better to leave this route. Or, let’s say, a “listening agent” jumped out of a subway car at the last moment before the doors closed and suddenly discovered that somewhere else another car door had slammed belatedly; again, it’s not worth the risk. But if “you left,” then in any country “outdoor surveillance” will definitely set you up, for example, provoke a fight, or something else. And you will automatically be included in the “Who is Who” directory and become persona non grata, that is, you will be allowed to leave the country within 24–72 hours.

I remember an incident that happened to one of my intelligence friends. This was in the 60-70s in Austria. Our Soviet intelligence officer worked there under diplomatic cover. One day he drank a little and, in order not to get into any unusual situation, decided to catch a taxi and go to his place of residence. And apparently he was already being followed. He stopped a taxi and got into the car. The driver drove off at high speed, and only then did our scout notice that a young beautiful woman was sitting next to him in the back seat. The scout did not know what to decide: either drive in silence, or stop the car and get out. Before he had time to comprehend what was happening, this young woman tried to sit on his lap and unbutton his blouse, and under the blouse the bra had been removed in advance. Suddenly the driver adjusts the front mirror and sees this couple in all their glory. Then he immediately drives them to the nearest police station. As soon as the car stops, the police open the door and photograph the whole picture.