The fleet of the leading countries of the world before the start of the First World War. Naval forces of the warring powers Russian fleet in the First World War

On August 1, 1914, the First World War began, unleashed by imperialist Germany, which declared war first on Russia, and then on France and Belgium. Simultaneously with the army's actions on the land fronts, the German fleet began operations on the seas. Significant German naval forces were sent against the Russian Baltic Fleet, and the Germans and Turks were sent against the Black Sea Fleet.

The results of the Russo-Japanese War left their mark on the Russian fleet. Through the efforts of the advanced part of Russian naval officers and, above all, followers of Admiral Makarov’s school, the fleet, starting in 1907, began to relatively quickly restore and strengthen its combat power. More advanced warships were built, the system of training and education of personnel was updated and improved. The system for organizing fleet management has become more perfect. The navy began to pay more attention to the study of dangerous opponents and the development of war plans; equipment for future theaters of military operations was deployed. As a result of all this, the Russian fleet turned out to be relatively well prepared for the First World War.

However, due to the technical and economic backwardness of the country and the lack of finance, the construction of battleships of the dreadnought type began in the Baltic in 1909, and in the Black Sea in 1941, and these ships entered service only in the second year of the war. The construction of coastal fortifications was also not completed by the beginning of the war. By the beginning of the war in the Baltic Sea, Germany had a significant superiority in forces.

Russian sailors had to fight a treacherous and powerful enemy. But excellent knowledge, skillful use of military equipment and loyalty to military duty ensured their success in the fight against the German fleet.

On the day war was declared, the commander of the Baltic Fleet, a student and follower of Makarov’s school, Admiral Essin, made an appeal to the personnel:

“Let each of you exert all your strength, spiritual and physical. will apply his knowledge, experience and skill on the day of battle so that these shells would bring death and destruction to the enemy pages:! and ships."

Starting the war, the German fleet set as its goal to break into the Gulf of Finland, destroy Russian naval forces in the Baltic and strike Petrograd from the sea. In the first month of the war, the German cruisers Magdeburg and Augsburg, accompanied by destroyers and submarines, tried to penetrate the Gulf of Finland. During the operation, the Magdeburg ran aground off the island of Odensholm. A detachment of Russian cruisers and destroyers was sent against the enemy ships, which, having caused enormous destruction to the Magdeburg, captured it. The ciphers and codes found on the cruiser made it possible for the Allies to unravel the intentions of the German command until the end of the war.

The Baltics achieved especially great successes in carrying out active minefields off enemy shores. Of all the warring states, Russia turned out to be the most prepared for a military war. The Russian mine terrified the German pirates. This is evidenced by the confession of one German submariner.

“At the beginning of the war,” he wrote, “only one mine posed a danger - the Russian mine. None of the commanders who were “entrusted with England” - and, in fact, we were all like that. - did not willingly go to the Gulf of Finland. “Many enemies - many honor” is an excellent saying. But close to the Russians with their mines, the honor was too great. Germany, it must be said frankly, had nothing to do there. Each of us, unless forced to do so, tried to avoid “Russian affairs.”

Mine barriers were placed on a large scale during the first months of the war.

On October 31, 1914, a special-purpose semi-division consisting of the destroyers General Kondratenko and Okhotnik. "Border Guard" and "Novik", under the cover of four destroyers, laid a minefield in front of Memel. The operation, carried out at night, was not noticed by the enemy. On November 5, a minefield was laid on the approaches to Memel and in front of Pillau. On November 17, the German armored cruiser Friedrich-Karl exploded and was lost at this minefield. On the same day, the pilot steamer Elbing died here when it was blown up by a mine.

On November 19, in difficult weather conditions, the minelayer Amur placed a minefield on the routes of the German fleet in the area between the island of Bornholm and the Stolpe Bank. The German steamships Königsberg and Bavaria were lost at this barrier in March 1915. In mid-November, a large barrier was erected by the cruisers Rurik and Admiral Makarov in front of Dantzng Bay. Two German minesweepers were blown up by these mines in May 1915.

At the end of December of the same year, 3 German ships were blown up by mines and lost. Since all barrage operations were carried out secretly, few believed that the ships and steamships were sunk by submarines.

In order to save warships and commercial vessels, the German command was forced to reduce shipping. The navigation of the most valuable warships was limited to the parallel of Gotland. The German cruisers relocated to the west - from Nepfarsasser to Swnnemünde.

As a result of the active operations of the Russian Baltic Fleet, normal communication between Sweden and Germany was disrupted, which could no longer receive the required amount of ore and cellulose used for the production of explosives and paper. All this could not but affect Germany's military production.

Even more sensitive blows to German communications were inflicted by the Baltic in 1915. According to the maps found by our submariners on German ships, it was established that the courses of German ships lie in the southern part of the Gulf of Bothnia. from Kvarken to Alandsgaf, away from the coast. Next - pg tellio. it was possible to attack German ships without violating Swiss neutrality.

Russian submarines were actively operating in the Gulf of Bothnia. On October 24, 1915, the Alligator boat captured a German steamer and sailed it into the Åland archipelago, handing it over to the destroyer Poslushny.

On October 29, the submarine Cayman, acting in conjunction with cruisers, captured the German steamer Stettin, which was carrying military personnel, and brought it to Abo. In 1915 alone, submarines of the Baltic Fleet destroyed and captured 15 German transports. During this year they carried out 51 attacks on enemy ships.

Surface ships conducted active mini-barrage operations on the communication routes of the enemy fleet.

In January 1915, the State Duma cruisers Oleg and Admiral Makarov, under the cover of three other cruisers, carried out mine laying. Between the island of Bornholm and the Stolpe Bank, on January 25, the German cruiser Augsburg was blown up by a mine. On the Russian barrier near the Arkona lighthouse, the cruiser Gazelle was blown up and received serious damage.

In April, a German steamer was lost in the same area. A special-purpose half-division consisting of five destroyers laid mines on the approaches to Lnbava, which was occupied by the Germans. Minefields were also placed at Vindava.

In November, a detachment of four cruisers, under the cover of the battleships Petropavlovsk, Gangut and the destroyer Novik, laid a minefield of 56 mines on German communications south of Gotland. A German cruiser was blown up at this barrier in the area of ​​the X"borg bank< Данциг».

On December 6, a detachment of cruisers, under the cover of battleships and the destroyer Novik, laid a large minefield in the southeast of Gotland. On January 13, 1916, the German cruiser Lübeck was lost here.

On December 16, three destroyers - Novik, Pobeditel and Zabiyaka - laid 150 mines on the likely routes of German ships northwest of Vindava. This area was under constant surveillance by enemy cruisers. In order to inflict damage not only on large, but also on small enemy ships and transports, the mines were placed with a slight indentation. On December 17, the cruiser Bremen, escorted by two destroyers, was blown up on this minefield. The first to hit the mine was the squadron minsss "V- 191". An explosion occurred and the ship sank. Saving the crew of the dead destroyer. "Bremen"'s bow hit two mines. Two strong explosions followed, and the cruiser disappeared under water.

Convinced that the Bremen and V-19I were victims of submarines, the German ships and transports continued:! use old fairways. On December 23, he hit a mine patrol ship"Freya." When German patrolmen and two destroyers arrived at the scene of the death, they discovered mines. Maneuvering between them, they tried to get out of the minefield area. After traveling about five miles, the German destroyer S-177 was blown up and sank. After this, by order of the commander of the German Baltic Fleet, the entire area of ​​Vindava “was prohibited for navigation; the same order canceled the permanent patrol between the island of Gotland and Vindava.

In 1914-1915, the total loss of Germans from ships and transports amounted to 105 thousand tons. Russian postern - 29 thousand tons.

Thus, a serious threat was created for German merchant shipping in the Baltic. Trading companies refused to send their ships to Sweden.

The lack of raw materials negatively affected the work of the German military industry. Needs German army in weapons and ammunition, as well as the demands of industrial magnates, who made huge profits on military orders, forced the Germans to increase the supply of iron ore, cellulose and timber. The German high military command was forced to transfer two light cruisers and a flotilla of destroyers from the North Sea to the Baltic, which led to a weakening of the naval forces. acting against the British.

During the 1916 campaign, Russian destroyers, with the support of cruisers, attacked German communications frozen along the coast of Sweden.

On May 31, 1916, three Russian destroyers - Novik. “Pobeditel” and “Thunder” attacked a German convoy located in Norrkopingskon Bay. As a result of the attack, the German auxiliary cruiser “Herman” and two armed escort ships were sunk. These actions of the Russian ships caused great damage to German trade.

The Baltic soldiers engaged the enemy under any conditions. The crew of the destroyer Novik, in a fierce battle with two German destroyers, showed determination, fearlessness and contempt for the enemy - qualities that were demonstrated by almost all sailors of the Baltic Fleet.

On August 17, 1915, Novik noticed the silhouettes of two ships. These were the German destroyers “V-99” and “V-YuO”, trying to break into the Nrbensky Bay.

Despite the fact that the Germans had a clear advantage in strength, the commander of the Novik, Captain 2nd Rank Berents, decided to approach the German destroyers. The distance was quickly decreasing. When there were 43 cables left before the enemy, the Novik opened fire. With the third salvo, coverage was achieved, and with the fourth it went into defeat. A few minutes later, a fire broke out on the lead German destroyer. The order of the fleet commander gave high praise to the Russian destroyer. “After six minutes of battle, due to the excellent shooting and skillful maneuvering of the Novik’s head, the destroyer, hit by shells, began to retreat.” Encouraged by the first successes, the gunners of the Russian destroyer intensified their fire. On the destroyer V-99, the middle pipe was knocked down and a fire broke out on the poop deck. The Novik transferred fire to the V-100, which caused serious damage.

Trying to break away from the pursuing Russian ship, the V-99 fell into a net barrier; backing up, he ran into Russian mines. Two deafening explosions were heard. A few minutes later the enemy ship disappeared under water.

This success was possible thanks to the high combat training of the crew, the courage and organization of all its members. The Novik commander Berents wrote in a report addressed to the mine division commander: “I consider it my duty to note the amazing calm and endurance of all personnel. So, for example, shooting began strictly on command and after the “shot” signal not a single extra shot was fired; the transition from volleys to rapid fire and back was just as good. Minor damage, so typical of guns, was corrected quickly, but without fuss.”

The German fleet suffered a major defeat in the Baltic in a raid operation that the German command decided to undertake in November 1916.

On November 10, the German flotilla, consisting of 11 newest high-speed destroyers “G-56”, “S-57”, “S-58”, “S-59”, “0-89”, cG-90”, “V-72” ", "V-75", "V-76", "V-77", "V-78" with a displacement of 1000 tons each and a speed of 34 knots, went to sea under the command of Vnting.

The flotilla was tasked with finding and attacking light forces

Baltic Fleet, defending the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, and then shelling the Baltic port, which at that time was located a large number of wagons with artillery weapons prepared for dispatch to the 12th Army. The Germans wanted to show that Germany had large forces in the Baltic that could paralyze the actions of Russian battleships that had just entered service, as well as create a flank danger for the army.

The light cruiser Strasbourg accompanied the flotilla to the advanced Russian minefields. The destroyers left to complete their task, and the cruiser remained here until their return. They decided to carry out the operation at night under cover of darkness. The destroyers sailed in a wake column formation at a distance of about 1.5 cables from each other, forming a long straight line. From the lead ship, only the first three destroyers were visible, following in the wake of the flagship.

The sea was calm. Low clouds that covered the moon, poor visibility - all this favored the secrecy of the flotilla's actions. By 21 o'clock it was supposed to arrive at the island of Odensholm, from where it was planned to search for Russian soldiers.

At 20 hours 38 minutes, the commander of the flotilla, who was on the * destroyer "S-56", was informed that the three end ships had fallen behind. Ignoring this, Vnting continued to set the flotilla on the same course. Suddenly, alarming news was received on the radio: one of the lagging U-75 destroyers hit a mine and was blown up. Water quickly filled the boiler room, and the ship lost speed. The nearby destroyer S-57 took on board personnel from the V-75. After some time, the second mine exploded, and the V-75 sank. Due to the huge shock on the S-57, the steam pipeline was damaged and the destroyer lost speed; "G-89" took on board the crew of the sinking ship and, taking the opposite course, went to connect with the cruiser "Strasbourg".

The Germans continued their unsuccessful search for Russian ships at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland for more than two hours. Having lost two of his destroyers and not finding Russian ships, Vitnng decided to go to the Baltic port to bombard it. On November 11, at about 1 hour 20 minutes, 8 German destroyers approached Rogervik Bay. Three destroyers assigned to bombard the city and port entered the bay; the remaining ships were at the entrance to the harbor. Having illuminated the port and the city with searchlights, the Germans began shelling, which lasted about 20 minutes. The shelling destroyed several buildings and killed a few civilians. Having finished shelling, the German destroyers set off on a reverse course.

It was decided to bypass the area where the first two destroyers were destroyed to the north.

At 3:15 a.m., the third German destroyer V-72, the second to last in the ranks, was blown up. "V-77" took on board the crew from "V-72" and sank the destroyed destroyer with artillery fire.

The commander of the flotilla, having heard artillery fire, decided that the Russian ships had launched an attack on his end destroyers. Having made a successive 180° turn with his lead ship, Vitng rushed to the shooting site. At 3 hours 20 minutes, immediately after the turn, a deafening explosion was heard under the G-90, which was following the flagship. The ship began to sink. "S-59" removed the crew from "G-90" and "V-78" fired a torpedo into the sinking destroyer. "G-90" disappeared under water in an instant. The order was broken. Two destroyers - "S-58" and "S-59" - separated from the core of the flotilla. What was happening around, Vitnng could not understand 21 only when he received the “MM” signal from “V-72” (“I have a “mine hole”), he realized that the destroyers were in a minefield and ordered the remaining ships to pack up and leave the dangerous place. At 3 hours 58 minutes, the destroyer "S-58", in a hurry to connect with the flagship, was blown up by a mine. Mines were found floating on the surface near the explosion. In view of this, “S-59” could only send boats to save the personnel of the sinking ship. Having accepted the command, the destroyer began to maneuver between the mines, wanting to get out of the danger zone. Soon he was blown up by a mine too. The flagship destroyer S-56, having received its crew, sank it with a torpedo. 45 minutes later I fought on a V76 mine. After the smoke cleared, there was no ship or people on the surface of the water. Several minutes passed. Another explosion severely damaged the boilers of the flagship.

Thus, as a result of this adventurous operation, the Germans lost seven ships.

For 11 months after this they did not dare to take active action. It was only in the fall of 1917, when the Russian working class was preparing for an armed uprising to overthrow the Provisional Government, that the German imperialists launched a major operation to seize the Baltic Islands. The Germans hoped to break into the Gulf of Finland and strike revolutionary Petrograd from the sea.

But the Baltic sailors, led by the Bolsheviks, struck

powerful blows to the German fleet and thwarted the enemy’s insidious plans.

The Black Sea Fleet fought no less stubbornly against the Germans and Turks.

In October 1914, the German-Turkish fleet suddenly attacked Russian cities and ports on the Black Sea. Sevastopol was shelled. Odessa, Kerch and Novorossiysk. However, the Black Sea troops repulsed all enemy attacks.

Response actions of the Black Sea Fleet soon followed.<0 ноября 1914 года русские корабли обстреляли турецкий порт

Zunguldak. from where the enemy transferred coal to Constantinople. At the same time, Russian destroyers laid minefields near the Bosphorus. Returning to their bases, they sank three Turkish transports with troops.

On November 17, Russian ships shelled Trebizond and then laid a minefield off the Anatolian coast. The next day, near Cape Sarych, a battle between Russian ships and the German cruisers Goeben and Breslau took place, as a result of which Goeben received serious damage.

In 1915, the Black Sea Fleet conducted active cruising operations. In May, during one of them, the Goeben was again hit by artillery from Russian ships. In addition, surface ships and submarines laid mines off the Turkish coast, which blew up enemy military ships and transports. In April 1915, the Turkish cruiser Medzhidiye was blown up in a minefield in the Odessa-Ochakov area, and in June the cruiser Breslau was blown up.

Russian submariners acted skillfully and courageously in the Black Sea. On October 12, 1916, the submarine Tyulen entered into battle with the armed steamer Rodosto, captured it and brought it to Sevastopol.

During the 1916 campaign, the Black Sea Fleet supported the Caucasian Army, which was advancing on Trebizond.

As a result of active offensive actions, the Black Sea Fleet in 1914-1917 “sank 102 enemy steamships, 110 motor ships and about 5,000 sailing ships. Russian sailors successfully repelled German attacks in the north, where the enemy sought to disrupt Russia’s ties with its allies.

These are the brief results of the combat activities of Russian sailors during the First World War, who with their activity, knowledge of the matter and masterful use of weapons inflicted crushing blows on the strongest enemy. In this war, the sailors* fought tirelessly against the Germans, who were trying to subjugate Russia to their policies and seize Russian lands, but at the same time, the majority of the sailors did not want the autocracy to win. The most overdosed part of the sailors, under the leadership of the Bolsheviks, prepared for the resolution, because only the overthrow of the autocracy could ensure the preservation of the national independence of the state and its free development and strengthening. In their struggle to transform the imperialist war into a civil war, the revolutionary sailors relied on rich revolutionary traditions and especially rich experience in the fight against tsarism under the leadership of the Bolshev goats.

The Black Sea Fleet was not affected by the Russo-Japanese War. It had 8 squadron battleships, 2 cruisers and 4 mine cruisers.

The reconstruction of naval forces remained one of the priority problems for Russia. Prominent domestic shipbuilders A.N. were involved in its solution. Krylov, N.N. Kuteynikov, I.G. Bubnov and others. A voluntary fundraiser has been announced among the population for the needs of the fleet. A “Committee to strengthen the fleet using voluntary donations” was established. Over five years, the Committee collected a substantial amount - 17 million rubles. With these funds, it was decided to build 20 destroyers of the General Kondratenko and Ukraina type. They laid the foundation for a new fleet. In 1913, a significant event occurred in the development of the class of domestic destroyers. On September 4, in St. Petersburg, the Putilov plant handed over to the fleet the lead destroyer Novik, which brought well-deserved glory to Russian military shipbuilding. For several years, Novik was the fastest ship in the world (37.5 knots).

The Novika project was created in accordance with the technical specifications developed by the Marine Technical Committee under the leadership of A.N. Krylova, I.G. Bubnova, and G.F. Schlesinger.

The lead one was followed by the construction of serial ships with some elements of improvement. They were built by three factories in St. Petersburg, as well as factories in Revel, Riga and Nikolaev. By the beginning of the First World War, there were 75 destroyers in all Russian fleets different types and 11 were being completed. In addition, the fleets had 45 destroyers of earlier construction. Total for 1913-1917 17 Novik-class destroyers entered the Baltic Fleet, and 14 Novik-class destroyers entered the Black Sea Fleet.

The experience of the war with Japan showed the important role of cruisers in squadron battles. The need for every possible increase in their speed and maneuverability, as well as strengthening of artillery weapons, became apparent. A subclass of battlecruisers has appeared in foreign fleets. In Russia, their construction began only in 1913-1915, when the cruisers “Izmail”, “Kinburn”, “Borodino” and “Navarin” were laid down, but the outbreak of the World War did not allow them to be completed.

And immediately after the end of the Russo-Japanese War, cruisers were built at domestic and foreign shipyards for the Russian fleet, the prototype of which was the Bayan, which had proven itself well in the role of a squadron cruiser and showed high survivability of combat and technical means. Thus, the cruiser “Admiral Makarov” was built in France, the new “Bayan” and “Pallada” - in St. Petersburg, the cruiser “Rurik”, built in England, differed from the cruiser “Bayan” in the main caliber (instead of two 203-mm guns, four 254 mm guns).

In 1913, 6 light cruisers of the Svetlana type were laid down with a displacement of 6800-7800 tons, armed with fifteen 130 mm guns. Of these were completed (in Soviet period) only three cruisers (“Svetlana”, “Admiral Nakhimov” and “Admiral Lazarev”).

By the beginning of the war, the Russian fleet included 14 cruisers of various types.

From the defeat of the Russian fleet in the Battle of Tsushima, and, above all, from the circumstances and causes of death squadron battleships, England was the first to conclude. Already at the end of 1905, English shipbuilders began building the original armored ship “Dreadnought” with a displacement of about 13,000 tons, with steam turbines, classified as a battleship. The main caliber artillery on the Dreadnought consisted of ten 305 mm guns located in two-gun turrets. Four turrets, controlled from one central post, could simultaneously participate in a battleship's broadside. The side of the ship was fully armored.

Russian shipbuilders built dreadnought battleships according to the design of I.G. Bubnov and with the participation of A.N. Krylov, which surpassed the English prototype in many respects. In 1909, the battleships “Sevastopol”, “Gangut”, “Poltava” and “Petropavlovsk” were laid down at the St. Petersburg shipyards.

The linear arrangement of twelve 305-mm guns, placed in three-gun turrets, made it possible to fire from any side simultaneously with all barrels. If the weight of a salvo of one of the first English dreadnoughts “Vengard” was 3003 kg, then on “Sevastopol” it reached 5650 kg. In one minute, the domestic battleship produced up to 11.5 tons of metal and explosives. The main armor belt had a thickness of 225 mm. For the Black Sea in Nikolaev in 1915-1917. the dreadnought battleships “Empress Maria”, “Emperor” were also built Alexander III” and “Catherine II”. The fourth battleship, Emperor Nicholas 1, laid down in 1915, was not completed.

In connection with the construction of battleships, the Russian Maritime Ministry noted that the results of testing these ships showed the full readiness of our factories, which were the first to build ships of such a significant displacement, as well as very powerful turbine-type mechanisms.

Pre-dreadnought battleships “Andrei Pervozvanny” and “Imperator Pavel 1”, laid down during the Russian-Japanese War, became part of the Baltic Fleet in 1912. During their construction, a number of significant changes were made to the original project, taking into account the experience of the past Russian- Japanese war.

The use of mine weapons in the Russo-Japanese War and its further development required the fleet to take effective measures to ensure mine defense. First of all, the fleet needed ships equipped with sweeping devices. Such ships were included in the small shipbuilding program. The world's first specially built minesweepers "Minrep" and "Vzryv" were laid down at the Izhora plant in 1909. In accordance with the tactical and technical requirements, the minesweepers had a displacement of 150 tons. The main armament of the ship were Schultz trawls (snake and boat). There was also one 57 mm gun. The ships entered service in 1911. Before the First World War and during the war, minesweepers of slightly larger displacement such as “Cluse” (190 tons) and “Capsul” (248 tons) were built.

In 1909-1910 two ships specially designed for laying mines entered service. These are minelayers “Amur” and “Yenisei” with a displacement of 2926 tons. They could take 324 mines on board. Artillery included five 120 mm guns and two 75 mm anti-aircraft guns.

For the Caspian and river flotillas, gunboats with a displacement of 600-400 tons with artillery of 120-152 mm caliber were built.

Submarine shipbuilding also gained momentum. First combat boat“Dolphin”, designed under the direction of I.G. Bubnova, entered service in 1904. I.G. Bubnov also designed the submarine “Akula”, which was built at the Baltic Shipyard (1910). The submarine was armed with eight torpedo tubes.

After the Akula, the Russian fleet included submarines of the Kalmar type (according to the American design), Lamprey (displacement 123/150 tons) and Walrus (displacement 630/790 tons).

However, the main core of the Russian submarine fleet was made up of Bars-class submarines - also designed by I.G. Bubnova. Their construction began in 1913-1914. in St. Petersburg and Revel. The surface displacement of the Bars was 650 tons, the underwater displacement was 782 tons. Two diesel engines with a total power of 3000 hp. allowed the submarine to develop a surface speed of 18 knots, its cruising range was within 2250 miles. In a submerged position, the full speed reached 9.6 knots. It was ensured by the operation of two electric motors with a power of 900 hp. At this speed, the submarine could travel 25 miles underwater. The working depth of immersion was limited to 50 m, the maximum -100 m. The armament consisted of four torpedo tubes (two each in the bow and stern) and two guns of 57 mm and 37 mm calibers.

A special place in the domestic submarine shipbuilding industry is occupied by the world’s first underwater minelayer “Crab” designed by M.P. Naletova. Developments on its creation, begun by the designer back in Port Arthur, were interrupted by the Russian-Japanese War. However, after the war, work was continued at the Nikolaev shipyards, and in August 1912 the ship was launched, and in June 1915 it was accepted into the Black Sea Fleet. Up to 60 minutes were taken on board the “Crab”. The armament includes two bow torpedo tubes and a 76-mm gun.

In July 1915, “Crab” made its first military campaign. Near the Bosphorus they laid a minefield, on which the enemy cruiser Breslau was blown up.

The underwater minelayers “Ruff” and “Forel” were built for the Baltic Fleet according to the “Crab” type, and three minelayers of smaller displacement were also laid down. By the beginning of the First World War, the Russian fleet had 15 combat submarines.

The main naval theaters of combat for Russia during the First World War were the Baltic and Black Seas. From the beginning of the war, the Baltic Fleet equipped the central mine and artillery position Nargen - Porkkala-Udd in order to prevent the enemy from breaking through into the Gulf of Finland. The entrance to the Gulf of Riga was covered by another mine and artillery position. With the help of minelaying in the southern part Baltic Sea The enemy's sea communications were disrupted and the German fleet was damaged. It was especially important to limit the functioning of the sea route along which strategic raw materials were transported from Sweden to Germany.

The mine threat created by the Russians in the Baltic turned out to be so effective that the Germans, having lost a large number of warships and transport vessels, abandoned naval warfare for a long time at the end of 1914. During the First World War, the Baltic Fleet deployed about 40 thousand mines. An important task of the fleet was also to assist groupings of ground forces on the coastal flanks, which it successfully accomplished.

In 1915, the Black Sea Fleet was inferior in combat power to the Turkish fleet, reinforced by the German battle cruiser Goeben and the cruiser Breslau. However, later, replenished with new battleships, it was able to block the German-Turkish fleet in the Bosphorus and sharply reduce the enemy’s maritime transport. Operating on the coastal flanks. The Black Sea Fleet provided significant assistance to the army with artillery fire, supported it with landings, and provided transportation of troops and equipment. During the war years, his ships deployed more than 13 thousand mines.

During the First World War, the Russian fleet did not participate in major naval battles like Jutland. At the same time, there were numerous military clashes with the enemy of individual formations and ships of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets (battles at Cape Sarych and Gotland Island, the Moonsund operation, etc.).

Created in September 1916, the Arctic Ocean flotilla provided maritime transport with the allies and fought against enemy submarines and mine danger. After the October events of 1917, Russia withdrew from the war.

On March 3, 1918, a peace treaty was concluded between Soviet Russia on the one hand and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria on the other. According to the agreement, all Russian ships were subject to transfer to domestic ports or disarmament on the spot. The ships and vessels of the Baltic Fleet located in Finland were supposed to remain there until navigation began. Thus, there was a threat of loss of naval forces in this naval theater, the main core of which was concentrated in Helsingfors.

The leadership of Soviet Russia decided, despite the difficult ice situation in the Gulf of Finland, to transfer all ships to Kronstadt.

During March-April 1918, the legendary Ice Campaign of the ships of the Baltic Fleet took place. 226 ships and vessels were saved for Russia, including 6 battleships, 5 cruisers, 59 destroyers and destroyers, 12 submarines. In addition, two air fleet brigades and various military equipment were removed by ships.

In May 1918, the German command, threatening to disrupt the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, demanded that Russia surrender its ships of the Black Sea Fleet. To prevent this, by order of V.I. Lenin in June 1918, in the areas of Novorossiysk and Tuapse, the battleship “Free Russia” (formerly “Ekaterina II”), 11 destroyers and destroyers, and 6 transports, which came here from Sevastopol, were sunk.

With the outbreak of the civil war and foreign intervention, the revolutionary-minded part of the sailors, junior commanders, officers and admirals of the fleet went over to the side of the new government, the other part, primarily admirals and officers, went over to the side of the White Army. Former commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral A.V. Kolchak in November 1918 self-proclaimed himself the Supreme Ruler of Russia, leading the counter-revolutionary struggle in Siberia. Most of the ports and bases of the domestic fleet ended up in the hands of interventionists from the Entente countries and Japan. The Russian naval forces practically ceased to exist. To assist ground forces command of the warring parties civil war parties created river and lake flotillas that were active fighting. The flotillas, as a rule, included gunboats converted from steamships, armed with two to four 75-130 mm guns, as well as armed tugs, floating batteries, messenger ships and boats. In some cases, flotillas were replenished with ships transferred from fleets along inland waterways. The flotillas attacked the flanks and rear of the enemy, ships and vessels, defended or destroyed crossings, landed troops, and provided transportation.

After the defeat of the White Army, Lieutenant General P.M. Wrangel in the Crimea in 1920, the bulk of the ships and vessels of the Black Sea Fleet (33 pennants) under the command of Vice Admiral M.A. Kedrov went to the French naval base of Bizerte (Tunisia).

St. Andrew's flags on these ships were lowered on October 24, 1924 after the recognition of the USSR by the French government. Russian sailors switched to the status of refugees.

By the beginning of hostilities, the Entente naval forces were significantly superior to the Navy of the Union of Central States

In terms of the spatial scope, the number of participants and the intensity of the armed struggle in the continental, oceanic and maritime theaters of military operations, the First World War had no analogues in previous history.

The most intense military operations took place in the North Sea, the North Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean, Baltic, Black, Barents and White Seas. In addition, sporadic military actions, especially in initial period wars, and then when single German cruisers entered the ocean, deployed in the central and southern parts of the Atlantic Ocean, as well as in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and (during the period of unrestricted submarine warfare) off the Atlantic coast of North America.

In the North Atlantic Ocean, between North America and Western Europe, passed the most important routes of sea communications, which had great importance for the war economy of the Atlantic countries, especially for England, whose economy was completely dependent on maritime trade. The main hub of these messages was the southwestern approaches to England.

On the coast of the Atlantic Ocean, England and its allies had an extensive basing system, while the few German cruisers stationed before the war in the Atlantic and intended to operate on sea communications in the event of war did not have such bases. In addition, counting on the short duration of the war, the outcome of which was to be decided in land battles and in the North Sea, Germany did not attach much importance to cruising operations on remote ocean communication routes. The English cruiser squadrons allocated to protect ocean communications were to operate, each in its own zone, based in Halifax, Kingston and Gibraltar, etc. In the first three to four months of the war, single German cruisers operated on maritime communications in the Atlantic, which did not achieve significant success, but diverted large cruising forces of the British from the main naval theater - the North Sea.

After the defeat of the German squadron in the battle of the Falkland Islands, operations on ocean communications in the Atlantic almost ceased.

In 1915-1916, single German auxiliary cruisers appeared here only periodically, breaking the English blockade in the North Sea. In the fall of 1916, the first German submarines appeared off the coast of the United States. With the entry of the United States into the war (April 1917), during the period of unrestricted submarine warfare, they expanded their area of ​​​​operation to the central and western part of the North Atlantic, right up to the coast of the United States, making raids in this area in 1917 - 1918. up to 15 trips. However, the main area of ​​operation for German submarines throughout the submarine war remained the western approaches to England, which included the northeast Atlantic, the Bay of Biscay, the English Channel and the Irish Sea. Here, during the period of the most intense unrestricted submarine warfare, up to 1/4 of all combat resources of the German Navy's submarine forces based in the North Sea were concentrated, and up to six million tons of merchant tonnage were sunk (during the entire war). However, the enormous forces and means of the Allies, with the presence of numerous and well-equipped bases, made it possible to successfully deploy a powerful anti-submarine defense. Transportation along the Entente's most important sea routes in the Atlantic Ocean continued, albeit with great strain and with significant losses of tonnage, throughout the war.

On Pacific Ocean, especially with the entry of Japan into the war, the allied fleets had a developed basing system that ensured the operation of any formations of ships to protect sea communications. Germany had here its only colonial naval base, Qingdao, where in peacetime the East Asian Cruiser Squadron was based, which made up half of all the cruising forces Germany had before the war outside the waters of the mother country. Due to the overwhelming superiority of the allied fleets in the Pacific, the German command did not intend to use Qingdao as a base in wartime. The German cruiser squadron, after some minor actions in the western part of the Pacific Ocean, went to the shores of South America. Here, at Coronel, the only naval battle of the war in the Pacific took place between German and British cruiser squadrons. After this, only in 1917, two German auxiliary cruisers operated on sea communications in the Pacific Ocean for quite a long time. At this time there were mine laying off the coast of New Zealand and Australia. These actions, due to the relatively small military significance of the Pacific communications, were primarily of a demonstrative nature and were intended to divert part of the forces of the allied fleets from the main theater of military operations - the Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea.

The Indian Ocean, to the shores of which the vast colonial possessions of England overlooked, was considered, in relation to the basing system, an “English lake”.

The well-equipped ports of Cape Town, Aden, Bombay, Colombo, and Singapore provided the basing of all the forces necessary to protect maritime communications against the occasional single German cruisers operating here. In the initial period of the war, there were two German light cruisers in the Indian Ocean, against which the Entente, given the length and scattered nature of ocean communications, had to allocate quite significant forces. After the destruction of these cruisers, transportation across the Indian Ocean, which was of serious importance for the economy of England, was carried out unhindered. In 1917, during a period of particularly intense German submarine activity in the Mediterranean, the important sea route leading from the Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea was temporarily (and not for all ships) moved and passed around the southern tip of Africa. At the same time, a German auxiliary cruiser operated on sea communications in the Indian Ocean, which laid mines off the southern coast of Africa and off Ceylon.

The most important sea routes passed through the English Channel, as well as along the east coast of England and to the shores of Norway.

Almost all of Germany's foreign maritime trade was carried out through this sea. With the closure of trade routes along the North Sea, Germany was left with the possibility of importing only from the Scandinavian countries through the Baltic Sea and its strait zone. Sea communications from the North Sea were also of significant importance for England. This route brought in food and timber from the Scandinavian countries, Swedish iron ore, and exported coal.

The main composition of the fleets of the strongest naval powers - England and Germany - was concentrated in the bases of the North Sea.

Table 1

Composition of naval forces in the North Sea at the beginning of the war

The main naval base of the German fleet, Wilhelmshaven, had sufficient repair facilities for ships of all classes and supplies. At the same time, approaches from the sea were covered by the island fortress of Helgoland, which in turn was a base for light forces and hydroaviation.

A body of water protected by the fortifications of Heligoland, o. [Borkum] and adjacent to the mouths of the Weser and Elbe, was called the German Bight or the “wet triangle”. In preparation for war, the German command paid great attention to the defense of this area. Coastal batteries were installed here, and barriers were placed on the approaches to the base. During the war, the German fleet was expanded to include submarine bases in the Belgian ports of Bruges, Zeebrugge and Ostend.

It should be noted that the pre-war basing of the English fleet did not meet the task assigned to it of a long-range blockade of Germany and clearly lagged behind the construction of the fleet itself.

The lack of well-equipped bases in the northern part of the sea put the Grand Fleet in a difficult position at the beginning of the war, and only the presence of convenient sheltered anchorages allowed the fleet to be in this part of the sea. Before the war, the main base of the English fleet was Portsmouth, the fleet base was Plymouth (Devonport). These bases were fortified from the sea and had docks, repair facilities and supplies.

The bases were Dover and Portland. On the southeast coast of England (the mouth of the Thames) there was a naval area called Nore with the bases of Chatham and Sheerness. On the east coast of England, in the depths of the Firth of Forth, the Rosyth base was established, and construction of the Cromarty base began in the Moray Firth. However, the location of all these peacetime bases did not meet the main tasks facing the British fleet, to establish a long-range blockade of Germany and to prevent the enemy from weakening the forces of the English fleet through the actions of mine flotillas and submarines. Therefore, immediately before the start of the war, the main forces of the English fleet were transferred to the vast sheltered bay of the Orkney Islands - Scapa Flow.

At the beginning of the war on the west coast of Scotland, Lough Ew and Lough na Keel were temporarily used as bases until Scapa Flow was installed. In the Shetland Islands, the port of Lerwick (Lerwick) was used to base light forces that had been supporting Scandinavian convoys since 1917.

An important boundary separating England from the continent was the English Channel (English Channel) - a junction of the most important sea routes. All freight and military transport from England to France was carried out through the canal and the route from the Atlantic to the eastern ports of England passed through. At the same time, the English Channel with the Strait of Dover was the shortest route for German submarines to reach the western sea routes of England.

The main naval base of the French fleet, Brest, and the Cherbourg base were also located on the coast of the English Channel. Due to the fact that the main forces of the fleet operated in the Mediterranean Sea, these bases were of secondary importance

A developed network of water aerodromes was created on the east coast of England, and coastal batteries were installed to protect the immediate approaches to the ports.

Throughout the war, the North Sea remained the basing area for the main forces. navies England and Germany. Together with the northeastern part of the Atlantic Ocean, the English Channel and the approaches to it from the west, it was the most important of the naval theaters of military operations, although decisive military clashes did not occur between the fleets concentrated here.

During the First World War, the Mediterranean theater of military operations occupied an important strategic position, where sea routes to Europe from India and from Far East, as well as sea connections between France and Italy with their North African colonies.

With Italy's entry into the war, superiority in forces in the Mediterranean was on the side of the Entente. England could not allocate significant forces for operations in the Mediterranean. However, the main forces of the French fleet were concentrated here, which made it possible to block the Austrian fleet in the Adriatic Sea.

table 2

Considering the problem of basing fleets, it should be noted that the main naval base of the English fleet in the Mediterranean Sea was La Valletta on the island of Malta, which was well fortified. The fleet's base was Gibraltar, and its temporary base was Alexandria.

Assessing the system of basing the English fleet in the Mediterranean as a whole, it should be recognized that it ensured its combat activities, but during the Dardanelles operation the absence of bases in the Aegean Sea area affected it.

The main naval base of the French fleet was Toulon. At the same time, the base had all the ship repair facilities and large reserves of material and technical equipment. Bizerte served as a base for all classes of ships, Algiers was used mainly for basing destroyers, and Oran was the base point.

The existing basing system generally ensured the operations of the French fleet in the western part of the Mediterranean Sea. For operations in the Adriatic Sea, the French fleet was based at La Valletta.

The main base of the Italian fleet in the Mediterranean Sea was La Spezia. At the same time, Taranto was the main base of the Italian fleet on the Adriatic Sea. Naples was also used as a fleet base. Ports on the east coast of Italy: Brindisi, Ancona, Venice served as temporary bases.

As for the basing systems of the Italian fleet, it ensured combat operations in the middle part of the Mediterranean Sea, but was underdeveloped in the Adriatic Sea.

The system of basing the Austro-Hungarian fleet in the Mediterranean is of particular interest. its main naval base, Pola, had sheltered parking for ships of all classes, several docks and repair shops. The base point with limited repair facilities was Kotor. The close proximity to the Montenegrin border allowed until 1916 the possibility of shelling this base with artillery. From the sea, the approaches to the Bay of Kotor were protected by coastal artillery. During the war, the equipment at the Kotor base was improved. Most of the German submarines operating in the Mediterranean were based here.

By the beginning of the war, the German ships Goeben and Breslau, which were in the Mediterranean Sea, passed through the straits to Constantinople and continued to operate in the Black Sea during the war.

During the entire war there were no major operations or combat engagements of surface forces in the Mediterranean. At the same time, the activities of German submarines on the sea communications of the Entente gained the greatest development. Moreover, in three years, from the autumn of 1915, about 4 million tons of merchant tonnage were sunk here, i.e. 1/3 of all merchant tonnage sunk by German submarines in 1915-1918. Throughout the war, the Entente carried out large troop transports across the Mediterranean Sea to the Western European and Balkan theaters of military operations.

With the outbreak of the First World War, the ports of the Baltic and Black Seas found themselves cut off from the ocean, and acquired particular importance as the only route of communication between Russia and the allies (except for the route through the Pacific Ocean and Siberia), the Northern Russian naval theater of military operations.

As is known, the Barents and White Seas, due to harsh climatic conditions in winter, are largely covered with floating ice. At this time, only the Barents Sea off the western part of the Kola coast does not freeze and is available for navigation all year round.

It should be emphasized that the plans of Russian soldiers did not include military operations in the Northern Theater. The Barents and White Seas had only some commercial significance. The White Sea ports were used to export timber. There were no ports on the ice-free coast of the Barents Sea. Only Arkhangelsk was connected to the center of the country by railway. From a military point of view, the theater of operations was not equipped; there were no defensive structures. All monitoring of the coast was carried out by the messenger ship “Bakan”, which came annually from the Baltic Sea to protect the fisheries.

The current situation required the rapid development of equipment at existing ports and the creation of new ones, as well as the deployment of measures to protect maritime communications. First of all, it was necessary to build railway to the coast of the ice-free Kola Bay, and to extend navigation on the White Sea using icebreakers. The first measures to equip the theater boiled down to the construction of observation posts on the approaches to Arkhangelsk. Coastal batteries were installed on Mudyugsky Island and a patrol service was organized. In January 1915, the laying of an underwater telegraph cable from England to Aleksandrovsk was completed. At the same time, a battery and booms were installed to protect the cable exit near Aleksandrovsk. A radio station and several observation posts were also built here.

Throughout the war, the Baltic naval theater of operations was important for Russia, from where an enemy with a strong fleet could threaten the entire Russian Baltic coast, including the St. Petersburg area.

In addition, the northern flank of the Russian-German front abutted the sea.

Difficult navigational and hydrometeorological conditions and prolonged ice cover made it difficult to conduct combat operations and limited the use of naval forces. At the same time, the small size of the sea made it possible to deploy forces for operations in a relatively short time, and also facilitated the interaction of different classes of ships.

The Gulf of Finland, on the eastern coast of which the Russian capital was located, was of great strategic importance. Kronstadt was the mainstay of the bay's naval defense and the fleet's main repair base before the war, but basing on Kronstadt was difficult due to prolonged freeze-up. Particularly important for defense Gulf of Finland had a bottleneck of the bay between the island of Nargen and the Porkkala-Udd peninsula, as well as the Abo-Aland and Moonsund areas, which occupied a flank position at the entrance to the bay and provided access for the fleet to operate on the open sea. The Abo-Alandek skerry area was used for basing light forces, and the Moonsund area, which at the beginning of the war did not have any means for basing and defense, covered the entrance to the Gulf of Riga.

The main base of the Russian fleet on the Baltic Sea was Helsingfors with a roadstead and the Sveaborg fortress. However, Helsingfors was not sufficiently fortified and equipped to host a fleet. The inner roadstead was inconvenient for large ships, so the battleships were forced to stand in the unprotected outer roadstead. As for ship repair facilities, they were insignificant: the only dry dock for battleships on the Baltic Sea was located in Kronstadt. Revel also had limited repair capabilities: the planned construction and equipment of the main, well-defended base of the Baltic Fleet (Peter the Great Fortress) was just begun before the war.

The Baltic Port, Rogonyul (since 1915) and Ust-Dvinsk were used as bases for the light forces of the Russian fleet. The anchorages were the roadsteads of Porkkala-Uddsky [Lapvik], Örö, Utö, Werder [Kuivast].

The forward bases and strongholds of Libau and Vindava, according to the plan, were abandoned by the Russian fleet at the beginning of the war, and in 1915 they were occupied by the enemy.

For Germany, the importance of the Baltic Theater increased due to the fact that, in the presence of an almost circular blockade, the Baltic Sea with its strait zone remained the only route for transporting iron ore and other raw materials from Sweden, which Germany urgently needed.

The German fleet had an extensive basing system in the Baltic Sea with sufficient repair facilities. The main base was Kiel. Thanks to the presence of the Kiel Canal, this base, as a repair and logistics base, was of great importance for the North Sea. Danzig with the well-covered Putzig roadstead, Pillau base, and from mid-1915 Libau were used as bases. It should be emphasized that the balance of standing fleet forces in the Baltic Sea was in favor of the Russian fleet.

Table 3

Composition of naval forces in the Baltic Sea at the beginning of the war

However, the German command had the opportunity, if necessary, to transfer significant forces of the High Seas Fleet through the Kiel Canal and thus create a large superiority in forces. Thus, in 1915, ships were transferred from the North Sea for a breakthrough into the Gulf of Riga, and in 1917 - for the Moonsund operation.

Taking into account the possibility of quickly concentrating the main forces of the German fleet in the Baltic Sea, the Russian command proceeded from the general balance of forces of the fleets and set defensive tasks for its fleet, the most important of which was the defense of the coast and covering the approaches to the capital from the sea.

It should be noted that the equipment of the Baltic Theater at the beginning of the war was insufficient and clearly did not meet the tasks assigned to the Russian fleet.

The basis of the defense of the Gulf of Finland at the beginning of the war was the Central Mine and Artillery Position - a minefield placed in the narrowness of the gulf and covered on the flanks by batteries on the sharp Nargen and at Porkkala-Udda. Directly adjacent to it was a flank-skerry position west of Porkkala Udda, where mines were laid and batteries were installed in the first days of the war. The coastal defense of the Central Position did not provide strong cover for the flanks. The defense of the position was entrusted to the fleet, the main forces of which were deployed in the rear of the position in anticipation of a battle with the German fleet during its breakthrough into the Gulf of Finland.

The deployment of inactive operations in the middle and southern parts of the sea in 1914 required strengthening of the theater equipment in order to ensure the defense of the Gulf of Finland. Batteries were built in the areas of the islands of Nargen and Revel, two batteries on the island of Worms and a battery on the Porkkala-Udd peninsula.

To expand the basing of light forces and submarines in the areas of the Abo-Aland skerries and the Moonsund archipelago, intensive work began at the end of 1914, which continued in subsequent years.

Assessing the state of the defense of the German coast at the beginning of the war, it should be considered stable. During the war, a wide network of airfields, radio stations and direction-finding stations was created on the coast. Defensive minefields were placed mainly in the strait zone and on the approaches to their bases, active minefields were placed in the northern part of the Baltic Sea in order to block the Russian fleet in the Gulf of Finland.

Moving on to the consideration of the Black Sea theater of military operations, it should be noted that if more or less sufficient attention was paid to the equipment of the Baltic naval theater of military operations (TVD) before the First World War, the same cannot be said about the Black Sea theater of operations. The attitude of Russia's top military leadership towards the latter, as a secondary theater of military operations, negatively affected not only the construction of ships, but also the organization of the basing system.

Meanwhile, the limited size of the Black Sea, and therefore the relatively short distances to the enemy’s most important targets (280 miles from Sevastopol to the Bosphorus) made it possible to quickly deploy forces in any area.

The main base of the Black Sea Fleet was Sevastopol, the base points were Odessa and Batum, and the rear repair base was Nikolaev. At the same time, it was relatively equipped only main base fleet. However, Sevastopol was weakly fortified from the sea. Therefore, the safety of the ships located in Sevastopol in wartime was not guaranteed. The port itself was also insufficiently equipped. The remaining bases were in extremely unsatisfactory condition. The Military Department, to which they were subordinate until 1910, repeatedly demanded the elimination of fortifications in Batumi (Batumi) and Ochakovo, and only the decisive action of the Navy Ministry against such a rash decision made it possible to preserve them as possible bases for the fleet during the war.

Batum was important not only as a naval base, but also as a transport and transshipment point for supplying the Caucasian army. Enhanced defensive work to strengthen Batum began only during the war. Coastal defenses were reinforced with field guns, an observation post, and minefields on the approaches to the port. A hydroaviation base was equipped, and the fortress artillery of Batum, which had insufficient firing range, received new guns for reinforcement at the end of 1914.

In addition to the listed fortified points, coastal batteries were installed near Odessa, on the Tendra Spit, at Ak-Mosque, Yevpatoria, Yalta, Feodosia, Novorossiysk, Tuapse, Sochi, Gagra, Sukhumi, Poti.

By the beginning of the war, there were several radio stations in Russia, and a number of new stations were built during the war.

The network of observation and communication posts was widely developed; all coastal points were interconnected by telegraph and telephone communications. The airfield network was developed.

The most serious drawback of the system of basing fleet forces on the Black Sea theater of operations was the lack of a well-equipped and protected naval base on the Caucasus coast.

The main enemy of Russia in the Black Sea theater of operations was Türkiye.

By the beginning of the war, Turkey had the only naval base in the theater of operations - Constantinople, and since 1915, when Bulgaria took the side of the Central Powers, Varna was used for temporary basing (in particular, by submarines).

Sea connections on the Black Sea were of great importance for Turkey, since the road network on the Anatolian coast was very poorly developed. Its most important internal sea route ran along the Anatolian coast from Constantinople to Trebizond. This route supplied the armies of the Caucasian Front, and also delivered coal from the Zonguldak and Eregli region to the capital. The lack of convenient anchorages protected from the sea made it difficult for the Turks to organize the protection of sea communications. During the war, this path underwent some changes compared to peacetime. At the same time, the ships moved closer to the shore at relatively shallow depths, which significantly complicated the actions of Russian submarines.

Table 4

The composition of the naval forces on the Black Sea at the beginning of the war with Turkey

By the beginning of the war, there were no new battleships in the Black Sea Fleet (3 dreadnoughts were built in Nikolaev), however, Russian battleships were stronger than Turkish ones. However, the arrival of the German battle cruiser Goeben from the Mediterranean Sea to Constantinople in August 1914 negated the advantage of the Russian fleet.

The fact is that the high-speed Goeben, like the German light cruiser Breslau, could escape from any formation of Russian ships superior in strength and, in turn, had the opportunity to impose battle on the weaker of the enemy ships.

A few words should be said about the Black Sea straits of the Bosporus and Dardanelles, connecting the Black and Mediterranean Seas through the Sea of ​​Marmara. The Bosphorus Strait is 16 miles long and up to two miles wide; depths along the axis of the strait are 28-100 m. Both banks at the entrance to the strait from the Black Sea were heavily fortified by the beginning of the war.

On the Asian shore of the strait from the entrance from the Black Sea there were eight forts and coastal batteries - in total up to 50 guns of caliber from 150 to 80 mm; there are also eight forts and batteries on the European coast - in total over 20 guns of caliber from 150 to 350 mm.

The mine defense of the Bosphorus was organized even before the start of the war. Three rows of mines controlled from the shore were placed across the strait in the narrow area between Rumeli-Kavak and Agadolu-Kvvak. At the same time, the passage was left on the eastern side. Several rows of mines were laid north of Anadolu-Kavak, and several individual mine banks were laid along the Asian coast. Directly at the entrance, a barrier was placed across the strait. Mines were also placed near Killos.

The length of the Dardanelles Strait is 35 miles, the width is two to three miles, the depth along the axis of the strait is 50 - 100 m; the narrowness at Çanakkale is eight cables wide.

The fortifications of the Dardanelles consisted of a number of batteries, which were located near the coast and were divided into external and internal. Intermediate batteries located at heights had guns (mostly field guns and mortars) with a caliber of no more than 150 mm.

By the beginning of hostilities, the defense of the strait included a number of old open forts built in 1877-1878, armed with outdated cannons, and several batteries. The firing range of the guns did not exceed nine km. Total number guns reached 100. During the war, the equipment was updated and expanded, especially in connection with the Dardanelles landing operation of the Anglo-French fleet.

When approaching the strait from the Aegean Sea, enemy ships first of all fell into the fire zone of the forts and external batteries of Kumkale and Seddulbahir, installed at the very entrance to the strait. These forts and batteries were armed with 26 guns, including 16 of 240 - 280 mm caliber.

Approaching the beam of the Seddyulbahir batteries, the ships came out from under fire from the Kumkale battery, but remained in the fire zone of the batteries and the Seddyulbahir fort. This system of gun placement made it possible to fire both across and along the strait, to the stern of ships breaking through into the strait.

Further along the Asian and European coasts there were intermediate batteries (85 guns of 120 - 210 mm caliber. Among them was the Dardanos battery on a high hill on the Asian coast near the Kepez-Limany Bay, which fired at the strait in both directions at the maximum firing range.

The basis of the strait's defense was strong internal batteries located on both sides of the narrow part of the strait up to Çanakkale. On the Asian coast there were coastal batteries Hamidiye I and Chimenlik, on the European coast - Rumeli, Hamidiye II, Namazgah. In addition, north of Canakkale on the Asian coast, up to the Nagra narrowness, there were three forts, also part of common system defense of the narrow strait.

All internal forts and batteries had 88 guns, including 12 guns of 280 - 355 mm caliber, 57 guns from 210 to 260 mm. The batteries of the newest construction were especially strongly fortified - Hamidiye I on the Asian coast and opposite Hamidiye II on the European coast. The fire control of the batteries, as well as the entire management of the naval defense of the strait, was carried out by German officers.

Assessing the balance of forces at sea at the beginning of the First World War, it should be noted that the combined naval forces of the Entente (England, France and Russia) significantly exceeded the naval forces of the Union of Central States both in general, there and in most naval theaters of war.

Taking into account the ships that were under construction, the fleets of the Entente states were twice as superior to the navies of Germany and its allies in new battleships, 2.5 times in battlecruisers, 2.5 times in destroyers, and 2.5 times in submarines - three times.

In addition, the Entente fleets had a more developed basing system and a better strategic position in most naval theaters of war.

Special for the Centenary

In recognition of the Entente's victory in World War I, it would be appropriate to note the fact that the views and assessments of two major researchers of the combat effectiveness of the Russian fleet - the Soviet (N. Yu. Ozarovsky) and the emigrant (A. P. Budberg) completely coincide.

The first wrote that, despite Germany’s large superiority in naval forces, the Russian fleet was able, during a three-year intense struggle, to maintain a stable and favorable regime in its operational zone, maintain strategic positions and successfully implement a number of offensive operations, preventing the enemy fleet achieve none of its operational and strategic goals. During combat operations, Russian naval forces systematically caused damage to the German fleet and forced it to suffer losses, the proportion of which significantly exceeded the losses of the Russian fleet. These successes were based on the superiority in combat training of the Russian fleet, which was achieved in the interval between the Russo-Japanese and the First World Wars, as well as in the skillful use and excellent knowledge of the specifics of naval theater of operations and in the exceptional valor of the personnel of the Russian fleet, which throughout His centuries-old success was best achieved precisely in impossible tasks. Moreover, as the historian noted, the enemy suffered the greatest losses in the main naval theater of operations for Russia - the Baltic, where the superiority in the forces and means of the German fleet over the Russian was overwhelming, since the presence of the Kiel Canal as an internal operational line allowed the Germans, depending on situation to strengthen your Baltic Fleet by transferring the necessary forces from the North Sea to the Baltic in the shortest possible time (the transition of two squadrons of battleships took only 7 hours) [Ozarovsky N. Yu. German losses at sea from the actions of the Russian fleet in 1914-1917. M.-L., 1941. P. 4].

A.P. Budberg noted that the extent to which the German command valued the Russian Baltic Fleet (and its commander in chief, Admiral N.O. von Essen) and at the same time feared it, is evidenced by the fact that at the beginning of the war, during the period of strategic deployment, when The Germans counted every battalion; they left an entire corps on the coast of Pomerania to counter a possible Russian landing. And even in a state of extreme excitement, when the German command needed reserves for rescue East Prussia, it did not risk touching this corps, preferring to take troops from the French front. It preferred transfers from France to the rapid approach of the nearby corps, fearing the Baltic Fleet. And this circumstance, the expert noted, gives the Russian sailors the right to believe that their share was invested in the Marne victory. The cruising operations of the Black Sea Fleet off the Anatolian coast of Turkey, where dozens of Turkish transports were sunk, transporting troops and supplying Constantinople and the Turkish army, was of great importance for combat operations on the Caucasian front - the Turks were forced to supply their Caucasian troops through difficult, nasty and longer land communications [Budberg A.P. Armed forces Russian Empire in the performance of all-Union tasks and duties during the war of 1914-17. Paris, 1939. S. 28 - 29.].

In the war at sea 1914-1917. The Russian fleet was able not only to maintain its strategic positions and complete its assigned tasks, but also to inflict a number of sensitive blows on the enemy, regularly draw back its forces and assets, and grind resources.

The main task facing the Baltic Fleet was the defense of the Gulf of Finland and preventing the breakthrough of the strongest German fleet to Petrograd. Initially doomed to be locked in the eastern part of the Baltic, the fleet had to act, nevertheless, as efficiently as possible. An effective installation of mine-laying positions was carried out. A significant part of the German forces was diverted to combat the mine threat. By laying minefields, as well as destroyer and submarine raids, the Russians impeded economic ties between Germany and Sweden. The Germans could only obtain a number of materials and strategic raw materials from Sweden, which was of strategic importance in the conditions of the outbreak of a war of attrition.

The Black Sea Fleet supported the Caucasian Army and ensured supremacy at sea. There was a struggle on communications, landing operations were carried out, assistance was provided to the allies during the assault on the Straits, and their own corresponding operation of a strategic scale was being prepared. The role of the Black Sea Fleet was very significant in ensuring the successful offensive operations of the Caucasian Army - primarily Erzurum and Trebizond.

The 1914 campaign was characterized by the fact that the Baltic Fleet - in the face of a many times stronger enemy - the German fleet - carried out, under the leadership of its brilliant leader Admiral N. O. von Essen, the rapid mobilization, deployment and laying of minefields. The latter (primarily the Central mine-artillery position) became the basis of the fleet’s defensive line. Accordingly, the main operation carried out by the fleet in 1914 was a series of mine laying with appropriate cover of mine-layering forces (already during the first laying on July 18, 1914, 2,124 mines were laid, 4 mine-layers took part in the operation under the cover of naval forces ). As a result, the most important strategic operation was implemented, and the right flank of the North-Western Front was reliably covered. Thus, by the time war was declared, the Baltic Fleet was promptly mobilized and deployed, and the laying of minefields at the Central Position was successfully completed. Moreover, this became possible primarily thanks to the high mobilization and combat readiness of the control bodies of the Baltic Fleet and the initiative of N. O. von Essen, who correctly assessed the foreign policy situation and implemented a whole range of preventive measures in advance in a timely manner. And as a result, the risk of a sudden attack by the enemy fleet, as happened during the Japanese attack on the Pacific squadron in January 1904, was virtually reduced to zero [Kozlov D. Yu. Baltic Sea Fleet in the 1914 campaign // Military Historical Journal. 2006. No. 10. P. 12]. The campaign included demonstrative departures of naval forces to sea, cruising and patrol operations.

1. N. O. von Essen.

A huge success of the Entente was that the newest cruiser of the German forces of the Baltic Sea, Magdeburg, while trying to break into the Gulf of Finland on August 13 [Hereinafter, the old style] landed on the rocks of Odenholm Island, and, under the threat of capture, was blown up by its crew and finished off by Russian cruisers. Bogatyr" and "Pallada". Secret enemy documents fell into the hands of Russian sailors, including a signal book and a secret map of sea squares. This was of great importance primarily for the British fleet; the Allies' radio reconnaissance capabilities increased many times over. 15 people from the crew were killed, 60 people were captured.

2. Light cruiser Magdeburg.

3. Captured commander of the Magdeburg, 2 officers and 57 sailors from the cruiser’s crew on the streets of St. Petersburg. August 16, 1914

4. Russian trophy - the battle flag of Magdeburg.

The 1914 campaign was characterized by the expansion of the Baltic Fleet's operational zone, as well as the impact on the enemy's maritime transport (strategically important iron ore from Sweden), and the deployment of active minefields (on the enemy's communications and on the approaches to his ports).

On September 28, at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland, the armored cruiser Pallada was torpedoed by a German submarine (597 crew members were killed).

5. cruiser "Pallada".

In the first six months of the war, the enemy suffered more severe losses in the Baltic: as a result of a mine war, the armored cruiser Friedrich Karl was killed (sank on November 4, 1914, while the light cruiser Elbing, which moved to its aid, was damaged; surprisingly that on the same day, on the same mine bank, a pilot steamer - also called Elbing - was lost, 14 cargo ships (a total of more than 20,000 gross tons), the light cruisers Augsburg and Gazelle were damaged (in January In 1915, the latter was finally put out of action, having lost both propellers after being blown up by Russian mines, disarmed and sold for scrap in 1920). This affected the operational activities of the German fleet - the death of the Friedrich Karl led to the curtailment of the operations of German large surface ships, and the main base of the naval forces of the Baltic Sea was moved from Danzig to Swinemünde.

6. Armored cruiser "Friedrich Karl".

7. Light cruiser Augsburg.

8. Light cruiser "Gazelle".

9. Light cruiser Elbing.

In fact, we can state the fact that the Russian fleet seized the strategic initiative in the Baltic by the end of 1914 - for which the great merit of its brilliant leader. As the Soviet naval historian V.A. Petrov noted, during the 1914 campaign the Baltic Fleet, being weaker than in other campaigns, had the greatest strategic success [Petrov M.A. Review of the main campaigns and battles of the steam fleet in connection with the evolution naval art. L., 1927. P. 495].

The Black Sea Fleet could not avoid a surprise attack by the enemy - as a result of an attack by Turkish-German ships on October 16 on Sevastopol, Odessa, Novorossiysk and Feodosia, the fleet lost a minelayer and a gunboat sunk, another destroyer was damaged (losses in people of the Sevastopol fortress and fleet - 85 killed , 40 wounded, 76 prisoners) [Kozlov D. Yu. Strange War on the Black Sea (August-October 1914). M., 2009. P. 152].

Subsequently, the combat operations of the Black Sea Fleet came down to challenging the German-Turkish strategic initiative, the actions of light forces on enemy communications and support for the Caucasian Army.

The inclusion of the German battle cruiser Goeben and the light cruiser Breslau into the Turkish fleet created a very unusual situation in the Black Sea: before the war, neither side counted on the appearance of a battle cruiser in this specific theater of operations. Both Russia and Turkey sought to build or acquire dreadnoughts optimized for coastal warfare. The high-speed Goeben upset all calculations, and before the entry into service of the Russian dreadnoughts of the Empress Maria class, neither side could claim “ownership” of the Black Sea: due to the power and speed of the Goeben, the Russian cruisers could not act independently, and old battleships were supposed to go to sea only as a whole squadron. But, in turn, having met such a squadron, the Goeben had to leave, taking advantage of its speed advantage. A certain balance has been established.

10. Cruisers "Goeben" and "Breslau".

The most important clash of this period was the battle on November 5, 1914 at Cape Sarych between the Russian linear squadron and the Goeben and Breslau. The 14-minute battle practically came down to a duel between the lead Russian battleship Eustathius and Goeben (the remaining ships were excluded from the centralized fire control system due to poor visibility). "Goeben" received 3 hits from 12-inch shells and 11 hits from smaller caliber shells. As a result, a fire broke out on the ship, killing 105 people and injuring 59 people. "Eustathius" received 4 hits from 11-inch shells, did not receive serious damage, losing 58 crew members - 34 (including an officer who died from wounds) killed and 24 wounded [Gribovsky V. Yu. Black Sea Fleet in battles with "Goeben" // Gangut. 1996. No. 10. P. 27 – 28]. Without waiting for other Russian battleships to enter the battle, the Goeben left the battle at maximum speed, was subsequently repaired until the first days of December, and already on December 13 it was blown up by a Russian mine and again faced lengthy repairs.

11. Battlecruiser "Goeben" - "Sultan Selim Yavuz".

12. Battleship "Eustathius".

13. Main caliber of the battle cruiser "Goeben".

14. Drawing of an eyewitness to the battle near Cape Sarych: a 305-mm shell hit the battle cruiser “Goeben” - at the second pipe.

Strategic parity in the Black Sea continued.
Although the theater itself was more suitable for maneuver warfare than the Baltic, mine warfare was also of great importance for the Black Sea: in 1914, Russian ships laid over 5,500 mines. The raiding actions of light forces were significant: for example, on October 27, 1914, Russian destroyers destroyed 3 Turkish transports (224 people were captured) [Apalkov Yu. A. Warships of the Russian fleet 8. 1914 - 10. 1917 Directory. St. Petersburg, 1996. P. 110].

It is impossible not to note the significant success achieved in the Danube theater of operations. He was provided with the energy and courage of a small mine team consisting of 44 miners and torpedomen from the Black Sea Fleet sent in August to help the Serbian army. The team installed several torpedo batteries and a number of mine cans on the Sava River. With the help of a torpedo, the team managed to disable two enemy monitors for a long time. The monitor "Temesh" was blown up by a Russian mine and died.

15. Austrian monitor “Temesh”.

The Austrian admiral O.R. Wulf described the tragedy with one of the best ships of the Danube flotilla: the right gun turret was torn off by the power of the explosion at the monitor, and part of the cellars were engulfed in flames - the crews of the turrets and cellars were killed. Moreover, the armored deck swelled so much that the conning tower door almost jammed. 31 people were killed, the survivors were 3 officers and 48 sailors, the patrol ship was removed [Wulf O.R. Austro-Hungarian Danube Flotilla in world war 1914-1918. St. Petersburg, 2004. P. 12].

Largely thanks to these actions, the Austrians did not take active action on the Danube in 1914.

“The bill on the shipbuilding program for the next five years presented to the State Duma should give firm consistency and certainty to the reconstruction of the fleet and is therefore a matter of paramount importance for national defense, because the main task of the Baltic Fleet is the defense of the capital.

St. Petersburg is of paramount importance for the state not only as the center of all higher government institutions, but also the boards of most banks, railways, joint-stock companies and other trade and financial enterprises are concentrated there.

In purely military terms, the results of the long-term work of the headquarters are concentrated in St. Petersburg, i.e., all mobilization plans and the sequence of replenishment, attrition and restoration of the armed forces, stocks of maps, topographic plans, tablets and boards for their printing. The main gunpowder, cannon and shell factories are located near St. Petersburg, and pipe, cartridge and mine factories are located in St. Petersburg itself.

In St. Petersburg are stored huge reserves of gold from the State Bank, the Mint, treasures of the Hermitage, innumerable capital of private financial enterprises, cash reserves of the State Treasury and, finally, even the Expedition for the procurement of state securities is located in St. Petersburg.

From here it becomes clear that the occupation of St. Petersburg by the enemy not only ends the war in his favor, but even pays for it, for the imposition of sequestration on all state and public capital will bring such a hefty indemnity, in comparison with which the 500 million currently requested for the fleet seems an insignificant amount.

It is clear that our possible adversary, excellently informed, perfectly developing plans for his actions, is clearly aware of the significance of St. Petersburg and, of course, will choose it as the direct subject of his actions.

In an alliance with whatever powers we are, their fleets cannot penetrate the Baltic Sea. It would take a few hours to mine the Belts and the Sound; Germany would not diplomatically seek Denmark's prior consent to do so. Then the German fleet, with the exception of a few second-class ships sufficient to guard this barrier, has complete freedom of action in the Baltic Sea when it needs it.

In the explanatory note presented for the program, you see the insignificance of the force that we can now oppose to Germany; It is clear that complete mastery of the sea for Germany is a matter of several days, and it goes without saying that Germany will make every effort to achieve this, in proportion to the importance of the task.

Having mastered the sea, Germany will be able to land huge armies anywhere, just as freely as Japan did in the last war.

Imagine now the landing of a strong army somewhere on the Finnish coast, accompanied by the publication of a loud manifesto declaring the independence of Finland from the Russian yoke. This army will be provided on both flanks and rear; during its advance, it has not only a railway, but also a sea, through which provisions, supplies, reinforcements are transported to it, and on return ships - the evacuation of the sick, wounded, etc. Take into account that even a medium-sized commercial steamer in 10,000 tons of cargo capacity is equivalent to ten railway trains, and there are hundreds of such ships in the German merchant fleet, not counting the 15,000 - 20,000-ton ships, of which there are dozens. Note that this army will march across the country, friendly towards it, but hostile towards us, that, having control of the sea, it can constantly disturb communications and the rear of our army, which will have to meet halfway, having at its disposal only one railway, and even then barely connected with the imperial ones.

I will not bore you with a list of possible large enemy landing operations along the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland and Riga and the Baltic Sea to act on the flank and rear of our main ground forces and to support the left flank of the offensive of enemy troops. Take a look at the map, put yourself in the place of our enemy and see how you would act, if only to divert as many troops as possible to defend the coast and the approaches to the capital. Believe that the enemy will act better, more systematically than we can imagine, and will be able to use every unpreparedness, every oversight, every weak point of ours to our detriment.

So, you see the invaluable importance of the fleet in the defense of the state and the possible outcome of such a war, which will decide the very question of its further existence.

It is often said that for the above-mentioned main task of the fleet - the defense of the Baltic coast - it is enough to have mine ships and submarines and that large warships are not necessary.

This view is wrong. The fleet cannot receive unilateral development of some types of ships to the detriment of others; it is necessary to have ships of all types and in a certain proportion.

In fact, let us assume that we would like to base our defense only on mines and submarines; Let's see how the enemy would conduct his actions then.

Modern destroyers now carry not only mine weapons, but also relatively powerful artillery. Their speed is almost equal to the speed of a mine, so it is useless to use a mine against a destroyer - a hit is almost impossible; When they meet, the destroyers engage in an artillery battle, in which the enemy's numerical superiority ensures decisive success.

In the same way, destroyers are powerless against high-speed, so-called “small” or “light” cruisers, which, however, have now reached a displacement of 6000–8000 tons and carry 8-inch guns.

It is clear that the enemy will send his destroyers and his small cruisers against our mine fleet, with the support of which he will either destroy our destroyers or block the remaining ones in Kronstadt.

Submarines are also powerless against destroyers and fast small cruisers, and it is clear that when the sea is guarded by enemy destroyers, the submarine can only go underwater, which means moving no more than 35 miles from its base.

Thus, if we had only destroyers and submarines, they would soon find themselves driven into Kronstadt, and the enemy would be the complete master of the entire sea to a line approximately 40–50 miles, say, 100 versts from Kronstadt, and the enemy would not will deny himself the pleasure of seeing the effect of a bomb thrown from an airplane, at least on Nevsky Prospekt.

From here it is clear that in order to support our destroyers against the enemy, we also need to have “small” fast cruisers with strong artillery weapons.

Suppose we had submarines, destroyers and “small” cruisers, the enemy would send his mine fleet, his “small” cruisers and, to support them, high-speed large armored cruisers, one type of which a “small” cruiser must avoid, to avoid being shot and drowned by 12- and 14-inch high-explosive shells from long distances. In addition, he would send several second-class battleships, which would sail with lowered nets, without fear of mines, and with their artillery would destroy the strongholds of our fleet and our submarines.

You see, then, the need for large cruisers, without which mine defense cannot be ensured.

Large armored cruisers now differ from a battleship only in their greater speed and their weaker artillery in number, not in caliber of guns; therefore, it is unprofitable for a large cruiser to engage in an artillery battle with battleships, and if the enemy’s large cruisers have support in the form of battleships, then our cruisers will have to give in to them or rely on the same support.

Thus, you see that only a planned, calculated struggle of fleet against fleet is possible, and the fleet is an organic whole, and the absence of any type of ships in it or their relative small number is not compensated by the exaggerated development of the number of ships of another type - their excessive number will not satisfy dominance over the enemy, but will only represent a waste of funds that, with a more correct ratio, would have been used more profitably.

It is necessary to say a few more words about the minefield. A minefield is valid only when it is supported by coastal fortifications or the battle fleet from minesweepers; if this is not the case, then the cautious enemy will clear his fairways and, with his patrol ships, will protect them from possible or accidental obstruction; therefore, minelayers have a very specific and very important task, but it must also be in connection with the battle fleet, and cannot be performed without it.

Having thus explained the need to have ships of all types in the fleet, attention must be paid to ensuring that the fleet is able to fight for as long as possible and with possible success against a more numerous and powerful enemy. Here success is ensured by the preparation of positions and the proximity of the base to the place of main operations.

As you can see, the immediate and main task of the fleet is to prevent the enemy from taking possession of the Gulf of Finland. The favorable position of Revel, appreciated by Peter the Great, indicates this point as a natural base for the fleet (both in the sense of supplies, repairs, shelter, and as a point of support for the fight against the enemy), therefore the creation of a base for the fleet is included in the general plan for the reconstruction of the fleet in Reval.

The fleet, at least at first not numerous, but harmoniously composed of battleships, large and small cruisers, destroyers and submarines and minelayers, based on Revel, will require very serious efforts from the enemy to take over the sea. The enemy will no longer be able to send forward only detachments of destroyers or light cruisers; he will have to conduct an offensive with the entire fleet; on a campaign he will not be able to go with his nets lowered, for he will have to always be ready for battle, or, more precisely, he will have to conduct his attack with battle. This means that then our submarines, our minefields will become fully operational and, until our fleet is completely destroyed along with its base - Revel, the coast of the Gulf of Finland will be protected from the landing of an enemy army.

In the Black Sea, the tasks of our fleet are so obvious and have received such immediate support from the State Duma that this program includes only those two “small” cruisers that should support the operations of the mine fleet, and then auxiliary vessels related to the equipment of the Sevastopol port and base for the fleet.

Finally, in the Pacific Ocean, the immediate task is to maintain the defense of the Vladivostok fortress from the sea - for this purpose it is planned to build submarines based in Vladivostok.

I will not bore your attention with a detailed listing of the required loans; you can see all this in the table along with a statement of the reasons for the prices made. I will only say that a total of 502,744,000 rubles are requested, of which 392,500,000 will be spent on the construction of combat ships, 15,477,000 - on auxiliary vessels, 13,133,000 - on floating facilities of ports, i.e. 421,107,000 rubles. - for shipbuilding, the remaining 81,637,000 - for equipment of plant bases.

These numbers may amaze you with their enormity, but if you compare them with the importance of the fleet for the defense of the state and if you take into account that everything will be carried out in Russia, that in shipbuilding about 80% is paid for labor, that the allocation of these funds you believe solid foundation for the most urgent needs of state defense and that at the same time you will give income to hundreds of thousands of workers to apply their ability to work in all branches of industry - then you will not refuse the half a billion that Russia needs to renew its fleet.”

The so-called “experts in Duma affairs” assured, without knowing the content of the report of the Minister of the Navy, that the Ministry of the Navy was guaranteed a majority of 4 or 5 votes.