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The most famous battles of the Middle Ages. Great battles of the Middle Ages Historical battles of the Middle Ages

The problem of assessing losses is primarily a problem of assessing sources, especially since before the 14th century almost the only sources were chronicles. Only for the late Middle Ages do more objective clerical reports and, occasionally, archaeological data become available (for example, information about the Danish-Swedish battle of 1361 at Visby was confirmed by the discovery of 1,185 skeletons during excavations of 3 of the 5 ditches in which the dead were buried).

The chronicles, in turn, cannot be correctly interpreted without understanding the psychology of that time.

The European Middle Ages professed two concepts of war. In the era of “developed feudalism” (XI-XIII centuries) they existed de facto; in the late Middle Ages, military treatises appeared that directly and explicitly presented and explored them (for example, the work of Philippe de Maizières, 1395).

The first was a war "mortelle", "deadly", a war of "fire and blood", in which all "cruelty, murder, inhumanity" were tolerated and even systematically prescribed. In such a war it was necessary to use all forces and techniques against the enemy; in battle it was necessary not to take prisoners, to finish off the wounded, to catch up and beat those fleeing. It was possible to torture high-ranking prisoners in order to obtain information, kill enemy messengers and heralds, violate agreements when it was profitable, etc. Similar behavior was allowed towards the civilian population. In other words, the greatest possible extermination of “trash” was proclaimed to be the main valor. Naturally, these are primarily wars against “infidels,” pagans and heretics, but also wars against violators of the social order “established by God.” In practice, wars against formally Christians, but sharply different on national-cultural or social grounds, also approached this type.

The second concept was "guerroyable" war, i.e. "chivalrous", "guerre loyale" ("honest war"), waged between "good warriors", which should be waged in accordance with the "droituriere justice d"armes" ("direct right of arms") and the "discipline de chevalerie", ( "knightly science"). In such a war, the knights measured their strength among themselves, without interference from the "support personnel", in compliance with all the rules and conventions. The purpose of the battle was not the physical destruction of the enemy, but to determine the strength of the parties. Capture or put to flight a knight the opposing side was considered more honorable and “noble” than to kill him.

Let us add that capturing a knight was also economically much more profitable than killing him - a large ransom could be obtained.

Essentially, the “war of chivalry” was a direct descendant of the ancient German concept of war as “God’s judgment,” but humanized and ritualized under the influence of the Christian Church and the general growth of civilization.

A slight digression would be in order here. As is known, the Germans viewed the battle as a kind of trial (judicium belli), revealing the “truth” and “right” of each side. The speech put by Gregory of Tours into the mouth of a certain Frank Gondovald is typical: “God will judge when we meet on the battlefield whether I am the son of Clothar or not.” From today's point of view, such a method of “establishing paternity” seems anecdotal, but for the Germans it was completely rational. After all, in fact, Gondowald did not claim to establish the “biological fact” of paternity (which was simply impossible at that time), but to the material and legal rights arising from this fact. And the battle was to determine whether he had the necessary strength and ability to retain and realize these rights.

At a more private level, the same approach was manifested in the custom of “judicial combat”, and a healthy man was obliged to defend himself, and a woman or an old man could nominate a deputy. It is noteworthy that the replacement of the duel with weregeld was perceived by early medieval public opinion not as a sign of the “humanization” of society, but as a sign of “corruption of morals”, worthy of all condemnation. Indeed, in the course of a judicial duel, the stronger and more skilled warrior gained the upper hand, therefore, a more valuable member of the tribe, who, for this reason, was more deserving, from the point of view of public benefit, to possess the disputed property or rights. A “monetary” solution to the dispute could provide an advantage to a less valuable and necessary person of the tribe, even if he had great wealth due to some accidents or the baseness of his character (a tendency to hoarding, cunning, bargaining, etc.), that is, it did not stimulate "valor" and "vice". It is not surprising that with such views, judicial combat in various forms (including martial arts) was able to survive among the Germanic peoples until the end of the Middle Ages and even survived them, turning into a duel.

Finally, the Germanic origin of the concept of “knightly” war is also visible at the linguistic level. In the Middle Ages, the Latin word for war, bellum, and the German word, werra (which became the French word guerre) were not synonymous, but designations for two different types of war. Bellum applied to official, "total" interstate war declared by the king. Werra originally designated war as the realization of "fayda", family blood feud, and "divine judgment" under customary law.

Let us now return to the chronicles, the main source of information about losses in medieval battles. There is hardly any need to prove that in the overwhelming majority of cases the chronicle is not an objective “office” document; it is rather a semi-artistic “panegyric-didactic” work. But glorifying and teaching can be done on the basis of different, even opposite, premises: in one case, these goals are served by emphasizing mercilessness towards the “enemies of faith and order,” in the other, by “chivalry” in relations with “noble” opponents.

In the first case, it is important to emphasize that the “hero” beat up the “infidels” and “villains” as best he could, and achieved significant success in this; hence the tens of thousands of Saracens or commoners killed in the chronicles of “deadly” wars. The record holder in this regard is considered to be the description of the battle on the Salado River in 1341 (the last major attempt to invade Spain by African Moors): 20 knights killed among Christians and 400,000 killed among Muslims.

Modern researchers emphasize that although the exaggerated numbers “20,000”, “100,000”, “400,000” of the “crusader” chronicles cannot be taken literally (the killed “pagans” were rarely counted in general), they have a certain meaning, since they convey the scale and significance of the battle in understanding of the chronicler and, most importantly, serve as psychologically accurate evidence that we are talking about a “deadly” battle.

On the contrary, in relation to a “knightly” war, that is, a ritualized “God’s court” within the knightly class, a large number of killed “brothers” of the winner cannot in any way put him in a favorable light, testify to his generosity and “correctness.” According to the concepts of that time, the military leader who put to flight or captured his noble opponents rather than arranged their extermination looked more “chivalrous.” Moreover, taking into account the tactics of that time, large losses of the enemy meant that the knights knocked out of the saddle or wounded, instead of being captured, were achieved by commoner bollards walking behind - shameful behavior according to the concepts of that time. That is, here a good chronicler should have strived to underestimate the losses among the knights, including the enemy.

Unfortunately, “minimalist” historians, rightly criticizing clearly inflated figures, did not take into account the other side of the coin - that in a different psychological situation, “poets”-chroniclers could be just as prone to downplaying losses (since “objectivity” in the modern sense it was alien to them anyway). After all, if you think about it, 3 killed French knights out of one and a half thousand after a three-hour close hand-to-hand battle at Bouvines (1214) are no more plausible than 100 thousand killed Muslims at Las Navas de Tolosa.

As a standard of “bloodless battles” of the 12th-13th centuries, they cite those such as at Tanchebray (1106), when only one knight was allegedly killed on the French side, at Bremuhl (1119), when out of 900 knights participating in the battle died only 3 with 140 prisoners, or under Lincoln (1217), when the victors lost only 1 knight (out of 400), the vanquished - 2 with 400 prisoners (out of 611). The statement of the chronicler Orderic Vitalis regarding the Battle of Bremuhl is characteristic: “I found that only three were killed there, since they were covered with iron and mutually spared each other, both out of fear of God and because of brotherhood in arms (notitia contubernii); they tried not to kill the fugitives, but to take them prisoner. Truly, as Christians, these knights did not thirst for the blood of their brothers and rejoiced at the fair victory granted by God himself..." One can believe that in these cases the losses were small. But are such battles most characteristic of the Middle Ages? In fact, this is only one of their categories, significant, but not predominant. They were attended by knights of the same class, religion and nationality, for whom, by and large, it was not so important who would become their supreme overlord - one contender or the other, Capetian or Plantagenet.

However, in battles of this type, such low losses are possible only if the opponents deliberately spared each other, avoiding fatal blows and finishing moves, and in a difficult situation (being wounded or knocked out of the saddle) easily surrendered, instead of fighting to the end . The knightly method of individual close-quarters hand-to-hand combat fully allows for a “lethal dosage.” However, this same method can also be extremely bloody - if the opponents intend to act not only in full force, but also mercilessly towards each other. It is extremely difficult to break away from an aggressive enemy and escape in a close combat situation.

The latter is confirmed by the mutually destructive crusader-Muslim battles in the Middle East and Spain - they took place at the same time and with the participation of the same knights who fought at Bremuhl and Lincoln, but here the chroniclers count losses in the thousands, tens and even hundreds of thousands (for example, 4 thousand crusaders and a clearly exaggerated 30 thousand Turks under Dorylaeus in 1097, 700 crusaders and 7 thousand Saracens under Arzuf in 1191, etc.). Often they ended with the total extermination of the defeated army, without distinction of class rank.

Finally, many European battles of the 12th-13th centuries were of an intermediate nature between “chivalrous” and “deadly”, sometimes adjoining the first or the second type. Obviously, these were battles in which a strong national feeling was mixed and in which foot militias of commoners (usually townspeople) actively participated. There are few such battles, but they are usually the largest battles.

The battle of 1214 at Buvin, which was mentioned above, is adjacent to the “knightly” type. It is known from three sources - Guillaume le Breton's detailed rhymed chronicle "Philippida", a similar poetic chronicle by Philippe Musquet, as well as an anonymous chronicle from Bethune. It is noteworthy that all three sources are French, and their preferences are visible to the naked eye. This is especially true of the more detailed chronicles of Le Breton and Musquet - it seems that the authors competed in writing laudatory odes to their king Philip Augustus (the first of them was Philip’s personal chaplain).

It is from the poems of Le Breton and Musquet that we learn that at Bouvine, 3 French and 70 German knights died (with at least 131 prisoners) for 1200-1500 participants on each side. Delbrück and his followers take these loss figures as an axiom. The later Verbruggen suggests that the Allies had about 170 knights killed (since the memorial inscription in the Church of St. Nicholas in Arras speaks of 300 enemy knights killed or captured, 300-131=169). However, they all leave the French losses of 3 killed knights without discussion, although the texts of the same chronicles are in no way compatible with such a ridiculously low figure:

1) Two hours of hand-to-hand combat between French and Flemish knights on the southern flank - were all of these traditional rivals inclined to spare each other? By the way, after Buvin, Flanders submitted to the French king, and his court chroniclers had every political reason not to offend the new subjects and to emphasize the “knightly” nature of the test that took place.

2) Before Duke Ferdinand of Flanders was captured, all 100 of his sergeant bodyguards were killed after a fierce battle. Did these probably good warriors allow themselves to be slaughtered like sheep without inflicting any losses on the French?

3) The French king himself barely escaped death (it is noteworthy that the German or Flemish infantrymen who knocked him off his horse tried to kill him, and not take him prisoner). Was it really true that his surroundings were not harmed in any way?

4) The chronicles also speak of the valiant behavior of the German emperor Otto, who fought with an ax for a long time, and his Saxon entourage. When a horse was killed near Otto, he barely escaped capture and was hardly repulsed by his bodyguards. The battle was already being lost by the Allies and the Germans had no reason to hope to save the prisoners, i.e. they had to fight to the death to save themselves. And as a result of all these exploits, 1-2 Frenchmen were killed?

5) On the northern flank, 700 Brabançon spearmen, formed in a circle, repelled the attacks of the French knights for a long time. From this circle the Count of Boulogne Renaud Dammartin and his vassals made forays. The count was an experienced warrior and, as a traitor, he had nothing to lose. Was he and his men able to kill 1-2 French knights, at best?

6) Finally, almost the entire burden of the French in this long and important battle fell on the knights, since the French foot communal militia almost immediately fled. These one and a half thousand French knights coped with both the German-Flemish knights and the many times more numerous, aggressive, although poorly organized German-Dutch infantry. At the cost of only 3 dead?

In general, the statements of Le Breton and Musquet could only be believed if they were supported by the same data from the German and Flemish side. But German and Flemish descriptions of this major battle of that time have not been preserved - apparently, the chronicler poets of these countries were not inspired by it. In the meantime, we have to admit that the chronicles of Le Breton and Musquet represent a tendentious propaganda panegyric and the loss figures in them are not trustworthy.

Another example of this kind is the Battle of Muret on September 12, 1213, the only major battle of the Albigensian Wars. In it, 900 northern French horsemen with an unknown number of foot sergeants under the command of Simon de Montfort defeated 2,000 Aragonese and southern French ("Occitan") horsemen and 40 thousand infantry (Toulouse militia and routiers). The Aragonese king Pedro II (an active participant in the Reconquista and the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212), being in the vanguard, collided with the French vanguard and was killed, after a fierce battle his entire maynade, i.e., was killed. several dozen knights and sergeants from the immediate circle. Then the French, with a blow to the flank, overthrew the Aragonese knights, demoralized by the death of the king, who carried away the Occitan knights in their flight, then the French dismembered and drove the Toulouse foot militia into the Garonne, and allegedly 15 or 20 thousand people were hacked to death or drowned (too outstanding an achievement for 900 mounted warriors ).

Moreover, if you believe the “History of the Albigensian Crusade” by the monk Pierre de Vaux-de-Cerny (aka Peter of Cerney, an ardent panegyrist of Simon de Montfort), the French killed only 1 knight and several sergeants.

One can still believe that the French cavalry cut through the Toulouse foot militia like a herd of sheep. The figure of 15-20 thousand dead is clearly exaggerated, but on the other hand, the death of a significant part of the male population of Toulouse in the Battle of Muret is an objective fact that subsequently manifested itself many times. However, it is impossible to believe that King Pedro II and his court knights allowed themselves to be killed so cheaply.

In conclusion, a little about another well-studied battle of the same era, Warringen (1288). If you believe the rhymed chronicle of Jan van Heel, the victorious Brabantians lost only 40 people, and the losing German-Dutch coalition lost 1100. Again, these figures are in no way consistent with the course of the battle described in the same chronicle, which was long and stubborn, and even The “minimalist” Verbruggen considers the figure for Brabant losses to be disproportionately underestimated. The reason is obvious - van Heel was the same panegyrist of the Duke of Brabant as Peter of Serney was of Montfort, and le Breton and Musquet were of Philip Augustus. Apparently, it was good form for them to incredibly underestimate the losses of their victorious patrons.

All of the above battles are characterized by the same features: their detailed descriptions have been preserved only from the side of the victors, and each time there is a huge gap in combat losses between the victors and the vanquished, which is in no way combined with a detailed description of the long and stubborn struggle. This is all the more strange since all these battles were no less significant for the vanquished, who had their own continuous chronicle tradition. Obviously, the losing side, not experiencing any poetic delight, preferred to limit itself to a few lines in the general chronicles. Let us also add that the chroniclers’ restraint immediately disappears when it comes to commoner soldiers - here numbers in the thousands are commonplace.

This is what concerns the battles of the 12th-13th centuries. Their sad feature is the impossibility, in the vast majority of cases, to verify the figures in the chronicles describing them, no matter how incredible they may be.

The picture changes dramatically at the turn of the XIII-XIV centuries, after the battles of Falkirk in 1298 and Courtrai in 1302. “Anemic” battles practically disappear, no matter what series of battles of the late Middle Ages you take - only bloody massacres with the death of 20 to 50% of the active participants the losing side. Indeed:

A) The Hundred Years' War - the “pathetic” 15% of the French killed in the Battle of Crecy (1346) can only be explained by the passive defensive tactics of the British and the onset of night, which allowed the majority of the wounded to escape; but in the battles of Poitiers (1356) and Agincourt (1415), which took place during the day and ended with a successful counterattack by the British, up to 40% of the French knights were killed; on the other hand, at the end of the war, the French, who had gained a tactical advantage, killed up to half of the English soldiers in the battles of Pat (1429), Formigny (1450) and Castiglione (1453);

B) on the Iberian Peninsula - in the largest battles of Najera (1367) and Aljubarrota (1385), English archers created exactly the same pile of corpses of Castilian and French knights as at Poitiers and Agincourt;

C) Anglo-Scottish wars - more than 5 thousand Scots killed (probably about 40%) at the Battle of Falkirk (1298), 55% of the Scottish cavalry were killed at Halidon Hill (1333), more than half died (possibly 2/3 including prisoners) of the Scots who took part in the Battle of Nevill's Cross (1346); on the other hand, at least 25% of the English army (versus about 10% for the Scots) killed at the Battle of Bannockburn (1314), more than 2 thousand English killed (20-25%) at the Battle of Otterburn (1388);

D) Franco-Flemish wars - 40% of French knights and mounted sergeants were killed in the Battle of Courtrai (1302), 6 thousand Flemings killed (i.e. 40%, according to French, possibly inflated data) and 1500 French killed at the Battle of Mont-en-Pevele (1304), more than half of the Flemish army was exterminated in the battles of Cassel (1328) and Rosebeek (1382);

D) wars with the participation of the Swiss - more than half of the Austrian knights were killed in the battles of Morgarten (1315) and Sempach (1386), in the battle of Saint-Jacob-en-Birse, a Bernese-Basel detachment of 1500 people was destroyed to the last man ., an unknown number of Baselians who tried to save him also died, 4 thousand people were allegedly killed by the French mercenaries, in the Battle of Murten (1476) more than half of the Burgundian army, 12 thousand people, were killed;

E) wars in the North - at Visby (1361) more than 1500 people were killed, the Danes completely destroyed the Swedish detachment defending the city, at Hemmingstedt (1500) the peasants of Dithmarschen, having lost 300 killed, destroyed 3600 soldiers of the Danish king Johann I (30 % of the entire army);

G) battles of the Hussite Wars of 1419-1434. and the wars of the Teutonic Order with the Poles and Lithuanians, including Grunwald (1410) - are also known for the merciless extermination of the losing side.

Previously, only the wars of the condottieri in Italy seemed to be a kind of island of “knightly” war (albeit in a perverted form). The opinion about the habit of condottieri leaders to conspire among themselves and organize almost bloodless imitations of battles, thereby deceiving their employers, is based mainly on the works of the Italian politician and writer Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527). His “History of Florence” (1520), written under the obvious influence of ancient models and its specificity compares favorably with medieval chronicles, until recently was unconditionally taken on faith as the most important source on the late medieval history of Italy. For example, about the battle between the Florentine-Papal and Milanese troops at Anghiari (1440), he writes: “Never before has any other war on foreign territory been less dangerous for the attackers: with such a complete defeat, despite the fact that the battle lasted four hours ", only one person died, and not even from a wound or some masterful blow, but from the fact that he fell from his horse and gave up the ghost under the feet of the fighters." But about the battle between the Florentines and Venetians at Molinella (1467): “However, not a single person fell in this battle - only a few horses were wounded and, in addition, several prisoners were taken from both sides.” . However, when in recent decades the archives of Italian cities were carefully studied, it turned out that in reality 900 people died in the first battle, 600 in the second. This may not be so much for armies of thousands of 5 people, but the contrast with Machiavelli’s statements is striking .

Thus, it became obvious that the “History of Florence,” contrary to external impressions, is not an accurate account of the events of that time, but rather a tendentious political pamphlet, in which the author, while defending certain ideas (the need to replace mercenary condottieres with regular national armies), very freely deals with facts.

The case of the “History of Florence” is indicative in the sense that even the most convincing and plausible, at first glance, medieval descriptions can be very far from the true state of affairs. Modern researchers managed to “bring the history of Florence to clean water”; for chronicles of the 12th century this, alas, is impossible.

However, certain patterns can be detected. Two types of wars have already been mentioned at the beginning of the article. Even more significant is that the degree of “bloodiness” of medieval wars is inseparable from the general social and cultural development of medieval society. The early period (up to the 11th century) was characterized by “feudal anarchy” and instability of social institutions and morality. The morals at that time were barbaric, the battles, although small in scale, were bloody. Then came the “golden age” of chivalry, when its hierarchy and morality had already been formed and were not yet too spoiled by commodity-money relations. At this time, the dominant military-political role of the knights was not questioned by anyone, which allowed them to play out power and property according to their own, gentle rules. Most Western European “battle tournaments” date back to this not so long period (XII-XIII centuries). However, on the periphery of the Catholic world, even at that time, the same rules were in effect - there was a life-and-death struggle with infidels and heretics.

However, even the “golden age,” if you look closely, was internally heterogeneous. The most “feudal” was the 12th century, the time of the highest religiosity and power of the papacy in Europe. This leading role of the church had a profound influence on military morale, gradually modifying the original German-pagan mentality of chivalry. It was in the 12th century that the intra-European (that is, inter-knight) wars were the most anemic and the external “crusader” aggression was the bloodiest. In the 13th century, the church begins to be pushed into the background by royal power, and religiosity by “state interests”; “brotherhood in Christ” begins to give way to nationalism again. Little by little, intra-European wars become more violent, helped by the kings' widespread use of commoner townspeople. The real turning point comes around 1300, when the “war of chivalry” within Europe finally gives way to the “war of death.” The bloodiness of the battles of the 14th-15th centuries can be explained by several factors:

1) Forms of combat operations are becoming more and more complex; one main type of troops and method of combat operations (a head-on clash of knightly cavalry in an open field) is being replaced by several types of troops and many tactical techniques with sharply different sets of advantages and disadvantages. Their use in different, not yet fully studied conditions can lead to either complete victory or catastrophic defeat. A clear example is the English archers: in some battles they destroyed the French heavy cavalry almost without losses, in others the same cavalry destroyed them almost without losses.

2) The same complication of forms of combat operations leads to the regular participation in battles of mercenary formations of commoner infantrymen, whose uncontrollability is sharply different from the previous bollards - knightly servants. Along with them, inter-class hatred returns to the fields of regular battles.

3) New technical means and tactics, such as massed shooting of archers across squares, turn out to be fundamentally incompatible with the “consciously gentle” method of conducting combat operations.

4) The aggressive “state interest” and the specificity of increasingly regular and disciplined armies turn out to be incompatible with the international knightly “brotherhood in arms.” A clear example is the order of Edward III during the Battle of Crecy in 1346 not to take prisoners until the end of the battle.

5) The morality of chivalry itself is also decomposing, no longer having sole control over the course of battles. “Christian generosity” and “knightly solidarity” are increasingly inferior to rational interest - if in given specific conditions there is no possibility of personally obtaining a ransom from a captured “noble” enemy, it turns out to be natural to kill him.

However, even the “anemic” battles of the 12th century were not harmless for the losers - there is nothing good in a ruinous ransom. Let us recall that under Bremuhl (1119) a third of the knights of the defeated side were captured, and under Lincoln (1217) even two-thirds.

In other words, throughout the Middle Ages, a general battle in an open field was an extremely risky business, threatening irreparable losses.

Hence the distinctive feature of medieval warfare in the period under review (from 1100 to 1500) was the emphasis on the defense/siege of fortresses and “small war” (ambushes and raids) while avoiding large battles in the open field. Moreover, general battles were most often associated with unblocking actions, that is, they were of a forced nature. A typical example is the Albigensian Wars (1209-1255): over 46 years, in dozens of sieges and thousands of small skirmishes, many tens of thousands of soldiers died on each side, and knights were killed to the same extent as commoner sergeants, but there was a major battle only one - under Mur in 1213. Thus, a medieval knight could have enormous, regularly replenished combat experience, and at the same time participate in only 1-2 major battles throughout his life.

Publication:
XLegio © 2002

Great battles. 100 battles that changed the course of history Domanin Alexander Anatolyevich

BATTLES OF THE MIDDLE AGES

BATTLES OF THE MIDDLE AGES

Battle of Poitiers (I)

The century after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 was a time of almost continuous Arab conquest. The shock wave of the Muslim explosion reached the borders with China in the east and the Atlantic Ocean in the west. The Umayyad dynasty, which replaced the four “righteous” caliphs, quite successfully advanced in several directions at once. But at the beginning of the 8th century, the first signs of the Islamic wave fading appeared. In 718, the Byzantine emperor Leo III the Isaurian, in alliance with the Bulgarian Khan Tervel, repelled the onslaught of a hundred thousand Arab army on Constantinople. This created military parity on the Arab-Byzantine border. But in the far west the Arab advance continued.

The invasion of Spain and then Gaul was led by the Umayyad dynasty; her troops under the command of Tariq Ibn Ziyad crossed the Strait of Gibraltar in 711 and soon established Muslim rule in the Iberian Peninsula. Already in 719, the Umayyad armies under the command of Al-Samha ibn Malik, ruler of al-Andalusia, captured Septimania, the gateway from Spain to Gaul. The following year, Narbonne was captured and became a stronghold for further offensives. In 725, Burgundy was invaded; in 731 Aquitaine was defeated and plundered.

Under these conditions, the defeated Duke of Aquitaine Ed turns for help to the last force capable of resisting the victorious Arabs - the Frankish kingdom.

In this kingdom, however, it is not the king who commands: by this time, all three of its parts were united under his rule by the Major of Austrasia, Charles Martell. A talented commander and outstanding organizer, Charles Martell restored the strength of the kingdom, began to create a truly regular army, founded a new branch of the army - heavily armed cavalry (that is, in essence, became the father of knighthood).

In 732, the governor of the Umayyad caliph, Abd ar-Rahman, led his fifty thousand army on a new campaign against Gaul. The main target was the city of Tours, famous for its riches - nearby was the Abbey of St. Martin, one of the main Christian shrines of Gaul. Along the way, the Arabs took and plundered Poitiers. Tours also could not resist their onslaught, which the Arabs took in full view of Martell’s army approaching to help the city. Abd ar-Rahman, who had no information about the number of Frankish soldiers and, moreover, understood that his army was extremely burdened with huge booty, decided to interrupt the campaign and ordered a retreat to Poitiers. However, the Franks, operating lightly, managed to get ahead of the enemy and block his path to retreat.

Charles's army was located on a large hill between the Maple and Vienne rivers, which covered the flanks. The basis of his battle formation was infantry, formed in a solid phalanx. In fact, the formation was almost a solid square, which was probably the best formation for repelling the attacks of the lightly armed Arab cavalry. Heavily armed cavalry was placed on the flanks of the Frankish army, and archers were scattered in front of the front. Numerically, the Frankish army was apparently inferior to the Arab (according to modern historians, Martell had about thirty thousand professional warriors and, possibly, a significant number of militias who did not take part in the battle itself), but the convenient position taken ahead of time at least equalized chances.

Victory of Charles Martell over Abderram. K. Steuben. 19th century

The fateful battle for Western Europe began with a powerful attack by the Arab cavalry. The only coherent description of the events that followed is given by the Arab chronicler. “The hearts of Abd ar-Rahman, his leaders and warriors were full of courage and pride, and they were the first to begin the battle. The Muslim horsemen charged several times with fury into the crowds of Franks, who resisted bravely, and many fell on both sides until the sun set. Night separated the two armies, but at dawn the Muslims renewed their attack. Their horsemen soon penetrated to the middle of the Christian army. But many of the Muslims were preoccupied with protecting the booty stored in the tents, and when a false rumor spread that some enemy soldiers were plundering the camp, several detachments of Muslim cavalry turned back to the camp to protect their tents. It seemed to others that they were running away, and disorder began in the army. Abd ar-Rahman wanted to stop it and started the battle again, but was surrounded by Frankish soldiers and pierced by many spears, so he died. Then the entire army fled, during which many people were killed.”

Based on indirect information from European sources, we can conclude that the battle lasted the whole day and, in addition to the courage of the phalanx formed in a square, the fate of the battle was finally decided by the attack of heavily armed knights. In addition, it was hardly out of nowhere that a rumor arose about the capture of an Arab convoy, which played a decisive role at the most intense moment of the battle. Apparently, Charles Martell sent small mounted reconnaissance groups to the Arab convoy (this is reminiscent of the actions of modern special forces sabotage groups!) in order to wreak havoc in the main Arab camp and free the maximum possible number of prisoners, hoping to split the enemy’s ranks, and maybe even strike from the rear. In any case, he succeeded in causing panic among some of the Arabs.

The victory at Poitiers was of great importance. The onslaught of the Arabs, who had previously encountered almost no well-organized resistance in Europe, was stopped. The death of a talented Arab commander and the associated squabbles in the struggle for the right to become the new governor also played a role. Soon Charles Martell inflicts several more defeats on the Arabs, pushing them back to Narbonne. And the fall of the Umayyad dynasty that followed in 750 and the resulting civil war in the caliphate finally stopped the Arab onslaught. In 759, Charles Martell's son Pepin liberates Narbonne, and Martell's grandson, who went down in history under the name Charlemagne, finally pushes the Arabs back beyond the Pyrenees, beginning the seven-hundred-year period of the Reconquista.

From the book 100 Great Military Secrets author Kurushin Mikhail Yurievich

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From the fall of Rome until the end of the 15th century, war remained a constant and integral part of the life of medieval society. Visigothic invasion of the Roman Empire in 376. and their victory over Roman troops at the Battle of Adrianople in 378 marked a turning point: from this time on, barbarian invasions of Western Europe began to intensify. Behind the Visigoths came the Ostrogoths, Vandals, Burgundians, Alans, Alemanni, Franks, Angles, Saxons and, ultimately, the Huns - a tribe that served as a kind of accelerator of the process, prompting other peoples to take off their courage and go to the West. The western part of the Roman Empire disappeared as a single state, its place was taken by many tribal formations, the ephemeral boundaries between which were constantly changing.
This is how, in fact, as is commonly believed, the Middle Ages began. Although, of course, the historical awareness of this fact and views on a rather long time period in the life of mankind, poorly illuminated by original sources, changed under the influence of the era. Of course, the Visigothic invasions played an important role in the fall of the Roman Empire, and the defeat and death of Emperor Valens in the battle of Adrianople effectively divided the empire into two halves. However, the fall of Rome could not have occurred as a result of one single event; the process was progressive and actually stretched out for another whole century. The barbarian armies also, apparently, were not as different from the Roman ones as is commonly believed, that is, they were not less disciplined, less bureaucratic in terms of organization, less well armed and had worse armor. In fact, many of the warriors gained martial arts while serving in the Roman armies, sometimes acting against other barbarians or... other Roman troops.
At first they used Roman weapons and armor, but quite soon they replaced the bronze plate or scale protective vestments adopted by the Romans with iron chain mail, and short Roman swords and throwing spears with longer chopping swords, as well as noticeably longer spears for stabbing blows and axes or axes.
The barbarians - let's call them that - also had unwritten codes of honor, rules of behavior in battle, which permeated their concepts of everything in the world, the exploits of heroes were sung in songs and tales and were directly reflected in the names of people, both male and female . Warriors were considered the elite of society. Their lives were valued especially highly in a system where everything was measured by the so-called vira and they were buried with their weapons and the most expensive trophies. The tribal leaders of the barbarians, or their kings, also acted as military leaders.

Anatoly Stegalin: “My graphic reconstruction of this battle is the first in more than six centuries!”

What was the largest battle in the Middle Ages?
The question is, of course, interesting.
The answer is even more interesting: The Battle of Grunwald... No: at Kosovo Field... What else: at Poitiers...
What are you talking about, the Battle of Kulikovo! *

Everything is correct! Every nation has fateful battles, the greatness and significance of which for their native country is undeniable.
And for the world, for history?

Well, let's correct the question: what is the most mysterious and little-known of the great battles of the Middle Ages?

And this is where the question becomes sharply paradoxical, especially if you add that it is about the same thing (the SAME) as the first one! For in terms of the number of fighting forces, bloodshed, global significance, geopolitical results and strategic scale (commander level), it has no equal, at least in the late Middle Ages.

Alas, by a strange whim of fate, this particular battle was beyond the sight and interest of military historians. No monographs, no maps. There is no special chapter about it even in the multi-volume opus of the great specialist in the history of wars, Evgeniy Razin.

But here’s what’s typical: against the backdrop of general historical ignorance, our “unlearned fellow countrymen” look much more advanced:
“The place for the battle is located on the Kondurche River between
the village of Novaya Zhizn and the village of Nadezhdino (in 1858-1941 there were German settlements here - the colonies of Alexandrotal and Marienthal). This field, not counting the adjacent gentle hills, is 2.5 times larger than the field near Old Buyan (about 10 square kilometers).”

This, by the way, is a fragment of a competitive essay by 9th grade student Mikhail Anoldov from the village of Koshki, Samara Region, published in the magazine “Science and Life” (No. 2, 2004).

Indeed, residents of the Samara region have heard more than once about the great forgotten battle on the Kondurcha River**. And many became direct “eyewitnesses” and even “participants” of the massacre as part of the game of historical reenactors, recreating its main stages.

However, the game writers know just as little about where exactly and how the battle took place, which in its grandeur is quite comparable to the “Battle of the Nations” at Leipzig, where the power of Napoleon I was destroyed (1814), or on the Catalaunian fields (451), where The Romans stopped the invasion of the Huns by Attila***.

The Kondurchin language was carefully studied by the remarkable Samara local historian Emelyan Guryanov. But even he did not have enough materials for a separate study on the burning topic.

This is how this “blank spot” of world history gaped for more than six centuries, until Anatoly Stegalin’s book “Tokhtamysh against Tamerlane” was published. In the work, to which a lot of time and effort was devoted, the author substantiates a number of interesting theses.

Firstly, the beginning of the death of the Golden Horde, says Anatoly Stegalin, was not the victories of Dmitry Donskoy, which are included in all textbooks of Russian history, but the unknown to most, defeat on the Kondurcha River of the troops of the ruler of the Golden Horde Tokhtamysh by the army of the powerful ruler of Transoxiana - Emir Timur (Tamerlane), who created the most powerful empire in Asia after Genghis Khan. It was after this defeat that the Horde lost their former military power, and the Volga Mongol Empire itself experienced irresistible tendencies towards collapse. Thus, the merciless “iron lame” Tamerlane acted as an indirect benefactor of Muscovite Rus'!

Secondly, according to the author, the greatest medieval military operation fell out of the focus of historians of Russia, Central Asia and, especially, Europe, since it took place in remote and sparsely populated forest-steppe regions. To Russia, the contribution of the Battle of Kulikovo to the crushing of the Horde yoke seemed much more significant, not to mention the most important patriotic “emphasis” of the victory of Prince Dmitry Ivanovich.

Thirdly, about the decisive confrontation between Timur and Tokhtamysh, in the opinion of the Samara local historian, there are only two trustworthy primary sources: “Zafar Name” - “Books of Victories” **** (both were created shortly after the event - around 1425) .

And fourth: the tactical drawing of the battle on Kondurch is worthy of being included in textbooks on the art of war, but someone undeservedly “erased” it, and Anatoly Stegalin considered it his duty to restore it.

Anatoly, when did your search for this topic begin?

About ten years ago, I was one of the organizers of the festival of historical reconstruction “The Battle of Timur and Tokhtamysh”. It had quite a resonance. And more than once, enthusiasts from military-historical clubs from all over the country came to us, on Samara soil, organizing colorful lists with the restoration of fencing techniques and the use of carefully reproduced ammunition: weapons and armor of bygone times. The guys have reached such a level of martial art in this matter that it’s time to give a master class to everyone.

And then the festival wave began to decline...

Yes, it was then that time appeared for specific research work on the restoration of the battle painting. I scoured the Internet and more than one library, after which I made conclusions that literally begged to be written down on paper. In the end, it turned out to be a whole book.

Is this a purely historical account?

No, the work is not written in a dry, highly academic style, but in a simple, understandable language with elements of intrigue. I believe that being entertaining will ensure a wide audience. In general, I would label this narrative genre as “research in the key of Internet blues.”

But what about scientific paraphernalia: quotes, sources, historiography, chronology, comparative historical analysis?

I hope that all these attributes are met. I didn’t compose, I didn’t fantasize, but I reconstructed. The texts of the original documents are quite complex for modern perception and even ornate. I studied them in detail, compared them with analogues, and generalized the coincidences.

Do the human resources of the fighting sides really allow us to classify the battle of Kondurch as one of the largest?

Previously, the number of soldiers was increased to 400 thousand. I think that this ratio is more realistic: Tamerlane has 120 thousand against Tokhtamysh’s 150 thousand.

About 30 years ago, approximately the same number of troops was “inscribed” in the Battle of Kulikovo (1380), and Mamai’s horde “reached” up to 300 thousand. Now, having studied the geography of the field, we have come to the conclusion that the arithmetic is overestimated by three to four times. And under the same Grunwald (1410), the total number of participants (Poles, Litvins, Russians and Czechs, together with the Teutonic Order opposing them) hardly reached the “number of one” Tokhtamysh. About 90-100 thousand Serbs and Turks fought on Kosovo Field (1389). So your point of view is quite valid.

It’s not even the main factor here, but the consequences: after the defeat at Kondurch, the collapse of the Golden Horde began.

Where did you get such a detailed map of the battle with the exact location of troops at different stages of the battle?

Asian chroniclers, and even European chroniclers, alas, did not practice such schemes, so my graphic reconstruction of the Battle of Kondurchin is the first in more than six centuries.

Anatoly Stegalin: “I invite everyone to the presentation at the Alabino Museum on March 1 at 15:00. The museum is preparing a little sensation, and I hope to get the audience a little excited...

about the author
Anatoly Stegalin (born in 1957) is a Samara local historian who thinks outside the box and digs deep. The scope of his interests is very broad: alternative history and search journalism (especially the “white spots” of Samara history), mythology, esotericism, organizing festivals of historical reenactors of ancient battles, alternative medicine and pharmaceuticals, photography, the study of paranormal phenomena (ufology), educational aspects of role-playing games...
He devoted more than one year to researching the log-logging culture of the Volga region. He hopes to soon systematize the results of his research, which are far from traditional, in a new book that will not leave anyone indifferent.

* Battle of Poitiers No. 1, also known as the Battle of Tours, and in Arabic sources the Battle of the Martyrs' Cohort (October 10, 732). The decisive battle between the hitherto victorious Arab army (under the leadership of the governor of al-Andalusia of the Umayyad Caliphate, Abdur-Rahman ibn Abdallah) and the collective forces of Europe (under the supremacy of the Austrasian majordomo Charles Martel). Occurred near the border between the Frankish kingdom and the then independent Aquitaine. The Frankish troops were victorious, Abdur-Rahman ibn Abdallah was killed, and Martell subsequently extended his influence further to the south. Apparently, the Frankish troops won the battle on foot. Leopold von Ranke believed that "The Battle of Poitiers was the turning point of one of the most important eras in the history of the world." A crushing defeat for the Umayyads, it hastened their decline by stopping the spread of Islam in Europe and establishing the rule of the Franks and their Carolingian overlords as the dominant European dynasty. Data from ancient Muslim sources indicate the number of Umayyad troops at 20-80 thousand or more soldiers, and the Franks at 30 thousand. The number of parties mentioned is from 20 thousand to 80 thousand. Losses from 1500 to 10,000.

Battle of Poitiers No. 2 (September 19, 1356) - a brilliant victory of the English corps of Edward “The Black Prince” (8 thousand soldiers) over the French army (50 thousand, about 20 dukes) of King John II the Good during the Hundred Years War. King John the Good fought bravely, but was captured along with his youngest son Philip (later Duke Philip II of Burgundy). The entire flower of French chivalry perished. Among those killed were Duke Pierre I de Bourbon, Constable of France Gautier VI de Brienne, Bishop of Chalons, 16 barons, 2426 knights; In total, 8 thousand were killed, and 5 thousand were killed during the flight. On May 24, 1357, the captive king was solemnly brought to London. A truce was concluded with France for 2 years. The ransom for the king was equal to 2 annual incomes of the kingdom, not to mention the banal trophy. For France it was a moment of national mourning. The Dauphin Charles V the Wise became the king's deputy.

The Battle of Kosovo Polje (Serbian: Kosovska bitka 15 June 1389) was a fateful battle between the combined forces of Serbia and the Kingdom of Bosnia with the Turkish army of Sultan Murad I, 5 kilometers from modern Pristina. The number of Turkish troops was about 27-40 thousand people. Among them are 2-5 thousand janissaries, 2500 horsemen of the Sultan’s personal guard, 6 thousand sipahis, 20 thousand azaps and akinci and 8 thousand warriors of vassal states. The army of the Serbian prince Lazar Hrebeljanovic consisted of 12-33 thousand soldiers (12-15 thousand people were under the direct command of Lazar, 5-10 thousand under the command of Vuk Brankovic, and about the same number of soldiers under the command of the Bosnian nobleman Vlatko Vukovich. He fought in the Serbian army a detachment of Knights Hospitaller, as well as a knightly detachment from Poland and Hungary). At the beginning of the battle, the Sultan was killed. According to some sources, he was killed by the Orthodox knight Milos Obilic, who, posing as a defector, entered the Sultan’s tent and stabbed him with a knife. After the death of the Sultan, the Turkish army was led by his son Bayazid. Lazarus is captured and executed, and Lazarus' daughter Olivera is sent to the Sultan's harem. The Serbs were forced to pay tribute to the Turks and supply troops to the Ottoman army. Serbia became a vassal of the Ottoman Empire, and in 1459 it was included in it. Despite the decisive victory of the Ottoman forces, immediately after the battle the Sultan's army made a hasty march towards Adrianople due to heavy losses, as well as the fears of the heir Murad Bayezid that the death of his father could lead to unrest in the Ottoman Empire. In the past, the number of Serbs was increased to 30 thousand, Turks 2-3 times more.

The Battle of Grunwald (Tannenbeg) July 15, 1410 - a general battle between the allied Polish-Lithuanian army led by King Vladislav II Jagiello and the Grand Duke of Lithuania Vytautas (39,000 people) and the army of the Teutonic Order under the leadership of Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen (27,000). Most of the knights of the order were killed or captured. Previously, the numbers of fighting forces were brought up to 80 thousand people on both sides. The outcome of the battle determined the final collapse of the order and the rapid flowering of the power of the unitary Polish-Lithuanian state.

The Battle of Kulikovo or the Battle of the Don (September 8, 1380) - the complete defeat of the army of the Horde dark leader Mamai by the united Russian army of the Moscow prince Dmitry Donskoy. Data on the number of troops vary greatly. The “Chronicle Tale of the Battle of Kulikovo” speaks of 100 thousand soldiers of the Moscow Principality and 50-100 thousand soldiers of the allies, “The Tale of the Battle of Mamayev” - 260 thousand or 303 thousand, the Nikon Chronicle - 400 thousand (there are estimates of the number of individual units of the Russian army: 30 thousand Belozersts, 7 or 30 thousand Novgorodians, 7 or 70 thousand Lithuanians, 40-70 thousand in the ambush regiment). Later researchers (E.A. Razin and others), having calculated the total population of Russian lands, taking into account the principle of recruiting troops and the time of crossing of the Russian army (the number of bridges and the period of crossing over them), settled on the fact that under the banner of Dmitry gathered 50-60 thousand soldiers (this agrees with the data of the “first Russian historian” V.N. Tatishchev about 60 thousand), of which only 20-25 thousand are troops of the Moscow principality itself. Significant forces came from territories controlled by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, but in the period 1374-1380 became allies of Moscow (Bryansk, Smolensk, Drutsk, Dorogobuzh, Novosil, Tarusa, Obolensk, presumably Polotsk, Starodub, Trubchevsk). S.B. Veselovsky believed in his early works that there were about 200-400 thousand people on the Kulikovo field, but over time he came to the conclusion that in the battle the Russian army could only number 5-6 thousand people. According to A. Bulychev, the Russian army (like the Mongol-Tatar) could be about 6-10 thousand people with 6-9 thousand horses (that is, it was mainly a cavalry battle of professional horsemen).
Modern scientists have given their estimate of the size of the Mongol-Tatar army: B.U. Urlanis believed that Mamai had 60 thousand people. Historians M.N. Tikhomirov, L.V. Cherepnin and V.I. Buganov believed that the Russians were opposed by 100-150 thousand Mongol-Tatars. Yu. V. Seleznev made an assumption about the Mongol-Tatar army of 90 thousand people (since it is presumably known that Mamai led 9 tumens with him). Military historian and weapons expert M.V. Gorelik suggested that the real number of Mamaev’s army did not exceed 30-40 thousand people. The battle had enormous moral significance for the Russian people, who had been under the yoke of the Golden Horde for 140 years.

** Battle of Kondurcha (June 18, 1391) - a grandiose massacre between the troops of Timur Tamerlane and the Golden Horde army of Khan Tokhtamysh on the banks of the Kondurcha River (modern Samara region). The battle ended with the complete defeat of Tokhtamysh and his flight across the Volga, and then to Lithuania. This predetermined the rapid decline of the Golden Horde.

*** The Battle of Leipzig (October 16-19, 1813) is the most significant battle in the history of the Napoleonic Wars in terms of the number of participants - the “Battle of the Nations”. The French army of Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte (about 200 thousand) suffered a crushing defeat from the allied forces of Russia, Prussia, Austria and Sweden under the command of Schwarzenberg, Barcalay de Tolia, Blucher and Bernadotte (about 300 thousand). During 4 days of fighting, the Allied forces lost up to 55 thousand soldiers and officers killed and wounded. The exact losses of the French are more difficult to indicate; apparently, they amounted to up to 40 thousand people killed and wounded, as well as up to 30 thousand prisoners, among them 36 generals. 325 guns and extensive warehouses and convoys fell into the hands of the Allies. Also, do not forget that on October 18, 5 thousand Saxons went over to the side of the coalition. As a result, Napoleon abdicated the throne (by the way, the Battle of Borodino in 1812 was bloodier, stubborn and decisive in its consequences).

The Battle of Waterloo (June 18, 1815) - the final defeat of Napoleon I (72.5 thousand with 240 guns) of the military coalition of England and Prussia under the command of Wellington and Blucher (70 thousand people with 159 guns). The French lost all their artillery at the Battle of Waterloo, 25,000 killed and wounded and 8,000 prisoners. The Allies lost: Wellington - 15,000 killed and wounded, Blücher - 7,000 (1,200 killed, 4,400 wounded and 1,400 captured).
In total, 15,750 people were killed on the battlefield (22,000 Allied losses according to the calculations of E.V. Tarle). Previously, the figures were inflated; it was said that Napoleon had almost one and a half times fewer troops: 80 thousand versus 120 (correctly, taking into account the “lost” units of Grusha).

The Battle of the Catalaunian Fields (June 20, 451) is one of the most important and largest battles in history. The Romans and their allies under the command of Aetius (100 thousand) defeated the hitherto indestructible army of Attila (69 thousand Huns and about 30 thousand allies). Not so long ago, the number of combatants was increased to half a million.

****According to Sherif ad-din, Tokhtamysh was completely unprepared for the invasion of the Golden Horde by Tamerlane’s troops. Intending to wear down the enemy, he began a retreat, thereby giving Tamerlane the opportunity to deploy his forces and press the Horde troops to the Volga, crossing the Kondurcha River. The location of the battle is disputed. According to Persian sources, Tokhtamysh's troops far outnumbered their enemy. However, Tamerlane’s army, which had well-armed and trained infantry and had a powerful center, was a much more organized and combat-ready force than the Horde troops of Tokhtamysh, which predetermined the outcome of the battle. Tamerlane's troops were divided into 7 divisions, and 2 of them were in reserve, ready, by order of the commander-in-chief, to come to the aid of the center or flank. Tamerlane's infantry on the battlefield was protected by trenches and huge shields.

Tamerlane's army was lined up in the battle as follows. In the center was the kul of Timur under the command of Mirza Suleimanshah, behind was the second kul of Timur under the leadership of Muhammad Sultan, next to them were 20 koshuns, which were at Timur’s personal disposal. On the right flank was the kul of Mirza Miranshah (as a kanbul - flank guard - next to it was the kul of Haji Seif ad-Din). On the left flank was the kul of Mirza Omar-Sheikh (as a kanbul - the kul of Berdibek).

At the beginning of the battle, numerous Horde troops tried to envelop the enemy from the flanks, but all attacks of the Horde warriors were repulsed, and then Tamerlane’s army launched a counter-offensive and, with a powerful flank attack, overthrew the Horde and pursued them for 200 miles to the banks of the Volga. The Horde were pressed to the shore. The battle was incredibly fierce and, lasting 3 days, was accompanied by unprecedented bloodshed. The Horde were completely defeated, but Tokhtamysh managed to escape. One of the decisive events of the battle was the betrayal of part of the Horde military elite, who went over to the enemy’s side. Timur's victory came at a cost, and therefore he did not develop further offensive, refusing to cross to the right bank of the Volga. The families and property of the Horde warriors went to the winners.
Nowadays, every year at the site of the battle a historical re-enactment takes place by the Samara Museum of Local Lore and military history clubs.

Sources of the “Book of Victories” by Sheref ad-din: 1) “Zafar-name” by Nizam-ad-din Shami; 2) descriptions and diaries of individual campaigns, which Nizam-ad-din used, but Sheref-ad-din borrowed from them many details omitted by his predecessor; 3) a poetic chronicle compiled by Timur’s Uyghur scribes in the Turkic language in Uyghur writing; 4) oral messages from contemporaries and participants in Timur’s campaigns.

WARS OF THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES

After the collapse of the Western Roman Empire, its eastern counterpart in Byzantium continued to exist, and its struggle for survival with the Arabs, and then with the Turks and Bulgarians, is a fascinating story. In 622, Muhammad led his followers from Mecca to Medina, marking the beginning of Arabian and Islamic expansion. The first military victory was won by the prophet himself, but the most prominent leaders of the Islamic campaign were to become Khalid ibn al-Walid and Amr ibn al-As. Within a hundred years, the Islamic empire stretched from the Aral Sea to the headwaters of the Nile and from the borders of China to the Bay of Biscay. Only one power, Byzantium, could resist the Arabs in that century, and even it lost the southeastern part of its empire. Then, when the Arab offensive, having reached southern France, fizzled out, the Franks again took a prominent place. And finally, in the 8th century. Viking raids began on Britain and Western Europe. A notable phenomenon in the military history of Western Europe in the 7th – 11th centuries was the steady development of cavalry.

The Arabs carried out their conquests thanks to the skillful use of camel and horse troops in convenient terrain, the open spaces of North Africa and Western Asia. But their battle formations and battle tactics were very primitive, and their means of defense were rather meager. Usually they were built in one, sometimes in two or three dense rows, units were formed from different tribes. Fear was caused by the number of Arabs and their appearance. As one Byzantine military leader noted, “they are very brave when they are confident of victory: they firmly hold the line and boldly resist the most furious attacks. Feeling that the enemy is weakening, with joint desperate efforts they deliver the final blow.” The foot troops were mostly incapable of combat and poorly armed; the Arabs' strength was the cavalry. At the beginning of the 7th century. cavalry was lightly armed and extremely mobile, but in subsequent centuries the Arabs learned much from their most stubborn opponents, the Byzantines, and increasingly relied on mounted archers and spearmen, protected by chain mail, helmets, shields and greaves.

Defensive structures of Constantinople, practically preserved before the capture by the Turks in 1453.

But the best qualities of the armies of Islam were not in equipment and organization, but in the moral principles generated by religion, mobility thanks to camel transport and endurance developed by difficult living conditions in the desert. The faithful followers of Muhammad were extremely close to the idea of ​​jihad, a holy war. There was also an economic reason for Arab aggression, the old history of overpopulation in the Arabian Peninsula. Over the centuries, South Arabia became drier and its inhabitants moved north. Arab population explosion in the 7th century. was the fourth, final, and largest Semitic migration. As before, migrants naturally first flocked to the fertile crescent of the Middle East with its fertile lands, and only then spilled out beyond the Euphrates and Nile valleys. They went far beyond the territories they conquered in ancient times, not only because of their numbers, but also because almost everywhere the conquered peoples greeted them as deliverers. Their tolerance, humanity and impressive civilization converted almost as many people as they conquered by force. With the exception of Spain, they conquered in the 7th century. The areas have preserved the Islamic religion and culture to this day.

The first obstacle for the Arabs was Byzantium. In the VIII – XI centuries. The Byzantine army and navy, in essence, were the most combat-ready force in the European and Mediterranean space. In 668, and then every year from 672 to 677, the Arabs attacked the Byzantine Empire at various points. They invaded its borders, but each time the Byzantine fleet ultimately defeated the invaders. Arab and Byzantine galleys were more or less identical. The large battle dromon had a hundred oarsmen placed on two rows of benches. The rowers in the top row were armed, and the crew was supplemented by marines. But the ships of the Byzantines were better equipped, armed with “Greek fire” - an incendiary mixture that was shot through a pipe on the bow or thrown into ballistas in pots.

The high point and turning point in the war between the Arabs and the Byzantines was the siege of Constantinople in 717–718. When the Arabs conquered Asia Minor, Emperor Theodosius III entered a monastery, but at this critical moment the professional military man Leo the Isaurian (Syrian) took over leadership. He quickly restored and strengthened the impressive fortifications of Constantinople - before the use of gunpowder, such walls were impregnable to the attackers and the city could only be taken by siege. Since Constantinople was surrounded on three sides by water, everything seemed to depend on the balance of power of the opposing fleets, and the Arabs had a huge numerical superiority here. However, Leo bravely and resourcefully led the twelve-month defense of the city, and when the siege was lifted, the Byzantine fleet pursued the enemy to the Hellespont, where the Arabs were caught in a storm and only a small fraction of their forces survived. For the Arabs this proved to be an unforgettable disaster. Thanks to the subsequent victory at Akroin in 739, Leo forced the Arabs to finally abandon the western part of Asia Minor.

The successes of Leo the Isaurian were achieved thanks to the combat capability of the army and navy that had been building up over a long period of time. Since the time of Belisarius, the main force of the Byzantine troops was heavy cavalry. The warrior was protected by long chain mail from the neck to the hips, a medium-sized round shield, a steel helmet, plate gauntlets and steel boots. The horses in the front row were also protected by steel breastplates. All the horses were under large, comfortable saddles with iron stirrups. The armament consisted of a broad sword, a dagger, a small bow with a quiver of arrows, and a long spear. Sometimes a battle ax was attached to the saddle. Like their Roman predecessors and unlike other Western armies, until the 16th century. Byzantine troops wore a set uniform: the cape over the armor, the pennant at the end of the spear and the plume of the helmet were of a certain color, distinguishing a particular military unit. To afford such equipment, the horseman had to have significant wealth. All commanders and every four to five soldiers were assigned an orderly. This was also expensive, but it made sense so that the soldiers could concentrate on purely military duties and, through good nutrition, maintain good physical shape. The history of the wealthy Byzantine Empire shows that a little comfort does not harm the requirements of combat effectiveness.

The functions of foot troops were limited to the defense of mountainous terrain and garrison service in fortresses and important cities. Most of the light infantry were archers, while the heavily armed infantry carried a spear, sword and battle axe. Each unit of 16 people was entitled to two carts for transporting weapons, food, kitchen utensils and entrenching tools. The Byzantines retained the classical Roman practice of building fortified camps at regular intervals, and the engineering troops were invariably at the forefront of the army. For each unit of 400 people there was a medical officer and six to eight porters. For each person carried from the battlefield, the porters received a reward - not so much for humanitarian reasons, but rather because the state was interested in the speedy restoration of the wounded's combat capability.

The cornerstone of the Byzantine military system was operational-tactical training: the Byzantines won with cunning and skill. They rightly believed that methods of combat should vary depending on the enemy's tactics, and carefully studied the techniques of a potential enemy. The most important military works of that time are the “Strategikon” of Mauritius (c. 580), “Tactics” of Leo the Wise (c. 900) and instructions on the conduct of border warfare by Nikephoros Phocas (who conquered Crete and Cilicia from the Arabs, in 963 - 969 former emperor).

Mauritius reorganized the structure and recruitment system of the army. He developed a hierarchy of units and units from the simplest unit of 16 soldiers to the “meros”, a division consisting of 6 - 8 thousand soldiers. There was a corresponding hierarchy of commanders, with the appointment of all military commanders above the rank of centurion being in the hands of the central government. After the Justinian Wars, the number of Teutonic mercenaries in the Byzantine army was greatly reduced. The empire did not have universal conscription for men, but there was a system that required regions, if necessary, to send a certain number of men for military training and active service. The border regions were divided into districts called “klissurs”, which, for example, could consist of a mountain pass and a fortress. Command of a klissura often served as a stepping stone to a successful military career. In a poem of the 10th century. “Digenes Akritas” describes life on the border of Cappadocia, where the warlike feudal lords who ruled the country carried out endless raids on the Arab territories of Cilicia and Mesopotamia.

The Byzantine tactics were based on a series of heavy cavalry attacks. According to Leo the Wise, the cavalry had to be divided into a first, fighting echelon, a second echelon of support and a small reserve behind the second, as well as units pushed far forward on both flanks, with the task of overturning the opposing flank of the enemy or protecting their own. Up to half of the available forces were allocated to the first echelon; the rest, depending on the tactical situation, were distributed in depth and on the flanks.

Naturally, there was a wide variety of tactical battle formations. Against the Slavs and Franks, as well as during major Arab invasions, foot and horse troops often acted together. In such cases, foot troops were stationed in the center, and cavalry was on the flanks or in reserve. If the enemy was expected to begin the battle with a cavalry charge, the light troops hid behind the heavy infantry, “in the same way,” Oman notes, “as a thousand years later the musketeers of the 16th and 17th centuries hid behind their pikemen.” In the mountainous terrain and gorges, the foot troops were positioned in a crescent shape, the heavily armed units blocked the enemy in the center, and the light infantry showered the enemy with arrows and spears on the flanks.

The Byzantines were the best warriors of the early Middle Ages in Europe, but the least conspicuous. This is because their strategy was mainly defensive and they preferred to rely more on their heads than on their brawn. They never entered into battle until circumstances were clearly in their favor, and often resorted to such cunning and subterfuge as spreading false information or inciting treason in the enemy ranks. They constantly had to resort to defensive actions: either to keep the Arabs out of Asia Minor, or to keep the Lombards and Franks from invading the Italian provinces, and to keep the Slavs, Bulgarians, Avars, Magyars and Pechenegs out of Greece and the Balkans. Thanks to constant combat readiness and vigilance, they were able to successfully hold the borders, this was their main task, and only very rarely did Byzantium act as an aggressive power.

The most formidable enemies of Byzantium were the Arabs. But the Arabs never appreciated organization and discipline. Although their armies were to be feared due to their numbers and mobility, they were largely a collection of aggressive and assertive savages who could not resist the systematic attacks of the orderly ranks of disciplined Byzantine warriors. The commanders of the Byzantine provinces also created an effective border security system. As soon as reports of Arab movements arrived, they gathered their forces. Foot troops blocked the paths, and the cavalry, gathered in the center, had to keep an eye on the invading forces, constantly attacking them. If the commander saw that he was inferior in strength, he had to avoid open battle, but create obstacles for the enemy by all other means - if possible, harass him with small raids, defend crossings and mountain passes, clog wells and put up roadblocks. In these cases, troops were recruited in distant provinces, and over time a well-trained army, say 30 thousand cavalry, marched against the Arabs. After their defeat at Akroin in 739, the Arabs were more of a nuisance than a threat to the security of the Byzantine Empire.

After 950, the Byzantine emperors Nikephoros Phocas and Basil II launched an offensive against the Arabs and Bulgarians. In 1014, Vasily completely destroyed the Bulgarian army, receiving the title of Bulgarian Slayer. He blinded 15 thousand captives, leaving one one-eyed man from every hundred to take them to their king.

In 1045 Armenia was annexed. However, in the middle of the 11th century. A new enemy, the Seljuk Turks, began to put pressure on the borders. The Turks in western Asia were considered natural horsemen. They formed numerous bands, armed mainly with bows, but often also with spears and scimitars. When attacking, they rushed in front of the enemy’s front, showering him with clouds of arrows and delivering short, painful blows. In the spring of 1071, Emperor Roman Diogenes with 60 thousand soldiers moved to Armenia, where he was met by 100 thousand Turks under the command of Alp Arslan. The novel recklessly discarded traditional Byzantine prudence and thoroughness. At Manzikert, the flower of the Byzantine army was destroyed, and the emperor himself was captured. The Turks poured into Asia Minor and in ten years turned it into a desert.

In Western Europe, the history of the Franks developed according to a model that differed little from the Byzantine one. With an increasingly cavalry-dominated army, they successfully stopped the Arab advance, but then, following a period of military and cultural superiority, were weakened by pressure from the barbarian Viking tribes.

For two centuries after Clovis's victory at Vougle in 507, which established their dominance over Gaul, the Franks did not change their military organization. Agathias describes the means of warfare of the Franks during the Merovingian dynasty (c. 450 - 750) as follows:

“The equipment of the Franks is very crude, they have neither chain mail nor greaves, their legs are protected only by strips of canvas or leather. There are almost no horsemen, but the foot soldiers are brave and know how to fight. They have swords and shields, but they never use bows. Throw battle axes and spears. The spears are not very long, they are thrown or simply struck with them.”

The throwing axes of the Franks, like the tomahawks of the Red Indians, were carefully hung in order to throw them with high accuracy or to use them in close combat. The armies of the Franks fought with precisely such weapons for two centuries, attacking in discordant ranks of foot soldiers. Most of the battles were fought between themselves. True, when we had to deal more often with various other armies, other means began to be used. At the end of the 6th century. wealthy warriors began to use metal armor.

In 732, Abd al-Rahman with an Arab army advanced north to Tours. Charles Martell gathered the forces of the Franks and moved towards the Arabs who were retreating with the booty. When Abd al-Rahman attacked, “the northerners stood like a wall, they seemed to be frozen together and struck the Arabs with swords. In the thick of the battle were the mighty Austrasians, it was they who sought out and defeated the Saracen king.”

It was a defensive battle won by infantry. They did not pursue the enemy. It cannot be said that the Franks, like the Byzantines, stopped the Arabs. The Arabs simply advanced as far as their resources allowed.

In 768, the grandson of Charles Martel, known as Charlemagne, ascended the throne of the Frankish king. At first there was much dangerous unrest in the kingdom, and if aggressive neighbors did not respond to gentle treatment, the only course of action was complete subjugation. Charlemagne considered himself a world ruler, appointed by God to manage secular affairs on earth. His missionaries advanced alongside the troops, often directly acting as a psychological strike force. He wrote to the pope: “Our task is to defend the Holy Church of Christ by force of arms with the help of holy piety. Your task, Holy Father, is to raise your hands to the sky, like Moses, to pray for assistance for our troops.” Thanks to the high combat effectiveness of Charlemagne's troops and his tireless activity, peace and tranquility came to the west of Europe, which it had not seen since the time of the Antonine dynasty. Military successes were a condition for achievements in the economy, justice and culture.

However, Charlemagne often resorted to extremely cruel measures, such as the murder in 782 in Verdun of four and a half thousand rebellious Saxon pagans in one day. From 768 to 814, Charlemagne undertook military campaigns almost every year. His Holy Roman Empire eventually covered the territory now occupied by France, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, West Germany, most of Italy, northern Spain and Corsica.

Charlemagne's army was very different from his grandfather's, the main difference being the transformation of heavy cavalry into a striking force. Cavalry was needed in long-distance, large-scale campaigns against enemies such as horse archers among the Avars or heavily armed spearmen in Lombardy. The importance of cavalry had long been recognized, but the cost of maintaining it was beyond the means of the Franks. In addition to expensive armor, the knight had to maintain an appropriate horse, strong enough to carry a knight in full armor, trained enough not to be frightened and carried away in battle, and fast enough for a swift attack. Such horses were specially bred and prepared. Even the costs of maintenance and food in winter were very significant. And the knight himself needed at least two servants: one to keep his weapons in order, the other to look after his horse; Moreover, the knight needed a lot of time for preparation and service itself. Under the Merovingian dynasty, no Frankish ruler was rich enough to maintain an army of heavy cavalry.

This and other problems were solved with the development of feudalism. The peculiarity of this system was that the lord, be it a king or a powerful person, gave land or protection to a vassal, receiving in return a sworn obligation to provide special services, often military. Charlemagne largely feudalized his kingdom. This arrangement appealed to those who were wealthy and those seeking protection in these troubled times. In the chaos that followed the death of Charlemagne in 814, when the empire fell apart, and Europe was plagued by attacks from the Magyars and Vikings, society turned into a kind of honeycomb, a system of cells based on mutual obligations: protection and service. The impact of feudalism on military affairs was twofold. On the one hand, the vassals who owned significant land could afford, and this was required of them, to equip knighthood. On the other hand, bonds of loyalty and mutual interest contributed to increased discipline in the army.

The core of the Frankish army was heavy cavalry. Not particularly numerous, it was highly professional. All knights had chain mail, helmets, shields, spears and battle axes. The old Frankish "militia" did not completely disappear, but the number of foot troops was reduced and combat effectiveness increased thanks to better weapons. At the Field of Mars, the annual gathering of the Frankish army, it was not allowed to appear with only a club - you had to have a bow. Charlemagne achieved a level of training, discipline and general organization not seen in the West since the barbarization of the Roman legions. An interesting document has survived in which Charlemagne in 806 summons one of the important vassals to the royal army:

“You will report to Stasfurt on the Bod by May 20th with your men, ready to perform military service in any part of our kingdom that we indicate. This means that you will come with weapons and equipment, full uniform and a supply of food. Each rider must have a shield, spear, sword, dagger, bow and quiver. The carts should have shovels, axes, picks, stakes with iron tips and everything necessary for the army. Take provisions for three months. On the way, do not cause harm to our subjects, do not touch anything except water, wood and grass. Take care that there are no omissions, since you appreciate our favor.”

Little is known with certainty about the Frankish battle formations. Probably, probing the enemy and the first skirmishes were entrusted to foot archers, and the cavalry delivered the decisive blow with all its might. Perhaps success was more likely to be accompanied by the good training and armament of the troops and the strategic insight of Charlemagne, rather than tactical skill. The solidity of his conquests was primarily ensured by the creation of a system of fortified points along the borders and in troubled areas, usually on hills near rivers.

In the 9th century. in the absence of kings knowledgeable in military affairs, the Frankish army loses its positive qualities. Leo the Wise describes the characteristics and weaknesses of the Franks as follows.

“Franks and pawnbrokers are overly fearless and daring. The slightest step back is considered disgraceful, and they will fight whenever you force a fight on them. When their knights are forced to dismount, they do not run, but stand back to back and fight against vastly superior enemy forces. Cavalry attacks are so terrible that, if you are not completely confident in your superiority, it is best to avoid a decisive battle. You should take advantage of their lack of discipline and organization. Both on foot and on horseback, they attack in a dense, clumsy mass, unable to maneuver because they are not organized and not trained. They are quickly thrown into confusion if they are unexpectedly attacked from the rear or from the flanks - this is easily achieved, since they are extremely careless and do not bother to set up patrols or conduct proper reconnaissance of the area. In addition, they camp as needed and do not make fortifications, so they can be easily killed at night. They cannot stand hunger and thirst and after a few days of deprivation they leave the ranks. They have no respect for their commanders, and their superiors cannot resist the temptation of bribes. Therefore, in general, it is easier and cheaper to exhaust the Frankish army with small skirmishes, protracted operations in uninhabited areas, cutting supply lines, rather than trying to finish them off with one blow.”

Charlemagne's empire began to disintegrate soon after his death due to weak power and raids from three directions at once throughout the 9th and 10th centuries. - Arabs, Magyars and Vikings. The biggest threat to Europe now came from the Scandinavian Vikings.

The Viking, or Scandinavian, invasions began at the end of the 8th century. At first, the raids that took place throughout Europe seem to have been carried out mainly for the purpose of plunder, but later many conquerors settled in the lands they had captured. In 911, the king of the Franks ceded them the land, which was later called Normandy, and ultimately all of England became part of the Scandinavian empire of the Danish king Canute (995 - 1035). Meanwhile, the Vikings also invaded Iceland, Greenland and America, Spain, Morocco and Italy, Novgorod, Kyiv and Byzantium.

The strength of the Vikings lay in their seafaring skills. Their ships were at the level of the highest technical achievements and were the subject of their greatest pride, and they themselves were very skillful and hardy sailors. The "Gokstad ship" found in the excavations is 70 feet long and 16 feet wide, built of oak and weighs 20 tons. Its design is the most perfect. During long journeys, the Vikings sailed, but in battle they used oars. Yellow and black shields were hung alternately along the sides. By the 10th century ships became much larger in size, some of them could accommodate up to two hundred people and could sail 150 miles in a day. Food was preserved with salt and ice.

The Vikings always fought sea battles near the coast. They usually consisted of three stages. First, the commander conducted reconnaissance and chose a position to launch an attack, then, maneuvering, began approaching. During the battle, the captain always stood at the wheel. When the flotillas converged, the shelling began, usually the enemy was showered with a hail of arrows, but sometimes they were simply pelted with pieces of iron and stones. And finally, the Vikings boarded the ship, and the outcome of the battle was decided by hand-to-hand combat.

After this, the fleet remained the base of operations for raids into the interior. Typically, the Vikings moved upstream along important waterways, bypassing the countryside and sacking monasteries and towns on both banks. They moved up as long as the river remained navigable or until they encountered fortifications that prevented further progress. Then they anchored or dragged the ships ashore, fenced them with a palisade and left a guard, after which they began to plunder the surrounding area. At first, when enemy troops appeared, they returned to the ships and went downstream. Later they became bolder. But since their forces were small and their main goal was plunder, they avoided major battles. Over time, they began to build fortified points, to which they often returned. These palisaded and moated coastal or even floating camps, defended by Viking battle axes, were extremely difficult to capture.

When the Vikings began their invasions they were probably poorly armed. One of the main goals of their robberies was the extraction of weapons and armor, and by the middle of the 9th century. they captured a lot of both, and also mastered their production themselves. Almost all Vikings had chain mail, and in other respects their armor was similar to Frankish armor. At first, the wooden shields were round, but later took on the shape of kites and were often painted in bright colors. A powerful offensive weapon was the battle axe. This was not a light tomahawk of the Franks, it was a powerful weapon - a heavy butt and a blade made of one piece of iron, mounted on an ax five feet long. Sometimes excerpts from runes were applied to the blades. In addition, the Vikings used short and long swords, spears, large bows and arrows.

The Vikings were primarily foot soldiers - preferring to use their large axes on foot. Mobility on land was achieved through the use of horses captured in the area for transport purposes. The most favorite battle formation was a solid wall of shields, such tactics were necessarily defensive, because they had to confront cavalry on foot. Usually they chose their camp, the opposite bank of the river or a steep hillside as the battlefield. Being professional warriors who feel the shoulder of a comrade in arms, they always prevailed over the hastily recruited villagers who opposed them. All Vikings were tall and had exceptional physical strength. In their ranks were two particularly fearsome types of warriors. The first included berserkers, who, surprisingly, apparently belonged to the category of specially selected madmen, distinguished by extraordinary strength and ferocity. Others, and equally surprising, were the "shield maidens"; one of them was Vebjorg, who “fought the champion Soknarsoti. She dealt him powerful blows, slapping him in the face and splitting his jaw. He put his beard in his mouth to protect himself. Vebjorg performed many great feats, (but) in the end she fell, covered with many wounds."

By the end of the 9th century, the Franks and English began to adapt to Viking tactics. In the preceding years of chaos, feudalism had developed rapidly, and the Franks were now able to assemble large forces of combat-ready cavalry. In 885 - 886 Paris successfully withstood a major Viking siege. And in England, Alfred the Great (died in 899), in order to stop the Danish Vikings, created a system of powerful fortifications. However, instead of cavalry, he relied on elite heavy infantry troops, which distinguished themselves with victories at Ashdown and Edington. He also, unlike the Franks, took steps to create a powerful fleet modeled on the ships of his enemies, the Vikings. From the time of Alfred until the middle of the 20th century. England always had a powerful naval force that could be relied upon.

And the annexation of England by Canute in 1016 was a political event, not a military one. By that time, Western Europe, finally free from 750 years of incessant barbarian raids, was already breathing easier.

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