SS Tank Corps. Foreign volunteer legions and SS corps on the eastern front

The corps, which included the SS Reich division, was rushing to Moscow, but the position of the Germans was becoming critical: the resistance of the Red Army was constantly growing, and the Soviet command, regardless of losses, threw more and more fresh units into battle. On October 14, the SS division entered the legendary Borodino field and attacked the positions of the 32nd Infantry Division. During the battle, Hausser's soldiers attacked positions on the Semyonovsky flushes, took them and reached the Borodino-Mozhaisk road. The positions of the Siberian regiments were broken through, the 32nd division was almost completely destroyed. The new Battle of Borodino ended in the defeat of the Red Army. But in these battles the division was to lose its creator and commander. On October 14, 1941, Paul Hausser was seriously wounded by shrapnel from a shell that exploded nearby: the right side of his face was severely damaged, his right eye and jaw were especially damaged.[SS Oberführer Wilhelm Bittrich took command of the division after Hausser was wounded.] In Germany, where Hausser was immediately evacuated, he underwent several operations, and then followed a fairly long course of rehabilitation. Health was generally restored, but the right eye lost sight forever. On May 9, 1942, Hausser was awarded a silver Wound Badge. In general, the 1941 campaign in the East turned out to be extremely difficult for the German troops, and the SS Reich division was no exception - its losses amounted to 40% of its personnel.

SS Panzer Corps

Hausser had to recover from his injury for more than six months. He was no longer destined to return to his division. And not only because of the consequences of the injury. At this time, Himmler managed to take the next step in the development of the SS troops: the undeniable advantages of the SS divisions on the Soviet-German front removed all objections of the Reich leadership regarding the creation of the next level of SS military headquarters. If earlier Himmler’s undoubted success was the formation of SS divisions, which the Wehrmacht leadership was so opposed to, now he received the go-ahead to create the headquarters of the SS corps. This corps was to include the best and most combat-ready SS divisions - Leibstandarte, Reich and Totenkopf. In principle, in fact, Himmler planned to create a powerful - perhaps the most powerful in German army- a strike formation that would be capable of solving the most important problems, and its use in the direction of the main attack promised great benefits (and even greater fame). Hausser was quite logically nominated for the post of commander of the new corps. Who else, besides the creator of the SS reinforcement units, could be entrusted with command? Neither Eicke nor Dietrich were ready to occupy such a high post - to be honest, Dietrich, although he later became army commander, still did not rise above the division level (rather, his limit was the post of regiment commander, and even then in the military time). Hausser was still a lieutenant general of the Reichswehr, that is, he had the necessary level of training to command a corps. So, in general, there was no one to choose from.

On May 13, 1942, the order was given to begin the formation of the SS Panzer Corps (SS-Panzerkorps), and on May 28, SS-Obergruppenführer and SS General Paul Hausser officially headed it. The formation of headquarters and corps units was carried out in Bergen-Belsen. In general, the states were standard for tank corps; in the end, the following units of corps subordination were formed (initially they did not have a number, but then - with the advent of other SS corps - they received the number 102, and even later, during the next reorganization, a number of them - number 502):

aviation squadron (Fliegerstaffel);

motorized corps cartographic service of the SS;

SS heavy tank battalion (Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung);

SS artillery command (SS-Artillerie Kommandeur);

SS artillery division (SS-Artillerie-Abteilung);

SS mortar company (SS-Granatwefer-Kompanie);

SS anti-aircraft company (SS-Flugabwehr-Kompanie 102);

SS rocket mortar division (SS-Werfer Abteilung);

SS Corps Signal Battalion (SS-Korps-Nachrichten Abteilung);

SS scooter company (SS-Kraftfahrzeug-Kompanie);

SS military geographic company (SS-Wehrgeologen-Kompanie);

SS repair company (SS-Werkstatt-Kompanie);

SS corps sanitary company (SS-Korps-Sanitats-Kom-panie);

SS Field Post Office (SS-Feldpostamt);

motorized company of SS war correspondents;

motorized unit of the SS Field Gendarmerie;

SS corps security company (SS-Korps Sicherungs-Kompanie 102);

SS field reserve brigade (SS-Feldersatz-Brigade).

Let us note that, among other things, the corps was given the mentioned tank battalion and a company of the first “Tigers” - PzKw VI tanks.

The three SS divisions mentioned above came under the command of Hausser, and initially, at the stage of formation of the corps, they all underwent reorganization. In the camps in Northern France, they were transferred to the staff of motorized (panzergrenadier) divisions (they officially received such names in November 1942), and each received a tank battalion - all together they were quite an impressive force. Thus, Hausser's corps initially included the motorized divisions "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" of SS-Obergruppenführer and SS General Sepp Dietrich, "Das Reich" of SS Gruppenführer and SS Lieutenant General Georg Keppler and "Death's Head" of SS Obergruppenführer and SS General Theodor Eicke . As you can see, Hausser did not have a very easy time with such distinguished commanders, only Keppler was his “pupil”, and the rest were independent individuals, in some cases having much stronger and broader connections in the party leadership and in the SS. Hausser did not receive an SS man as chief of staff - this position was taken by the General Staff, Wehrmacht Colonel Müller.

In August, the corps, still at the stage of reorganization, was included in the active army and subordinated to the 15th Army stationed in Northern France. In the fall of 1942, Hausser's SS men had the opportunity (along with other German troops in France) to take part in the occupation of Southern France, which until that time was formally under the jurisdiction of the legitimate French government of Marshal Henri Petain.[After the German attack on France, Petain led a group calling for a speedy end to the war and the conclusion of a truce with Germany. On June 16, 1940, he was legally appointed prime minister and soon concluded an armistice with Germany. Petain chose the resort town of Vichy in the south of France as the headquarters of his government. On July 10, 1940, the National Assembly (with 569 votes in favor, 80 against and 17 abstains) transferred full power to Petain in the unoccupied territory of France. Thus, Petain (like Hitler in 1933) received a mandate to govern the state absolutely legally, from the hands of the highest legislature countries. In fact, from that moment on, France, which broke off diplomatic relations with Great Britain, was an ally of Germany.] The operation was carried out quite quickly, but the Germans failed to achieve the main goal - to capture the French fleet based in Toulon: in fact, this meant the failure of the operation and only expanded the territory controlled by the Germans, which required an even greater increase in the occupation troops. And this despite the fact that there was a significant lack of forces on the Soviet-German front.

Despite the fact that, in general, Hausser needed some more time to bring his corps into full combat readiness, including the training of very significant reinforcements, the divisions that arrived in France suffered heavy losses in Russia and, in addition, left almost all their equipment at the front, - he soon received orders to leave for the East. The situation on the Soviet-German front was close to critical. The Soviet offensive in January 1943 led to the destruction of Paulus' Stalingrad group, and a powerful blow in Ukraine brought the entire southern flank of German troops to the brink of disaster. In January 1943, the transfer of the SS Panzer Corps to Ukraine began, and initially only the Leibstandarte and the Reich arrived here, the Totenkopf was somewhat behind - its losses were the most significant and the training of replacements took Eicke more time. On January 30, 1943, Hausser himself received from Hitler one of the highest party awards - the Golden Party Badge.[According to status, the badge was automatically given only to those whose NSDAP number was less than 100,000. In other cases, the badge was like Hitler’s personal insignia. Hausser received it in advance - as the commander of the elite SS units. Note that Hausser's subordinates, Dietrich and Eicke, had been wearing Golden Party badges for quite some time by this time.]

Paul Hausser, commander of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps

Corps and division commanders, however, faced completely different problems. Although both SS divisions had undergone more than a year of training, their combat readiness still remained incomplete. We have already written about the situation with tanks, so the 1st tank battalions of the 9th and 10th SS divisions remained in France, since they never received the Panthers they were entitled to. Moreover, the lack of equipment and equipment did not allow the anti-tank divisions of both divisions to be sent to the East. Thus, both SS divisions were tank divisions only on paper.

SS soldiers in the USSR, spring 1944

For the speedy transfer of divisions to the front, 72 railway echelons were allocated for each. The dispatch of units was accompanied by significant difficulties, the main of which were air raids by allied aviation. One of the most powerful occurred on March 28, when at the station, while waiting for departure, a train with headquarters units of the 3rd battalion of the 22nd SS regiment was twice raided. As a result, even before arriving at the front, the battalion suffered its first losses, with 5 officers killed, including the battalion adjutant of SS Obersturmführer Werner Maximov and the quartermaster of SS Untersturmführer Walter Volkmann. It is interesting to note that during the raid, the battalion’s personnel came under the command of local anti-aircraft units, thereby providing all possible assistance in repelling it. It is worth adding that the servicemen who survived the raid received a special 10-day leave, as a result of which they had the opportunity to celebrate Easter at home with their families.

However, neither Anglo-American air raids nor sabotage by the European Resistance could disrupt the transfer of the division to the front. The Frundsberg's route to the front followed the route: Nantes - Paris - Metz - Trier - Koblenz - Kassel - Halle - Cottbus - Breslau - Krakow - Lvov. So already at the beginning of April, cold and snow, in complete contrast to warm France, where spring had already begun, “welcomed” the soldiers of the 10th SS Division in Western Ukraine.

On April 1, 1944, the corps headquarters headed by Hausser arrived in Lvov. As already indicated, the II SS Panzer Corps was included in the 4th Panzer Army of Panzer General Erhard Routh. On April 2, Hausser received a special order from Routh, according to which the divisions of the corps were ordered to prepare for battle as soon as possible. Considering that most of the corps had just arrived or was even on the way, it was not possible to quickly carry out this order. In addition to parts of “his” corps, Hausser also subordinated the 100th Jaeger and 367th Infantry Divisions, as well as the 506th Heavy Tank Battalion, which arrived from Hungary.

The divisional supply units were perhaps the very first to unload in Lvov. Wasting no time, the commander of the 10th SS utility battalion, SS Sturmbannführer Gerhard Schill, launched a vigorous activity and quickly organized a supply point. Bakers from the 1st company of the battalion received orders to bake 12,000 loaves of bread on the first day - after all, the arriving soldiers needed to be fed quickly. Preparing this amount of bread required 20,000 liters of water and 10 tons of flour. Meanwhile, SS Obersturmführer Richard Bohler, an officer from the maintenance battalion, arrived at the German army supply depot in Vinniki, 6 kilometers southeast of Lvov, with orders to get fresh meat. According to the most conservative estimates, the division required 147 head of cattle, 120 pigs and 240 sheep per day.

Equipment of the SS division "Frundsberg" in Ukraine

The bulk of the division began arriving on April 3, 1944. Since the Lvov station could not receive all the units of the arriving tank divisions, many of them had to unload at “neighboring” stations. Leo Franke's 6th company from the 10th SS Panzer Regiment arrived in the area of ​​Zolochev (a city east of Lviv) by noon on April 2. Since there was no equipment for unloading wagons with equipment at this station, bales of hay, wisely taken by the SS men from France, were used to unload the tanks. The commander of the 3rd platoon, Edmund Erhard, recalled: “At the station, the company commander called the platoon commanders for a briefing. The enemy was advancing on Lviv, and we were sure that we would be in battle before the end of the day. We checked the marching order to the collection point using maps.” The 1st platoon under the command of Hans Quandel was moved forward, followed by the 3rd platoon, parts of the company headquarters and the 2nd platoon of SS Untersturmführer Rudolf Schwemmlein. The company commander, Leo Franke, in a nimble Volkswagen, moved along the moving column, accompanied by two connected motorcyclists. The company's route ran through several surrounding villages; Soon the SS tankers reached the Slovit area. During the march, the most important opponent for the SS division “Frundsberg” turned out to be cold, piercing wind and slush. early spring in impassable terrain, with completely muddy roads. The movement was slow. The column of the 6th tank company was moving along a narrow road, and as soon as a tank or truck got stuck, the entire column stopped. Therefore, the 6th company of the 10th tank regiment reached the assembly point in Berezhany only at 5 a.m. on April 4. The tanks of the 2nd Platoon, many of which were stuck in the mud or driven off the road, joined the company during the day.

On April 2-3, units of the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion Heinrich Brinkmann unloaded from the trains at the station near Zolochev. The battalion had time to reorganize after the 1,600-kilometer road. After everything was ready for the march, Brinkmann moved to Berezhany, to the assembly area. Like other mobile SS units, the battalion's movement was hampered by muddy roads. All the roads were clogged with columns of troops that moved almost at a walk. Caught in a traffic jam, the armored vehicles practically stopped. Almost 15 hours (!) were spent on the 35-kilometer route. Therefore, it was only on April 4 that Brinkmann arrived in the indicated sector.

While the division was just getting ready, the German headquarters had already begun hasty preparations for a powerful relief strike. On April 3, Routh ordered both army divisions subordinate to Hausser to secure a place for the deployment of mobile units of the II SS Panzer Corps in the Rohatyn-Berezhany area. According to Routh's plan, as soon as the main elements of the II Panzer Corps arrived, all 4 divisions would strike to the southeast, in the general direction of Buchach, and break through the encirclement ring around the 1st Panzer Army. Let us note here that since units of the 1st Panzer Army had been fighting surrounded for more than a week, an important task for units of the II SS Panzer Corps was the task of quickly organizing supplies for Hube’s units after their release. Therefore, trucks with supplies for the encircled units, mainly fuel and ammunition (in total, about 600 tons of various cargoes) had to move behind the attacking wedge.

Officers of the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion in Zolochev

The Germans concentrated opposite the right flank of the 18th Guards Rifle Corps of the Red Army under General I.M. Afonina. This corps held a section of the outer front encircling the 1st Tank Army from the west and was exhausted from previous battles and lacked personnel and weapons. With two battered rifle divisions, the corps occupied a 35-kilometer-long defense line from Podgaitsy to Mariampol on the Dniester. It is clear that the Soviet troops did not create a strong defense in this area, and in addition, reconnaissance on the external front was carried out unsatisfactorily. The successful actions of the corps were not helped by the fact that organizationally it was subordinate to the 1st Guards Army, the main forces of which fought with the 1st Tank Army in the Proskurov area (now Khmelnitsky), 100 kilometers to the south.

On April 4, German rangers and infantrymen began moving to their original positions. The conditions in which the march took place were more than difficult - ice, slush, bad roads. Subsequently, the thaw that began on April 5 further aggravated the problem. Soon the entire area turned into a sea of ​​mud, making movement almost impossible. The technology got bogged down. All available sappers and special snowplows were used to clear the roads. These measures achieved some results and traffic partially returned to normal. But now, in addition to the weather difficulties, enemy opposition was added: Soviet planes, as soon as the weather permitted, immediately attacked the Germans.

Commander of the 21st SS Regiment Eduard Deisenhofer

Nevertheless, both army divisions went on the attack on April 4, as planned, despite all the difficulties. The 367th Division of Major General Georg Zwade successfully captured a bridgehead across the Naraevka River, southeast of Rohatyn, and the 100th Jäger Division of Lieutenant General Willibald Utz created bridgeheads along the Zlota Lipa River at Litvinovo, 10 kilometers northwest of Podgaitsy and in the area southeast of Berezhany. It is interesting that, according to Soviet reports, on that day only reconnaissance in force was recorded in the Podgaitsy area (!): allegedly the Germans unsuccessfully attacked with an infantry regiment supported by 30 tanks. Further more. Commander of the 18th Corps I.M. Afonin reported that during that day 11 tanks and 2 armored personnel carriers were burned and destroyed, and up to 300 enemy soldiers were destroyed. However, these data are not confirmed by German sources: the 100th Jaeger Division just achieved some successes, and, according to all sources, it acted without tank support. Podgaytsy was taken by Utz's units already by the morning of April 5th.

By the evening of April 4, 57 trains with units of the SS Frundsberg division had already arrived in Lvov and its environs (and only 35 trains with Hohenstaufen units). There was no time to wait for all the components of both divisions to arrive, and Hausser decided to bring the Frundsberg into the battle. Some units (mainly those that disembarked in the vicinity of Lviv) set out immediately upon arrival, such as the already mentioned 6th Panzer Company or the 10th SS Reconnaissance Battalion. After 24 hours, the division was already more or less deployed, but its real strength still remained small: Troenfeld reported to Hausser that there were only 32 Pz-IV tanks and 38 Stug-III self-propelled guns in combat-ready condition.

But, despite all the problems, it was urgent to act. Hausser placed his panzer divisions (or rather division) in the center, while the 100th Jäger Division covered the left flank and the 367th Infantry the right.

The goal Routh set for the II SS Panzer Corps was simple: attack southeast along the Rohatyn-Berezhany line, and then strike south of Podgaitsy and move through Monastyriska to Buchach.

The first unit of the SS division "Frundsberg" to receive baptism of fire was the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion. On the morning of April 5, Brinkmann's battalion reached Podgaitsy, which had just been taken by units of the 100th Jaeger Division. According to the recollections of SS Unterscharführer Franz Widmann, a liaison officer from the battalion headquarters, the huntsmen made a good impression on the SS men with their equipment and equipment. Something irritated the SS men: “They (the huntsmen - R.P.) had white camouflage coats, which we did not have,” Widmann recalled. The battalion command post was set up in a typical Ukrainian hut with a thatched roof. Soon Troenfeld arrived in Podgaitsy. At 11.00 a meeting was held in which Treuenfeld, Brinkmann, Willibald Utz and the staff officers of both divisions took part. As a result of this “advice,” Brinkmann received an order to reconnoiter the approaches to Buchach and ensure the protection of the sector north of Buchach, creating a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Strypa River.

Commander of the 10th SS Panzer Regiment Franz Kleffner

The weather forecast for that day was disappointing - snow and rain. The disgusting condition of the roads did not allow the use of wheeled armored vehicles, so the 1st company of the battalion (equipped with just these vehicles) remained in reserve, southeast of Podgaitsy. To quickly carry out the received order, three reconnaissance patrols were created from the units of the 2nd and 3rd companies - two patrols were supposed to go to Buchach in different ways, and one to Osovitsa (10 kilometers east of Buchach).

At about 14.00 on April 5, armored personnel carriers began to move forward. Using a small 12-ton bridge built by sappers of the 100th Jaeger Division with the active involvement of the residents of Podgaitsy, they crossed the Koropets River and continued moving towards the enemy. Soon, units of the 1st and 2nd patrols reached the fork in the road to Podgaitsy, 6 kilometers south of the city. Here, the forward reconnaissance squads of SS-Untersturmführer Kurt Schoeller's 1st Patrol came across a Soviet anti-tank position, probably elements of the 563rd Anti-Tank Destroyer Regiment. Sholler decided not to get involved in the battle, but preferred to bypass the Soviet defense center, making a detour to the side, 1 kilometer to the north. However, he did not take into account the state of the earth's surface, and his maneuver failed: two armored personnel carriers were hopelessly stuck in the mud, and the rest could barely move. As a result, the movement of the 1st patrol stopped somewhere four kilometers southeast of Podgaitsy.

Meanwhile, the 2nd patrol of SS Untersturmführer Rudolf Hoffmann reconnoitered the approaches to the village of Madzelovka. Taking advantage of the moment, the battalion headquarters company, led by Brinkmann himself, and parts of the 3rd company of SS Obersturmführer Gerhard Hinze, reinforced by two artillery and one anti-tank platoons taken from the 2nd company, approached him. At about 5 p.m., Hinze's group, together with the headquarters company, attacked to the southeast and took Madzelovka almost without a fight - the Soviet troops simply fled. However, progress was slowed down both by rain and mud, and by mines, with which Soviet troops abundantly “strewn” all the surrounding roads.

Commander of the 10th SS Reconnaissance Battalion Heinrich Brinkmann

The reinforced 3rd company of Hinze developed an attack and captured the village of Kurdvanovka. True, the enemy failed to inflict large losses: the bulk of the Soviet troops managed to retreat across the Strypa River near the village of Osovitsy. On the shoulders of the retreating enemy, by 21.00 Hinze took Osovitsy and established control over the intact bridge over Strypa. The SS military guard was placed on the heights east of Osovitsa. Thus, Hinze managed to create a small bridgehead. However, the poor condition of the roads and lack of fuel did not allow the main units of the reconnaissance battalion to reinforce Hinze’s detachment that had rushed forward. As reinforcement, only the 3rd patrol of SS Hauptscharführer Gottfried Kuffner (commander of the 3rd platoon of the 2nd company, on the basis of which this patrol was created) arrived, and the main part of the reconnaissance battalion, led by the headquarters company, concentrated at Kurdvanovka, where Up to 50 different armored vehicles were assembled. During the first day at the front, the battalion's losses were 2 killed and 4 wounded. Going back a little, we note that Kuffner's 3rd patrol turned out to be the most successful of all three. Advancing north of the other two patrols, Kuffner managed to capture the village of Kotuzov, 12 kilometers southeast of Podgaitsy, where 7 trucks and 1 motorcycle with a sidecar were taken as trophies. Building on their success, the patrol captured the village of Vishnevoye on Strypa, but its advance stopped there, as Soviet troops blew up the bridge across Strypa during their retreat. Realizing that nothing more could be achieved in the area, Brinkmann redirected Kuffner, ordering him to reinforce the German units in Osowitz.

As the facts show, on April 5 the Germans did not waste time. The 100th Jaeger Division attacked to the northeast and achieved partial successes. After this, in full accordance with preliminary plans, the time came to bring into action the main forces of the 10th SS Panzer Division.

While Brinkmann's scouts were fighting at Osovitsa, the Frundsberg tank companies reached Podgaitsy. In an attempt to stop the German advance, Soviet aircraft heavily bombed Podgaitsy. Although this raid could not greatly influence the course of events, it still delayed the deployment of the division’s tank companies to attack. The town was literally packed with troops and equipment: in addition to various Frundsberg units, there were units of the 100th Jaeger Division and advanced detachments of the 653rd heavy anti-tank division (equipped with Ferdinand self-propelled guns). Congestion arose in the narrow streets of the provincial town, and to restore order, the personal intervention of the division commander Karl von Treuenfeld was required, who was among the soldiers and regulated the flow of traffic.

Eventually, tanks and self-propelled guns from Leo-Hermann Reinhold's 2nd Battalion of the 10th SS Panzer Regiment attacked the enemy south of the 10th SS Reconnaissance Battalion's positions between 5 and 6 p.m. Without further ado, Troenfeld decided to strike at Buchach along the shortest route. It so happened that the tanks followed in the footsteps of Schoeller’s 1st reconnaissance patrol.

The forward detachment was the 6th tank company of Leo Franke. At first, everything developed in the spirit of rapid march typical of SS troops, but then the tanks got stuck in the mud and the pace of the offensive slowed down noticeably. In addition, Franke took into account Schoeller’s warning about an enemy anti-tank nest on his way and, most importantly, made the appropriate conclusions. Slowly the 6th tank company approached the Soviet anti-tank position, which, as we remember, the 1st reconnaissance patrol did not dare to contact. Events developed very quickly - at first the Red Army soldiers opened fire on the leading tank, but were unable to hit it. The Germans responded with accurate fire from tank guns. In a short battle, 10 Soviet anti-tank guns located along the road were destroyed. Division veteran Bernhard Westerhoff described the event as “a real night battle.” The Germans did not suffer losses and continued their offensive, but the Soviet infantry, taking advantage of the darkness, took cover on both sides of the road and now constantly tried to attack the tanks separately. Nevertheless, the offensive continued, and to strengthen the blow, Treuenfeld threw forward the 8th Panzer Company of SS Obersturmführer Wilhelm Stock, armed with self-propelled guns.

SS Untersturmführer Georg Siebenhuner

Soon, in this direction, the SS took the villages of Marinopol and Delievo. According to Soviet data, the Soviet 563rd Anti-Tank Fighter Regiment defending in this area reported the destruction of 15 enemy tanks and two armored personnel carriers during the day, but at the same time suffered significant losses. German data does not confirm such high losses; not a single tank was lost that day.

By the end of the day on April 5, despite the terrible condition of the ground and strong enemy resistance, German tanks nevertheless they reached Kovalevka (a village 15 kilometers from Buchach), and during the battle Franke was wounded. As darkness fell, the tankers were joined by vanguard units of the 1st battalion of SS-Sturmbannführer Heinz Laubscheer from the 21st SS Regiment. As most researchers note, the results of the first day of fighting for the SS Frundsberg division turned out to be very successful. In just April 5, according to Soviet data, the Germans pushed back units of the 18th Rifle Corps to a depth of 10 kilometers.

During the night of April 5–6, the remaining units of the 21st SS Regiment reached the positions of the advanced tank detachments at Kovalevka, and by mid-day on April 6, the division's strike group was ready to continue the attack on Buchach. The attack was led personally by SS Gruppenführer Treuenfeld. However, already during the attack, plans changed, and the infantrymen were reoriented to Monastyriska, as planned according to Routh’s plan, and the tanks, without infantry support, continued the attack on Buchach alone. Nevertheless, by 17.00 on April 6, the 6th Tank Company, at the cost of losing two tanks, broke the strong resistance of the 8th Infantry Division of the Red Army, reinforced by the 520th Anti-Tank Destroyer Regiment, and broke into Buchach. Soviet troops retreated to the northeast. 15 minutes later, 8 Pz-IV tanks (according to other sources, 5) collided with the advanced units of the German 6th Panzer Division - it was the 114th Panzer-Grenadier Regiment of Major Stahl, which was storming Buchach from the east. As P. Karel pathetically said: “Five minutes later, the soldiers of Frundsberg and the 6th Panzer Division were clapping each other on the back: “We did it!” Thus, communication between the 1st and 4th Tank Armies, disrupted for two weeks, was restored. However, the formation in Buchach was only the beginning of the final breakthrough of the 1st Tank Army. The strike groups of both the SS Frundsberg Division and the 6th Panzer Division were in a very vulnerable position in Buchach. This was especially true for the Frundsberg tanks, which did not have infantry support and were therefore very vulnerable. The tankers had to “dismount” and take all-round defense, especially since the Soviet command, understanding the full significance of Buchach, threw front reserve units into battle - the 52nd and 74th Rifle Corps, which resolutely attacked. As a result, the forward detachments of both German armies were cut off from the main forces and were now fighting surrounded, and the narrow corridor connecting the 1st and 4th Panzer armies was again blocked by the enemy.

A group of division soldiers in Ukraine

The quick arrival of reinforcements near Buchach - a grenadier from the 21st SS Regiment - was a big question. They, led by other tank units of the 2nd battalion of the 10th SS Panzer Regiment, advanced on the right flank. Their goal, according to Routh's orders, was the village of Monastyriska, control of which was ensured by the southern flank of the division. The ground along which the attack took place turned into a swamp, the armored personnel carriers of the 1st “armored” battalion of Laubscheer got stuck in the mud and practically stopped. In addition, at Monastyriska the SS men encountered units of the 280th Infantry Division, which had no intention of retreating. The Red Army soldiers offered decisive resistance, and the pace of the German attack slowed down sharply, and after the commander of the 3rd battalion of the 21st SS Regiment, SS Sturmbannführer Karl-Günther Molt, was wounded, the division's advance stopped altogether. In this difficult situation, the regimental commander, SS-Obersturmbannführer Deisenhofer, asked for air and artillery support. For this, the 1st Division of SS Sturmbannführer Harry Jobst was involved. Adjutant of the 1st Division of the 10th SS Artillery Regiment and temporary commander of the Hummel battery, SS Untersturmführer Hans-Dietrich Sauter led his battery to the position at Podgaitsy to support the attack on Monastyriska with fire. Although the soldiers equipped their firing positions according to the regulations, Sauter was faced with the fact that his young artillerymen stubbornly refused to dig deep trenches, unlike the same Red Army soldiers, whose trenches (captured and carefully examined by the Germans) met all the requirements. Soon the Hummels opened fire.

As a result, at about 16.00, after an air strike by dive bombers from the 77th assault squadron, the 2nd battalion of SS Sturmbannführer Fritz Mauer from the 21st SS regiment took Monastyriska by storm. After this, progress in the offensive for Frundsberg ended, and only the next day, April 7, units of the 21st SS Regiment finally reached Buchach, together with the 1st company of the 10th SS Engineer Battalion.

Meanwhile, the bulk of the 10th SS Reconnaissance Battalion was unable to strengthen the 3rd Company's bridgehead in Osowitz. The units assembled at Kurdvanovka (headquarters company, units of the 2nd and 4th companies) were practically immobilized due to lack of fuel and mud spreading everywhere. The requested fuel almost never arrived. In addition, the 1st company, armed with wheeled armored vehicles, still remained in Podgaitsy, since it could not move along the muddy roads. The situation in this area was unstable: for example, the anti-tank platoon of SS Untersturmführer Theo Henke from the 5th company was drawn into battles with the retreating units of the Red Army west of Kurdvanovka. Among other things, Treuenfeld ordered Brinkmann to secure the northern flank of the division, for which the latter needed to gather all available forces. The regrouping of the battalion began.

Hans Lingner, Georg Martin and Rudolf Reinecke in Ukraine

During April 6, 3 Soviet aircraft were shot down by rifle fire from soldiers of the reconnaissance battalion, and the pilots were captured. Judging by the German description (“we have never seen such primitive aircraft”), these were Po-2 aircraft. It is curious that on August 1, 1944, the battalion was awarded a special award - a special letter from Adolf Hitler, in which the Fuhrer personally thanked the soldiers of the 10th SS Reconnaissance Battalion for the destruction of three enemy aircraft at Kurdvanovka.

Meanwhile, the Soviet command also did not sit idly by. Realizing the importance of such a key point as Podgaitsy, which was supposed to become the basis for further development Soviet offensive, on April 6, the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front gave the following order: “The 4th Tank Army, having subjugated the 147th Infantry Division, advance by forced march in vehicles to the western bank of the river. Strypa, strike at Podgaitsy and drive the enemy back. Koropets." However, the terrible condition of the roads did not allow this order to be carried out: the Soviet troops, like the Germans, got stuck in the mud and lost valuable time, and when the situation with the weather and roads improved, it was already too late.

Nevertheless, this and other orders intensified the actions of the Red Army. On the afternoon of April 6, Soviet troops, with 2-3 infantry companies supported by 4 tanks, broke through to the north of Osovitsa, at Vishnevchik (squeezing out the 100th Jaeger Division), and then at Bobulintsy (squeezing out parts of the Hinze group) and created dangerous jamming. After this, the threat of encirclement loomed over the Germans in Osowitz. Since the attempt to reinforce the bridgehead failed due to lack of fuel, Brinkmann ordered Hinze to abandon his positions and retreat to Kurdvanovka. During the night, the SS men evacuated their small bridgehead on Stryp and by 3 o'clock in the morning they reached Kurdvanovka. Realizing what was happening, the Soviet troops did not waste time: they crossed the Strypa and entrenched themselves on both banks of the river. Thus, from Vishnevchik to Osovitsa a dangerous Soviet bridgehead was created with a key point in Bobulintsy. Note that, despite a fairly active day, the losses of the reconnaissance battalion amounted to only one person wounded.

On April 7, the 367th Infantry Division, operating on the right flank of the II SS Panzer Corps, struck in the direction of the confluence of the Strypa and the Dniester. The attack was successful, and on the left flank the army infantrymen established contact with the 21st SS Regiment, thereby creating a continuous front. On the same day, the 100th Jaeger Division, reinforced by the 506th heavy tank battalion of Major Eberhard Lange, repelled all Soviet attacks and secured a foothold on the eastern bank of the Strypa near Zolotnikov, in the north of the corps’ defense sector. The next day, heavy Ferdinad self-propelled guns from the 653rd anti-tank division approached the division.

Heinz Harmel

Heinz Harmel during exercises (coincident in time)

At this moment, the main units of the 1st Tank Army were stuck on dirt roads in the area of ​​the Seret River, 25 kilometers east of Strypa. In front of Hube's army lay an open, treeless area that stretched west all the way to the Dniester. The chances of the army quickly receiving reinforcements or supplies were very low, given that Frundsberg could not expand the bridgehead at Buchach, and the main part of the SS Hohenstaufen division was still in the Berezhany area and had not yet entered to battle. And although small infantry reinforcements from the 21st SS Regiment reached the position of the 6th Company in Buchach by April 7, the bulk of the Frundsberg forces were still in the area northwest of Monastyriska.

The situation was aggravated by the fact that the Germans failed to create a continuous front along Strypa. The 15-kilometer gap between the right flank of the 100th Jaeger Division at Zolotnikov and the weak Frundsberg forces in Buchach was covered only by the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion. And then he covered it purely formally, since by that moment, April 7, the reconnaissance battalion found itself in Kurdvanovka almost completely isolated, communication with its neighbors (100th Jaeger Division to the north and 22nd SS Regiment to the south) had not been established. Because of the mud, only half-track vehicles could move more or less successfully, so the 1st company of SS Obersturmführer Karl Ziebrecht on wheeled armored vehicles, which was unable to overcome the mud, still remained in Podgaitsy as a reserve.

Under these conditions, Heinrich Brinkmann and his men did everything in their power to maintain control of the area. Since one of the most important tasks of the battalion was to cover the front at Buchach from the north, mobile patrols were sent to the area of ​​​​the gap between Buchach and Zlotniki. Such a patrol included two armored personnel carriers with a 20 mm gun and one radio armored personnel carrier. In addition, a reinforced combined patrol was formed under the command of SS Untersturmführer Rudolf Harmstorff, commander of the 2nd company. Their task was simple - without getting involved in battles, to imitate the German presence along the entire front at Strypa. It is clear that patrols of such force could not seriously influence the situation, but still it was better than nothing, especially since the enemy did not show much activity at first.

Since the threat of a strike from Soviet troops was brewing from the northeast, in order to cover this dangerous area, Brinkmann sent a reinforced Harmstorf patrol to the area north of the village of Kuydanovo. The remaining patrols were engaged in patrolling near Strypa, periodically coming into fire contact with small groups of Soviet troops. Let us add that on April 7, Gottfried Kuffner’s patrol destroyed a Soviet reconnaissance plane that had made an emergency landing.

Meanwhile, in preparation for a potential Soviet attack, the battalion was actively establishing a foothold in Kurdvanovka. Defense work was carried out under the leadership of veteran of the Demyansk pocket, SS Untersturmführer Helmut Temanns, officer for special assignments of the battalion headquarters. Some armored personnel carriers were dug into the ground and turned into firing points. Soldiers dug up rifle cells and some houses were turned into strongholds. Hinze's company, moved closer to the front, dug in on the right flank, but suffered losses from sniper fire and was forced to retreat, gaining a foothold in front of Kurdvanovka itself.

On the night of April 8, Rudolf Harmstorff attacked the area of ​​the Soviet bridgehead in Bobulintsy and Vishnevchik, despite the significant superiority of the enemy. Losses were two killed and six wounded, plus one cannon armored personnel carrier, but overall the raid was successful: prisoners were taken and testified. It was established that the enemy had concentrated large forces here, including units of the 10th Guards Tank Corps. Considering that this area had not previously received much attention, this valuable information was of particular importance. Harmstorff's 2nd Company fought almost the entire day at the front near this bridgehead, “exerting fire pressure on the enemy,” as the Germans noted in documents.

Now it immediately became clear to the German command that if Soviet troops in this sector successfully crossed Strypa and turned south, then they would be able to again encircle the 1st Panzer Army, and even the SS Frundsberg division to boot. After analyzing the situation, at 20:35 Routh gave the order to the SS Hohenstaufen division to attack through Kosovo and cross Strypa north of Zolotniki. In turn, “Frundsberg” was supposed to strike to the northeast from the bridgehead in Buchach and, operating on the eastern bank of the Strypa, connect with them, creating a more or less continuous front.

During the night of 7–8 April, the 1st SS Sturmbannführer Alois Wild's 1st Battalion of the 22nd SS Regiment reached Buchach and in the morning joined elements of the 2nd Panzer Battalion in their attack to the northeast, to join the Hohenstaufen. The 1st Division of the 10th SS Artillery Regiment also arrived in Buchach and supported the attack. During the battle, tanks and artillery destroyed 40 Soviet anti-tank guns and several self-propelled guns, as a result the SS men somewhat expanded the bridgehead northeast of Buchach. True, the threat on the flank was not completely eliminated, and the SS men gained a foothold in new positions. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion of the 22nd SS Regiment also crossed Strypa and established contact with Wild units, which further strengthened the bridgehead. On the same day, the 367th Infantry Division took control of a 30-kilometer line from Buchach southwest to the Dniester.

While Frundsberg was desperately expanding its bridgehead, the 1st Panzer Army was also not idle: the opposing Soviet troops on the Buchach front were driven back, and communications between the German armies was again restored. At noon on April 8, Model, Hube and Hausser met in Buchach, formally demonstrating to the world the stability of the German position on this sector of the front and achieved success in the rescue of the 1st Tank Army. Now a new phase of the operation began. The Germans faced two main tasks: firstly, to hold and expand the corridor in Buchach, through which to withdraw units of the 1st Tank Army as soon as possible, and secondly, to release the garrison of the encircled Ternopil, which was unequivocally declared a “fortress”.

Heinz Harmel during an exercise

Meanwhile, the enemy was not going to give up. At 21.45 on April 8, Soviet troops launched a strong attack in the Terebovlya area, 35 kilometers south of Ternopil, with the aim of closing the corridor at Buchach. Routh immediately ordered the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions and the 100th Jäger Division to strike towards the advancing Soviet forces and destroy them. Serious difficulties arose with the implementation of this order. The next day, Hohenstaufen and the 100th Jäger Division began to move into their starting positions for a decisive attack, but became bogged down in battles with fiercely attacking Soviet units, while Frundsberg spent the entire day in local battles in the Buchach area, mainly against units of the 18th Guards Rifle Corps. The success of these defensive battles showed that although Routh's planned attack was thwarted, the enemy was also stopped and the situation stabilized for the Germans.

SS tank in Ukraine in the spring of 1944

The new commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal Walter Model, personally planned the operation to relieve the blockade of Ternopil. For this purpose, the 9th SS Division Hohenstaufen was temporarily withdrawn from the II SS Panzer Corps and reassigned to the IIL Panzer Corps of Panzer General Hermann Balck. Hohenstaufen reinforced the Friebe battle group, created on the basis of the 8th Panzer Division. This group was supposed to deliver the main blow. The attack began on April 11 in pouring rain. Despite heavy losses, the two tank divisions managed to cover only half the distance separating them from Ternopil, and the operation ended in failure.

Meanwhile, units of the 1st Tank Army continued to escape from encirclement through the Buchach corridor, but all this was carried out extremely slowly. On April 10, the 21st and 22nd SS regiments, supported by the 2nd battalion of the 10th SS Panzer Regiment, entered into a heavy battle with the 18th Guards Rifle Corps to expand the German bridgehead northeast of Buchach. This was necessary to expand the corridor so that most of the 1st Tank Army could finally leave the pocket. The situation was not in favor of the Soviet troops, exhausted from previous battles: the corps divisions (141st, 226th, 280th Rifle Divisions) had only 300-350 active bayonets, and there was almost no artillery. Therefore, despite the arrival of some units of the 67th Rifle Corps at Afonin, the operation was successful for the Germans, and by dawn on April 11, the German bridgehead was expanded by 10 kilometers, and the 18th Guards Rifle Corps was pushed northeast and south of Buchach . The expansion of the bridgehead made it possible to somewhat speed up the exit of units of the 1st Tank Army from encirclement.

Between 11 and 15 April, the 21st and 22nd SS Regiments, plus the 2nd Battalion of the 10th SS Panzer Regiment, supported by the 1st Battalion of the 10th SS Artillery Regiment, continued to defend the bridgehead northeast of Buczacz against the fierce attacks by Soviet troops trying to prevent the breakthrough of the 1st Tank Army. The intensity of the fighting was reflected in the combat report of the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on April 14, 1944: “The 4th Panzer Army with 11.30 part of its forces resumed the offensive and, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy’s 10th SS Panzer Division, advanced two kilometers west of Kaytanovka, captured Bobulintsy, Kurdybanovka (southern) and reached an unnamed stream four kilometers southwest of Osovtsy. During the day of the battle, 5 tanks and self-propelled guns and up to 150 enemy soldiers and officers were destroyed.”

The most difficult trials fell on the 21st SS Regiment, in which on April 10-15 only 7 company commanders were killed. On April 14, Heinz Laubscheer, commander of the 1st battalion of the 21st SS regiment, was wounded; Leo-Herman Reinhold took command of the battalion directly on the battlefield. It was no easier for the 22nd SS Regiment: in these battles, the commander of the 22nd SS Regiment, SS-Obersturmbannführer Ernst Schutzek (April 11), and the commander of the 1st battalion of this regiment, SS-Sturmbannführer Wild, were seriously wounded (April 19, Wild died in a field hospital) . The only tank battalion of the 10th SS Panzer Regiment, the 2nd, was sent to support the 22nd Regiment.

At the same time, the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion was fighting heavily in the sector opposite the Soviet bridgehead at Osovitsa, 12 kilometers north of Buchach. As we remember, the Soviet bridgehead on Strypa posed a serious threat; it was obvious to everyone that if this bridgehead was not quickly eliminated, then Soviet troops would be able to use it for another attempt to encircle the 1st Tank Army. This was not easy to do, given that Brinkmann's battalion was the only German unit between the positions of the SS Division Frundsberg at Buchach and the 100th Jäger Division at Zolotniki in the north. On April 10, Soviet troops attacked the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion from the bridgehead in Bobulintsy. Although the attack was repulsed, the situation remained serious. Losses for the day amounted to 7 killed and 16 wounded, 2 armored personnel carriers. On April 11, Brinkmann launched a counterattack with the reinforced 3rd company of Hinze, which in the afternoon captured the heights on the outskirts of Bobulintsy. On the same day, the 4th company of SS-Oberschurmführer Pauli, which had established a defensive line on Stryp, without any heavy weapons, was subjected to a counterattack by Soviet troops with the support of tanks. The Red Army soldiers managed to break into the German line, but after one Type KV-1 tank was hit by a PAK-40, Pauli corrected the situation with a counterattack. Despite the “active day”, the battalion’s losses amounted to only 4 wounded soldiers. Then parts of the battalion were drawn into stubborn defensive battles. There was no continuous line of defense; in some places, Soviet troops infiltrated into the German rear; to eliminate these breakthroughs, Brinkmann launched hastily created patrols. SS Unterscharführer Franz Nowak of the 4th Company recalled: “Russian infantrymen will bleed to death on our lines. We shoot to the last bullet, the Russians are driven back. I touched a Russian soldier dying from a wound in the stomach with my machine gun. I light a cigarette and give it to the dying man... After a few puffs, he closes his eyes.”

In heavy fighting that lasted several days, the battalion also suffered heavy losses. Hinze's 3rd company was surrounded at Bobulintsy, but on April 14 it managed to break out of the ring and retreat to Kurdvanovka. At dawn on April 15, the enemy penetrated the positions of the 2nd platoon of the 3rd company at Kurdvanovka with infantry supported by two tanks. The Soviet troops did not show much decisiveness, limiting themselves to only occupying a few houses on the outskirts. At about 2 p.m., SS-Unterscharführer Gstottner destroyed one tank from a range of 30 meters with a Panzerfaust, after which SS-Untersturmführer Rudolf Hoffmann, commander of the 2nd platoon, counterattacked with the support of the sapper platoon of SS-Hauptscharführer Hartmann. During this bold attack, Hoffmann, who was in the front ranks, was killed, but the Red Army soldiers were driven out of Kurdvanovka.

Brinkmann then sent several patrols forward to clarify the situation. A patrol from SS Untersturmführer Georg Siebenhuner from the 3rd Company was sent north to pinpoint the enemy's position. During reconnaissance, Siebenhuner came across a Soviet position at the edge of the forest. Two camouflaged tanks opened fire on the leading armored personnel carrier. Within seconds, several German vehicles were on fire. Siebenhuner himself died. The rather battered patrol returned to Kurdvanovka. It was also hot in Kurdvanovka itself: during the day, Soviet artillery opened harassing fire on the village, and the battalion suffered losses in killed and wounded. On April 15, 9 people were killed (including 1 officer) and 44 wounded (one of them, SS Untersturmführer Hans Oetjens from the 4th company, was slightly wounded and remained in service).

While Brienmann's scouts held the front along Strypa, the headquarters of the II SS Panzer Corps was preparing its operation to eliminate the enemy bridgehead. On April 14-15, units of the 7th Panzer Division replaced the 21st SS Regiment in positions near Buchach. The released units were concentrated on the eastern bank of the Strypa, together with the 22nd SS Regiment, to participate in the planned attack against the Soviet bridgehead. A little further north, on the western side of the river, the 3rd battalion of the 21st SS regiment, parts of the 73rd Panzer-Grenadier Regiment of the 19th Panzer Division and 20 Tigers of the 506th Heavy Tank Battalion were concentrated. Units of the 100th Jäger Division, in particular the 54th Jäger Regiment, prepared to attack from the north, and the 10th SS Reconnaissance Battalion from the west. At 1600 on 15 April, the 3rd Battalion of the 21st SS Regiment carried out a limited attack to the north to improve its position before the attack.

The concentrated German attack began on the morning of 16 April. Note that in the last two days the weather has improved and the roads have dried out a little, which has facilitated the operation of the German mobile forces. The 1st battalion of the 21st SS regiment attacked from the east of Strypa, and the 3rd battalion of the 21st SS regiment attacked from the west bank. Then the 22nd SS Regiment took action, and by noon the 1st Battalion of the regiment had knocked out Soviet troops from the forest near the village of Starye Petlikovtsy. On the right flank, the 9th company of the 22nd SS regiment crossed Strypa and captured height 392; here, to the right, the 1st company of the 21st SS regiment reached height 380 - two kilometers northeast of Osovitsa. Units of the 73rd Panzer-Grenadier Regiment and the Tigers of the 506th Tank Battalion began to concentrate south of Kurdvanovka. Seeing that the situation was not changing for the better, Soviet troops unexpectedly withdrew from their positions in the southeast of Kurdvanovka. Having learned about this, Brinkmann decided to immediately attack Bobulintsy in order to block the enemy’s escape routes.

The day before, reconnaissance had established that Soviet troops had seriously fortified themselves in Bobulintsy and on the heights next to them, having dug tanks into the ground. The rather battered 137th Infantry Division of the Red Army defended itself here (according to the testimony of prisoners, it consisted of about 600 people). The attack was carried out by the forces of the 4th company of SS Hauptsturmführer Kurt Pauli, reinforced by two cannon armored personnel carriers. Before the attack, a single Stug-III self-propelled gun from the SS division “Das Reich” came out to Kurdvanovka, straying from its division. Brinkmann assigned self-propelled guns to the 4th Company.

Pauli drove 1 kilometer into enemy territory, where his company came under fire from Soviet anti-tank artillery and tanks. The SS men were supported by army Tigers, who knocked out two Soviet tanks; another tank was destroyed by soldiers of the 4th company using a 75-mm anti-tank gun on an armored personnel carrier. After this, the enemy fled. Pursuing him, Pauli went out to the Bobulins. At the same time, the 54th Jaeger Regiment of the 100th Jaeger Division broke into the northern outskirts of Bobulintsy, and the 73rd Panzer-Grenadier Regiment attacked from the south. At this moment, units of the 2nd company of the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion under the command of SS Untersturmführer Harmstorff approached Kurt Pauli's company. The sapper platoon of SS Hauptscharführer Hartmann, without special equipment, manually cleared the passages for the equipment and the grenadier. Despite this, two armored personnel carriers were lost to mines. However, this did not stop the attack of the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion. Two Soviet anti-tank artillery positions were destroyed. At 17.00 a height 1 kilometer west of Bobulintsy was captured. By 19.00, the Bobulins were finally surrounded by the Germans, and the SS men were drawn into fierce street fighting in the village. The Red Army soldiers fought to the last, but by 20.00 the Bobulins were taken, about which Pauli immediately informed the command. Brinkmann immediately transferred two platoons of the 3rd company here. The SS men dug in in the village, and Harmstorff's patrol was sent on reconnaissance, further to the east. In the north, contact was established with the 100th Jaeger Division, and units of the 21st SS Regiment were approaching from the south. This success was paid for at a high price: three armored personnel carriers were lost, one cannon armored personnel carrier, and in addition, the self-propelled gun from Das Reich that Pauli had been given was blown up by a mine. 10 people were killed, 7 were wounded, two were missing. Among the wounded was the commander of the 3rd platoon of the 4th company, SS-Hauptscharführer Karl Keller.

After the capture of Bobulintsy, the Soviet bridgehead was eliminated, and now the Germans firmly controlled the front along the Strypa and the bridgehead at Buchach. Now some units of the SS Frundsberg division have been transferred to reserve, in particular the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion.

On April 20, the last units of the 1st Tank Army safely crossed Strypa, and thus the army successfully completed the evacuation and finally broke out of the encirclement. As Paul Hausser wrote after the war: “Seeing the remnants of an army emerging from encirclement after fighting during the Russian winter is a difficult sight for any soldier. To provide care for the wounded and sick, a lot of preparatory work was required from the corps doctor and quartermaster.” It is needless to note that the medical staff and supplies of the SS division “Frundsberg” bore a significant part of the burden of assisting the units of the 1st Panzer Army.

On April 21, the 3rd battalion of the 21st SS regiment, the 10th SS reconnaissance battalion and the divisional escort company took up positions in the Bobulintsy area, where they remained until the division was relieved. On this day, the reconnaissance battalion at the Strypa front destroyed one Soviet 150-mm self-propelled gun.

The exit of the 1st Tank Army from encirclement was a major success for the German command. After the war G.K. Zhukov joylessly noted in his memoirs: “Neither I nor the front headquarters could determine exactly how many people broke out of the encirclement. Different numbers were mentioned. Apparently, it was not dozens of tanks with landing forces that emerged from the encirclement, as the troops then reported, but much more.” It is noteworthy that it was the SS division Frundsberg that played one of the main roles in this operation.

On April 25, two army divisions relieved the Frundsberg in the positions at Buczacz, and Infantry General Friedrich Schulz's 59th Army Corps replaced the II SS Panzer Corps in this sector. Thus, the first military campaign for the 10th SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg" ended. One of the young soldiers of the reconnaissance battalion summed it up in a peculiar way: “The conscription born in 1925 went through its baptism by fire! Now we were real front-line soldiers!”

The division's losses in its “first test” amounted to 2,076 people, of which 577 were killed and died from wounds, of which 18 were officers (of which SS Untersturmführer Werner Gutgessel died in the hospital on May 10 from his wounds; the aforementioned SS Sturmbannführer Wild also died in the hospital ), 1432 wounded and 67 missing.

On April 27, the division's commander changed. Von Treuenfeld was recalled to carry out a “special assignment”, and his position was taken by SS Standartenführer Heinz Harmel, holder of the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves. He gained fame as the commander of the SS Deutschland Regiment of the SS Division Das Reich. In March-April 1944, Harmel completed the courses for division commanders, after which he was appointed commander of the Frundsberg. On May 18 he was promoted to SS Oberführer.

Harmel noted his appointment with an order for the division:

“Officers and soldiers of the 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg!

The Reichsführer SS appointed me commander of the 10th SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg". Today I took command. I am happy that I will command a division whose name reflects the glorious traditions of Frundsberg being revived in the army. Discipline and an inexhaustible aggressive spirit are decisive in the transition to these traditions. I am proud that the young division showed itself worthily in the first battle and received full recognition. I believe in my officers and men and expect that the division will take its place alongside the old SS divisions. And this place will not be the last! For the Fuhrer, the people and the Reich!

Another change in the command structure was the change of commander in the 10th SS Panzer Regiment. In April, SS-Obersturmbannführer Franz Kleffner was appointed commander of the 6th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment "Theodor Eicke", leaving the 10th SS Panzer Regiment without a commander at all. True, this did not cause any particular difficulties or inconveniences, since the division did not conduct combat operations, and the regiment itself consisted of only one battalion (2nd). Looking ahead, we note that only on June 22 a new regiment commander was appointed - SS Obersturmbannführer Otto Petsch became him.

The II SS Panzer Corps spent the rest of April and May in the reserve of Army Group Northern Ukraine in the Lvov region. Here, the main task of Frundsberg was to prepare to repel the expected Soviet offensive in the sector at the junction between Army Groups Center and Northern Ukraine. Everyday life was spent in constant training alerts and work on equipping stationary defensive positions on Buta. Some of the division's personnel were involved in anti-partisan actions. In particular, the combat report of the II SS Panzer Corps noted that Jagdkommandos from the 9th and 10th SS divisions took part in the liquidation of a Soviet “gang” of almost 300 people, among whom were 20 “Soviet paratroopers” (that is, dropped on parachutes of military specialists from the Red Army) in the Bobrka area. The nationalist forces also suffered: in addition, in the Berezhany area, the SS destroyed a detachment of the Ukrainian rebel army(and Bandera’s), numbering about 200 people.

It is characteristic that, despite the operations against Ukrainian nationalist forces, during its stay near Lvov, Ukrainians were enrolled in the division, mainly as translators and volunteer assistants (Hiwi - Hilfswillige - voluntary assistant), in total there were about 200 people.

On June 1, 1944, the II SS Panzer Corps came under the command of the 1st Panzer Army, but in light of subsequent events it did not stay in its composition for long.

On June 1, there were 426 officers, 2,432 non-commissioned officers and 14,165 soldiers in the ranks of the SS division "Frundsberg" - a total of 17,023 people. However, as of June 30, the division's personnel strength had been reduced to 13,552, so it is likely that some of the division's personnel were transferred to reinforce other units.

The division's actions received high praise and recognition from the German command. The true expression of this was a special order from Field Marshal Model (issued on the day that the II SS Panzer Corps was leaving for France), in which he emphasized the merits of the Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg divisions. In this document, we are primarily interested in the part dedicated to the SS division “Frundsberg”: “The corps played a major role in strengthening the front in a very difficult time and in creating a shield for the defense of the Motherland. With the restoration of contact with the 1st Panzer Army in Buchach, you... the soldiers of the 10th SS Panzer Division helped save the situation in a critical situation... I recognize your services and thank you. Now the Fuhrer is calling you to a new mission. I am confident that you will carry out his order in accordance with our motto: “There are no better soldiers in the world than the soldiers of Adolf Hitler!”

An objective analysis shows that the first baptism of fire of the SS division Frundsberg ended in complete success. Still “green”, with no combat experience, and in addition, not yet fully equipped, the division rose to the occasion, fully confirming its high rank of “SS Panzer Division”. Although it should be noted that since the division had only one tank battalion, Frundsberg actually acted as a panzer-grenadier division, and not a tank division.

The division successfully fought both offensive and defensive battles. In the “best traditions” of the SS troops, she was thrown into battle almost from the march, not yet completing a full deployment. Dirt and off-road conditions presented serious obstacles, but they were successfully overcome. During the battle, the advance detachment in Buchach was temporarily cut off, but successfully held out in encirclement. True, it should be said that the Soviet troops opposing Frundsberg, mainly the 18th Guards Rifle Corps, were exhausted from previous battles and experienced a significant shortage of personnel and weapons. Nevertheless, Frundsberg was also still far from the “best form” of the SS Panzer Division.

Sons of the Reich. P.4.

List of killed division officers. Personal archive of R. Ponomarenko. L. 1. We add that the next day, March 29, the list of division losses was supplemented by the doctor of the 3rd battalion of the 22nd SS regiment, SS Hauptsturmführer Dr. Ingo Riedl, and the commander of the 3rd battalion of the 21st SS regiment, SS Hauptsturmführer Werner Schmid.

It is interesting that radio reconnaissance of the 1st Ukrainian Front detected the operation of a radio network of a tank division, unknown numbering, in the Zolochev area on March 26; on March 27 they detected the concentration of two tank divisions in this area, and on March 28 - infantry and tanks on the approaches to Podgaitsy. This gave rise to some domestic historians, for example B. Sokolov, to conclude that the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps were already near Lvov at this time, which, as we have seen, is not true. (Cm. Sokolov B. Red Army against SS troops. P. 283). So it is unclear what exactly Soviet radio intelligence detected and whether it was German disinformation.

Chronique de la SS-Pz-AA 10 S. 151. Needless to say, this statement sharply contrasts with generally accepted myths about the superiority of SS units over the Wehrmacht in terms of equipment and equipment.

Tributary of the Dniester.

Due to the condition of the supply routes, supply at this moment could only be carried out by dropping containers from the air.

Afonin I.M. It was difficult, but the path was glorious. P. 139.

Cm., Reynolds M. Sons of the Reich. P.5.

Moskalenko K.S. On Pivdeno-Zakhidny Direct P. 342. We note that, having absolutely no knowledge of the material, the Russian historian B. Sokolov, obviously relying on Soviet memoirists, claims that on the morning of April 5, both SS tank divisions and the two mentioned above were brought into battle army divisions (Red Army against SS troops. P. 292). Such a statement is unfounded, given the above material about the SS division “Frundsberg”. As for the Hohenstaufen, on April 5, only one battalion from this division was able to enter the battle - Ernst Hagenlocher's 1st battalion from the 19th SS Regiment. The remaining units of the 9th SS Division were still arriving at the front by this time.

From the Dnieper to the Vistula. P. 187.

6th SS Panzer Army

The formation of the headquarters began on September 6, 1944 by the command of the SS troops "Dislots". On Sept. In 1944 the army was transferred to the subordination of Army Group B in the West. In Feb. In 1945, the army was transferred to Army Group South in Hungary. In May 1945, the army headquarters surrendered in Krems (Austria) to the American troops of General. D. Patton.

The army included the I and II SS Panzer Corps and the LXVII Army Corps.

Commander: SS Oberstgruppenführer, SS Colonel General Joseph Dietrich (6.9.1944 - 8.5.1945)

I SS Panzer Corps "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" (I SS-Pz.Korps "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler")

The corps headquarters was formed on August 14, 1943 (the formation of the entire corps was completed in December 1943) in Berlin-Lichterfeld; Initially, the corps headquarters were located in Brussels. It has been used as part of the ground forces since Aug. 1943. On Dec. 1943 subordinated to the command of the 14th Army in Italy, and in January. 1944 transferred to the reserve of Army Group D in France. In June 1944 he became part of the 7th Army in Normandy. The following month he became part of the tank group "West", which in August. 1944 was deployed to the 5th Tank Army.

On Sept. - Oct. 1944 fought as part of the 7th Army in the Eifel region in France. On Nov. 1944 was taken to rest in Westphalia, and the following month transferred to the reserve of the main command in the West. In Jan. 1945, as part of the 5th Tank Army, participated in the offensive in the Ardennes. After a holiday in Germany (February - March 1945) in April. 1945 transferred to the 6th SS Panzer Army in Hungary.

The corps included the 1st SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler", the 12th SS Panzer Division "Hitler Youth", the Training Panzer Division (in Normandy), as well as the 101st (501st) SS Heavy Tank Battalion. Corps units were numbered 101 (501). In May 1945, together with the army, he retreated to Lower Austria and surrendered to Anglo-American troops in the Vienna area.

Commanders: SS Oberstgruppenführer, SS Colonel General Joseph Dietrich (4.7.1943-9.8.1944); SS Brigadeführer, Major General of the SS troops Fritz Kraemer (9.8.1944-16.8.1944); SS-Obergruppenführer, SS General Georg Keppler (16.8.1944-30.10.1944); SS Gruppenführer, Lieutenant General of the SS troops Hermann Priss (October 30, 1944 - May 8, 1945).

II SS Panzer Corps (II SS-Pz.Korps)

Formed in June 1942 in Bergen-Belsen under the name of the SS Panzer Corps, received the number “2” on June 1, 1943. In Aug. 1942 - Feb. 1943 was in France as part of Army Group D, and then transferred to the southern sector of the Eastern Front near Kharkov and in March 1943 included in the 4th Tank Army. It was used as part of the ground forces from March 1943; at this time it included the 1st SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich", the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf".

Fought at Kharkov and Belgorod (summer offensive 1943). In July 1943, together with the army, he was transferred to Kursk. After the fall of the fascist regime in Italy in August. 1943 transferred to the Apennines (to Eastern Front only the SS division “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler” remained) and in December. became part of the 14th Army. In Jan. 1944 transferred to France to the Alençon area. As of March 1944, the corps included the 9th SS Panzer Division "Hohenstaufen", the 10th SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg", a tank training division and the 349th Infantry Division.

Since Apr. 1944 fought in the Lviv region in Northern Ukraine as part of the 1st Tank Army, but in July 1944 he returned to France and took part in the battle in Normandy as part of the West tank group. Since Aug. 1944 - in the 5th Tank Army. In Oct. - Nov. 1944 fought as part of the 1st Parachute Army, and in January. 1945 in the ranks of the 6th SS Panzer Army participated in the offensive in the Ardennes. After a holiday in Germany (February - March 1945), as part of the same army, he took part in the offensive near Budapest. Having suffered heavy losses, he retreated to Lower Austria and in May 1945 surrendered to Anglo-American troops.

Commanders: SS-Obergruppenführer, SS General Paul Hausser (1.6.1942-28.6.1944); SS-Obergruppenführer, SS General Wilhelm Bittrich (10.7.1944-8.5.1945).

Volunteer Legion "Norway", 1942 As an interesting fact, it should be noted that there are no buttonholes. There were several examples of sleeve patches for Norwegian volunteers. The one shown in this photo is shaped like the Norwegian flag with a blue and white cross on a red background. Another type of this patch was an image of a red shield with a black outline and a cross located in the center.

III (German) SS Panzer Corps (HI germanisches SS-Pz.Korp)

Formed on March 30, 1943, and it consisted mainly of SS units formed from “Germanic” peoples and Volksdeutsche. These were new SS formations, primarily the 11th SS Motorized Division "Nordland" and the 4th SS Volunteer Motorized Brigade "Netherland". It has been used as part of the ground forces since Sept. 1943, when it was included in the 2nd Tank Army in the Balkans. Here he fought against the partisans of Marshal I. Broz-Tito, and after Italy left the war, he participated in the disarmament of Italian units and the occupation of Northern Italy. On Sept. - Nov. 1943 was again thrown against the partisans. Only during one operation at the end of November.

1943 500 people The 1st battalion of the 24th SS Panzer Regiment was destroyed in the Glina area approx. 5 thousand partisans (however, the partisans then defeated the 23rd and 24th regiments at Glina). At the end of Nov. 1943 began his transfer to the front of the 18th Army, which occupied positions in the Oranienbaum area near Leningrad. March - September 1944 fought as part of the army group "Narva", and in November. 1944 returned to the 18th Army defending in Courland. In Feb. 1945 transferred to Arnswald, where he was included in the 11th Army of Army Group Vistula. From March 1945 he was part of the 3rd Panzer Army, which fought in the Stettin area. In the last days of the war he occupied positions near Mecklenburg.

Commanders: SS Obergruppenführer, SS General Felix Steiner (10.5.1943-9.11.1944); SS-Obergruppenführer, SS General Georg Kepler (11/9/1944-2/4/1945); SS-Obergruppenführer, General of the SS troops Matthias Kleinheisterkamp (4.2.1945-11.2.1945); Lieutenant General Martin Unrein (11.2.1945-5.3.1945); SS Brigadeführer, Major General of the SS troops Joachim Ziegler (5.3.1945-1.5.1945).

IV SS Panzer Corps (IV SS-Pz.Korp)

Formed on August 14, 1943 in Poitiers (France). On June 30, 1944, it included parts of the disbanded VII SS Panzer Corps. It has been used as part of the ground forces since Aug. 1944, when he was included in the 9th Army, operating in the Warsaw area on the Soviet-German front. In Oct. - Dec.

1944 the corps included the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf", the 5th SS Panzer Division "Wiking", the 104th (504th) Heavy Artillery Division, as well as different time The 711th, 96th Infantry, 118th Jaeger and 211th People's Grenadier divisions were assigned. On Dec. 1944 transferred to the reserve of Army Group Center (in Warsaw), and in January.

1945 - Army Group South in Hungary. From Feb. 1945 fought in Hungary as part of the 6th SS Panzer Army. After the defeat near Budapest, it retreated to Enns (Austria), where it was disbanded in May 1945.

Commanders: SS-Obergruppenführer, SS and Police General Alfred Wünneberg (8.6.1943-23.10.1943); SS Gruppenführer, SS Lieutenant General Walter Kruger (10/23/1943-3/14/1944); SS-Obergruppenführer, General of the SS troops Matthias Kleinheisterkamp (1.7-20.7.1944); SS Brigadeführer, SS Major General Nikolaus Heilmann (20.7.1944-6.8.1944); SS Obergruppenführer, SS General Herbert Otto Gille (6.8.1944-8.5.1945).

V SS Volunteer Mountain Corps (V SS-Freiwilligen-Gebirgskorps; V SS-Frw. Geb. Korp)

Formed on August 14, 1943 in Prague, it was used in the Balkans to conduct anti-partisan operations. In Oct. 1943 the corps included the 7th SS Volunteer Mountain Division "Prince Eugene", the 13th SS Mountain Division "Hanjar", the 369th (Croatian) and 181st Reserve Infantry Divisions; In addition, the 21st SS Mountain Division "Skanderbeg" and the 23rd SS Mountain Division "Kama" were operationally subordinate to the corps headquarters. Then he was transferred to Germany. It was used as part of the ground forces from November. 1943, when it was included in the 2nd Tank Army operating in Bosnia. In Feb. 1945 transferred to the 9th Army of the Vistula Army Group, which occupied positions on the Oder. As of March 1945, the corps included the 32nd SS Volunteer Grenadier Division “30 January”, the 286th and 391st Infantry Divisions, the garrison of the Frankfurt-on-Oder fortress and the 5th SS assault battalion. Capitulated in May 1945 near Berlin.

Commanders: SS-Obergruppenführer, SS General Arthur Phleps (4.7.1943-21.9.1944); SS Brigadeführer, Major General of the SS troops Karl Ritter von Oberkamp (21.9-1.10.1944); SS-Obergruppenführer, SS and Police General Friedrich Jeckeln (10/1/1944-5/8/1945).

VI SS Army Corps (Latvian) (VI Waffen - A.K. der SS)

Formed on 10/8/1943, and it included Latvian SS formations: the 15th and 19th Grenadier Divisions of the SS Troops, as well as the Grenadier (Latvian No. 7) Regiment of the SS Troops, etc. It was used as part of the ground forces from January. 1944, when it was included in the 16th Army, operating in the North of Russia in the Pleskau region. Until the end of the war, he fought in the ranks of this and also the 18th army, retreating fighting to Courland, where in May 1945 he surrendered to Soviet troops.

Commanders: SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS Troops and Police Karl von Pfeffer-Wildenbruch (8.10.1943-11.6.1944); SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS Troops and Police Friedrich Jeckeln (11.6.1944-21.7.1944); SS Gruppenführer, Lieutenant General of the SS troops Karl Fischer von Treuenfeld (21-25.7.1944); SS-Obergruppenführer, SS General Walter Krueger (25.7.1944-8.5.1945).

VII SS Panzer Corps (VII SS-Panzerkorp)

Possibly formed in Oct. 1943. Composition unknown; On July 20, 1944, it was disbanded and its units were merged into the IV SS Panzer Corps.

Commander: SS-Obergruppenführer, General of the SS troops Matthias Kleinheisterkamp (10.1943-20.7.1944).

IX Waffen SS Mountain Corps (Croatian) (IX Waffen Gebirgskorps (Kroatisches)

It began to form in June 1944 in Baksalmas (Hungary), where it included the 22nd SS Mountain Division "Kama" and the 509th SS Heavy Artillery Division. In Oct. 1944 transferred to Croatia. It was used for anti-partisan operations until the end of 1944, when it was transferred to Hungary. On Dec. 1944, near Budapest, the corps included the 8th SS Cavalry Division "Florian Geyer", the 22nd SS Volunteer Cavalry Division "Maria Theresa", the Felhernhalle Panzer Division and the 13th Panzer Division. In addition, several unreliable Hungarian divisions were subordinated to the corps command. 12.2.1945 destroyed near Budapest by Soviet troops. Only 170 servicemen managed to escape from the encirclement.

Commanders: Gruppenführer, SS Lieutenant General Karl Gustav Sauberzweig (21.6-12.1944); SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS Troops and Police Karl von Pfeffer-Wildenbruch (12.1944 - 12.2.1945).

X SS Army Corps (X SS-A.)

Formed in Jan. 1945 (possibly from the headquarters of anti-gang units). In March 1945, destroyed in Pomerania.

Commanders: SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS Troops and Police Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski (26.1-10.2.1945); Lieutenant General Günter Krappe (10.2-7.3.1945); SS Standartenführer Herbert Goltz (7.3.1945-3.1945).

XI SS Panzer Corps (XI SS-Pz.Korp)

It has been used as part of the ground forces since Aug. 1944 (possibly formed at the same time).

Commander: SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS troops Matthias Kleinheisterkamp (6.8.1944 - 8.5.1945).

Officers of the Khanjar division. They were probably photographed at an early stage in the history of this formation. Their buttonholes are not yet decorated with division symbols - they are either clean or carry SS runes. One of the officers (on the left) can barely see the army eagle on his left sleeve. This method of wearing this type of emblem was common, although it had to be placed on the chest. Judging by the hue of the image, in this case the headdresses are red fezzes. Of note is the use of two different types of mountain “Styrian” gaiters and mountain boots. All officers have standard buckles on their belts.

XII SS Army Corps (XII SS-A.K.)

Formed in Aug. 1944. Used as part of the ground forces from September. 1944. On Dec. 1944 the corps included the 176th Infantry and 1.83rd People's Grenadier Divisions, as well as SS units subordinate to the corps. 16.4.1945 destroyed in the Ruhr pocket.

Commanders: SS-Obergruppenführer, General of the SS troops Matthias Kleinheisterkamp (1.8-6.8.1944); SS Obergruppenführer, General of the SS Troops and Police Kurt von Gottberg (6.8-18.10.1944); SS-Obergruppenführer, SS General Karl Maria Demelhuber (10/18-10/20/1944); General of Infantry Ponter Blumentritt (20.10.1944-20.1.1945); Lieutenant General Fritz Bayerlein (20.1-29.1.1945), General of Artillery Eduard Grasemann (29.1.1945-16.4.1945).

XIII SS Army Corps (XIII SS-A.K.)

Formed in Aug. 1944 in Breslau. It has been used as part of the ground forces since Sept. 1944. Soon transferred to France. If on Nov. 1944 the corps included the 17th SS Motorized Division "Götz von Berlichingen", but already from December. 1944 only parts of the Wehrmacht remained subordinate to the corps headquarters: the 19th People's Grenadier and 347th Infantry Divisions, the 566th Anti-Tank Division, the 9th Anti-Aircraft Division, etc. Fought on the Western Front and ended the war in the Alps.

Commanders: SS Gruppenführer, SS Lieutenant General Hermann Priss (7.8-20.10.1944); SS Gruppenführer, Lieutenant General of the SS troops Max Simon (10/20/1944-5/8/1945).

XIV SS Army Corps (XIV SS-A.K.)

Formed on Nov. 1944. 25.1.1945 disbanded, and the remaining units were included in the X SS Army Corps. Use in ground forces has not been confirmed.

Commanders: SS Gruppenführer, Lieutenant General of the SS and Police Forces Heinrich Friedrich Reine-fart (11.1944-12.1944); SS-Obergruppenführer, SS and Police General Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski (12.1944-25.1.1945).

XV Cossack Cavalry Corps (XV Kosaken Kav. Korps)

Created by order of G. Himmler on February 25, 1945 on the basis of the command of the 1st Cossack Division of the SS troops. It included Cossack formations, which were transferred to the Reichsfuehrer SS for the duration of the war on November 4, 1944. The corps included the 1st and 2nd Cossack divisions, as well as the Plastun brigade.

Commander: SS Gruppenführer, SS Lieutenant General Helmut von Panwitz.

XVI SS Army Corps

Formed in Jan. 1945. Use in the ground forces has not been confirmed.

Commander: SS-Obergruppenführer, SS General Karl Maria Demelhuber (1.1945-8.5.1945).

XVII Waffen-Armee Korps der SS (Ungarisches)

Formed in March 1945. 4/5/1945 surrendered to American troops.

Commanders: SS Obergruppenführer, SS General Ferenc Feketehalmi-Czeydner (3.1945-4.1945); SS-Obergruppenführer, SS General Jeno Ruszkai (4.1945-5.1945).

XVIII SS Army Corps (XVIII SS-A.K.)

Formed in Dec. 1944. Used as part of the ground forces since February. 1945.

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Books

• The tragedy of fidelity. Memoirs of a German tankman, Tieke Wilhelm. Wilhelm Thieke's memoirs tell the story of the 3rd German Panzer Corps from its formation in 1943 until its complete defeat in the spring of 1945. The author details...
• The tragedy of fidelity. Memoirs of a German tankman. 1943-1945, Tieke Wilhelm. Wilhelm Thieke's memoirs tell the story of the 3rd German Panzer Corps from its formation in 1943 until its complete defeat in the spring of 1945. The author details...

By the beginning of the Russian campaign, three volunteer regiments of foreign citizens had been created in the ranks of the SS, and with the outbreak of hostilities, the number of foreign units began to grow steadily. According to Himmler, the participation of foreign legions in the war against the USSR was supposed to show the pan-European desire to destroy communism. The participation of citizens of all European countries in the war against the Soviet Union gave rise to the post-war identification of the Waffen-SS and the European Community.

In 1941, foreign volunteers were recruited into national volunteer legions and corps, ranging in strength from one battalion to a regiment. Various anti-communist units created in 1917–1920 in Europe received similar names. In 1943, most of the legions were reorganized into larger military units, the largest of which was the German SS Panzer Corps.

SS-Standarte "Nord West"

The formation of this German regiment began on April 3, 1941. The regiment was dominated by Dutch and Flemish volunteers, organized into companies along national lines. Nordwest's training took place in Hamburg. After the start of the war with the Soviet Union, it was decided to use the regiment’s personnel to quickly form independent national legions. By the first of August 1941, the regiment consisted of 1,400 Dutch, 400 Flemings and 108 Danes. At the end of August, the regiment was transferred to the Arus-Nord training area in East Prussia. Here, on September 24, 1941, according to the order of the FHA SS, the regiment was disbanded, and the available personnel were distributed between the national legions and units of the V-SS.

From the moment of formation to last day The regiment commander was SS-Standartenführer Otto Reich.

Volunteer Legion "Netherlands"

The creation of the legion began on June 12, 1941 in the Krakow region, a little later the legion cadre was transferred to the Arus-Nord training ground. The basis of the legion was the Dutch battalion from the disbanded “Nordwest” regiment. Another contingent that arrived for formation was a battalion created from the ranks of the assault troops of the Dutch National Socialist movement. The battalion departed Amsterdam on October 11, 1941 and joined forces with volunteers already training in Arus.

Already by Christmas 1941, the legion was a motorized regiment of three battalions and two companies (13th infantry gun company and 14th anti-tank company). Before being sent to the front, the total number of the legion exceeded 2,600 ranks. In mid-January 1942, the legion was transferred to Danzig, and from there by sea to Libau. From Libau, the Dutch were sent to the northern sector of the front in the area of ​​Lake Ilmen. By the end of January, the legion arrived at its designated positions in the area of ​​the Novgorod-Tosna road. The legion received its baptism of fire in the battle at Goose Mountain near Volkhov (north of Lake Ilmen). After this, the Dutch took part in long defensive and then offensive battles at Volkhov. Then the legion operated at Myasny Bor. In mid-March 1942, a reinforced field hospital with Dutch personnel, part of the legion, arrived on the Eastern Front. The hospital was located in the Oranienburg area.

During the fighting, the legion earned the gratitude of the OKW, but lost 20% of its strength and was withdrawn from the front line and replenished with ethnic Germans from Northern Schleswig. After a short rest and replenishment, in July 1942 the legion took part in the destruction of the remnants of the Soviet 2nd Shock Army and, according to some sources, participated in the capture of General Vlasov himself. The legion spent the rest of the summer and autumn in operations near Krasnoye Selo and later around Shlisselburg, slightly deviating from the Leningrad direction. At the end of 1942, the legion operated as part of the 2nd SS Infantry Brigade. Its strength at this time decreased to 1,755 people. On February 5, 1943, news came from Holland that the honorary chief of the legion, General Seiffardt, had been killed by the Resistance. After 4 days, the FHA SS issued an order to assign the name “General Seyffardt” to the first company of the legion.

In addition to the gratitude of the OKW, the legion had another distinction: its Rottenführer Gerardus Muyman from the 14th Anti-Tank Company knocked out thirteen Soviet tanks in one of the battles and was awarded the Knight's Cross on February 20, 1943, thus becoming the first German volunteer to receive this honor. On April 27, 1943, the legion was withdrawn from the front and sent to the Grafenwoehr training ground.

On May 20, 1943, the Volunteer Legion "Netherlands" was officially disbanded, only to be reborn on October 22, 1943, but as the 4th SS Volunteer Panzergrenadier Brigade "Nederland".

Volunteer Corps "Denmark"

Eight days after the German attack on the USSR, the Germans announced the creation of the Danish Volunteer Corps, independent of the Nordland Regiment. On July 3, 1941, the first Danish volunteers, having received the banner, left Denmark and headed to Hamburg. By order of the FHA SS of July 15, 1941, the unit was named the Volunteer Unit "Denmark" and then renamed the volunteer corps. By the end of July 1941, a headquarters and infantry battalion of 480 men had been organized. In August, one officer and 108 Danes from the disbanded Nordwest regiment were added to the battalion. At the end of August, a communications department was created at the battalion headquarters. In September 1941, the corps was expanded to include a reinforced motorized battalion. On September 13, 1941, the unit was moved to Treskau to join the reserve company of the corps. By December 31, 1941, the strength of the corps had increased to 1,164 ranks, and about a month later it increased by another hundred people. Until the spring of 1942, the corps personnel were trained.

On 8–9 May the Danish battalion was transported by air to the Heiligenbeil area ( East Prussia), and then to Pskov, to Army Group North. Upon arrival, the corps was tactically subordinated to the SS division Totenkopf. From May 20 to June 2, 1942, the corps took part in battles north and south of the Demyansk fortifications, where it distinguished itself by destroying a Soviet bridgehead. At the beginning of June, the Danes operated along the road to Byakovo. On the night of June 3–4, the battalion was transferred to the northern section of the Demyansk corridor, where it fought off strong enemy attacks for two days. The next day, June 6, the Danes were relieved and camped in the forests near Vasilivshino. On the morning of June 11, the Red Army launched a counterattack and returned Bolshiye Dubovichi occupied by the Germans. By mid-day the situation had worsened even more and von Lettow-Vorbeck ordered the corps to retreat. After this battle, the number of companies fluctuated from 40 to 70 people each. Having taken up defensive positions in the Vasilivshino area, the corps was replenished with reserve personnel arriving from Poznan. On July 16, the Red Army attacked and occupied Vasilivshino, and on the seventeenth it attacked the Danish battalion with tanks and air support. Vasilivshino was again occupied by the Germans on July 23, the extreme left flank of this position was occupied by the corps. On the twenty-fifth of July the Danes were withdrawn to reserve. By August 1942, the battalion had lost 78% of its initial strength, this was the reason for its withdrawal from the Demyansk area and sending to Mitava. In September 1942, the Danes returned to their homeland and paraded through Copenhagen and were dismissed to their homes, but on October 12 all ranks were again gathered in Copenhagen and returned to Mitau. On December 5, 1942, a reserve company was introduced into the battalion, and the corps itself became part of the 1st SS Infantry Brigade.

In December 1942, the corps served in the fortified area of ​​Nevel, and later fought defensive battles south of Velikiye Luki. After this, the corps spent three weeks in reserve. On Christmas Eve, the Danes were attacked by a Soviet division and retreated from Kondratovo, which they occupied, but on December 25 the corps recaptured Kondratovo. On January 16, 1943, the Velikiye Luki cauldron was closed, and the Danes moved to a position north of Myshino-Kondratovo, where they remained until the end of February. On the twenty-fifth of February, the corps attacked and captured the enemy stronghold on Taide - this was the last stand of the Danish volunteers.

At the end of April 1943, the remaining Danes were sent to the Grafenwoehr training ground. On May 6, the corps was officially disbanded, but most of the Danes remained to continue serving as part of the newly formed Nordland division. In addition to the Danes, a large number of ethnic Germans from northern Schleswig served in this unit. White emigrants also preferred to serve in the Danish corps.

The volunteer corps was commanded by: Legions-Obersturmbannführer Christian Peder Krussing July 19, 1941 - February 8–19, 1942, SS-Sturmbannführer Christian Frederick von Schalburg March 1 - June 2, 1942, Legions-Hauptsturmbannführer K.B. Martinsen 2–10 June 1942, SS-Sturmbannführer Hans Albrecht von Lettow-Vorbeck 9–11 June 1942, again K.B. Martinsen June 11, 1942 - May 6, 1943), Legions-Sturmbannführer Peder Neergaard-Jacobsen May 2–6, 1943

In April 1943, after the disbandment of the volunteer corps, Martinsen created the Danish equivalent of the German SS from its veterans who returned to Denmark. Officially, this unit was first named the “Danish German Corps”, and then the “Schalburg” Corps in memory of the deceased corps commander. This corps was not part of the B-SS and in no way belonged to the SS organization. In the second half of 1944, under pressure from the Germans, Schalburgkorpset was transferred to the V-SS and reorganized into the SS training battalion Schalburg, and then into the SS security battalion Zeeland.

Volunteer Legion "Norway"

With the outbreak of Germany's war against the USSR, the idea of ​​the need for real participation of Norwegians in hostilities on the side of Germany was widely circulated in Norway.

Recruitment centers were opened in major Norwegian cities, and by the end of July 1941 the first three hundred Norwegian volunteers went to Germany. After arriving in Kiel they were sent to the Fallinbostel training area. Here, on August 1, 1941, the volunteer legion “Norway” was officially created. In mid-August, another 700 volunteers from Norway arrived here, as well as 62 volunteers from the Norwegian community in Berlin. On October 3, 1941, in the presence of Vidkun Quisling, who arrived in Germany, the first battalion of the legion took the oath in Fallinbostel. As a sign of continuity, this battalion received the name "Viken" - the same as the 1st Hird Regiment (paramilitary units of the Norwegian National Samling). The legion's staff, according to the order of the FHA SS, was to consist of 1218 ranks, but by October 20, 1941, the unit numbered more than 2000 people. The Norwegian Legion was organized according to the following principle: headquarters and headquarters company (anti-tank company), a platoon of war correspondents, an infantry battalion of three infantry companies and one machine gun company. The reserve battalion created in Halmestrand was also considered part of the legion.

On March 16, 1942, the legion arrived at the Leningrad sector of the front. A few kilometers from Leningrad, the Norwegians were introduced into the 2nd SS Infantry Brigade. After arrival, parts of the legion began to carry out patrol duty, and then took part in battles at the front until May 1942. In September 1942, the reserve battalion of the legion, which had already transferred the bulk of the ranks to the legion, was consolidated into a company, but, in addition to this company, a new one was created on the territory of Latvia in Jelgava (Mitava). At the same time, the first of four, a police company of the Norwegian Legion, created in Norway from pro-German police officers, arrived at the front. Its commander was SS-Sturmbannführer and leader of the Norwegian SS Janas Lie. The company acted as part of the legion, which at that time was on the northern sector of the front, where it suffered heavy losses in defensive battles near Krasnoe Selo, Konstantinovka, Uretsk and Krasny Bor. In February 1943, the 800 remaining legionnaires were combined with reserve companies, and at the end of March the legion was withdrawn from the front and sent to Norway.

On April 6, 1943, a parade of legion ranks took place in Oslo. After a short vacation, the legion returned to Germany in May of the same year; the Norwegians were gathered at the Grafenwoehr training ground, where the legion was disbanded on May 20, 1943. However, most of the Norwegians responded to V. Quisling’s call and continued to serve in the ranks of the new “German” SS division.

After the creation of the 1st police company and its excellent service on the Eastern Front, the creation of other police companies began. The second company was created by Norwegian police major Egil Hoel in the fall of 1943, and included 160 Norwegian police officers. After completing training, the company arrived at the front and was assigned to the 6th SS reconnaissance unit of the Nord division. Together with the specified unit, the company operated at the front for 6 months. The company commander was SS-Sturmbannführer Egil Hoel.

In the summer of 1944, the 3rd police company was created; in August 1944, it arrived at the front, but due to Finland’s withdrawal from the war and the retreat of German troops from its territory, the company did not have time to take part in the battles. One hundred and fifty of its members were sent to Oslo, and in December 1944 the company was disbanded. At the time of its formation, the company was commanded by SS-Hauptsturmführer Age Heinrich Berg, and then by SS-Obersturmführer Oscar Olsen Rustand. The last of these officers tried to form the 4th police company at the end of the war, but nothing came of his idea.

The legion was commanded by: Legions-Sturmbannführer Jürgen Bakke from August 1, 1941, Legions-Sturmbannführer Finn Hannibal Kjelstrup from September 29, 1941, Legions-Sturmbannführer Arthur Quist from the fall of 1941.

Finnish volunteer battalion

Even before the start of the war with the Soviet Union, the Germans secretly recruited Finns into the V-SS. The recruitment campaign provided the Germans with 1,200 volunteers. During May - June 1941, volunteers arrived in batches from Finland to Germany. Upon arrival, the volunteers were divided into two groups. Persons with military experience, i.e. participants in the “Winter War,” were distributed among the units of the Viking division, and the remaining volunteers were collected in Vienna. From Vienna they were transferred to the Gross Born training area, where they were formed into the Finnish SS Volunteer Battalion (previously designated as the SS Volunteer Battalion Nordost). The battalion consisted of a headquarters, three rifle companies and a heavy company. Part of the battalion was a reserve company in Radom, which was part of the reserve battalion of the German legions. In January

In 1942, the Finnish battalion arrived at the front at the location of the Viking division on the line of the Mius River. According to the order, the arriving Finns became first the fourth and then the third battalion of the Nordland regiment, while the third battalion itself was used to replace the division's losses. Until April 26, 1942, the battalion fought on the Mius River against units of the 31st Infantry Division of the Red Army. Then the Finnish battalion was sent to Aleksandrovka. After heavy fighting for Demidovka, the Finns were withdrawn from the front for replenishment, which lasted until September 10, 1942. The change in the situation at the front required the participation of the battalion in the bloody battles for Maykop, in which the German command used the Finns in the most difficult sectors. At first

In 1943, the Finnish volunteer battalion, in the general flow of the German retreat, went all the way from Malgobek (through Mineralnye Vody, villages and Bataysk) to Rostov, participating in rearguard battles. Having reached Izyum, the Finns, along with the remnants of the Nordland regiment, were withdrawn from the division and sent to the Grafenwoehr training ground. From Grafenwoehr the Finnish battalion was transferred to Ruhpolding, where it was disbanded on July 11, 1943.

During the battalion's existence, Finnish volunteers also served as part of the war correspondents unit and as part of the Totenkopf reserve infantry battalion No. 1. Attempts to create a new entirely Finnish SS unit in 1943–1944 were unsuccessful, and the formation of the Kalevala SS unit was discontinued . The most famous Finnish volunteer was Obersturmführer Ulf Ola Ollin from the 5th SS Panzer Regiment, of all the Finns he received greatest number awards, and his Panther tank with number 511 was known to the entire Viking division.

The battalion commander was SS-Hauptsturmführer Hans Kollani.

British Volunteer Corps

By the beginning of 1941, about 10 Englishmen served in the ranks of the W-SS, but until 1943, no attempts were made to form an English legion in the Waffen-SS. The initiator of the creation of the English unit was John Amery, the son of the former British Minister for Indian Affairs. John Amery himself was a well-known anti-communist and even participated in the Spanish Civil War on the side of General Franco.

Initially, from the British living on the continent, Amery created the British Anti-Bolshevik League, which was supposed to create its own armed forces to be sent to the Eastern Front. After long debates with the Germans, in April 1943 he was allowed to visit British prisoner-of-war camps in France to recruit volunteers and propagate his ideas. This venture received the code designation “Special Compound 999.” It is interesting to note that this number was the Scotland Yard telephone before the war.

In the summer of 1943, a special unit was transferred to the control of the D-1 Department of the SS Khabarovsk Army, which dealt with issues of European volunteers. In the autumn of 1943, volunteers exchanged their previous English uniform for a Waffen-SS uniform, receiving SS soldiers' books. In January 1944, the former name "St. George's Legion" was changed to "British Volunteer Corps", more in line with the tradition of the B-SS. It was planned to use prisoners of war to increase the size of the corps to 500 people, and to put Brigadier General Parrington, captured in 1941 in Greece, at its head.

After some time, the British were divided into groups for use at the front. Volunteers were distributed to various parts of the Waffen-SS. The largest number of volunteers were taken into the Kurt Eggers regiment, and the rest were distributed between the 1st, 3rd and 10th SS divisions. Another 27 British remained in the Dresden barracks to complete their training. In October 1944, it was decided to transfer the BFC to the III SS Panzer Corps. After the famous Western Allied air raid on Dresden, the BFC was transferred to the Lichterfelde barracks in Berlin, where those returning from the front also arrived. After completing their training in March 1945, the British were transferred partly to the headquarters of the German SS Panzer Corps, and partly to the 11th SS Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion. In the ranks of the said battalion, the BFC took part in the defense of Schonberg on the western bank of the Oder on March 22.

With the beginning of the assault on Berlin, most of the British made a breakthrough to the Western allies, to whom they surrendered in the Mecklenburg area. The remaining individual volunteers took part in street fighting together with the Nordland division.

In addition to the British, the BFC recruited volunteers from the colonies, commonwealth countries and America.

BFK commanders: SS-Hauptsturmführer Johannes Rogenfeld - summer 1943, SS-Hauptsturmführer Hans Werner Ropke - summer 1943 - May 9, 1944, SS-Obersturmführer Dr. Kühlich - May 9, 1944 - February 1945, SS-Hauptsturmführer er doctor Alexander Dolezalek - until the end of the war.

Indian Volunteer Legion

The Indian Legion was created at the beginning of the war in the ranks of the German army as the 950th Indian Infantry Regiment. By the end of 1942, the regiment consisted of about 3,500 ranks. After training, the legion was sent to security service, first in Holland and then in France (guarding the Atlantic Wall). On August 8, 1944, the legion was transferred to the SS troops with the designation "Waffen-SS Indian Legion". Seven days later the Indian volunteers were transported by train from Lokanau to Poytirz.

Upon arrival in the Poytirz area, the Indians were attacked by the Maquis, and at the end of August, soldiers of the legion engaged the Resistance on the way from Chatrow to Allieres. In the first week of September the legion reached the Berry Canal. Continuing their movement, the Indians fought street battles with French regulars in the town of Doune and then retreated towards Sancoin. In the Luzi area, the Indians were ambushed at night, after which the legion quickly marched towards Dijon through Loire. In the battle with enemy tanks at Nuits - Site - Georges, the unit suffered heavy losses. After this battle the Indians retreated by marching through Relipemont towards Colmar. And then they continued their retreat to German territory.

In November 1944 the unit was designated the "Waffen-SS Indian Volunteer Legion". By the beginning of December of the same year, the legion arrived at the garrison of the city of Oberhoffen. After Christmas the legion was transferred to training camp Heuberg, where it remained until the end of March 1945. At the beginning of April 1945, the legion was disarmed by order of Hitler. In April 1945, the Indian Legion began moving towards the Swiss border in the hope of obtaining asylum there and avoiding extradition to the Anglo-Americans. Having broken through the Alps to the Lake Constance region, the Indian volunteers were surrounded and captured by the French "Maquis" and the Americans. Since 1943, the Indian Regiment had a so-called Guards Company, located in Berlin and created for ceremonial purposes. During the war, the company apparently continued to remain in Berlin. During the assault on Berlin, Indians in SS uniforms took part in its defense, one of them was even captured by the Red Army, all of them were probably ranks of the mentioned “Guards” company.

The commander of the legion was SS-Oberführer Heinz Bertling.

Serbian Volunteer Corps

Until the establishment of the Serbian government of General Milan Nedić in August 1941, no attempts were made to organize Serbian armed units. General Nedić announced the creation of various state police forces. Their combat effectiveness left much to be desired, so they were mainly used for local security tasks. In addition to these formations, on September 15, 1941, the so-called Serbian Volunteer Team was created. This unit was created from activists of the ZBOR organization and radical military personnel. Colonel Konstantin Mushitsky, who was the aide-de-camp of the Yugoslav Queen Mary before the war, was appointed commander of the unit. The team soon turned into an excellent anti-partisan unit, which received recognition even from the Germans. Like the rest of the Serbian and Russian units, the team “made” peace with the Chetniks and fought only against Tito’s troops and Ustasha tyranny. Soon KFOR departments began to appear throughout Serbia, these departments were known as “detachments”, during 1942 their number increased to 12, the detachment usually included 120–150 soldiers and a few officers. KFOR units were widely recruited by the Germans for anti-partisan actions and, in fact, were the only Serbian formation that received weapons from the Germans. In January 1943, the SD Command was reorganized into the SD Corps, which consisted of five battalions of 500 people each. The corps did not hide its monarchist orientation and even went to parades in Belgrade under a banner with monarchist slogans. At the beginning of 1944, KFOR and new volunteers were reorganized into 5 infantry regiments (Roman numbers I to V) of 1,200 soldiers each and an artillery battalion of 500 people. In addition, a recruit school and a hospital in Logatec were later established as part of the KFOR. On October 8, 1944, units of the corps began their retreat from Belgrade. The next day, the SDKorps was transferred to the Waffen-SS with the designation "Serbian SS Volunteer Corps". The structure of the hull was left unchanged. The ranks of the Serbian Corps did not become ranks of the Waffen-SS and continued to bear their previous ranks and obey the Serbian command. After the retreat from Belgrade, KFOR units, together with the Chetniks and Germans, left for Slovenia. In April 1945, by agreement with the Germans, KFOR became part of one of the Chetnik divisions in Slovenia. At the end of April, two KFOR regiments (I and V regiments), on the orders of the Chetnik commander in Slovenia, General Damjanovic, left in the direction of the Italian border, crossing which they capitulated on May 1. The remaining three regiments II, III and IV, under the command of the KFOR chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Radoslav Tatalovich, took part in the battles with the NOLA near Ljubljana, after which they retreated to Austrian territory and surrendered to the British.

The commander of the Serbian Corps was Colonel (at the end of the war, General) Konstantin Mushitsky.

Estonian Volunteer Legion

The legion was formed according to the staff of an ordinary three-battalion regiment in the SS training camp “Heidelager” (near the city of Debica, on the territory of the General Governorate). Soon after being fully recruited, the legion was designated the "1st Estonian SS Volunteer Grenadier Regiment". Until spring next year The regiment was trained in the above camp. In March 1943, the regiment received an order to send the first battalion to the front as part of the SS Viking Panzergrenadier Division, which was operating at that time in the Izyum area. The German SS-Hauptsturmführer Georg Eberhardt was appointed commander of the battalion, and the battalion itself became known as the Estonian SS Volunteer Grenadier Battalion “Narva”. From March 1944 it operated as the 111/10th SS Regiment "Westland". Without engaging in major battles, the battalion, together with the division, operated as part of the 1st Tank Army in the Izyum-Kharkov area. The baptism of fire of the Estonians took place on July 19, 1943 in the battle for height 186.9. Supported by the fire of the Viking division's artillery regiment, the battalion destroyed about 100 Soviet tanks, but lost its commander, who was replaced by SS-Obersturmführer Koop. The next time Estonian volunteers distinguished themselves on August 18 of the same year in the battle for heights 228 and 209 near Klenova, where, interacting with a company of “tigers” from the SS tank regiment “Totenkopf”, they destroyed 84 Soviet tanks. Apparently, these two cases gave the spacecraft analysts the right to indicate in their intelligence reports that the Narva battalion has extensive experience in fighting with machine guns. Continuing hostilities in the ranks of the Viking division, the Estonians, along with it, ended up in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky cauldron in the winter of 1944, upon leaving which they suffered huge losses. In April, the division received an order to remove the Estonian battalion from its composition, the Estonians were given a touching farewell, after which they left for the place of the new formation.

Caucasian SS military unit

In the first years of the war, a large number of units from natives of the Caucasus were created within the German army. Their formation took place mainly in the territory of occupied Poland. In addition to front-line army units, various police and punitive units were formed from Caucasians. In 1943, in Belarus, in the Slonim district, two Caucasian Schutzmannschaft police battalions were created - the 70th and 71st. Both battalions participated in anti-partisan operations in Belarus, being subordinate to the head of the anti-banditry formations. Later, these battalions became the basis for the North Caucasus security brigade formed in Poland. By order of Himmler dated July 28, 1944, about 4,000 ranks of the brigade, along with their families, were transferred to the region of upper Italy. Here, together with the Cossack camp, the Caucasians formed the backbone of the anti-partisan forces, which were subordinate to the HSSPF “Adriatic Coast” of SS-Obergruppenführer Globocnik. On August 11, by order of Berger, the brigade was reorganized into the Caucasian Corps, and less than a month later it was renamed the Caucasian Unit. The unit's recruitment was accelerated by the transfer of 5,000 employees from the 800, 801, 802, 803, 835, 836, 837, 842 and 843rd army field battalions. The formation consisted of three national military groups - Armenian, Georgian and North Caucasian. It was planned to deploy each group into a full-fledged regiment.

At the end of 1944, the Georgian and North Caucasian groups were located in the Italian city of Paluzza, and the Armenian group in Klagenfurt. In December 1944, the Azerbaijani group, which had previously been part of the Eastern Turkic SS formation, was transferred to the formation. Azerbaijani participants in the events after the war claimed that their group managed to arrive in Verona before the end of the war.

Groups located in Italy were constantly involved in anti-partisan operations. At the end of April, the North Caucasian group began to retreat to Austrian territory, and the small Georgian group was disbanded by its commander. In May 1945, the ranks of the unit were issued by the British to the Soviet side.

Unlike the next unit, all command positions were occupied by Caucasian emigrant officers, and the commander of the unit itself was SS-Standartenführer Arvid Theuermann, a former officer of the Russian Imperial Army.

Eastern Turkic SS military unit

The German army created a large number of volunteer units from the inhabitants of the Soviet Central Asia. The commander of one of the first Turkestan battalions was Major Mayer-Mader, who in the pre-war years was a military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. Mayer-Mader, seeing the limited and futile use of Asians by the Wehrmacht, dreamed of sole leadership of all Turkic units. For this purpose, he first contacted Berger, and then the head of the VI Directorate of the RSHA, SS-Brigadeführer and Major General of the V-SS Walter Schellenberg. To the first, he proposed an increase in the number of V-SS by 30,000 Turkestanis, and to the second, the implementation of sabotage in Soviet Central Asia and the organization of anti-Soviet protests. The major's proposals were accepted and, in November 1943, the 1st Eastern Muslim SS Regiment was created on the basis of the 450th and 480th battalions.

The formation of the regiment took place near Lublin, in the town of Poniatovo. In January 1944, it was decided to deploy the regiment to the SS division Neue Turkestan. For this purpose, the following battalions were taken from the active army: 782, 786, 790, 791st Turkestan, 818th Azerbaijani and 831st Volga-Tatar. At this time, the regiment itself was sent to Belarus to participate in anti-partisan operations. Upon arrival, the regiment's headquarters was located in the town of Yuratishki, not far from Minsk. On March 28, 1944, during one of these operations, the commander of the regiment, Mayer-Mader, was killed, and SS-Hauptsturmführer Billig took his place. Compared to the previous commander, he was not popular with his men, and a number of excesses occurred in the regiment, as a result of which Billig was removed and the regiment was transferred to the von Gottberg battle group. In May, the regiment took part in a major anti-partisan operation near Grodno, after which, together with other national units, it was withdrawn to Polish territory in late May - early June. In July 1944, the regiment was sent to the Neuhammer training ground for replenishment and rest, but it was soon sent to Lutsk and subordinated to the special SS regiment Dirlewanger. With the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising in August 1944, the Muslim Regiment and the Dirlewanger Regiment were sent to suppress it. Upon arrival, on August 4, both regiments came under the command of the Reinefart battle group. In Warsaw, the Turkestans operated in the urban area of ​​Wola. At the beginning of October, the Warsaw Uprising was over. When the uprising was suppressed, the Turkestanis received recognition from the German command. On October 1, it was announced that the regiment would be deployed to the Eastern Turkic SS military unit. The Muslim regiment was renamed into the military group "Turkestan" with a strength of one battalion, the rest of the regiment, together with reinforcements from the Volga-Tatar units of the army, formed the military group "Idel - Ural". In addition, an SS assembly camp for Turkic volunteers was created in the vicinity of Vienna. On October 15, the formation, together with the Dirlewanger regiment, was sent to suppress the new, now Slovak uprising.

By the beginning of November 1944, the formation consisted of 37 officers, 308 non-commissioned officers and 2,317 soldiers. In December, the military group “Azerbaijan” was taken from the formation. This group was transferred to the Caucasian connection. In December, the formation presented an unpleasant surprise to the Germans. On December 25, 1944, the commander of the Turkestan group, Waffen-Obersturmführer Gulyam Alimov, and 458 of his subordinates went over to the Slovak rebels near Mijava. At the request of Soviet representatives, the rebels shot Alimov. For this reason, about 300 Turkestanis again defected to the Germans. Despite this sad experience, two days later the Germans organized officer courses to train native officers of the unit in the town of Poradi.

On January 1, 1945, the military group “Crimea”, created from the disbanded Tatar brigade, became part of the formation. At the same time, SS-Obersturmbannführer Anton Ziegler gathered another 2,227 Turkestanis, 1,622 Azerbaijanis, 1,427 Tatars and 169 Bashkirs in the Vienna assembly camp. All of them were preparing to join the ranks of the Turkic SS unit. In March 1945, the unit was transferred to the 48th Infantry Division (2nd Formation). In April 1945, the 48th Division and the Turkic formation were at the Dollersheim training camp. The national committees planned to transfer the unit to Northern Italy, but nothing is known about the implementation of this plan.

The Eastern Muslim SS Regiment and the Eastern Turkic SS Unit were commanded by: SS-Obersturmbannführer Andreas Mayer-Mader - November

1943–28 March 1944, SS-Hauptsturmführer Bill-liga - 28 March - 6 April 1944, SS-Hauptsturmführer Hermann - 6 April - May 1944, SS-Sturmbannführer Reserve Franz Liebermann - June - August

1944, SS-Hauptsturmführer Rainer Olzsha - September - October 1944, SS-Standartenführer Wilhelm Hintersatz (under the pseudonym Harun al Rashid) - October - December 1944, SS-Hauptsturmführer Fürst - January - May 1945. There were mullahs in all parts of the formation, and the supreme imam of the entire formation was Naguib Khodia.

SS Troop Losses

During the Polish campaign, the losses of the V-SS amounted to several dozen people. The superiority of the German army in weapons and the lightning speed of the campaign reduced Waffen-SS losses to almost a minimum. In 1940, in the West, the SS men faced a completely different enemy. The high level of training of the British army, positions prepared in advance and the presence of modern artillery among the allies became an obstacle to the SS's path to victory. The Waffen-SS suffered approximately 5,000 casualties during the western campaign. During the battles, officers and non-commissioned officers led soldiers into the attack by personal example, which, according to the Wehrmacht generals, led to unjustifiably large losses among Waffen-SS officers. Undoubtedly, the percentage of losses among Waffen-SS officers was higher than in Wehrmacht units, but the reasons for this should not be sought in poor training or in combat methods. In the Waffen-SS units, a corporate spirit reigned and there was not such a clear line between officer and soldier as in the Wehrmacht. In addition, the structure of the Waffen-SS was built on the basis of the “Führer principle” and that is why in attacks SS officers were ahead of their soldiers and died along with them.

On the Eastern Front, the SS faced fierce resistance from the Soviet army and, as a result, in the first 5 months of the war, Waffen-SS units lost more than 36,500 people killed, wounded and missing. With the opening of the second front, SS losses increased even more. According to the most conservative estimates, between September 1, 1939 and May 13, 1945, the SS troops lost more than 253,000 soldiers and officers killed. During the same time, 24 Waffen-SS generals died (not counting those who committed suicide and police generals), and two SS generals were shot by court. The number of wounded in the SS by May 1945 was about 400,000 people, with some SS men being wounded more than twice, but still returning to duty after recovery. According to Leon Degrelle, of the entire Waffen-SS Walloon unit, 83% of the soldiers and officers were wounded one or more times. Perhaps in a number of units the percentage of those who were wounded was lower, but I think it did not fall below 50%. The SS troops had to operate mainly in occupied territories, and by the end of the war they had lost more than 70,000 people missing in action.

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