Makhno army in the civil war. Ten facts about the rebel army of Nestor Makhno, which are fundamentally consigned to oblivion Fact ten about the rebel army of Makhno

During the years of Soviet power, Father Makhno was presented by propaganda as an insidious, greedy, cruel, bloody bandit. In the cinema of that time, Makhno was portrayed as an evil and comical character. A kind of bad boy. With the collapse of the USSR, in modern Russia, there is a revision of historical events, as well as the personalities who made history. Having learned many interesting historical facts, I became interested in the activities of Nestor Ivanovich Makhno. His struggle for equality and social justice for workers today cannot leave many history buffs indifferent. Who really was Nestor Ivanovich Makhno?

Gulyaypole is a large village in the Yekaterinoslav province (now the Zaporozhye region of Ukraine) with a population of 20-30,000 people, in which there were several schools, plants, factories and even a bank. It was here that Nestor Ivanovich Mikhnenko, who became known as Makhno, was born on October 29, 1888. He was the fifth child in the family and grew up without a father. From the age of seven he worked as a laborer in seasonal agricultural work for landowners and kulaks, and a little later became a worker at a foundry. Working from childhood, he experienced the hard life of the poor peasants and workers, and then the desire to devote his life to changing the unjust way of life penetrated into his consciousness.

At the age of 16, Nestor joined the anarchist-communist organization “Union of Poor Grain Growers,” which carried out a number of attacks on landowners in the Yekaterinoslav province. During one of the actions, a police bailiff was killed. Nestor Makhno, sentenced to death along with other participants for this, remained alive only because the death penalty was not applied to minors, but was replaced by indefinite hard labor. According to other sources, the original sentence did not provide for the death penalty for Makhno, but rather indefinite hard labor. It was commuted to a 20-year prison sentence.

This version explains why Nestor served time in Butyrka prison, where he met the revolutionary Pyotr Arshinov, a native of Yekaterinoslav (pseudonym Pyotr Marin), a Bolshevik since 1904, who switched to the position of anarcho-communism in 1906. In 1904-1906, Arshinov led the organization of the RSDLP at the Kizil-Arvat station in Central Asia, worked as editor of the illegal Bolshevik newspaper Molot, but was disappointed with the “moderation” of the Bolshevik program. Being theoretically more prepared, Arshinov contributed to Makhno’s general and political self-education.
As a practical revolutionary, Arshinov could be an example of commitment to “direct action” for the young Nestor, for he was the organizer of several terrorist acts. For example, in the spring of 1907, in front of dozens of workers, he shot and killed the head of the railway workshops, Vasilenko, who was dismissing strikers. Naturally, such a person had a huge influence on Makhno’s worldview. Nestor Ivanovich, in fact, received his education in prison. In addition to Arshinov, there were other political prisoners in his cell with him, who had an extensive library, by prison standards, from which Makhno studied books every day. Having gained knowledge, Nestor himself began to write political articles and poems.

The political situation in the country changed dramatically, and the February Revolution of 1917 opened the doors of the Butyrka prison to Makhno. An amnesty was declared for all political prisoners. Having spent a short time in Moscow, Nestor Ivanovich did not find his place among the Moscow anarchists and returned to his homeland in Gulyai-Polye, where he was drawn and where anarchism had long taken its roots. Arshinov, in turn, remained in Moscow, becoming a member of the Moscow Federation of Anarchist Groups. Nestor Ivanovich came to his native village as a martyr, having suffered from the authorities for a just cause - the fight against the autocracy, landowners and all the oppressors of the working class. Eight years in prison did not shake his belief in the rightness of anarchism. He actively joined the political life of Gulyai-Polye, often spoke at rallies, published leaflets, campaigned for “Free Councils”, “Local Power”, called for ignoring the elections to the Constituent Assembly: “The Constituent Assembly is a card game of all political parties. And ask anyone who visits gambling dens, did any of them come out of there without being deceived? Nobody!"

Less than a month after Nestor Makhno was released from prison, he became chairman of the newly created Gulyai-Polye Peasant Union. And a few months later he was elected chairman of the Gulyai-Polye local land committee, reorganized into a district committee. This committee, under the direct leadership and on the initiative of Makhno, prepared the immediate distribution of all landowners' land and agricultural implements among the peasants.

At that time, Nestor Makhno was completely absorbed, on the one hand, in the affairs of the Peasant Union, and on the other, in the problems of the workers. At the same time, while leading the Peasant Union, he holds the post of chairman of the trade union and initiated the convening of the owners of all industrial and commercial enterprises in Gulyai-Polye to present them with an energetic demand to increase workers’ wages by 100 percent.
This demand of the workers and the trade union caused a storm of indignation among the owners of the enterprises and a categorical refusal to increase wages in such an amount. Disputes over the percentage of the workers' wage increase lasted 2-3 days, after which the owners or directors of the enterprises assured the workers that the maximum wage increase would be 45 - 60 percent. After this, Nestor Makhno, as the chairman of the meeting of employers and workers, told them that the negotiations were ending: “The Council of the Trade Union has authorized me to take under my leadership all public enterprises managed by you, citizens, but by right not belonging to you, and to deal with you on the street , at the site of each enterprise. I close the meeting!"
Makhno stood up and went to the phone. The heads of the enterprises knew that the Trade Union Council had sent its man to the telephone exchange for immediate emergency communication of all telephones of the enterprises with the telephone of the trade union. The purpose was to warn workers that factory owners who did not accept their demands would be met with worker demonstrations and work stoppages upon returning from the meeting. Half an hour later, in the meeting room, the owners of the enterprises began to sign the texts of the agreement proposed by the trade union. And when the documents were signed, all enterprises were informed by telephone about the success of negotiations with the directors of the enterprises. Over time, the workers in Gulyai-Polye “took over” the enterprises where they worked and controlled their administrative and economic activities, and then began to prepare to take them under their direct control.
Unexpectedly, news came from Petrograd from the Provisional Government and from the Council of Workers', Peasants', Soldiers' and Cossacks' Deputies that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General Kornilov, had withdrawn the troops loyal to him from the front and was moving towards Petrograd with the aim of eliminating the revolution.

Nestor Makhno headed the Committee to Save the Revolution, disarmed the landowners and bourgeoisie in the region, and organized the confiscation of their lands, which were transferred to peasant farms and communes. At the end of November, news arrived in Gulyai-Polye about the October Revolution in Petrograd and Moscow, and then throughout Russia. The Bolsheviks, led by the brilliant politician, tactician and propagandist Lenin, timely and skillfully grasped the aspirations of the working masses and captivated them with the slogan “All power to the Councils of Workers’, Peasants’ and Soldiers’ Deputies locally!” In turn, recognizing and welcoming the demand of the worker-peasant masses “Land for the peasants, factories for the workers!”, Lenin and the Bolsheviks (to a lesser extent, their allies the Left Socialist Revolutionaries) became leaders of public opinion. They now led a new stage of the revolution and, having a powerful publishing base, bombarded cities and villages with their appeals, declarations and programs. Anarchists also played an important role in the October events, but due to their disorganization they remained at the tail end of the revolution.

In March 1918, Soviet Russia signed the Brest Peace Treaty. Even earlier, in February, separately from the Bolsheviks, it was ratified by the Ukrainian Central Rada. Under this treaty, German and Austro-Hungarian troops occupied a significant part of Ukraine. The Soviet government, or rather Trotsky, officially notified its partners that Russia did not recognize separate agreements between the Rada and the central powers. Makhno and his supporters did not recognize these agreements either. The anarchists began to prepare for a new struggle.

Scattered Bolshevik and anarchist detachments tried to resist the invaders and the troops of the Central Rada, but invariably suffered defeats and rolled back to the east. After this, virtually all of Ukraine ended up in the hands of German-Austro-Hungarian troops.

At this critical moment, Makhno decides to support the Bolsheviks in the fight against the occupiers, and in April 1918 he creates a strong armed detachment in Gulyai-Polye. Having left for a meeting at the Red Army headquarters, headed by A.I. Egorov, he receives news that Gulyaypole was occupied by German-Austrian units and their minions, detachments of the Ukrainian Central Rada, with the help of their agents who joined the village and local authorities.

Together with detachments of Red Army soldiers and part of his comrades, Makhno retreated to Taganrog. Here he participated in a conference of anarchists, at which they decided to secretly return to Gulyai-Polye and organize partisan detachments among peasants and workers in order to draw the broad working peasantry through them into the fight against the German-Austro-Hungarian expeditionary armies and the Ukrainian Central Rada.

After Taganrog, Makhno continues his journey across Russia, visiting Rostov-on-Don, Saratov, Tsaritsyn, Astrakhan and Moscow. In Moscow he met with Sverdlov and Lenin. In particular, Lenin was interested in how the peasants of the Gulyai-Polye region understood the slogan “All power to the Soviets in the localities!”
- The power of the Soviets at the local level - this, in peasant terms, means that all power in everything must be identified directly with the consciousness and will of the working people themselves; that rural, volost or district Councils of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies are no more and no less than units of revolutionary grouping and economic self-government on the path of life and struggle of workers with the bourgeoisie and its henchmen - right-wing socialists and their coalition power - answered Nestor Ivanovich.

They talked for a long time about the role of the anarchist movement in Ukraine and the joint fight against counter-revolution. After which Lenin offered support to the anarchists in the war against the occupiers in Ukraine. So, with the assistance of Lenin and Sverdlov, in July 1918, Makhno again found himself in Ukraine, in his native Gulyai-Polye region, which, with its working and revolutionary population, would become the center of the uprising against the occupiers.

Let us note that the Soviet government, while formally observing the terms of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, actually supported the fight against the occupiers. But she could dismiss the claims of her “partners” with references to the fact that she could not control the detachments of anarchists, Socialist Revolutionaries, etc., had no relation to them, etc. We are familiar with this technique, which is very appropriate in certain situations, neither surprise nor indignation he cannot call.

On April 29, 1918, the Central Rada was overthrown by the bourgeoisie and landowners, who put in its place their representative in the person of Hetman Pavel Skoropadsky, whose power did not change anything for the worker.

Inspired by the possibility of resuming the fight against the counter-revolution, Nestor Makhno let all the peasants and workers in Gulyai-Polye know that he was not far from them and hoped to see them soon. He scouted out the state of the opposing forces located both in Gulyai-Polye itself and around it, in the villages and hamlets closest to it, and began to prepare an attack on the Gulyai-Polye German Hetman garrison. He secretly made his way to Gulyai-Polye, settled with a family he knew, who hid him and passed on letters to his supporters, from whom he organized a small partisan detachment. At the head of this detachment, Makhno carried out a number of successful attacks on the German occupiers and local landowners. In September-October 1918, the forces of other partisan detachments operating in the Aleksandrovsky district were grouped around Makhno’s detachment. Makhno actually became the leader of the rebel movement in the Yekaterinoslav province and received recognition as a leader - the father. The old man’s detachment made lightning raids and immediately disappeared, only to suddenly appear in another place. To penetrate the enemy's camp, dressing in the uniform of the hetman's troops was widely used. The November 1918 revolution in Germany brought the Germans out of the First World War, which led to the annulment of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty (which V.I. Lenin foresaw at the time of its conclusion) and the end of the German occupation of the territory of Ukraine. The Directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic took power here, whose armed forces under the command of S.V. Petlyura occupied Yekaterinoslav.

From the beginning of 1919, Makhno, who by this time had concluded an alliance with the Bolsheviks, fought against the Volunteer Army of General A.I. Denikin, the Directorate of the UPR and the Entente troops that landed in the south of Ukraine. At this time, Makhnovist detachments formed a brigade as part of the Trans-Dnieper division of the Red Army. For the capture of Yekaterinoslav, N. Makhno was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. But the alliance with the Bolsheviks turned out to be short-lived, due to the anti-Makhnovist propaganda campaign launched by the Bolsheviks. L.D., who arrived in Ukraine Trotsky wrote: “The period of partisanship dragged on greatly in Ukraine. This is precisely why its liquidation became so painful. Now we have to use hot iron. But this work must be done. We need to put an end to the adventurers not in words, but in deeds.” The high command of the Red Army declared Makhno an outlaw.

Despite this, the Makhnovists continued their struggle against the white movement. Moreover, many Red Army soldiers went over to their side, and the number of Makhno’s rebel army increased to 35 thousand soldiers. It included large mounted formations and had many machine guns. Makhno with all these forces retreated to the Kherson province, uniting with Ataman Grigoriev, who also broke away from the Bolsheviks. In mid-July 1919, Makhno headed the Revolutionary Military Council of the united Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine (RPAU), and after the murder of Grigoriev, who did not want to conduct active military operations against the troops of A.I. Denikin, became its commander-in-chief.

In the summer of 1919, a large-scale offensive by Denikin’s troops against Moscow began. Makhno at this time was waging a partisan war in the rear of the Whites. Seeing that a critical moment was approaching for all revolutionary gains, he again called on all his fighters to form an alliance with the Bolsheviks. Pressed by the units of Denikin's general Ya. A. Slashchev, the Makhnovist partisan detachments retreated to Uman, finding themselves encircled by Petliurists in the north-west and Slashchev in the south-east. Then Makhno gathered all his troops into a single fist and attacked the whites pursuing him with all his might, inflicting a crushing defeat on the latter in the battle of Peregonovka. Having broken through the encirclement ring, the Makhnovists made a dizzying and lightning-fast raid to the east, smashing the rear of the Whites and, having covered 600 versts in 11 days, found themselves a hundred versts from Denikin’s headquarters in Taganrog.

On October 14, units of Denikin’s Volunteer Army captured Orel, but soon the attack on Moscow fizzled out, as the White command was forced to remove selected cavalry units from the front from the corps of generals Mamontov and Shkuro. Thus, the battle near Peregonovka and the subsequent raid of the Makhnovists to the east significantly influenced the course of the Civil War. Soon after the defeat and further retreat of Denikin’s armies to the south, Makhno found himself unnecessary to the Bolsheviks, and was again declared an outlaw.

Wrangel's offensive in the summer of 1920 and the occupation of Northern Tavria by his army again forced the Bolsheviks to enter into an alliance with Makhno. The combined forces under the command of M.V. Frunze and N.I. Makhno drove Wrangel's army from there to Crimea, which became the last stronghold of the white movement in the European part of the country. During the Perekop-Chongar operation, Makhno’s troops were the first to break through the Crimean defensive fortifications. However, after the defeat of Wrangel, in violation of a previously reached agreement, the Bolshevik leaders gave the order to disarm units of their recent ally. Until the end of August 1921, the Makhnovists waged an unequal struggle with Soviet power. Thanks to harsh and energetic punitive operations and the transition to a new economic policy, the Bolsheviks managed to deprive the insurgent movement of a broad social base. Realizing the futility of continuing the struggle, Nestor Makhno, pressed by Red Army formations, crosses the Romanian border with a small group of fighters.
After forced emigration, Makhno lived for some time in Romania and Poland. In 1925, he and his family moved to Paris, where he lived until his death. Nestor Makhno died in 1934, the urn with his ashes was walled up in the Wall of the Communards at the famous Pere-la-Chaise cemetery.

This is how the life of this extraordinary, tragic and odious man, Nestor Ivanovich Makhno, ends. Robber, convict, anarchist, partisan, public defender, talented military leader, emigrant. His life was full of hardships, suffering and dangerous adventures.
When assessing this historical figure, I think it is important to take into account that Lenin’s slogan: “Land for the peasants, factories for the workers!” Nestor Ivanovich Makhno was ahead of and carried out literally and completely from the summer of 1917. Gulyai-Polye and its surroundings at that time became something of an “island of freedom” for peasants. Already at the end of October 1917, on the lands of the landowners and kulaks, four agricultural communes were organized from agricultural workers and the poorest peasantry of the Gulyai-Polye region, with a number of participants of over 700 people. The activity of the communards was very high; they repaired equipment, cleaned grain, prepared for the upcoming sowing, and adapted buildings for the homes of communard families. Public catering was organized in the communes. Communards were allocated land according to labor standards.

If we consider Nestor Makhno as a military leader, one can only be amazed at how a man without a military education made a decisive contribution to the victory for the Reds in the civil war on the southern front. Most of all, I remember his lightning attacks on carts, which became almost a symbol of the civil war.

In conclusion, I would like to note that Makhno could not help but come into conflict with the Soviet government, as well as any other. Despite the fact that no one acted with white gloves in the Civil War, Makhno was not the worst representative of its leading participants; most importantly, he remained true to his political and ideological views. Could an anarcho-communist become a disciplined subject to power? The answer, in my opinion, is obvious, it couldn’t. Could the government (any one - be it Soviet or anti-Soviet) for any long period of time come to terms with the presence of armed allies, partners, and not disciplined subordinates? And finally, let us remember that the Bolsheviks, according to their political and economic program guidelines, were guided by the development and victory of the industrial system. And where and when did the industrial system develop otherwise than by extracting resources from the rural economy? Again, the answer is obvious, industrialism and peasant freedom are not compatible in the same time and space.

The legendary Old Man Makhno is a bright and controversial figure in Russian history, a convinced anarchist and a frantic fighter.

Childhood and adolescence

Nestor Ivanovich Makhno was born in the village of Gulyaypole (now Zaporozhye region) on November 7, 1888. The boy's parents were poor peasants, his father Ivan Rodionovich worked as a coachman for the master, his mother Evdokia Matreevna ran the house and took care of the children: Nestor was the youngest of five sons.

With the death of their father, the family was orphaned, the children lost their only breadwinner. The youngest of the brothers also had a hard time. Having reached the age of seven, the boy began to hire out for daily work: herding cattle, working as a laborer for landowners. Despite this, Nestor managed to study for four years at a parish school, where he was sent at the age of eight.

Prison and anarchy

Since 1903, the young man worked at an iron foundry. In 1906, Makhno was arrested for carrying weapons, but he was released due to his youth. It was during this period that the future chieftain became acquainted with the concept of anarchism, and anarchy forever became his muse.

Having joined the “Free Union of Anarchist Grain Growers,” Nestor Makhno participated in many terrorist acts related to the expropriation of the property of landowners and wealthy peasants. In 1910, members of the group were put on trial. The military court of the city of Yekaterinoslav (now Dnepropetrovsk) sentenced the anarchist-terrorists to various terms of hard labor (according to other sources, to the death penalty).

Lenta.co

Nestor Makhno was sentenced to 20 years of hard labor. For some time, Makhno was kept in the Yekaterinoslav prison, then transferred to Butyrka in Moscow. Here he met the anarchist Arshinov, who had a considerable influence on the young cellmate.

In Butyrka, Nestor did not waste time: he not only absorbed the basics of ideology gleaned from his senior colleague in the struggle, but also engaged in self-education, read many books on political economy, history, studied mathematics, grammar, and Russian literature. Makhno was released from prison together with Arshinov in March 1917, under an amnesty in honor of the February Revolution. In addition to knowledge and experience, the prisoner also took away from his imprisonment a terrible acquisition - consumption, which killed him many years later.

Political and military career: beginning

There are many inaccuracies in Makhno's biography. Over time, his associates were killed, and evidence of his activities in Ukraine is rather contradictory. However, his role in the war, the Civil War, cannot be underestimated, even though he went to realize his anarchist ideals over corpses.

Nestor Makhno in the army | However

Returning from imprisonment in Gulyai-Polye, Nestor found himself in the thick of revolutionary events. He, “who suffered for a just cause,” was elected by his fellow villagers as the head of the peasant union and the local peasant council. With the participation of Makhno, in the fall of 1917, representatives of the Provisional Government were driven out of the Alexandrovskaya volost and Soviet power was established. In 1918, as a representative of the Gulyai-Polye Revolutionary Committee, he participated in the all-Don conference of revolutionary committees and Soviets.

The establishment of a new government was prevented by the invasion of interventionists: in the summer of 1918, Austro-German troops occupied Ukraine. This time can be considered the beginning of Makhno's military career, since it was then that the rebels first united into a partisan detachment under his leadership. The detachment fought both against the Germans and Ukrainian nationalists. As revenge, the authorities dealt with Nestor's older brother and burned the house where his mother lived.

KDKV

Then, in May 1918, Nestor Makhno came to Moscow, where he personally met with Sverdlov, as well as with the leaders of the anarchist party. Meetings with the leadership of the Soviet government did not bring anything useful, but at the Moscow Conference of Anarchists, tactics for fighting the occupiers in Ukraine were developed. Armed with forged documents, Makhno went home to organize a rebel army.

"Inflexible Dad"

Father Makhno's whole life was an endless struggle. While recognizing some of the Bolsheviks’ positions as correct, he did not resign himself to their desire to “crush the entire revolution and its merits.” At the same time, he more than once concluded a temporary truce with the Soviet regime, fighting against the White Guards and interventionists.

Nestor Makhno became a living ideal for anarchists around the world. He managed to create his own state within a state, establish communes in the cities under his control, establish production, open schools, trade unions, create all the conditions for the peaceful life of ordinary people, without neglecting the principles of anarchy.

Gogomuz

His army was a significant force on the political map of the former Russian Empire for several years, but Makhno is especially revered by Ukrainian Jews, because pogroms and robberies concerned only landowners, and nationalism in the ranks of the rebel army was punished harshly, even by execution.

The activities of Father Makhno in Ukraine during the Civil War can be briefly described by the following theses:

• in 1918 he formed an alliance with the Red Army and fought against the troops under the command of Petliura;
• in 1919, Dad again united with the Bolsheviks and fought with Denikin’s troops;
• On May 29, 1919, he broke the agreement with the Bolsheviks, who announced the liquidation of the “Makhnovshchina”;
• in July-December 1919 he waged a partisan war against Denikin’s army, then again supported the “Reds”, broke through the White Guard front and took the cities of Gulyaypole, Berdyansk, Nikopol, Melitopol and Yekaterinoslav;
• in 1920, Makhno again came into conflict with the Bolsheviks, but rejected Wrangel’s proposals to create an alliance;
• in September 1920, another reconciliation between the father and the “Reds” followed, followed by participation in the Crimean campaign;
• after the victory over the White Guards in Crimea, Makhno refused to join the Red Army, for which the Bolsheviks destroyed almost all of his troops;
• at the end of 1920, dad gathered a new army of fifteen thousand and waged a guerrilla war in Ukraine, but the forces were unequal, and in August 1921, Makhno and his closest associates crossed the border into Romania.

Emigration and personal life

Romania did not hand him over to the Soviet authorities, but Makhno, along with his wife and comrades-in-arms, were placed in a concentration camp. From there the Makhnovists fled to Poland, then to Danzig and France. Only in Paris did they manage to live a peaceful life. Local anarchists and other freedom-loving citizens participated in the fate of the legendary chieftain, providing him with all possible assistance.

TVNZ

The American anarchist Alexander Berkman became especially friendly with Nestor, who eventually found funds for the funeral of the great revolutionary. Makhno's death was the result of a long-standing illness that had undermined his health since the days of hard labor. The cause of death was consumption. Nestor Ivanovich died in a Paris hospital on July 6, 1934. Makhno's grave is located in the Père Lachaise cemetery.

There are legends about the personal life of Nestor Makhno: without a doubt, the ataman of an army of thousands could afford any pleasure. With a rather unprepossessing appearance according to contemporaries (although in the photo he looks like a bright personality), short stature, and puny figure, women loved him. They were loved and feared, because they, like his soldier, were awed by the father’s cold, calculating, piercing gaze.

Nestor Makhno with his wife Galina Kuzmenko and daughter | Poltavika project

The marriage did not work out with his first wife, Nastya Vasetskaya, whom Nestor married after leaving prison. They had a son, but he soon died and the couple separated. But Makhno’s second wife, Galina Kuzmenko, went through the whole war, emigration and camps hand in hand with him. They say that she herself participated in pogroms and executions, finding special pleasure in such a life. In Paris, their daughter Elena was born, but Galina, unable to withstand the plight, took the girl and left her husband.

IO.UA

In 2009, a monument to Nestor Makhno was unveiled in Gulyai-Polye, about a dozen films have been made about him, many novels, studies, memoirs have been written, and Nestor Ivanovich himself is the author of a number of memoir books. The latest to appear on domestic screens was the series “The Nine Lives of Nestor Makhno” starring.

Judging by the documents, the Makhnovists visited our region (Kursk region - approx.) on January 20, 1921. Earlier, the anarchists marched through Poltava and Sumy, trying to break away from the Red Army units. According to the first information, a detachment of two hundred fighters was spotted in the Sudzhi area. It was not only Makhno’s old guard, but also local peasant kulaks who joined the bandits. Subsequently, new data appeared: the gang stopped in “thirty versts south of Oboyan, approximately up to 8,000 people” (according to other sources, 2-3 thousand). In the arsenal of the Makhnovists there were rifles (about 300 pieces), machine guns (55), each fighter had a revolver, bombs and their invariable attribute - a saber.

“The gangs were pursued by the mounted corps of Comrade. Nesterovich, who from Yekaterinoslav followed on the heels of the Makhnovists, wrote S. Volkov in 1929 (brochure “Makhno’s Gang in the Kursk Province”). - The garrisons of Sudzhansky, Gvaivoronsky, Belgorod and Korochansky were once again given a categorical order to support Comrade by all means. Nesterovich and finally break up the gangs" .

In the early 2000s, employees of the Kursk Museum of Archeology managed to record the memories of elderly villagers (born in 1903, 1910 and 1912) who personally saw the elusive “father”: “The Makhnovists appeared here in January, passed through our village (Kamyshnoye, Belovsky district - ed.), retreating to Miropolye, lasted almost the whole day. A column of about a hundred people moved ahead, three in a row. Everyone was dressed in black uniforms (black trousers, boots, sheepskin coats, hats), and at the head of the column they carried two black banners. The banners were folded, but not covered. The first was decorated with aiguillette-type terry, the second with some kind of embroidery. The horsemen of the detachment looked tired, but well-fed, were armed with rifles and sabers, and sat on good horses. They treated local children to sugar, bags of which hung in front of their saddles, and promised to give even more if anyone pointed out the owners who had good horses...”

Between Sudzha and Oboyan

The first stop of Makhno's troops was in the village of Guevo, Sudzhansky district. Here the Makhnovists killed three policemen, took about 60 horses from the peasants, and attacked a distillery. The next point is the Belaya settlement. First of all, the soldiers burst into the police building: “At the Police Department of the 2nd District, Makhno’s gang found Comrade. Laptin (assistant chief - ed.), who was shot, and policeman Comrade. Nadelov was detained, taken naked around the square and tortured, but thanks to his development, Comrade. Nadelov escaped from the hands of the bandits and escaped." . At the same time, bandits attacked the executive committee building, where 8 people were brutally killed. The apogee of the atrocities in Belaya was mass rape.

“At 6 o’clock in the morning, Makhno’s gang of 3,000 horsemen, armed with rifles, revolvers, bombs, checkers, machine guns... left the Belaya settlement in the direction of the village of Peny, Oboyansky district...” Following the old man were the Reds, who missed the anarchist by literally an hour. At the same time, the police strengthened security at the county borders and checked suspicious walkers. A spy was caught and then shot; “Makhnovist seal, wigs and other items” . By the way, the old man’s henchmen were also actors who knew how to throw dust in their eyes, introducing themselves, for example, as Budenovites.

“On January 23 at 8 o’clock in the morning, when Comrade. Drozdov (head of the local Politburo - ed.) was about to leave Pen, when he saw through the window that some cavalrymen with red flags had entered the village in full force, the security officers wrote in the report. - This aroused suspicion, and Comrade. Drozdov sent the boy to find out “what kind of horsemen they are.” The boy returned and reported that they were “cutting down telegraph poles and tearing wires...” In Peny, the gang killed several party workers and Red Army soldiers. Surprisingly, the anarchists were not interested in food warehouses, although there was something to profit from there. However, a day later, the crooks pulled up to 3,000 pounds of bread from the storehouses of the village of Bogatoye and began offering the loot to the population, but the peasants refused the handouts. From Pen the rebels moved to Verkhopenye. And again murders, robberies... The bulk of the Makhnovists were based near the villages of Syrtsovo and Berezovskoye. From here the detachments attacked the nearest villages. From Verkhopenye the bandits went to the village of Luchki, near the village of Teterevino they dismantled the railway tracks, took the Sazhnoye station, and by the end of the day they stopped for the night in the villages of Kazachye, Oleshanets, Oskochnoye and Zayache.

Went to Voronezh province

While Makhno’s boys were having fun, the “Reds” could not catch up with the elusive “dad”. Nesterovich’s fighters had problems with uniforms and provisions: “The Red Army soldiers were moving through a hungry area. For the fourth day, the fighters had no hot food, for the last two days there was no bread... Daily attacks in deep snow, without roads, through ravines and hedges completely tore out the soldiers’ uniforms and rendered the remains of their shoes completely unusable...”

Mikhail Frunze, commander of the armed forces of Ukraine and Crimea, responded to this: “Makhno’s detachment, pursued by our troops for over a thousand miles, has noticeably weakened. Testimonies from prisoners and defectors indicate a great lack of weapons and ammunition. The task of the troops pursuing Makhno remains the same - to drive him until he is completely exhausted, in order to finally put an end to the main rebel of Ukraine." .

Knowing that an offensive was underway from the Belgorod and Gaivoron districts, Makhno decided to move to Korosh (now Belgorod region). “As soon as you left, dear friend, two days later I occupied the city of Korocha (Kursk, province), published several thousand copies of the “Regulations on the Free Soviets” and immediately took the direction through Vapnyarka and Donshchina to the Ekaterinoslav region and Tavria.” , - Makhno wrote to his comrade, omitting the details of the capture of the village. But there was something to tell: the city was partially looted, 18 people were killed: party workers, police officers, and ordinary residents. The Makhnovists carried out reprisals with particular cruelty: “Beards were chopped off, throats were cut, dozens of wounds were inflicted in the stomach with a saber and a bayonet...” - it is said in the documents of the Provincial Executive Committee.

In addition, bandits ransacked food warehouses and government institutions. They took away valuables, food, and livestock. Horses were especially valued; they were also taken away, although not always by force, sometimes offering “in-kind exchange”: weak nags were exchanged for healthy horses. Also in the heat of the moment, the book fund, the local library and museum were looted, almost 20 thousand books were destroyed. After four days of “occupation,” the gang was driven out of the city. The approximate damage from the actions of the thugs was estimated at 4 million rubles in those days. The gang took with them another 800 thousand in cash.

The Kursk voyage of Makhno's rebel army ended in the village of Nikolaevka, bordering the Voronezh region. There, the “father” faced collapse: in early February, the “Reds” completely defeated the Makhnovists, only individual detachments and the leader himself managed to escape to Ukraine.

Assessing the actions of the Makhnovists in Denikin’s rear, military historians led by A. Bubnov wrote in the third volume of “The Civil War of 1917-1921”: “In addition to failures at the front, the white armies suffered a number of strong blows from Makhno’s partisan detachments, which significantly degree, their strategic position was shaken. By October 25, 1919, Makhno's forces had reached 28 thousand bayonets and sabers, with 50 guns and 200 machine guns, representing a fairly strong organizational core, divided into four corps."88 Members of the Yekaterinoslav Provincial Committee Konivets and Levko testified about 25 thousand soldiers of Makhno’s army, including 14 thousand infantry, 6 thousand cavalry, 5 thousand in separate cavalry units and artillery 89 . The main rebel headquarters of G. Kolos (the most knowledgeable) determined the size of Makhno's army at 35-40 thousand people 90. Historian Volkovinsky believes that the number of Makhnovists by November 1919 reached 80 thousand people 91 . Soviet encyclopedias on the history of the civil war estimated them at 30-35 thousand 92 .

In our opinion, it is quite difficult to accurately determine the size of Makhno’s army during this period due to the fluidity and instability of its composition. At the moment of greatest success in the fight against Denikin, it certainly increased. The peasants who replenished it sometimes stayed in the ranks of the army for only a few days, until serious skirmishes with the enemy, and then deserted to their native villages. Therefore, we can only talk about the size of the organizational core of Makhno’s army. In the summer of 1919, he co-organized his army mainly from the retreating Red Army units, which included his former regiments. It is right to consider this part of the Makhnovist troops the most permanent; we have determined its number at 45-50 thousand people. Speaking about the total mass of Makhnovist formations controlled by Makhno’s Headquarters, the data provided by V. Belash can be considered reliable. In this case, one should take into account the scale of the region captured by the Insurgent Army, information about those who died of typhus at the end of 1919 (35 thousand people) 93 and those who joined the ranks of the Red Army at the beginning of 1920 (35 thousand people) 94 .

According to Belasha, Makhno’s army in the fall of 1919 consisted of four corps. The 1st Donetsk had 15,500 bayonets, 3,650 sabers, 16 guns and 144 machine guns; 2nd Azov - 21,000 bayonets, 385 sabers, 16 guns and 176 machine guns; 3rd Ekaterinoslav - 29,000 bayonets, 5,100 sabers, 34 guns and 266 machine guns; 4th Crimean - 17,500 bayonets, 7,500 sabers, 18 guns and 154 machine guns. The reserve of the army headquarters included: a machine gun regiment (700 machine guns), a cavalry brigade (3,000 sabers), convoy troops, labor regiments, commandant companies and squadrons with a total number of 20,000 people. In total, the army had 103 thousand bayonets, 20 thousand sabers, 1435 machine guns, 84 guns 95. The Makhnovist formations consisted of infantry and cavalry regiments, most of the units were formed in accordance with the Red Army states and were not subject to reorganization. New regiments were created according to their model.

The main branch of Makhno's troops remained infantry. Arshinov wrote that the most famous infantry regiments in the Makhnovist army were the 13th Insurgent Infantry, 3rd Steel and 1st Ekaterinoslav. The majority of the infantry were mounted on carts, which proved their indispensability in raids on Denikin’s rear. Chaises and carts, drawn by 3-4 horses, became the means of transport for infantry, hospitals, supplies and made the rebels extremely mobile. Lined up in one or two rows, the carts with infantry moved at a fast trot along with the cavalry, making daily marches of 60-70, and sometimes 90-100 versts 96 .

Crushing defeats from Shkuro's cavalry in April-May 1919 forced Makhno and his commanders to pay serious attention to cavalry. September 22 in the village. In the meantime, he issued an order on the need for training in cavalry 97. Makhno's cavalry caused a lot of trouble for the White Guards. The chief of staff of the Slashchev division, Colonel Dubego, wrote: “The operations against Makhno were extremely difficult. Makhno’s cavalry, which at first was almost elusive, performed especially well. They often attacked our convoys and appeared in the rear” 98 .

The third branch of Makhno's troops was artillery. Under the leadership of the artillery instructor, former captain Morozov, batteries and half-batteries of two and four guns were created, which, by decision of the army headquarters, were assigned to corps and units. The Makhnovists used only field and mountain artillery with two types of guns - a 76 mm rapid-fire cannon and a 152 mm 99 mortar.

The problems of recruiting the Insurgent Army were resolved at the next congress of the “Makhnovist region”, held on October 27 - November 3, 1919 in Aleksandrovsk. As a result of a lengthy discussion, the principle of “voluntary-forced” mobilization was rejected and the congress resolution on November 2 announced the transition to “voluntary-equalization” mobilization of men from 19 to 45 years old. The formation of units was carried out on a territorial basis (in villages, volosts and counties), with elected junior command staff, economic and judicial bodies under units 100. Commanders of the regimental level and higher were selected at meetings, conferences and congresses of the command staff of the corps and army, and were approved by their headquarters 101. The entire region occupied by the Makhnovist troops was divided into “regimental districts”, in which district formation departments were formed. They conscripted commanders into the Rebel Army on the basis of so-called compulsory conscription, and the rank and file - voluntarily, on the basis of "self-mobilization". It was a “business meeting”, the resolution of which was formalized in a protocol, and those of conscription age who expressed agreement with mobilization were included in the army lists. Captured Denikinites from forcibly mobilized peasants were also accepted into the army. Thus, the principles of volunteerism and forced mobilization into the Rebel Army were combined, which ensured its recruitment. General Slashchev wrote: “Makhno brilliantly managed to take advantage of the disdain towards him from the White headquarters and, showing high organizational talent, quickly formed new detachments and began to threaten Taganrog and Rostov, forcing serious fears for the integrity of the location of the White commander-in-chief. Here Makhno’s ability to act without only in a partisan, but also in a regular way, and quickly form and unite their units (by the standards of a civil war in general of a militia nature) into good, persistently fighting regular troops" 102. Slashchev’s opinion was shared by his chief of staff, who wrote: “The Makhnovist “troops” differ from the Bolsheviks in their combat effectiveness and stamina” 103.

In our opinion, the higher resilience of the Makhnovist formations in comparison with parts of the Red Army is explained by the fact that the Insurgent Army was socially more homogeneous and revolutionary, consisting mainly of anarcho-communist volunteers. V. Volkovinsky ignored the fact of the liquidation of the kulaks by the Makhnovists and in his study claims that the Makhnovist cavalry consisted mainly of rich peasants 104. This contradicts the documents that allowed M. Kubanin to conclude: “The social composition of Makhno’s army in 1918-1919 consisted of purebred proletarians and peasants who rebelled against the power of the hetman and Denikin 105. The “kulaks” could not support the Makhnovists with their forced redistribution of land and property, support for the Bolshevik government. Both the “reds” and the “whites” wrote about the poor, lumpen-proletarian composition of Makhno’s army. R. Eideman colorfully noted: “Under the black flag of the Gulyai-Polye anarchist, all those dissatisfied with the Denikin way of government, including supporters Soviet power" 106. And the White Guard newspaper "New Russia" reported on November 6, 1919: "Makhno's main and most persistent core consists of criminals who join him at all points through which he passed. A significant part is made up of Bolsheviks, who sometimes do not hide at all that they follow Makhno for the time being, until Soviet power reigns in Ukraine again."

According to Belash, landless farm laborers made up 35% of Makhno's army, workers - 7%, poor and middle peasants - 40%, other categories - 15% 107 . Noteworthy is the testimony about the social composition of the Insurgent Army of M. Gutman: “The entire army of forty thousand Makhno was quite diverse in composition. There were students, anarchists, and Socialist Revolutionaries, there were even a few Bolsheviks... There were all sorts of rabble that either sided with Makhno, then to Denikin solely for the purpose of plunder. There were quite a few criminals released from prison. But the main core were peasants, among whom Makhno was unusually popular" 108 .

We consider it necessary to note that the social composition of the Makhnovist commanders did not change significantly in comparison with the “Red Army period”. All command positions from the regiment and above were occupied mainly by Makhno’s comrades in the “Black Guard” and the fight against the hetman. Belash wrote that “Makhno’s career commanders were for the most part brave and cunning fighters who had influence on their comrades, subordinating them with their courage and cunning, whom the fighters followed with confidence and love” 109 .

The majority of the peasant “reserve” was only Makhno’s traveling companion, whom the command could not always cope with. Desertion was widespread mainly among this category, which was highlighted by V. Verstyuk on the basis of orders for Makhnovist formations and units for the autumn-winter of 1919 110.

The national-territorial composition of the Insurgent Army, according to Belash, was as follows: residents of the Yekaterinoslav region made up 50%, Tavria and Kherson region - 25%, Poltava region - 8%, Don region - 7%, other provinces - 10% 111. The majority of Makhno's army, including its "father", were Ukrainians, the second largest nationality being Russians. The Revolutionary Military Council of the Army and the cultural and educational department were dominated by Jews. “Ideological anarchists,” most of whom belonged to this nationality, largely determined the ideology of the Makhnovist movement. Therefore, according to V. Ermakov, “although there were cases of manifestations of anti-Semitic sentiments, it is hardly correct to link this with the activities of Makhno and his immediate circle” 112 . Makhnovist terror in all periods of his activity had not a national, but a social orientation. The army order of November 18, 1919 said: “Every rebel must remember that his enemies are people of the bourgeois class, regardless of whether they are Russians, Jews, Ukrainians or the French and British” 113.

Makhno was loyal to the activities in the Insurgent Army and on the territory controlled by it of various political parties and their printed organs, "People's Power" (the organ of the right Socialist Revolutionaries), "Zvezda" (the organ of the Ekaterinoslav Provincial Committee of the Bolsheviks), etc. 114. All parties expressed their views completely freely orally and in print, sometimes even criticizing anarcho-communism. Taking advantage of this, the Bolshevik “Zvezda” distorted the social composition and essence of the Makhnovist movement, on November 15, 1919, it wrote: “The petty-bourgeois anarchist ideology, adopted by the propertied strata of the peasantry, turned out to be the most complete reflection of their proprietary aspirations and aspirations. The idea of ​​anarchy, providing freedom to the propertied strata of the village from all pressure from the proletariat and the peasant poor allied with it, it could not have been more to the liking of the village kulaks and oppressors.”

Makhno allowed completely legal activities in the Ekaterinoslav province and in his troops of the Bolshevik provincial committee led by the communist Pavlov (Mirkin). The communist Chetolin in 1925 still had the opportunity to publish truthful memoirs: “Makhno, while campaigning against us, did not take any decisive measures against the Gubernia Committee and the organization” 115.

Communist Bolsheviks occupied a number of command positions in Makhno's army, among them Lashkevich - commander of the 13th regiment, Polonsky - commander of the 3rd regiment, Brodsky - chief of the Nikopol garrison, etc. 116. According to the Yekaterinoslav Provincial Committee of the CP/b/U, at the beginning of December 1919, in the 26 Makhnovist regiments, the prevailing desire was to unite with the Red Army; sympathy was expressed for the “Soviet” (Bolshevik) government and the RCP/6/-KP/6/U . There were also units that were “Soviet”-minded, but anti-communist. It was noted that the composition of these units, with certain propaganda and explanatory work, could take the side of the Red Army 117.

Belash obviously underestimated the degree of influence of the communists in the Makhnovist troops and tried to prove the ideological superiority of the anarcho-communists. He claimed that RKP/b/ cells were created only in the 13th and 3rd infantry regiments, in the “English battery”. 70% of the personnel of the Insurgent Army were anarcho-communist, 20% sympathized with the Social Revolutionaries and Petliurists, only 10% were communist-Bolsheviks. According to Belash, the corresponding party affiliation took shape at the congress in Aleksandrovsk at the end of October - beginning of November 1919. There were 85 anarchists at it. (42.5%) - all commanders and heads of military departments, 21 people. - Left Social Revolutionaries (10.5%), some of whom were commanders, and some were delegates from villages. There were 4 Bolsheviks. (2%) - from the workers of Aleksandrovsk Belik, Ekaterinoslav - Novitsky, Khartsyzsk - Ivanov and from the army - Kolodub. 70 delegates were non-party (35%) workers and peasants of the Yekaterinoslav region and Donbass. The Mensheviks, Narodniks, Right Socialist Revolutionaries and nationalist parties did not have delegates at the congress and were not included in the Revolutionary Military Council of the Insurgent Army, 118 although Makhno did not prohibit their activities. The resolution of the Makhnovist Revolutionary Military Council dated November 6, 1919 declared: “All socialist parties, organizations and movements without exception are given complete freedom to disseminate their views, ideas, teachings and opinions, both orally and in print.” 119 The Makhnovists only did not allow the activities of bourgeois and monarchist parties - “counter-revolutionary”.

The central place at the Alexander Congress was given to strengthening the Insurgent Army. All other issues were resolved from this perspective. The Congress reviewed and approved the declaration “On Free Soviets” prepared by V. Volin and P. Arshinov. The Declaration essentially became the program document of the Makhnovist anarcho-communist movement and Makhno’s army. It outlined the main goals and objectives of the revolutionary activities of anarcho-communist formations and the construction of the Makhnovist army. The declaration considered the “popular insurrectionary movement in Ukraine” as the beginning of the “great third revolution”, striving for the final emancipation of the masses “from all oppression of power and capital.” According to the declaration, the Rebel Army was “the core of this revolutionary popular movement” and was supposed to “help the rebel people in their struggle against all attacks on the part of government and capital.” The ideologists of the Makhnovshchina viewed the army as a temporary and forced phenomenon. They wrote that “a genuine peasant and workers’ revolution will embrace the entire working Ukraine and liberate it from rapists and rulers,” after which the Makhnovist army and its fighters will dissolve “in millions of ordinary rebel people and begin the free construction of a truly new life” 120.

During the Alexander and Ekaterinoslav “standing” of the Makhnovists in October-December 1919, some changes occurred in the structure and forms of work of the central governing bodies of the Insurgent Army. (Appendix No. 6) The cultural education commission formed under the RVS of the army in August 1919 grew into the cultural education department. It was now part of the “civilian” (for the population) and military apparatus of the RVS, and had sections: press, oral propaganda, theater and school. The cultural and educational department was still headed by V. Volin, a member of the secretariat of the Nabat conference; he was later replaced by Lashchenko. The press was supervised by P. Arshinov. The central organ of the army headquarters was the daily newspaper "Path to Freedom", published in Russian and Ukrainian. Anarcho-communist newspapers were also published in Russian: “Nabat” (the organ of the secretariat of the anarchist conference), “Free Berdyansk”, “Free Melitopol”, “Free Gulyaypole”, “Free Orekhovo”, “Free Nikopol”. Due to a shortage of paper and correspondents, these newspapers were published irregularly. Numerous anarcho-communist leaflets and appeals were also published. During interrogation at the Moscow Cheka, Volin said that in a “settled” state, the printing work of the cultural and educational department was more active. In Aleksandrovsk from October 4 to November 4, in addition to the declaration “On Free Soviets,” appeals were issued against Denikin and Petlyura 121. The Makhnovist movement from the beginning and to the end had not only an anti-White Guard, but also an anti-Ukrainian political orientation. In the army corps, the press section had its own apparatus - small printing houses ("American") that published the daily army newspaper "Rebel" and leaflets.

The apparatus of the oral propaganda section consisted of regular leaders and rebels with the gift of speech. Conversations were conducted on political and economic topics in units and among the population. Outstanding speakers were Volin, Makhno, Aly, Arshinov, Udovichenko, Kalashnikov, Gavrilenko.

The theater section in Makhno’s army was headed by amateur artists N. Konoplya and Tsyganok. This section was divided into musical, dramatic, opera and satirical groups. At the headquarters of the army and corps, brass bands were formed in some regiments. The regiments throughout the state had accordions (1 at headquarters and 1 in each platoon), purchased with army funds.

The school section was headed by G. Kuzmenko. Its functions were to organize school affairs in the rebel-controlled region, but during the month of its stay in Aleksandrovsk the section did not manage to organize this work 122 .

One of the most important tasks of the cultural and educational department and army headquarters was maintaining the morale and military discipline of the soldiers. Drunkenness, theft, looting and other negative phenomena were widespread among the Makhnovists, but they were fought against. The orders of Makhno and his commanders of all levels are replete with warnings and punishments for such offenses. On November 18, Makhno issued an order to the army which stated: “Drunkenness is considered a crime. It is considered an even greater crime for a rebel of the revolutionary army to show himself on the street while drunk.”123 Makhnovsky Shtarm developed a disciplinary instruction with a list of disciplinary offenses entailing administrative punishment and crimes subject to judicial responsibility. For minor violations, the rebels were reprimanded in orders (orders for service and work were cancelled). Looting, rape of women, appropriation of military property, concealment of captured valuables, and lynching of prisoners and arrestees were considered crimes.

The organ of “justice” in the Insurgent Army was counterintelligence, headed by L. Golik and L. Zadov, the main weapon of Makhnovist terror. According to Belash, it “shot anyone who served Denikin as an officer, gendarme, prison guard, or counterintelligence officer. The punitive functions of counterintelligence were led by Makhno himself 124.

A. Shubin believes that counterintelligence also fought against robberies and looting in the Makhnovist army. In his opinion, in the autumn-winter of 1919, Makhno “gave sanction not for robberies, but for reprisals against officers. Against the general background of the civil war, Makhno’s measures against robberies can be considered satisfactory” 125. Makhno really did not encourage criminal robbery; he even personally shot the most zealous looters. But the anarcho-communist ideology and the poor composition of his army, the hostile attitude towards the “rich” and the propertied in general, the principle of “self-sufficiency” of the army did not allow the Makhnovists to avoid robberies even against the poor population.

The power of Makhnovist counterintelligence was omnipresent - both among the Makhnovist troops and among the civilian population. It was staged no worse than in the Bolshevik Cheka. The troops had secret agents in every ten (department), the civilian counterintelligence department had freelance employees in villages and cities who did not receive a salary, but regularly reported on everything, including political conspiracies, hiding White Guards 126 . In addition to working in the occupied area, counterintelligence functions included collecting information about the location and military plans of the enemy, communication between individual units of the Rebel Army dispersed in different places 127.

In the fall of 1919, the headquarters of Makhno's army developed the basics of combat training of personnel and commander training. Training in units was conducted by the most experienced commanders. Belash wrote that young recruits underwent “practice” at the front in combat units; headquarters and commanders “were responsible for training them in the shortest possible time” 128. At the beginning of December, team courses were organized in Ekaterinoslav in the premises of the former English club. They were led by the commander of the 3rd Corps, former staff captain of the tsarist army P. Gavrilenko. The main objective of the courses was to provide theoretical training to low- and middle-level commanders (up to the regiment) chosen by the rebels in their units 129 .

A combat department was also created at the army headquarters for the theoretical training of young soldiers who had not gone through the school of world war. The training program was based on the “specialization” of the rebel. The infantryman's training included 20 hours of drill, 20 hours of shooting, and 10 hours of fortification; for a cavalryman - 30 hours of mounted and foot formation, 20 hours of shooting, 10 hours of fortification and 10 hours of horse care; for an artilleryman - 20 hours to study the theoretical part of weapons, 20 hours of shooting and 20 hours of fortification 130.

In comparison with the “Red Army period,” the supply system for Makhno’s army underwent significant changes. Without, as before, sources of centralized supply, the rebels completely switched to self-sufficiency. The communist V. Miroshevsky, who served in Makhno’s troops at that time, described this system as follows: “The supply of troops was carried out in the primitive way that is usually used by the rebels. “Brothers” lived, as they say, “on pasture,” that is, on When they arrived in the village, they were housed in peasant huts and ate whatever God provided. Under such a system, the Makhnovists did not feel any particular shortage of food supplies" 131 .

But providing for an army that had grown in number required clear organization and improvement. Finding itself in stationary conditions, the RVS of the army brought up supply issues for discussion at the delegates' congress in Aleksandrovsk at the end of October 1919. According to its resolution, the army was supported by voluntary contributions from peasants, war booty, requisitions and indemnities imposed on the wealthy class 132 . Providing for the army was handled by the supply department of its headquarters, which had a field (with the troops) and local (district) procurement and distribution apparatus.

Food and fodder procurements were carried out with the expectation of a certain number of eaters, determined by the headquarters, of the army for a month with the troops and for 5-6 months in district warehouses. War trophies became the main source of supplies of food and fodder. In October-December 1919, up to 2 million pounds of food and 1.5 million pounds of fodder were exported from Aleksandrovsky and Melitopol districts to the army area. These supplies were stored in mobile "shops": at stations, ships and mills. Requisitions and voluntary procurement on the private market from less wealthy citizens were widely used. Payment was made in money or in the form of material compensation (clothing, cart, horse, etc.). At the same time, the owner’s wealth was determined by a unit commission with the involvement of poor groups of the local population, as the Bolsheviks did. According to the calculations of the supply department, the daily ration of a Makhnovist consisted of 150 g of proteins, 110 g of fats and 510 g of carbohydrates 133.

The Makhnovists' clothing allowance was ensured through military trophies, including the organization of special "expeditions" to the rear of the Denikinites. The stripping of captured White Guards and the requisitioning of things from the “bourgeois” were widely used. On November 21, 1919, army headquarters confiscated the Ekaterinoslav pawnshop, where there was a lot of gold and clothing. Some of the things were returned to the poor with receipts, Makhnovist doctors and nurses received good things, outerwear and underwear went to the infirmary, and hats were made from astrakhan coats for cavalrymen. Attempts were made to arrange the tailoring of uniforms and shoes under an agreement with local craftsmen, but it was not always possible to obtain what was ordered due to the frequent and unexpected retreats of the Makhnovist troops 134 .

The supply of weapons and ammunition was provided by the artillery department at the army headquarters. Repairs to the equipment of artillery and machine guns were carried out at private and joint-stock enterprises in Aleksandrovsk, Melitopol, Berdyansk, Gulyaypol, and Yekaterinoslav. The main source of replenishment of weapons and ammunition were war trophies. M. Kubanin also wrote that in October 1919 the Makhnovists captured Denikin’s most important supply bases Sinelnikovo, Lozovaya, Berdyansk, Mariupol 135 . After this, they did not experience a shortage of weapons and ammunition. “The Makhnovists had a huge amount of weapons, especially machine guns,” Miroshevsky testified, “entire mountains of rifles were carried on carts, which were distributed to the peasants when passing through villages. It was rare that a Makhnovist did not sport a saber or cleaver taken from an officer” 136 . During this period, in addition to the above systems, English rifles and carbines Lee-Metford 1892 and Lee-Enfield 1902 (caliber 7.69 - 7.71 mm), French rifles of the Lebel 1892/1907/ system appeared in service with the Makhnovist troops. 1915 (caliber 8 mm). Among the trophies, the American Springfield rifle 1903 (caliber 7.62 mm) was especially valued, since the diameter of its barrel corresponded to the Russian cartridge 137. According to Belash, as of November 1, 1919, the army’s arsenal had 37 million 750 thousand rifle cartridges and 496 thousand shells. The combat kit for a rifle was 250 rounds, for a heavy machine gun - 5,000 rounds, for a light machine gun - 2,500 rounds, and for a gun - 124 rounds. In addition, 75 million rifle cartridges and 1.5 million shells were stored in army warehouses 138. For comparison, we note that the entire Ukrainian Front of the Red Army received about 11 million rounds of ammunition and 53 thousand shells in January-March 1919 139 .

Largely at the expense of the enemy, Makhno’s army also provided itself with horses. They were divided into categories (combat, artillery, convoy) and, if purchased, they were paid for from 15 to 100 thousand rubles. It was allowed to exchange two defective or tired horses for one fresh one. Requisitioning horses from wealthy peasants was often practiced if their number exceeded the labor norm (for two eaters - 1 work horse) 140. I. Dubinsky and G. Shevchuk noted that the Makhnovists achieved great maneuverability precisely through the constant requisition of horses from the peasants 141, which, of course, alienated the “kulaks”.

Purchases of horses and food for the needs of the army were carried out by purchasing commissions of units and formations, controlled by the financial commission of the RVS and the chief treasurer of the army headquarters. The army treasury was replenished through indemnities imposed on the “rich” in cities and villages and expropriations of banks 142. Concealing captured, expropriated or indemnity money was considered a grave crime. “The Makhnovists did not receive any monetary allowance, since they served the revolution by vocation and were not happy with the salary,” wrote Belash. “In exceptional cases, benefits were issued from the army treasury to the families of the dead rebels” 143. This order actually pushed the Makhnovists to robbery, looting, and theft to satisfy their personal needs. Part of the money taken from the “bourgeoisie” was distributed to the poor. In Yekaterinoslav, 3 million rubles were allocated for distribution to the poor population. 144. Of these, 550 thousand were allocated to orphans. The head of the city shelters, M. Gutman, wrote: “We must pay tribute to the Makhnovists, after the “volunteers” the orphans were fed for a month” 145.

At the end of 1919, the most difficult problem became the sanitary and medical provision of the Makhnovist army. The medical and sanitary department located at the headquarters acted as a department. On November 19, 1919, the communist Kolodub 146 was appointed head of the department and head of the army hospital. Mobile hospitals were subordinate to him - army (5 thousand beds), corps (1000 beds), brigade and regimental (50 beds each). The provision of medical personnel was carried out according to the staff of the regiment, where there were chief and battalion doctors (6 people in total), and in the companies there was 1 paramedic. However, the medical and sanitary department could not prevent the typhus epidemic that began in the army in mid-October - it spread throughout Russia and Ukraine. In Yekaterinoslav, the army command took decisive measures to improve medical care for personnel. Captive medical workers were brought in, short-term courses for paramedics and nurses were created at the corps, the city's medical staff was mobilized, vaccinations were organized, baths, laundries and isolation chambers were opened 147 . And yet, according to Belash, the Makhnovists lost up to 35 thousand people from typhus, that is, approximately half of their personnel 148. “The rebel army named after Father Makhno was melting by leaps and bounds,” recalled M. Gutman, “Peasants , having filled their “carts” with looted property, a line of people pulled out of the city to their villages, abandoning “father” Makhno to the mercy of fate” 149.

By the beginning of December 1919, the Slashchev division had completed its reorganization into a corps and, together with General Revishin’s group, began active operations against Makhno on both banks of the Dnieper - Revishin diverted the Makhnovists’ attention on the Sinelnikov side, and parts of Slashchev’s corps, in a deeply echeloned group, broke through the front in the Pyatikhatka area, captured Verkhnedneprovsk and went to the station. Sukhachevka, on December 19 they occupied Yekaterinoslav and held it for a week. Makhno's 1st Donetsk Corps surrendered the city without a fight and rolled away from it 35 versts to the south 150. 25 thousand Makhnovists left Ekaterinoslav, including 14 thousand infantry, 6 thousand cavalry, convoy services and artillery. There were 10 thousand sick and wounded people. The army was armed with 42 three-inch guns, 2 six-inch guns, 4 armored vehicles, 4 armored trains, approx. 1000 machine guns. The Whites received an armored train and 2 armored cars 151 as trophies.

During these days, Slashchev’s corps was forced to repel attacks from the red units from the north, commanded by I. Yakir. Under the pressure of the Red Army, Denikin’s troops retreated to the south and Slashchev did not pursue Makhno. He wrote: “The Whites retreated in two large groups. 1) Led by Headquarters, as part of the Volunteer Army, Donets, Kuban and Terets to the Caucasus and 2) troops of Shilling and Dragomirov - to Novorossiya, covering Nikolaev-Odessa and based on the latter. In In the intervals between them, the 3rd Army Corps under my command received an order to withdraw with the task of holding the Crimea" 152.

Having organized his troops, on December 24, Makhno attacked Slashchev’s units in the area of ​​the village. Sursko-Litovskoe, Petrenko’s detachment occupied the station. Igren. Belash with the cavalry went to the village. Mikhailovsky, took the position. Zaporozhye and Sukhachevka. In the evening, Makhno's cavalry occupied the village. Day. Slashchev's infantry retreated to Yekaterinoslav, leaving 400 people. killed, 4 guns and a convoy. By the night of December 25, Petrenko occupied Nizhnedneprovsk 153. On December 26, Slashchev’s troops left Yekaterinoslav without a fight and retreated along the right bank of the Dnieper to Alexandrovsk. The next day, at the Kichkassky Bridge, they captured 5 guns of the 2nd Makhnovist Corps and went south. With the help of the 4th Corps, Makhno tried to organize the pursuit of the Whites, but Slashchev covered his retreat with a horse curtain and retreated in marching order to the Crimea 154.

Makhno’s war with Denikin’s army was over; now he was most worried about the meeting and relationship with the Red Army, which had entered the “Makhnovist region.” Considering the enormous contribution of his army to the defeat of Denikin, Makhno counted on rehabilitation in the eyes of the RCP/b/, the return of the Red commanders to service. But the leaders of the RCP/b/ had a different opinion. V. Volkovinsky cited documents testifying to the desire of the Central Committee of the RCP/b/ back in the fall of 1919. "replace" Makhno as commander of the Insurgent Army 155. In their context, the only case of execution of communists on the orders of Makhno in December 1919 becomes explainable. Makhnovist counterintelligence shot several communists led by the commander of the 3rd “steel” regiment M. Polonsky for preparing a conspiracy to kill Makhno 156. The fact of this conspiracy is considered unproven by many historians, but V. Verstyuk’s conclusion about the existence of connections between the Front Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the communists of the Makhnovist army confirms its possibility 157. The methods of the RCP/b/, the Cheka, Lenin, Stalin and Dzerzhinsky did not exclude, but assumed physical isolation and reprisal against a political opponent.

In the battles with Denikin in the summer and autumn of 1919, the Makhnovist formations improved their tactical skills. Freed from the tutelage of the Red Command, successfully using the accumulated arsenal of means and methods of armed struggle, the Makhnovist command staff developed specific elements of battle tactics, which were improved in the process of conducting combat operations. Makhno felt the effectiveness of deep raid operations and widely used them. If earlier his formations, relatively small in number, maneuvered only within the Grishin-Gulyai-Polye region, now he carried out unexpected movements of large masses of troops over a considerable distance, causing panic in the enemy rear.

The marching order of the Makhnovist formations was now different from the regular armies. Ahead of the detachment was always a cavalry force with sparse flanks and a tightly packed center, which played the role of a vanguard. Behind the lava at a distance of 200-400 m, a column of the main forces was moving, which consisted of cavalry and infantry in carts. The movement of the column was closed by a small cavalry rearguard, whose task was not so much to guard the rear, but to push up the remaining carts 158 .

In battles, the Makhnovists continued to widely use envelopments, envelopments, attacks from the rear, using different types of troops to encircle the enemy. A typical example was the battle near Pologi on October 30, 1919, about which the newspaper “Ekaterinoslavsky Alarm” reported on November 6 of this year that Denikin’s soldiers lost more than 500 killed, 65 thousand cartridges, 8 machine guns, 4 chaises with shells and “in a mad panic retreated, pursued by cavalry until late at night."

In an area with a less developed railway network than in the Donbass, in the fall of 1919 the Makhnovist command abandoned armored trains. It was practically impossible to use armored trains in guerrilla warfare; sooner or later the railway giant became a vulnerable target.

Thus, in the autumn-winter of 1919, Makhno’s Insurgent Army was an operational partisan association of 60-100 thousand people. Its organizational structure practically copied the staff of the Red Army. The methods of combat training and the control system of the Makhnovist troops did not differ significantly from the Red Army. At the same time, the anarcho-communist orientation of the army determined its specific features. This was expressed in the volunteer principles of recruiting the army, political pluralism in the work of its Revolutionary Military Council and cultural and educational department, and the system of self-supply of Makhnovist units.

During this period, the principles of guerrilla maneuver warfare finally entered the Makhnovist military art. The rapid movement of manpower over considerable distances and the surprise of attacks became Makhno’s favorite tactics.

Notes

88. Civil war 1918 - 1921: In 3 volumes / Edited by A. S. Bubnov. - M. -L., 1930. - T. 3. - P. 282

89. Keen D. - Decree. op. - P. 79

90. History of the civil war in the USSR. - T. 4. - P. 314

91. Volkovinsky V.N. - Decree. op. - P. 130

92. Civil war and military intervention in the USSR. Encyclopedia. - P. 344; Great Zhovten and the huge war in Ukraine. Encyclopedic guide. - P. 331

93. Belash A.V., Belash V.F. - Decree. op. - P. 362

94. Brief history of the civil war in the USSR. - M., 1979. - P. 361

95. Belash A.V., Belash V.F. - Decree. op. - P. 341

96. Arshinov P. - Decree. op. - pp. 90-91

97. Volkovinsky V.N. - Decree. op. - P. 133

99. Beskrovny L. G. Army and Navy of Russia at the beginning of the 20th century. Essays on military-industrial potential. - M., 1986. - P. 87

101. Belash A.V., Belash V.F. - Decree. Op. - P. 346

102. Slashchev Ya. A. Materials on the history of the civil war in Russia // Military Bulletin. - 1921. - No. 12. - P. 41

104. Volkovinsky V.N. - Decree. op. - P. 133

105. Kubanin M. - Decree. op. - P. 160

106. Eideman R. Insurgency and its role in modern war // Army and Revolution. - 1919. - No. 3 - 4, - P. 96

107. Belash A.V., Belash V.F. - Decree. op. - P. 346

108. Gutman M. - Decree. op. - P. 62

109. TsGAOOU. - F. 5, Op. 1, D. 353, L. 176

110.Verstyuk V.F. - Decree. social - P. 346

111. Belash A.V., Belash V.F. - Decree. op. - P. 346

112. Ermakov V. - Decree. op. - P. 81

113. Makhno and the Makhnovist movement. - pp. 19-20

114. Belash A.V., Belash V.F. - Decree. op. - P. 354

115.Levko (Chetolin) Communists among the partisans // Chronicle of the Revolution. - 1925 - No. 4. - P. 93-94

116. Belash A.V., Belash V.F. - Decree. op. - P. 360 - 361

117. Keen D. - Decree. op. - P. 80-81

118. Belash A.V., Belash V.F. - Decree. op. - P. 352, 362

121. TsGAOOU. - F. 5, Op. 1, D. 330, L. 16

122. Belash A.V., Belash V.F. - Decree. op. - P. 350-351

123. Makhno and the Makhnovist movement. - P. 21

124. Belash A.V., Belash V.F. - Decree. op. - pp. 349, 354

125. Shubin A. Makhnovist movement in 1917-1921. // Friendship of Peoples. - 1993. - No. 3. - P. 186

126.Belash. A.V., Belash V.F. - Decree. op. - P. 349

127. Arshinov P. Anarchism and Makhnovshchina // Anarchical Bulletin. - Berlin, 1923. - No. 2. - P. 27-37

128. Belash A.V., Belash V.F. - Decree. op. - P. 347

129. TsGAOOU. - F. 5, Op. 1, D. 351, L. 177

130. Belash A.V., Belash V.F. - Decree. op. -WITH. 346-347

131. Miroshevsky V. - Decree. op. - P. 200

132. Arshinov P. History of the Makhnovist movement - P. 147

133. Belash A.V., Belash V.F. - Decree. op. - P. 343

134. TsGAOOU. - F. 5, Op. 1, D. 351, L. 177-178

135. Kubanin M. - Decree. op. - P. 87

136. Miroshevsky V. - Decree. op. - P. 199

137. Zhuk A. B. Rifles and machine guns. - M., 1987. - S. 40-41, 50, 52

138. Belash A.V., Belash V.F. - Decree. op. P. 345

139. Directives of the command of the fronts of the Red Army. - T. 4. - P. 385

140. Belash A.V., Belash V.F. - Decree. op. - P. 347

141. Dubinsky I., Shevchuk G. - Decree. op. - P. 347

142. Belash A.V., Belash V.F. - Decree. op. - P. 348

143. Ibid. - P. 345

144. TsGAOOU. - F. 1, Op. 20, D. 315, L. 8

145. Gutman M. - Decree. op. - P. 65

146. TsGAOOU. - F. 5, Op. 1, D. 351, L. 177

147. Belash A.V., Belash V.F. - Decree. op. - P. 347

148. Ibid. - P. 342

149. Gutman M. - Decree. op. - P. 86

150. Verstyuk V.F. - Decree. cit., - P. 199; TsGAOOU. - F. 5, Op. 1, D. 351, L. 196

151. TsGAOOU. - F. 1, Op. 20, D. 315, L. 8 vol.

152. Slashchev Y. A. White Crimea, 1920. - P. 41

153. TsGAOOU. - F. 5, Op. 1, D. 351, L. 196-197

154. Slashchev Y. A. White Crimea, 1920. - P. 42-43

155. Volkovinsky V.N. - Decree. op. - pp. 144-145.

156. TsGAOOU. - F. 5, Op. 1, D. 351, L. 193

157. Verstyuk V.F. - Decree. op. - P. 203