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Nicholas I: the apogee of autocracy. Foreign and domestic policy of Nicholas I - the apogee of autocracy “Apogee of autocracy”

History of Russia in the 18th-19th centuries Milov Leonid Vasilievich

§ 1. Nikolaev autocracy

Political ideas of Nicholas I. Having ascended the throne, Nicholas I saw his main task in the field of domestic politics in strengthening autocratic power. He associated the events of December 14, which made a huge impression on him, with the weakness of the late emperor and with his constitutional reform initiatives. Nicholas I was concerned about the state of minds in Russia; he associated the ferment that gripped various social strata with the influence of European radicalism. The words were attributed to him: “The revolution is on the threshold of Russia, but, I swear, it will not penetrate it as long as the breath of life remains in me, while, by God’s grace, I will be emperor.”

Possessing neither the abilities of Alexander I nor his political outlook, he, having become emperor at the age of thirty, without hesitation took upon himself the burden of rule, believing that they would be more than replaced by a strong will and efficiency. He had a clear, systematic mind, an excellent memory, he was well versed in engineering and, like all the sons of Paul I, was a connoisseur of fruit. In science, he valued its applied side; he was suspicious of enlightenment, despising the restless “spirit of the times.” He was characterized by a soulless rational-mechanistic perception of the world; he understood the correct state structure as the work of a well-established mechanism, to which the affairs and thoughts of all people are subordinated. Military service was his model: “Here there is order, strict unconditional legality, no know-it-all and no contradiction, everything follows from one another, no one orders before he himself learns to obey. I look at all human life only as a service, since everyone serves.” Militarism was the internal need of the king. According to the testimony of his personal friend A. X. Benckendorf, “the entertainment of the sovereign with his troops, by his own admission, is his only and true pleasure.”

Nicholas I sincerely considered himself God's anointed and firmly defended autocratic power from any encroachment. Under him, autocracy reached its apogee, when the entire course of state affairs was determined personally by the emperor, all threads of government were in his hands. In asserting the prerogatives of autocracy, Nicholas I followed the political instructions of Karamzin, whom he highly valued. The Tsar believed in autocratic initiative, but simplistically presented it solely as a guarantee of internal peace. When the revolution began in France in 1830 and the Bourbon dynasty was overthrown, he reasoned that “Russia is most protected from the disasters of the revolution by the fact that since the time of Peter the Great, its monarchs have always stood ahead of the nation.” He understood autocratic power as unlimited autocratic interference in the course of even the smallest state affairs, as the right to control the destinies of his subjects. He himself determined the uniform colors of the regiments, edited Pushkin’s works, and indicated what the corps de ballet formations should be like on the imperial stage.

Manifesto July 13, 1826. Nicholas I did not forgive the Decembrists for their actions. He punished them with “exemplary cruelty,” without wanting to know that reprisals against them were contrary to Russian law and a long-standing political tradition, which obliged the monarch to rule based on the superior class. On the day of the execution of the Decembrists, July 13, 1826, the Supreme Manifesto, written by Speransky, was published, which announced the trial of state criminals: “The matter, which we have always considered the cause of all Russia, is over; the criminals accepted the execution as worthy of them; The Fatherland has been cleared of the consequences of the infection that has been lurking among it for so many years.” The most important document of the Nicholas era, the Manifesto of July 13 affirmed the inviolability of the centuries-old foundations of Russia: “In a state where love for monarchs and devotion to the throne are based on the natural properties of the people, where there are domestic laws and firmness in governance, the efforts of the malicious will always be futile and insane: they can hide in the darkness, but at their first appearance, rejected by general indignation, they will be crushed by the force of the law. In this position of the state structure, everyone can be confident in the unshakability of order, the security and property of its guardian, and those who are calm in the present can look with hope into the future. Not from daring dreams, which are always destructive, but from above, domestic institutions are gradually improved, shortcomings are supplemented, abuses are corrected.”

In the Manifesto of July 13, dogmas were officially expressed for the first time, which S. S. Uvarov developed several years later. Their most important component was the opposition between Russia and Europe, Russian and European political, social and cultural ideals: “This intention was not in the properties, not in the morals of the Russians. Composed by a handful of monsters, it infected their immediate community, depraved hearts and daring dreaminess; but in ten years of malicious efforts it did not penetrate, could not penetrate further. The heart of Russia was and will be inaccessible to him. The Russian name will not be disgraced by betrayal of the throne and the Fatherland.” The events of the “instant rebellion,” said the Manifesto, united all classes in devotion to the sovereign, the “secret of the long-standing evil” was revealed, the “cloud of rebellion” was dispersed. The unanimous union of all the faithful sons of the fatherland tamed the evil, “indomitable in other morals.” The manifesto proclaimed: “The sad events that disturbed the peace of Russia have passed and, as we hope with God’s help, they have passed forever and irrevocably.”

The manifesto drew the attention of Russian citizens to the moral education of children: “Not to enlightenment, but to idleness of mind, more harmful than the idleness of bodily strength, - this willfulness of thoughts, the source of violent passions, this destructive luxury of half-knowledge, this impulse to dreamy extremes should be attributed to the lack of solid knowledge , the beginning of which is corruption of morals, and the end is destruction. All efforts, all government donations will be in vain if home education does not prepare morals and promote its types.” The nobility - “the guardian of the throne and the people’s honor” - was asked to become “an example to all other states” and undertake “a feat to improve domestic, not foreign, education.” The reproach expressed to the nobility is significant: the emperor believed that the noble society, dissatisfied with the brutal reprisal against the Decembrists, was at odds with him.

The July 13 Manifesto laid the ideological foundations of the Nikolaev autocracy. It entered the history of Russia as the first attempt at ideocratic rule, when a holistic, universally instilled and tightly controlled system of views determined the foundations of domestic and foreign policy, the development of education and culture, and the private life of citizens. Maintaining social and political stability and countering destructive European teachings required the construction of “mental dams” and the creation of a universal ideological doctrine. It fell to S.S. Uvarov to solve this problem, who belonged to those few Nikolaev dignitaries who never served in military service. However, the tsar valued his political outlook and ability to turn the achievements of European thought to the benefit of the autocracy.

Nikolaev ideocracy. Uvarov was smart and well educated. During Alexander's time he was a trustee of the St. Petersburg educational district, and in 1818 he became president of the Academy of Sciences. In public life he was known as a follower of Karamzin and was a member of Arzamas. In the midst of the struggle against Napoleon, Uvarov wrote several French pamphlets addressed to European public opinion, where he ideologically substantiated the need to resist despotism. He expressed the hope that “the kings and peoples at Bonaparte’s grave will jointly sacrifice despotism and popular anarchy.” The revolution was for him “a heap of crimes and useless misfortunes.” A convinced monarchist, Uvarov believed that the republican system was “inapplicable to the modern system of great European states.” He considered the pan-European ideal to be legitimate government, where “powerful barriers ensure civil liberties of the individual.”

After December 14, Uvarov’s Arzamas liberalism evaporated. In 1832 he was appointed to the post of Comrade Minister of Public Education. His first step was the cleansing of St. Petersburg University, expressed in the dismissal of unwanted professors, the second was an audit of Moscow University, where the “Sungurov case” was revealed: students were accused of sympathizing with the Polish rebels. Having studied the reasons for the “willfulness” of students, he came to the conclusion: “It is not scholarship that makes up a good citizen, loyal to his sovereign, but his morality and virtue.” Thanks to Uvarov, morality and virtue became categories of Nikolaev domestic policy.

The core of Uvarov’s report on the audit of Moscow University was the idea of ​​bringing the entire cultural and social life of Russia “to the point where solid and deep knowledge will merge with conviction and warm faith in the truly Russian guardian principles of Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality, which constitute the last anchor of our salvation and the surest a guarantee of the strength and greatness of our Fatherland.” The report received the approval of the emperor, Uvarov became the Minister of Public Education. While in this post, he finally systematized those views that became the basis of the Nicholas ideocracy and boiled down to the doctrine of the superiority of Orthodox and autocratic Russia over the European West. These ideas underlay the manifestos of Speransky and Bludov, and were first outlined in the later political writings of Karamzin. Uvarov formulated the goal of the doctrine clearly: “To erase the confrontation between the so-called European education and our needs; to heal the newest generation from a blind, thoughtless addiction to the superficial and foreign, spreading in their souls a warm respect for the Fatherland.”

Called by the emperor to solve a problem that was closely connected “with the very fate of the Fatherland” and was to “find the principles that constitute the distinctive character of Russia and exclusively belong to it,” Uvarov proclaimed Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality as national principles. He asserted: “Sincerely and deeply attached to the church of his fathers, the Russian from time immemorial looked upon it as a guarantee of social and family happiness. Without love for the faith of their ancestors, the people, like the individual, must perish... Autocracy is the main condition for the political existence of Russia. The Russian colossus rests on it as on the cornerstone of its greatness.” Following the foundations of Orthodoxy and autocracy corresponded to the long-standing traditions of conservative social thought. Nationality, understood as the special properties of the Russian people - obedience, humility, long-suffering, required clarification: “With regard to nationality, the whole difficulty lay in the agreement of ancient and new concepts; but nationality does not force one to go back or stop; it does not require immobility in ideas.”

Uvarov's doctrine ideally corresponded to Nicholas I's ideas about the Russian people, about Russia and its place in the world. Foreign policy successes and the strong internal position of the Russian Empire seemed to emphasize its special place in Europe and served as confirmation of the correctness of the doctrine. This was the theory of official patriotism of a victorious military empire. It did not at all imply the need for political and economic isolation of Russia, but ideological isolation seemed highly desirable. Based on the idea of ​​national exclusivity and imperial superiority, it became a necessary and important component of the domestic policy of Nicholas I. The Uvarov triad, which is sometimes called the “theory of official nationality,” ensured the stability of the Nicholas system.

Uvarov's doctrine claimed to be universal; it was addressed to all classes. By order of Nicholas I, in 1833, composer A. F. Lvov created a folk anthem based on the words of V. A. Zhukovsky. Lvov recalled: “I felt the need to write a majestic, strong, sensitive hymn, understandable to everyone, suitable for the troops, suitable for the people - from the scientist to the ignoramus.” These words reflect the desire of the Nikolaev ideocracy for inclusiveness and accessibility. However, the preaching of official patriotism, Orthodoxy and nationality, understood in the “Russian spirit,” was obviously unacceptable for a significant part of Russian subjects who were not Russian and belonged to a different confession. The natural response to it was the nationalism of non-Russian peoples.

Transformation of the Imperial Chancellery. Upon his accession to the throne, the inexperienced Nicholas I had no idea of ​​the progress of the state machine, but he knew for sure that he did not need a first minister. Having fallen into a deep depression, Arakcheev was removed from “national affairs,” which did not mean a abandonment of the basic principles of Arakcheevism. Following Arakcheev, A.P. Ermolov, popular in the army, soon found himself out of work. The emperor trusted a few, among whom were those close to him personally: A. Kh. Benkendorf, I. F. Paskevich, A. F. Orlov. Chief of the General Staff I. I. Dibich, Minister of Finance E. F. Kankrin and Minister of Foreign Affairs K. V. Nesselrode retained influence on affairs.

In an effort to increase his influence on state affairs, Nicholas I carried out a general transformation of the imperial office. Created in 1812, His Imperial Majesty's own office initially dealt with all matters that required the emperor's decision. In January 1826, the former office was renamed the I Department, and the II Department was formed, intended for collecting and systematizing the laws of the Russian Empire. In July of the same year, the III Division arose, then their number increased to six.

In the First Department, all central departments had to deliver information about their activities every morning and especially present cases that required the personal consideration of the king. Nicholas I had the illusion that state affairs were constantly under his control. For day-to-day intervention in all areas of government activity and public life, he used retinue officers. The adjutant generals and wing adjutants carried out a variety of assignments. For example, S. G. Stroganov inspected Moscow University in 1826, and on his proposal the teaching of philosophy was prohibited.

In order to better understand the internal state of the empire, the tsar ordered the clerk of the Investigative Committee, A.D. Borovkov, to compile a set of opinions of the Decembrists expressed by them during the investigation. He looked through them often and “got a lot of useful stuff” from there. To study the possibility of government reforms, on December 6, 1826, a Secret Committee was formed, headed by V. P. Kochubey, a longtime employee of Alexander I. The committee had to sort out the papers remaining in the office of Alexander I, where there were many projects for constitutional reforms and solutions to the peasant question. A set of testimonies of the Decembrists was also transferred there. The primary role in the Committee was played by Speransky, in whom Nicholas I found “the most faithful and zealous servant with enormous information and enormous experience.” Most of all, the members of the Committee were interested in the class issue and administrative changes. Kochubey considered it useful to draw the government’s attention to the “slavery” of the landowner peasants, but called for caution, “removing any thought about granting instant freedom.”

According to the members of the Committee, the State Council should be freed from administrative and judicial matters, leaving the drafting of laws under its jurisdiction. It was proposed to divide the Senate into a government Senate, which would include ministers, and a judicial Senate. Thus, the principle of separation of powers was consistently implemented. In lower local institutions, volost and rural, the collegial principle was strengthened and elective positions were allowed, which could serve to limit bureaucratic arbitrariness. The class reform was intended to strengthen the rights of the nobility. The main principle of reform, proposed by the Committee on December 6, 1826, was “not a complete change in the existing order of government, but its improvement through some specific changes and additions that correspond to the true needs of the state.” After working for more than three years, the Committee ceased its meetings. The plan for administrative and class changes was postponed.

Codification of laws. An important place in the system of Nikolaev ideocracy was given to the II Department. It was supposed to deal with the codification of laws, and “in the order of supreme administration” it was charged with the responsibility of allowing deviations from the laws. Thanks to Section II, the emperor controlled all legislative activities. Having rejected the constitutional initiatives of Alexander I, Nicholas I opposed them to a system that made it possible to streamline Russian legislation and, as it seemed to him, to limit the judicial and administrative arbitrariness of local authorities. He attached great importance to the codification of laws, which implied the systematization of existing legislation. Since the time of the Council Code of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, many contradictory regulations have accumulated, which made the task of creating new comprehensive legislation, a kind of new Code, urgent.

Having abandoned the idea of ​​​​developing a new legal code, Nicholas I instructed the II Department, in whose work Speransky played a major role, to distribute in chronological order and prepare for publication the laws of the Russian Empire from 1649 to the end of the reign of Alexander I. This is how the “Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire” arose. empire." Then Speransky and his employees selected and distributed into the appropriate sections those laws that were supposed to constitute the current legislation. By 1832, the famous “Code of Laws of the Russian Empire” was prepared, which began to operate as a “positive law” on January 1, 1835.

Nicholas I did not encourage Speransky’s desire to make additions and changes to the current legislation. Creativity was organically alien to him. The code of laws played a regulating and stabilizing role, but with its advent nothing new was introduced into the administrative and judicial practice of the autocracy. Objectively, he strengthened the omnipotence of the bureaucracy.

The first section of the first volume of the Code of Laws was titled: “On the sacred rights and advantages of the supreme autocratic power.” Here the legal concepts that determined the scope of the king’s powers were outlined. The first article of this section read: “The All-Russian Emperor is an autocratic and unlimited monarch. God himself commands to obey his supreme authority not only out of fear, but also out of conscience.” This was an appeal to the theory of divine right, which in the 19th century. is long outdated. According to further articles, the Russian Empire was governed on “the solid foundations of positive laws emanating from autocratic power.” The emperor became the only source of legality.

The code of laws knew the principle of separation of powers, which was especially carefully stipulated in relation to the rights and responsibilities of ministries. Legislative power, as part of the jurisdiction of the Council of State, and judicial power, as belonging to the Senate and judicial seats, were excluded from their functions: “The essence of the power entrusted to the ministers belongs solely to the executive order: no new law, no new institution or abolition of the previous may be established by the authority of the minister.” It was especially emphasized: “No ministry can judge anyone on its own and cannot resolve any litigation.” Ministries had executive power: “In the order of state forces, ministries represent an establishment through which the supreme executive power acts on all parts of government.” The functional separation of powers established by the Code of Laws streamlined the work of the state mechanism, but could not replace the absence of a political system of independent and mutually balancing branches of government. The emperor not only directly carried out legislative and executive functions, but also constantly intervened in the decisions of the courts. Nicholas I's subjective desire for justice in such cases often led to acts of royal arbitrariness.

III Department. In January 1826, Benckendorff submitted to the tsar a project “On the structure of the high police.” He proposed creating a political police built on the principles of “strict centralization” and extending to “all points of the empire.” The implementation of the project was entrusted to Benckendorff himself, who soon headed the III Department of His Imperial Majesty's own chancellery. At the same time, he was the chief of the Separate Corps of Gendarmes. The staff of the III Division was small, but its activities were effective. It had a network of secret agents in Russia and abroad.

The III Department was entrusted with monitoring “the general opinion and national spirit”, investigation of political affairs, supervision of public figures, writers and scientists. Secret political prisons were under his control. At the same time, it monitored foreign citizens in Russia, carrying out counterintelligence functions, caught counterfeiters, was in charge of schism and sectarianism, supervised the actions of the administration, and kept statistics on peasant unrest. Division III was to compile annual reports on the state of mind in the empire, submitted to the emperor. Called to ensure “the security of the throne and the tranquility of the state,” Section III was a body that allowed the emperor to control police and punitive functions. His activities strengthened the personal power of Nicholas I, but objectively weakened the state, since parallelism in the actions of the III Department and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, fraught with conflicts, arose.

IV, V and VI Departments of the Imperial Chancellery were in charge of educational and charitable institutions, preparation of reform in the state village, and Caucasian affairs. In general, the imperial chancellery, performing not only supervisory functions, replaced the corresponding departments; its activities inevitably introduced disorganization into the work of the state apparatus. The extreme centralization of control achieved in this case gave a short-term effect.

Censorship and education. Censorship was an important part of the Nicholas ideocracy. It was the censorship authorities who were responsible for the state of affairs in literature and theater, for the general state of minds and national morality. In 1826, the emperor approved the Censorship Charter, which contemporaries called “cast iron.” The Main Censorship Committee was established, which was subordinate to the Ministry of Public Education. Censorship control, in addition to the Censorship Committee, was carried out by a variety of departments: the Synod, the Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of the Imperial Household, and universities. There was theatrical, spiritual, and military censorship. Supreme supervision was the responsibility of Section III, for which public silence was evidence of success in capturing minds.

The censorship statute of 1826 required censors to “protect the sanctity of the throne, the authorities established by it, domestic laws, morals and national and personal honor from any attempt, not only malicious and criminal, but also unintentional.” Censors were required to act according to “political circumstances and types of government”, not to pass works that shake the Christian faith and condemn the monarchical system of government or contain “assumptions about the transformation of any parts of government.” For Nicholas I, this was a natural response to the reformist sentiments of the previous reign.

The statute of 1826 required censors to control not only the political, but also the literary side of works, “for depravity of morals is prepared by depravity of tastes.” The arbitrariness was so great that two years later the government was forced to issue a new Censorship Charter, where censors were advised not to find fault with words and individual expressions.

Nicholas 1 willingly played the role of patron of science and higher education, although he believed that universities were breeding grounds for freethinking. He understood that public service requires trained officials. During his reign, the Institutes of Technology and Land Surveying, the School of Law, the Naval Academy and other special educational institutions were opened. According to the University Charter of 1835, persons who graduated from the university received the rank of 10th or 12th class according to the Table of Ranks. Uvarov established a system for training domestic professors, promoted foreign business trips for young scientists, and opened new departments.

Popular uprisings and national movements. The European revolutionary upheavals of 1830–1831, the uprising in the Kingdom of Poland, the cholera riots in Russia, the protests of sailors in Sevastopol and military villagers of the Novgorod province became a serious test for the Nicholas regime.

In June 1830, dissatisfied with the quarantine measures established to prevent the plague, but accompanied by gross abuses by the authorities, the sailors of the naval and working crews of Sevastopol rebelled. The military commander of the city, Stolypin, was killed; the authorities suppressed the uprising a few days later, drawing large military units to the city. Quarantine measures against the cholera epidemic in 1830–1831. caused riots in Tambov and St. Petersburg, excited crowds destroyed hospitals, killed doctors who were considered the culprits of the epidemic. In the summer of 1831, quarantine became the reason for an uprising of military villagers in Staraya Russa. The rebels killed several officers, arrested the rest and began to appoint commanders from among themselves. Unrest swept through almost all the populated districts of the Novgorod province. Nicholas I stated: “The revolt in Novgorod is more important than the revolt in Lithuania, because the consequences can be terrible.” The riots were suppressed by military force, over four and a half thousand villagers were put on trial. Events of 1830–1831 were an indicator of acute social tension. Vyazemsky noted: “It is interesting to study our people in such crises. Distrust of the government, distrust of complete bondage to the will of the omnipotent appears here decisively. From everything, from all the rumors reaching the mob, it is clear that in cholera they find more a political illness than a natural one.”

In November 1830, an uprising began in Warsaw, which Nicholas I took as a personal insult. A year and a half earlier, in May 1829, he, as the Polish king, performed the coronation ceremony that was unpleasant to him and swore allegiance to the constitution. The troops of I. I. Dibich, who was then replaced by I. F. Paskevich, were sent against the rebels who announced the overthrow of the Romanov dynasty from the Polish throne. By the autumn of 1831, the uprising was suppressed, which gave Nicholas I the opportunity to put an end to the main constitutional initiative of Alexander I, with public hopes for the return of government reformism. In February 1832, the Organic Statute was issued, according to which the Kingdom of Poland was declared an integral part of the Russian Empire. The Russian emperor became the hereditary owner of the Polish crown, and there was no need for a separate coronation. The Polish Sejm was liquidated, the Polish army was disbanded.

In 1847, the secret Cyril and Methodius Society was discovered in Ukraine, the organizers of which were writers and historians N. I. Kostomarov, P. A. Kulish, N. I. Gulak, the poet T. G. Shevchenko was close to the society . The rules of society were based on the ideals of Christian morality; they provided for the abolition of serfdom, equality of citizens and, most importantly, the creation of a federation of Slavic peoples with a center in Kyiv. The influence of his ideas was insignificant. However, the head of the III Department, A.F. Orlov, demanded that the censorship pay special attention to those scientists and literary works “where the matter concerns the nationality or the language of Little Russia and other lands subject to Russia, without giving love for the homeland precedence over love for the Fatherland , empire and expelling everything that could harm the last love, especially about imaginary real disasters and about the former, supposedly unusually happy, position of the subject tribes.”

Nikolaev government and the European “Spring of Nations” of 1848 The reason for further strengthening of censorship oppression was the European “Spring of Nations” of 1848. Already in February, a Secret Committee was created under the chairmanship of A. S. Menshikov to revise magazines published in Russia. Journalists were required to assist “the government in protecting the public from contamination by ideas harmful to morality and public order.” On the recommendation of this committee, on April 2, a Committee was established for supreme supervision over the spirit and direction of works published in Russia. It was headed by General D.P. Buturlin. The task of his committee was to completely review all printed publications published in Russia, supervise censors, editors and publishers. The activities of the Committee gave contemporaries reason to talk about the government’s desire to introduce unanimity in Russia. The creation of the Committee meant the further development of ideocracy. The last years of the reign of Nicholas I went down in history as the “dark seven years.”

The government’s actions justified the prediction of the historian S. M. Solovyov: “We, Russian scientists, will get it for this revolution.” Uvarov's attempt to make a well-intentioned defense of university teaching led to his resignation. The new minister P. A. Shirinsky-Shikhmatov limited the teaching of political economy, philosophy and legal disciplines, and encouraged theology. The number of students dropped sharply and tuition fees were increased. The well-functioning educational system was on the verge of collapse. Soloviev stated: “What was the consequence? Everything stopped, died out, rotted. Russian enlightenment, which still had to continue to be nurtured in greenhouses, left out in the cold, was curtailed.” The reaction was triumphant.

Throughout the reign of Nicholas I, the main pillars of the autocracy were militarism taken to the limit, limitless regulation, and bureaucratic centralization; they determined the strength of the regime, which for a long time surprised Europe and instilled a feeling of powerlessness in its subjects. Such a policy created the illusion of stability, but in reality doomed the country to stagnation, to an economic and social lag behind advanced European states.

Under Nicholas I, autocratic initiative, which had been crushed during the Arakcheevism, ceased to determine the development of the country. Advanced society did not follow power, as in Catherine’s times and in the first years of Alexander’s reign, but was in constant opposition to it. The emperor's inherent desire to preserve the unshakable foundations of autocracy doomed the country to preserve the dilapidated class system and serfdom. Autocracy, from a creative force of historical development, turned into a regime of personal power, outwardly powerful, but irresponsible and destructive for Russia.

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From the book Complete Works. Volume 9. July 1904 - March 1905 author Lenin Vladimir Ilyich

European capital and autocracy The Social Democratic press has repeatedly pointed out that European capital is saving the Russian autocracy. Without foreign loans it could not survive. It was beneficial for the French bourgeoisie to support their military

S. BUNTMAN - And we continue the “Not So!” program, and I want to remind you that you can read all the texts on our... you can read on our website, in the same way you can read the large “Not So!” programs. ours, and the column “Small tragedies of great upheavals”, a column by Elena Syanova. Read, comment – ​​by the way, that’s what you’re doing. Here they say: “Repeat the information about Boris Akunin’s meeting.” What do you have in mind? If today’s wonderful seminar, “Dostoevsky and Globalization,” and this will be at the Higher School of Economics at 2 p.m., you can make it if you run right now and don’t listen to the “Not So!” program. Today at 10 o'clock, perhaps, you listened to an interview with the translator of The Brothers Karamazov into Japanese, a book that has sold out - the number of copies already sold has now exceeded a million. And this is phenomenal... here, both the circulation and the translation - you heard about it today, maybe you will hear about it again, but you can meet with Boris Akunin and his Japanese counter-partner, here, through our general connections, you can at 14:00 , if you have time. And we move on to our topic. This is a joint program with the magazine “Knowledge is Power”. Today we decided to return to the era of Nicholas I together with Andrei Levandovsky. Andrey, good afternoon!

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Good afternoon!

S.BUNTMAN – It is very common to compare all vertical eras, and Nicholas I, and all the wordings of the mottos of these eras. And maybe an analysis of the end of this era. And what the government did, and the ideal of autocracy that it achieved. And if I may say so, a hopeless ideal?

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Yes, this is a very good definition. Because our title is from the program “Apogee of Autocracy”, it was borrowed - there was a very good essay by Presnyakov, a historian of the last century. The essay is succinct and the title is excellent. This is the highest stage of development of the system that has been created in Russia for centuries. Probably from the first Moscow princes, roughly speaking. And which was brought to mind by Nikolai. Now, the order has been brought into perfect order. The feeling of the ideal was strong, and at the same time, here we were talking to you, the ideal turned out to be a dead end, as is often the case. This is a very serious problem - to feel like you’re taking off, to feel like you’re at the apogee, and at the same time feel that this apogee is a dead end.

S.BUNTMAN - But if we feel... The era of Nicholas I. The era of Nicholas I, which immediately attempts reforms, and Nicholas I comes, and the reforms somehow fade away under Alexander. Nicholas I carefully, after the turbulent events of his accession, puts everything in order. In what order does he bring it, and to what extent this order was, well, such a bad word, self-playing, i.e. It was as if he could act on his own.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - In general, it’s like, Nikolai is a person... the word “simple” does not fit, he is a specific person, I would say. He really disliked abstraction and reasoning. And at the same time, he is an ideologist. Or, at least, a person who has accepted the ideology once and for all. He is a Karamzinist, I would say. It is well known that he respected Nikolai Mikhailovich extremely. He still has in his personal collection the “Note on Ancient and New Russia,” rewritten in clerk’s handwriting for permanent use. And these are Karamzin’s two main ideas: autocracy is absolutely necessary for Russia, it is its salvation, it is the only possible system. This is a characteristic of the system. And the characteristics of the autocrat. A clear definition: autocrat and despot. Here Pavel, according to Karamzin’s definition, compromised the idea of ​​autocracy, turning it, autocracy, into despotism. “The autocrat is a servant of the people,” it is not written that way, but this is a man who bears the cross. Those. being an autocrat in Russia is not a sinecure, it is not a gift of fate, it is the most difficult test. Those. the autocrat must remember that he is responsible for this vast space, for this people. And Nikolai had this feeling very strongly developed. I think this is one of the most responsible people on the throne.

S. BUNTMAN - If you compare him... if you compare him with his brother, if you compare him with his father - these are the responsible ones... and Pushkin’s wish “to be like his ancestor in everything” - that’s how he... how he compared himself with whom did Nikolai relate? Did you relate yourself to Peter? With whom?

A. LEVANDOVSKY - You know, this is not a simple question, because it, of course, is valuable in itself. He loved his brother very much. He loved him, and he loved him sincerely; love, in particular, was expressed in the fact that he collected all the documents related to Alexander and put them under the carpet, or even destroyed them, and so on. This in itself shows that he loved his brother, but considered his brother compromised by the entire course of his reign. Here is one of the first documents that came from his pen, already as a sovereign - this is a letter to Konstantin, another brother...

S. BUNTMAN - Yes.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - ...the former king, one might say. Not for long. The former king did not last long. And it’s very interesting there, the word “order,” as it were, constantly appears in two forms. “The Alexander Order” - in quotation marks, relatively speaking: transitions from one system to another, the absence of a clear and clear course. And Order with a capital “T” is an order that has been created over centuries, and which he, Nikolai, will establish. Those. Alexander is not a role model, but this is, how to say, what he starts from. There is no need to talk about Paul - Paul’s reign requires a special, how to say, analysis...

S. BUNTMAN - And Nikolai understood this, that this... what can I say, about the reign of his father... which he, in general... after all, this is Nikolai and Mikhail - this is the second pair of sons. The first couple, already grown up... under Catherine, boys still grown up...

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Yes, yes, yes.

S.BUNTMAN - Alexander, Konstantin. And Nikolai and Mikhail are already a couple of very little ones.

The confrontation between Alexander and Pavel is very clearly visible. It is clear that father and son did not love each other, and they had mutual reasons for this. And Pavel really loved to tinker with Nikolai - well, with a child and a small one. But, apparently, Nikolai did not really remember his father, and so, in the memory of such a sovereign, this reign, in my opinion, did not play a special role. Moreover, he really did not like disorder, and the reign of Paul, it... I repeat, it was very interesting. But it turned out to be very chaotic and ended badly.

S.BUNTMAN - Although there was precisely a desire for order.

A. LEVANDOVSKY – It was, it was. But there, how can I say... so I understand, here one can really sum one thing up with another: Pavel has a great desire for justice, for the public good. But he sees himself as the only source of this good, this justice. Nikolai, perhaps, also has the same desire, but Nikolai, he is more of a statesman. He better understands the meaning of structures, he knows how to create them, develop them and knows how to rely on them. Pavel is fixated on himself as the source of everything - and it’s impossible to govern a huge country like that. Nikolai, he is much more pragmatic. Calm, balanced. And in essence, he has a good handle on the situation. Throughout almost his entire reign.

S.BUNTMAN – What are the main pragmatic tasks he sets for himself?

A. LEVANDOVSKY - I think that the main determining factor, although not the only one - everything else follows from this, but a lot follows - this is the establishment, preservation, maintenance of a very specific order. An order that has been created over centuries, as Nikolai understands it, an order... well, we are used to calling it an autocratic-bureaucratic system on a serf basis. Here is our slang, it has, so to speak, been established for decades. But in principle, really: power belongs to the tsar, he relies on a bureaucratic system that he himself installs. And the basis of this system is the serf system. For Nikolai, of course, order is the main thing. He was one of those people who meet at all levels of life, who sincerely believe that it is possible to establish an exemplary order and maintain it, well, not forever, but for a very long time. Which is probably wrong by definition.

S.BUNTMAN – That is. order... It must reach some kind of unshakable form...

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Absolutely right.

S.BUNTMAN - ...yours, to stay in it...

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Stay in it. There is an ideal, these are achievable ideals - these ideals are realized in practice and comes... well, the Kingdom of God on earth - a strong word, but something close to it. The theory of official nationality, in fact, interpreted Nicholas' rule as the ideal of the existence of the Russian people. Those. the ideology just worked to ensure that “we live in an ideal country.” And the main thing is to preserve these ideals for as long as possible.

S.BUNTMAN - And how was this implemented? Through what trends, through what documents, what measures? Well, here are the most important ones. Because these are some kind of penetrating measures that have always been there.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Yes.

S.BUNTMAN – Did Nikolai Pavlovich take piercing measures?

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Nikolai brought, I repeat, the autocratic-bureaucratic system to mind. It has been installed for centuries, and now, probably, it is not worth stopping at all stages. But he really brought it into exemplary order. You know, I can even picture something like this... I can imagine it well, I remember when I was working with these problems, it just visibly arose. Nikolai, I repeat, is an extremely responsible person. The residents of St. Petersburg knew that the Tsar gets up almost earlier than everyone else in the city - already at about 6 he is on his feet, at 7 in his corner office in the Winter Palace there are these famous shades, divided by lampshades, and he begins state activities. A lot of materials and documents pass through him, he sees ministers, department directors, and receives ambassadors. He gives guidelines of a general nature. They immediately descend to the ministerial level. They are there…

S. BUNTMAN - Right there - on the same day?

A. LEVANDOVSKY - In the near future. Deadlines...

S.BUNTMAN - In the near future.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Yes. Deadlines were set, and they were short, they had to be met. This means that in ministries, in departments, the general tsarist ideas take the form of decrees, rescripts, orders, and couriers, couriers, hundreds of couriers, couriers - well, not hundreds, dozens - go from St. Petersburg to the provincial capitals every day. Tula, Kaluga, what we have in Siberia... Tobolsk, etc.

S. BUNTMAN - Yes.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - There, at the provincial level, all this is perceived, perceived precisely, so to speak, in the conditions of a given region, and goes down to the district level: police captains, zemstvo assessors, district treasurers. The system is working. This is, how to say, extreme centralization, and Nikolai always has his hand on the control panel. From him there are impulses coming down, and from below there are impulses - reports and so on - which converge on his desktop.

S. BUNTMAN - Well, vertical or something like that, the pyramid is wonderful.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - And it was well-established, tough... But there were problems that...

S.BUNTMAN – We’ll talk about the problems, I think, in the second part. Ask your questions, share your thoughts. An extremely important era for, let’s say, Russia’s understanding of itself.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Yes.

S. BUNTMAN - In five minutes we will continue the program with Andrei Levandovsky. Ask questions.

NEWS

S.BUNTMAN - We continue our program. Nicholas I and the apogee of autocracy. Andrey Levandovsky is our guest. Here Andrey, I’ll read three or four messages now, they are very typical. “Why did the seemingly incredible consolidation of power in one hand, the super-vertical, lead to the monstrous catastrophe of the Crimean War?” An obvious question. Further, completely different, Marina from St. Petersburg asks: “Is it true that it was the Nikolaev peasant commissions under the leadership of Kiselev that laid the future foundation for the liberation of the peasants?” Third: “Nicholas I is Stalin yesterday. My attitude towards him was formulated by Herzen and Tolstoy” - Natasha from Moscow. And lastly, Max writes to us: “I know that it was under Nicholas that corruption in Russia reached monstrous proportions and led to collapse during the Crimean War.” Here, there are four aspects here. Yes.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - What will we do?

S. BUNTMAN - No, well, really... let's start in order.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - In order, really.

S. BUNTMAN - These are very important lines, where, in general...

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Absolutely right, they are really very sensibly, they cover the whole complex...

S. BUNTMAN - Yes.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Well, not all, but a significant part of the complex of problems.

S. BUNTMAN - Yes.

A. LEVANDOVSKY – So, here’s the first question: this is the concentration and these are the consequences. This is a problem that probably always arises from bureaucracy of all times and peoples. This means that everything seems to be very well organized, Nikolai in this regard is a formalist and a pedant. He has formal discipline at a high level. For every incoming paper there must be an outgoing one, etc. But this order is purely formal. Just to avoid indulging in abstract reasoning... Herzen was mentioned, my favorite pages are his, which characterize the essence of the matter very well. He worked in the system against his own will, twice - first in Vyatka, then in Novgorod. Both were amazing. Firstly, the very fact that a person is exiled, appointed to a high place in the provincial government. People abroad didn’t believe him later when he said that... they didn’t believe that he had been exiled. This means that Herzen is writing about his conversation with the Kazan governor Kornilov... excuse me, with the Vyatka governor Kornilov, who told him about how he began his activities. Herzen asked why such a smart person does nothing, having very serious powers. With a university education, clearly with good intentions. He spoke briefly. He says: “I came, young, full of strength, enthusiasm - there, in Kazan, in Ryazan, it doesn’t matter - well, I’ll move mountains. I came - I have a paper that needs an urgent answer. Incoming means from above. I read it - once, twice, nothing is clear. Written in Russian, it seems... the words are clear, the meaning is unclear. Well, I’m a new person, I call the business manager - he can’t explain anything. What should I do? And only one thing is clear: you must answer immediately, otherwise it will be bad. “So I have Ivan Ivanovich, the chief clerk,” he has been answering such papers for 30 years. Call Ivan Ivanovich. He asks to explain, he’s nothing at all... a non-speaking official, he just hums, how will he answer? “Yes he will answer.” “So, I decided to conduct an experiment,” said Kornilov. “I sat him down at the table, gave him a pen, gave him this paper, put it in front of him, and said: write.” He immediately began to write, five minutes later he handed me a paper, nothing is clear, but it is quite obvious that this is an answer to ... "

S.BUNTMAN - What is this answer to something incomprehensible.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - “I,” said Kornilov, “crossed myself, sent - after some time I received gratitude.” Those. This formal order leads to the fact that the office begins to work for itself. A special language emerges, so to speak, certain rules of the game, which officials know very well. Chernyshevsky, I remember, has a wonderful phrase about how bureaucrats live with their snouts in the air.

S.BUNTMAN - Well, yes, yes.

A. LEVANDOVSKY – The main thing is to catch the impulse and respond as it should. They live with their snouts up, and they must rule those below - that’s the main problem. Those. under Nikolai, the car started idling. By the way, this was obvious to Nikolai, and he tried to take additional measures, very interesting ones.

S.BUNTMAN – This is where it is very important: what measures did he try to take? Because are they able to get out of idle? Here is the clutch, to engage with something like this so that the wheels move, to produce something.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - The measures are purely Karamzin. He, the sovereign, is responsible for everything. So, if there is such a disorder hidden by the formal order, it is necessary to break through it - how? Through personal efforts. Under Nicholas, the previously almost invisible private office acquired a very special role. Those. those things that Nikolai considers the most important... But there are routine, everyday things - collecting taxes, putting things in order - this somehow, even with such a formal order-disorder will pass. But what he considers most important, he puts under his personal control. Allocates it to a special, own office. And she, like an egg, begins to multiply by division. From a small department that, in general... well, handled the tsar’s correspondence, some award matters... Six departments. Six departments, in particular, the drafting of a new set of laws, supervision of the population - the third department is famous. Now, the aforementioned Kiselev came out precisely from the Fifth Section - state peasants. The sixth department is Caucasian affairs. This means that officials along this line will work in direct contact with the king and will work differently than everyone else. Plus, the Third Department also took on the functions of... how to say? Nikolai said that he could not get upset, become tenfold. Local gendarmes are an emanation of the sovereign-emperor. They had very great powers in terms of control. They were not ordered to intervene directly, but they were supposed to report problems in the management system. This is one of their tasks that is often forgotten. Usually the Third Department and the gendarmerie system are characterized as political police and that’s it. In fact, it is a system of total supervision and control over compliance with a certain order. Here is the move with which Nikolai tried to solve the problem. Those. what is most important, put under your personal control, as it were, taken away from your own ordinary, ordinary officials. You understand, these are, in general, elements of some kind of state of emergency. Yes?

S. BUNTMAN - Yes.

A. LEVANDOVSKY – And any state of emergency is a signal that the “ideal” system does not work, or does not work as it should. Those. The very measures taken by Nikolai clearly indicated that he well understood that the ideal was largely false. It is beautiful from the point of view of external design, and Nikolai could not get away from this - he was, of course, a fanatic of order; If only it were his will, he would rule the state like an army. He was very fond of shows and parades, as you know - I understand why. A huge mass of troops moves in the right direction, arrives at the right time, he commands everything. Here the barracks was replaced by an office, but it cannot work like that. This means that here we are trying to use a commanding voice—he had a wonderful voice, by the way—to shout to different levels. Through your people. Through their proteges, observers, etc.

S.BUNTMAN - Other, deeper reforms. Here, Marina, for example, still insists that we should not forget that the scrapping of classical education and the emphasis on technical specialties prepared personnel for the further technical revolution under his son.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Yes. Yes. Absolutely right. Here we have...

S. BUNTMAN - In general, the education system, because what began under Alexander can only be called the beginning of the education system.

I don’t know whether we’ll make it or not, because it’s a very interesting question. This is also an internal contradiction. Sergei Semenovich Uvarov, the notorious creator of the theory of official nationality, the man who, so to speak, provided the ideological basis for Nikolaev’s rule, is at the same time the man under whom, and partly thanks to whom, an excellent system of secondary educational institutions was created. I think that it was under Nicholas that our gymnasiums became a phenomenon at the European level. And the universities were good. Plus, unprecedented technical educational institutions are actually appearing. Nikolai, by the way, has the makings of a good engineer. He is a big lover of architecture, but this kind of architecture, official, official, or something. He is well versed in, say, ballistics. In general, his abilities are rather natural and mathematical. He did not understand the humanities, but he understood the importance of technical sciences very well. Are we going to look for some kind of contradiction here? I actually... it exists, but... you see, here is the theory of the official nationality. After all, what was the idea, what did Uvarov stand for? From Alexander I, from the end of his reign, concerns about European enlightenment began. For a hundred years it was introduced - starting with Peter, literally, by force - it began to work and began to give birth to the Decembrists, relatively speaking. Those. people who are critical of the matter. It is no longer possible to close education while being a European country or pretending to be a European country. Uvarov offered to give his unprecedented enlightenment. Those. education that would produce smart, efficient, well-trained performers. Enlightenment, which would not only provide knowledge, but also educate loyal subjects of the sovereign-emperor. Those. This is an amazing desire to deprive enlightenment, European enlightenment, of its integral part - the analytical approach. A critical approach to the environment is impossible.

S.BUNTMAN - But the very young Pushkin, even before Nicholas, wrote in one of... in these historical notes he wrote: “Freedom as an inevitable consequence of enlightenment.”

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Yes, undoubtedly.

S.BUNTMAN - It is impossible to separate from each other, it cannot be...

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Impossible.

S. BUNTMAN - And this, by the way, is one of the indicators that the system can come up with some of its own... its own training of personnel working for it, its own...

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Without a doubt.

S.BUNTMAN - But she can never escape the consequences.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - The coin has an obverse, a reverse, there is no way to get away from this.

S.BUNTMAN - Yes.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - By the way, Uvarov himself, criticizing Alexander in his time - pogroms of universities... the search is the same, only grotesque: there, with the Bible in his hands - Nikolai is more and more pragmatic. He wrote about, for example, Golitsyn, the then Minister of Education...

S. BUNTMAN - Yes.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - “They want to find a fire that won’t burn.” Very well said. Fire, you can cook food on it, keep warm, but it inevitably burns. Now, it cannot be otherwise. Those. This is a problem, of course, that Uvarov could not solve, and by the way, did not intend to solve.

S.BUNTMAN – But it cannot be solved within these frameworks.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Impossible. Absolutely right.

S.BUNTMAN – You need to go to another dimension even...

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Absolutely right.

S. BUNTMAN - Well, it is impossible to solve the problem within a vertical framework.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - This enlightenment from the inside destroys the system. The system cannot do without it. This means, again, that this is an indicator that the system needs to be changed. And you know, the same thing, in relation to Pushkin. It’s very interesting, I recently read a very good work about Benckendorff - well, the dissertation was excellent. Benkendorf is Nikolai’s alter ego, he is undoubtedly his most beloved dignitary, they understood each other very well. And there was a very subtle remark: Benckendorff did not like Pushkin, Vyazemsky, Delvig. And let’s say, he was very lenient towards Polevoy. Why? Because Pushkin is a personality. It's not about his liberal views, it's about what he won't do... he won't say what he doesn't mean. The frivolous Delvig is the same. They are almost impossible to bend. And Polevoy, who at first acted as a pronounced liberal - Herzen considers him his predecessor, to some extent - who overthrew authorities - he was tied into a knot at one moment. Those. the authorities are subconsciously and consciously afraid of the personal principle.

S.BUNTMAN – That is. Pushkin has his own moves.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Our own.

S.BUNTMAN - And that Pushkin of 1931 is also Pushkin...

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Yes. Absolutely right.

S.BUNTMAN - ...Pushkin from the time of the Polish uprising is Pushkin himself, as he thinks, yes.

A. LEVANDOVSKY – These are his well-worn, absolutely sincere ones. And Polevoy, after he was bent, writes “Siberian Parasha.” Those. a patriotic work in which he does not believe at all. Those. This is a definite problem. Enlightenment gives personality, power... You know, another literary reminiscence that also amazed me: Nikolai reads Lermontov. This is very interesting. "Hero of our time". He begins to read... A letter to the Empress, he writes: “Here, I’m reading “Hero of Our Time.” Not expected. A wonderful thing, excellent language, and most importantly, how the topic is presented.” And a letter the next day: “What a dirty trick.” So, you see, at first he decided that Maxim Maksimovich was the hero of our time. You see, this is a sincere desire to have Maxim Maksimych in Russia. This is a wonderful person in all respects, he is written in a way that no Puppeteer or Polevoy can write. Very charming, extremely loyal, not reasoning, but only resonating, for whom duty is sacred. There would be more of these. And then it turns out that he is nothing more than a background, and the hero of our time is, well, a figure...

S. BUNTMAN - A completely different person, a completely different person, a completely different reflection.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - A completely different person. Which will not fit into the system in any way.

S.BUNTMAN - Yes, yes, absolutely. Yes. Now, here's an interesting thing. The need to prepare very important reforms, to re-equip, in general, the system...

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Yes, yes.

S.BUNTMAN – Reconfiguring it. And connected and also with peasant reform. Nikolai is undoubtedly preparing it.

A. LEVANDOVSKY – He cooks, no doubt.

S.BUNTMAN - But how?

A. LEVANDOVSKY - You see, he’s a person... well, the word “worthy” may be appropriate. He fulfills his mission with dignity, the way he understands it. He is very sincere. He understands the situation quite well. After all, it is absolutely obvious, we will not go into details now, I think there is not enough time, that serfdom by that time no longer allowed Russia to move forward. Suffice it to recall the construction of the railway, the only one under Nicholas, Moscow - St. Petersburg, which was built on a serf basis - there peasants were taken from the surrounding landowners, it took ten years to build, it undermined the budget... Well, it’s completely impossible. Indeed, how he is preparing reform. These are commissions, or rather committees. Committees on which the bureaucracy sits. The committees are secret, they even meet under code names. What is being done cannot be said out loud. If someone from the outside is invited, even if he is a minister among the ministers, nothing is explained to him. He gives the certificate and leaves. You see, you can cook anything in secret. It is impossible to abolish serfdom in secret. But it’s absolutely obvious...

S. BUNTMAN – I would like it, actually.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - I wanted them to wake up - here...

S. BUNTMAN - Not to mention this, but to introduce some kind of system there, such...

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Unnoticed.

S.BUNTMAN - Invisible, and which... and now he’s gone.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - He is not there.

S.BUNTMAN – There’s something different there.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - That would be wonderful. But this, again, is the same as with obverse, reverse...

S.BUNTMAN - This is impossible.

A. LEVANDOVSKY – ...absolutely impossible. Nikolai was faced with unsolvable problems. His ideal system confronted him with problems that he, often exhausted, tried to solve very sincerely, for the common good, but they were not solved. It was necessary to change. And it was very scary to change. It is also understandable. Here is the most, well, advanced, as they would say now, of his reforms - the famous inventory: a strict restriction of corvee and quitrent. This was very good - in favor of the peasants. But this was done only on the territory of part of Ukraine. For one simple reason: the landowners there are gentry, they are strangers, they are enemies. And the peasants are largely Orthodox. It made sense to show who is in power. When Nicholas was offered - this is just a norm, a limitation - to carry out the same measure throughout Russia, he gave an excellent answer - he expressed his thoughts well - “Although I am omnipotent and autocratic, I will never agree to this. I can’t quarrel with my landlords.” Those. his landowners, unlike the gentry, are his support, and to knock that support out from under him - he was not ready for this. Some kind of... shock was needed to take a step in this direction.

S.BUNTMAN - How does Russia interact with the world and Europe? We always know a lot about this. We know about the year 1848, we know about the beginning and events preceding the Crimean War, but in general, how is it possible... About the “gendarme of Europe”...

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Yes, yes, of course.

S.BUNTMAN – We all know this very well. Something is wrong here, here some message from Nikolaev was a little different. And looking from the outside, it doesn’t always tell us much.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Well, of course, Nikolai is for order. He still has a very clear attitude towards the revolution and towards liberalism too. He doesn’t like change, and he doesn’t like, how to say, what is associated with the concept of a constitution - a lawyer, self-government. He doesn't like the public. He, while still an heir, traveled to England. His mother, Maria Feodorovna, was afraid that he would pick up different ideas there, and Nesselrode even wrote a special note about how terrible the constitution was and so on... Well, that was naive. He visited Hyde Park, visited parliament and said that if, God forbid, this came to Russia, he would ask the Lord to confuse the languages. To... or make them mute. Because this is the beginning of the end, in general. From his point of view, this is all completely unnecessary. But Europe, in this regard, for him, in my opinion, is largely the threshold of Russia. France is a source of chaos, England is a possible ally, because England has some kind of order. It’s not very clear to him and completely unpleasant, but...

S.BUNTMAN - But stable.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - ...stable, stable, stable, absolutely right.

S. BUNTMAN - Moreover, we see this England during the time of Nicholas - England, which really establishes some kind of order.

A. LEVANDOVSKY – It certainly does. And as for neighboring Europe - well, Prussia, the Austrian Empire - there was an attempt to play the role of some kind of patron. If Alexander was on equal terms, even to some extent Metternich, the Austrian chancellor, crushed him under himself, then Nicholas pursued a very clear policy. Those. This is an attempt to continue domestic policy in foreign policy, undoubtedly. But there is different material, unfortunately. Harder to give in.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - All of us, you know, serve certain schemes, inevitably.

S. BUNTMAN - Yes.

A. LEVANDOVSKY – We are all developing them. Of course, I have a concept that is very difficult for me to move away from - everything turns out very well and harmoniously. This is an apparently ideal state, which, in fact, is... a system that is actually a kind of trap. In order to get out of this trap, to break out... by the way, it was necessary to risk quarreling with the landowners. Decisive, radical steps had to be taken. And it is quite obvious that this is impossible without shocks. The Crimean War was such a shock. One can also talk and argue about the reasons for it here for a long time, but it is an underestimation... After all, the British, of course, fooled the sovereign-emperor by the nose. You know, there is a correct observation here: he is a very subtle politician, he turned out to be an excellent diplomat at first. He achieved the maximum possible. The Treaty of Unkar-Iskeles placed the Bosporus and Dardanelles under Russian control. Without shedding a drop of blood. He played brilliantly on the internal contradictions in the Ottoman Empire. But here's a fair remark: he became dizzy after 48-49. All of Europe fell into a state of chaos. In Moldova they fought for some kind of constitution, on the outskirts of the Ottoman Empire. Russia, like a granite cliff, stood firm, helped Austria cope with the Hungarian uprising, brought order to the outskirts, and there was such a feeling... well, this is his approach, in my opinion, at the end of his reign: there are two subjects, Russia and England, you can and we need to negotiate. France is immersed in a chaotic state, and Prussia and Austria do not represent anything serious. This proposal to divide the Ottoman Empire is constantly being passed - a secret proposal. "The inheritance of a sick person."

S. BUNTMAN - Yes.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - This is a Nikolaev expression. We need to help him die safely and share it. The British say neither “yes” nor “no” for 6-7 years, at which time they are moving closer to France with all their might, especially after the arrival of Napoleon.

S.BUNTMAN – What was unthinkable for Russian diplomacy.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Absolutely right. And she overlooked it all. Or she simply didn’t dare to inform the Tsar properly... It is known that this selection of executive ministers, Nesselrode directly said, the Minister of Foreign Affairs: “I am the mouthpiece of Your Majesty’s ideas.” What advice from the mouthpiece? He is very informed, very knowledgeable. But he is afraid to say a word in contradiction to the king. This is where the results come from. Well, we talked about technical problems, but they still had an impact.

S. BUNTMAN - Yes. Both technical and technological problems.

A. LEVANDOVSKY – And technological ones.

S.BUNTMAN – The problem of communication, decision making.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Without a doubt. You read, here, materials related to... well, foreign literature about what it was like for the British and French in Crimea, and still you wonder how we lost the war, because there is such chaos, too, especially among the British.

S. BUNTMAN - Yes.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Yes.

S.BUNTMAN - By the way, the British wrote a very good history of the Crimean War. Simply wonderful.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Yes. Objective enough.

S.BUNTMAN – Objective, huge, analytical history.

A. LEVANDOVSKY – That’s what’s typical, they are not afraid to show their “products”, because indeed, the chaos is terrible, and there is a feeling that, in general, everyone will die of hunger and disease - this winter of 1854-55. Nothing is prepared, supply problems are worse than those of the Russian army. But nevertheless, by the way, a year passed and everything got better. Relatively.

S. BUNTMAN - Yes. Moreover, the English army, the English army then... it had the most important thing: it was... there that what happened in the Russian state happened.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Perhaps.

S.BUNTMAN - There is absolute lack of initiative and irresponsibility of the officers...

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Without a doubt.

S.BUNTMAN – ...about which English historians write a lot.

A. LEVANDOVSKY – Also, if you pay attention: there is immediately a storm in parliament, requests, a newspaper campaign - and some kind of order begins to be restored.

S. BUNTMAN - Yes. Yes.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Unlike our Russian affairs.

S.BUNTMAN – It is very interesting in Russia that the army turned out to be better than the state.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Better than the state.

S. BUNTMAN – The state is better organized, in England it turned out to be the opposite.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Here is Granovsky, my favorite hero, I have always been interested in him, he wrote about this in one of his letters: “Lord, this is the redemption of Russia, because there was a place, Crimea, where such people gathered.”

S. BUNTMAN - Yes.

A. LEVANDOVSKY – This redeems many other things.

S.BUNTMAN - Well, let's draw a conclusion. Is it possible to say, as Alexander writes to us, that “Nicholas I, having compressed the spring, laid a powerful stone in the foundation of the revolution of 1917”?

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Oh, far away.

S.BUNTMAN - Far away.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Far away. Because…

S. BUNTMAN - But in principle, this is a foundation stone.

A. LEVANDOVSKY – Foundation stone. But the chances were still good, Alexander II still had a chance...

S.BUNTMAN – And under Alexander, yes.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Alexander III, if... Well, “if” is almost like “not so.” Here. This is a special conversation already.

S. BUNTMAN - Yes. Yes. And there were still turning points, but in any case, historically, to realize that - and there were attempts at this in Russia - to realize that this is really a dead-end ideal.

A. LEVANDOVSKY – It seems to me that this is a stop on the way.

S. BUNTMAN - Yes.

A. LEVANDOVSKY – Stopping along the way, when it would be desirable not to stop. In general, it is impossible to stop on the historical path for a long time, of course.

S.BUNTMAN – But it’s tempting.

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Tempting, tempting...

S.BUNTMAN - But how tempting it is - as they showed there, in the 80s...

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Well, then, how did they remember: this is a time of rest, relaxation, order, calm, no serious problems, everything is decided for you.

S. BUNTMAN - Yes. It's tempting to fall back into stagnation.

A. LEVANDOVSKY – It’s tempting to return to stagnation.

S. BUNTMAN - Yes. Well, thank you very much!

A. LEVANDOVSKY - Thank you very much!

S. BUNTMAN - Andrei Levandovsky, we talked about Nicholas I. Rodion comments: “Also a slave in the galleys.” I would not say. Nikolai Pavlovich was much more precise in his self-definitions and definition of his functions, and much more serious, it seems to me. Well, this is the “Not So!” program, jointly with the magazine “Knowledge is Power”.

  • Question No. 4. Rus' between East and West: discussion about the influence of the Golden Horde on the development of medieval Rus' (second half of the 13th - first half of the 15th centuries).
  • Question No. 5. The reasons for Moscow’s victory in the struggle for all-Russian political leadership. Suppression of the Novgorod development trend.
  • Question No. 6. Completion of the unification of Russian lands around Moscow at the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th centuries. Formation of the Russian state.
  • Question No. 7. The Russian state in the 16th century. Ivan groznyj. Goals, forms and content of his reforms.
  • Question No. 8. State, politics, morality in Russia in the 16th century. An idea of ​​the mission of the state in Russia and Western European countries.
  • Question No. 9. The genesis of absolutism in Western Europe and Russia. The main stages of the formation of absolutism in Russia.
  • Question No. 10. Petrine Westernization of the public administration system.
  • Question No. 11. Peter I and his policies of mercantilism and protectionism in the process of industrialization of the country.
  • Question No. 12. Discussions about the legacy of Peter I. The results of his reforms (reforms or revolution “from above”?).
  • Question No. 13. The split of Russian society into two ways: “soil” and civilization” as a result of Peter the Great’s Westernization of Russia.
  • Question No. 14. Catherine II and “enlightened absolutism” in Russia.
  • Question No. 15. Reforms of Catherine II: Provincial reform of 1775, “Charter granted to the nobility” and “Charter granted to cities” of 1785.
  • Question No. 16. Domestic policy of Russia in the first quarter of the 19th century. State activities of Alexander I.
  • Question No. 17. Under the scepter of Alexander I. Projects of M. M. Speransky.
  • Question No. 18. “Apogee of autocracy.” Reforms of Nicholas I.
  • Question No. 19. The fall of serfdom. Reform of 1861
  • Question No. 20. Zemstvo, city and judicial reforms of the 1860s - 1870s.
  • Question No. 21. Financial, educational, military reforms of 1861-1874.
  • Question No. 22. The emergence of three socio-political movements in Russia in the second half of the 19th century: governmental, liberal and revolutionary-democratic.
  • Question No. 23. Features of the development of capitalism in Russia (80-90s of the 19th century).
  • Question No. 24. Economic and political crisis in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century. Features of the formation of Russian political parties.
  • Question No. 25. Political and socio-economic reasons for the First Russian Revolution of 1905-1907.
  • Question No. 26. The nature, features and driving forces of the First Russian Revolution of 1905-1907.
  • Question No. 27. Creation of the State Duma during the First Russian Revolution. The process of forming a multi-party political system.
  • Question No. 28. Stolypin’s modernization policy. Her results.
  • Question No. 29. Russia in the First World War. Crisis of the political system.
  • Question No. 30. February bourgeois-democratic revolution. The collapse of autocracy. Features of dual power.
  • Question No. 31 Development of the February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917. October revolution.
  • Question No. 32. Civil war in Soviet Russia. The politics of war communism (1918-1920).
  • Question No. 33. Soviet society on the rails of the New Economic Policy. The fate of NEP.
  • Question No. 34. The USSR is on the path to accelerated construction of socialism. Formation of an administrative-command management system and a regime of personal power, etc. Stalin.
  • Question No. 35. Soviet foreign policy on the eve and at the beginning of World War II.
  • Question No. 36. World War II. Results of its initial period (1939-1941).
  • Question No. 37. The USSR during the Great Patriotic War. Initial stage (June 1941 – November 1942).
  • Question No. 38. A radical turning point during the Great Patriotic War (November 1942 - December 1943).
  • Question No. 39. The final period of the Great Patriotic War (1944 - September 1945).
  • Question No. 40. Ideological confrontation between East and West in the post-war period. Origins of the Cold War.
  • Question No. 41. The prevalence of the totalitarian trend in the post-war period. Expansionism is the dominant feature of Stalin’s foreign policy.
  • Question No. 42. The beginning of the de-Stalinization of society. Political liberalism n. S. Khrushchev. "Thaw" in spiritual life.
  • Question No. 43. Economic development of the country in 1953-1965. Reasons for the incompleteness of Khrushchev's reforms.
  • Question No. 44. The socio-economic situation of the country in the 70s - the first half of the 80s. XX century.
  • Question No. 45. In search of ways to improve socialism. Stages of Gorbachev's perestroika. Her results.
  • Question No. 46. August 1991. Collapse of the USSR. Sovereign Russia on the path to forming a new statehood.
  • Question No. 47. Economic reforms in modern Russia: essence, consequences, social cost.
  • Question No. 48. Interethnic relations in modern Russia. Chechen problem.
  • Question No. 49. Modern Russia in the outside world.
  • Question No. 50. V.V. Putin and the state-constitutional reform of Russia.
  • Bibliographic list.
  • Content.
  • Question No. 18. “Apogee of autocracy.” Reforms of Nicholas I.

    1) During the reign of Nicholas I (1825-1855), the autocratic form of government reached its apogee. The emperor sought to rule in isolation from society, experiencing distrust of it (caused by the Decembrist uprising). This led to the fact that the only support of his absolute power was the bureaucratic apparatus that tripled during the years of his rule, a modernized police force, a submissive church and a colossal army, which he used primarily to suppress liberation movements both within the country and abroad. The main goal of his reign was the fight against the revolution, for which he tightened control over all spheres of public life by: 1. Creating a new political police - the gendarmerie, which was subordinate to the III department of the Emperor's Own Chancellery. Its activities were aimed not only at identifying opponents of the regime, but also at preventing political crimes (for which surveillance, denunciations, and secret agents were used). 2. Tightening censorship. Any criticism of the regime and its representatives was unacceptable. A huge number of government institutions received censorship rights. 3. Reactionary policy in the field of education. Education again became class-based (universities and gymnasiums for nobles, district schools for merchants and townspeople, parish schools for peasants). Subjects requiring independent thinking were excluded from the programs. Control over the education sector by government agencies was tightened. Numerous types of repression were provided for against violators of a very strict educational discipline. 4. Creation of their own ideological doctrine that substantiated the inviolability of autocracy - the “theory of official nationality” developed by S. S. Uvarov. She promoted “Orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality” as supposedly the fundamental “beginnings of Russian life.” They, according to the authors of the theory, meant the absence of a basis for social protest against absolutism - the people in Russia love the Tsar as a father, and this love is based on the solid foundation of Orthodoxy. This theory was introduced into the consciousness of society through educational institutions, the official press, literature, and theater.

    2) However, Nicholas understood that it was impossible to strengthen the empire with restrictions and repressions alone. Therefore, he also carried out a number of reforms that made it possible to temporarily stabilize the socio-economic situation in the empire: 1. Codification of legislation carried out by M. M. Speransky. It made it possible to somewhat limit the arbitrariness of the bureaucracy, inevitable under an autocratic-bureaucratic regime. In 1830, a collection of all Russian laws issued from 1649 to 1825 was compiled - the Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire (45 books), and in 1832 - on its basis - a collection of current law - “Code of Laws of the Russian Empire” (8 books ). 2. Reform of the state village (1837-1841), carried out by P. D. Kiselyov. It made it possible to somewhat improve the situation of state peasants. Peasant self-government was introduced. Hospitals and veterinary centers appeared in the state village. Recruitment and land use were streamlined. In case of hunger strikes, the so-called “public plowing” was provided, the harvest from which would go to the public fund. 3. Financial reform (1839-1843) implemented by E. F. Kankrin. By maintaining a strict proportion between paper credit notes and silver, it was possible to achieve a budget deficit and strengthen the country's financial system. However, in general, the successes of Nicholas's domestic policy turned out to be very limited and short-lived. The reason for this is the preservation of the autocratic-bureaucratic system and serfdom. They hampered the development of the country and ultimately led to the sad end of Nicholas’ reign - the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War (1853-1856).

    The years of the reign of Nicholas I (1825 - 1855) are assessed by historians as the “apogee of autocracy.”

    The influence of the Decembrist uprising on the reign of Nicholas I A. F. Tyutchev “He sincerely and sincerely believed that he was able to see everything with his own eyes, hear everything with his own ears, regulate everything according to his own understanding, transform everything with his own will. He never forgot what, when and to whom he ordered, and ensured the exact execution of his orders.” The order that Nikolai strove for: ØStrict centralization; ØComplete unity of command; ØUnconditional submission of the lower to the higher. Ø Constant struggle with the revolutionary movement, persecution of everything advanced and progressive in the country

    One of the primary tasks of the internal political course of Nicholas I was to strengthen the police bureaucratic apparatus; numerous secret committees and commissions were established, which were under the direct authority of the tsar and often replaced ministries.

    The government of Nicholas I focused on three major problems: administrative - improving public administration, social - the peasant issue, ideological - the system of education and enlightenment.

    The principle of the regime of personal power of the monarch was embodied in the expanding “own office” of the king. The Tsar's Office became its first department, whose responsibilities included preparing papers for the emperor and monitoring the execution of his orders.

    Strengthening the role of the state apparatus His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery Department 2: Codification of laws Department 1: Control over the execution of the emperor's orders Department 3: Body of political investigation and control over mental attitudes 4 department created to deal with women's schools and charity 5 department created in For the reform of state peasants . 6th department. Created in Caucasus Governance

    On January 31, 1826, the Second Department was created “to implement the code of domestic laws,” which was called “codification.”

    The codification (streamlining) of legislation was carried out by the II Department of the Chancellery under the leadership of Speransky. M. M. The “Code of Laws of the Russian Empire” set out the current laws.

    Preparation of a Unified Code of Laws. 1830 1833 Legislative acts from the Collection of laws of the “Conciliar Code” of 1649 to the end of the Russian Empire in 45 t. Alexander. I Code of Laws of the Russian Empire in 15 volumes. Legislative acts classified according to their scope. M. Speransky carried out codification in 5 years.

    Herzen called the III Department “an armed inquisition, police Freemasonry,” placed “outside the law and above the law.” The favorite of Nicholas I, General A.H. Benckendorf, was placed at the head of the III department; he was also the chief of the gendarmes.

    In 1828, the IV department was added, which managed educational, educational and other “charitable” institutions included in the department named after Empress Maria Feodorovna (the Tsar’s mother)

    Attempts to Solve the Peasant Question In 1842, a decree was issued on “obligated” peasants. Landowners could release peasants with land into hereditary possession, but in exchange for this the peasants had to perform various duties in favor of the landowners.

    In 1837 - 1841 reform was carried out in the state village by P. D. Kiselev. The sale of serfs for debts was prohibited; “retail” sales of members of the same family were also prohibited, peasant volost and rural self-government were introduced

    Attempts to Solve the Peasant Question Schools were opened in state-owned villages; by 1854, 26 thousand schools with 110 thousand students were opened. In order to protect peasants from crop failures, it was decided to create “public plowing”. Here the peasants worked together and enjoyed the fruits of their common labor.

    Attempts to Solve the Peasant Question 1847 Serfs received the right to redeem their freedom if their owner's estate was put up for sale for debts; in 1848 they were given the right to purchase unoccupied lands and buildings. Serfdom in Russia continued to be preserved.

    Strengthening the Noble Class Nicholas I paid great attention to the task of strengthening the noble class. The order of inheritance of large estates was changed. Now they could not be crushed and were passed on to the eldest in the family. Since 1928, only children of nobles and officials were admitted to secondary and higher educational institutions.

    Strengthening the nobility Decree on majorates of 1845. Raising the ranks that gave the right to the title of nobility (1845). Strengthening the role of noble assemblies.

    There were two degrees of honorary citizens: hereditary (merchants of the first guild, scientists, artists, children of personal nobles and clergy with educational qualifications) and personal (officials up to the 12th rank) Honorary citizens: hereditary personal

    The basis of public education under Nicholas I was the principle of strict class and bureaucratic centralization, which was embodied in the Charter of educational institutions published in 1828.

    On July 26, 1835, the “General Charter of Imperial Russian Universities” was published and a number of special educational institutions were established: the Institute of Technology, the School of Architecture, the Imperial School of Law, the Agricultural Institute, the Main Pedagogical Institute, and the Naval Academy in St. Petersburg.

    Introduction of Censorship To curb the press, Nicholas introduced strict censorship. Censorship was under the authority of the Ministry of Public Education, which was headed by S. S. Uvarov. “Charter on Censorship” of 1826, called “cast iron”. It was forbidden to admit serfs to secondary and higher educational institutions. S. S. Uvarov.

    And yet, despite censorship strictures, in the 30s and 40s “The Inspector General” and “Dead Souls” by N.V. Gogol, the stories by A.I. Herzen “Doctor Krupov” and “Who is to blame?” were published.

    In 30 -40 years. In the 19th century, the industrial revolution began in Russia. The industrial revolution refers to the historical period of transition from manufacturing - enterprises based on manual labor - to machine production. The Industrial Revolution began primarily in the cotton industry

    From the mid-30s. Railway construction began. Following the first railway from St. Petersburg to Tsarskoe Selo, built in 1837 (6 steam locomotives purchased abroad operated), the Warsaw-Vienna (1848) and Nikolaevskaya, connecting St. Petersburg with Moscow (1851), were launched.

    Reforms of E. F. Kankrin By 1825, Russia's external debt reached 102 million rubles in silver Minister of Finance Kankrin: He limited government spending, used credit carefully, pursued a policy of patronage of Russian industry and trade, and imposed high duties on industrial goods imported into Russia. In 1839-1843 Kankrin carried out a monetary reform. The silver ruble became the main means of payment. Then credit notes were issued, which could be freely exchanged for silver. Thanks to these measures, Kankrin achieved a deficit-free state budget and strengthened the country's financial position. The proportion between the number of banknotes and the state reserve of silver was maintained.

    “Foreign Policy of Nicholas I”: Directions of foreign policy a) Western European direction b) Middle Eastern Western European direction a) b) c) d) Russian-Polish War of 1830-1831. 1848 – revolution in France. March 1848 - summer 1849 - revolution in Germany. March 3, 1848 - September 5, 1849 – revolution in Hungary. Middle Eastern direction. a) War in Transcaucasia b) Russian-Turkish War of 1828-1829.

    The main task of Russian foreign policy in Western Europe was to maintain the old monarchical regimes and fight the revolutionary movement. Nicholas was impressed by the role of international gendarme in Europe, which Russia assumed in connection with the formation of the “Holy Alliance”.

    Russian-Polish War of 1830-1831. It began on November 29, 1830 and lasted until October 21, 1831. The slogan is the restoration of the “historical Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth” within the borders of 1772. The Sejm adopted an act deposing Nicholas and banning the Romanov dynasty from occupying the Polish throne. By the end of the uprising, the army numbered 80,821 people. The number of all troops that were supposed to be used against the Poles reached 183 thousand.

    In 1848-1849, a new, even more powerful, flurry of revolutions swept across Europe. Nicholas I took an active part in their suppression.

    The second and main direction of Russian foreign policy in the 20-50s was the solution of the eastern question. In the south, a very difficult relationship developed with the Ottoman Empire and Iran.

    The desire of tsarism to extend its influence into the Caucasus met stubborn resistance from the peoples of Dagestan, Chechnya, and Adygea. In 1817, the Caucasian War began, which lasted for many years.

    The famous Shamil appeared in the mountains of Dagestan. In the central part of Chechnya, Shamil created a strong theocratic state - an imamate with its capital in Vedeno. In 1854 Shamil was defeated

    The Caucasian War lasted for almost half a century (from 1817 to 1864) and cost many victims (Russian troops lost 77 thousand people in this war).

    In the late 20s and early 30s, Russia's foreign policy in the Caucasus and Balkans was extremely successful. The Russian-Persian War of 1826-1828 ended with the defeat of Persia, and Armenia and Northern Azerbaijan became part of Russia.

    The war with Turkey (1828 -1829), also successful for Russia. As a result of the Russian-Turkish and Russian-Iranian wars of the late 20s of the 19th century, Transcaucasia was finally included in the Russian Empire: Georgia, Eastern Armenia, Northern Azerbaijan. From that time on, Transcaucasia became an integral part of the Russian Empire.

    Defense of Sevastopol September 1854 - August 1855 Heroes of the defense of Sevastopol: Admirals: Kornilov, Istomin, Nakhimov Military doctor: N.I. Pirogov - first use of anesthesia First nurse of mercy: Dasha Sevastopolskaya Scout sailor: Koshka Military engineering: General Totleben - fortifications

    Malakhov Kurgan, a dominant height southeast of Sevastopol. On August 27, 1855, superior French forces captured the Malakhov Kurgan, after which Russian troops left the southern side of Sevastopol.

    The end of the war of 1855 - the death of Kornilov, Nakhimov, Istomin August 1855 - Sevastopol was captured. The fall of Sevastopol = the end of the war. The new emperor, AII, is negotiating peace. March 1856 – Peace of Paris. Russia loses part of Bessarabia, protection over Serbia and the Danube principalities. The most humiliating thing for Russia is the Black Sea = neutral. Russia has no right to have military fortifications there. Sevastopol was exchanged for the Kars fortress.

    In the first half of the 19th century. The process of Kazakhstan's voluntary entry into the Russian Empire was completed and the annexation of Central Asia began.