Commander of the Western Front at the beginning of the war. V.A.Semidetko

CONFERENCE

THE WESTERN FRONT IN THE INITIAL PERIOD OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR. NEW DOCUMENTS
Strategic defensive operation in Belarus June 22 - July 9, 1941

Behind last years in the country, in scientific world, certain changes have occurred. New scientific works were published, dissertations were developed and defended, documents and materials on the eve and beginning of the Great Patriotic War were published in newspapers and magazines.

All of them carry various information: from the publication of genuine documents, sometimes even classified as classified, written on the basis of documentary sources of the works of historians, to books and articles full of unfounded and far-fetched judgments, and even falsifications and forgeries. The latter causes bewilderment, sadness and fear: publications, books, brochures, articles, “documentary films” that historically incorrectly and distortively cover the initial period of the Great Patriotic War are produced and reach the reader and viewer much more than works based on a scientific basis .

In this regard, the topic we put in the title attracts special attention. We will try to consider it, relying on the latest research by Russian historians and new data from domestic archives.

The author would like to dwell on the following issues: “Strategic defensive operation in Belarus”, definition of its content, chronological framework, combat and numerical strength of the opposing armies, conduct of hostilities, results of the operation, losses of the parties, results and conclusions. This material will be published in the 5th volume of the Military Encyclopedia, developed by the Encyclopedic Directorate of the Institute of Military History, as well as in the work being prepared there, “Strategic Operations of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. Book I. Summer-Autumn Campaign of 1941.”, 7 -th issue of the "Military Historical Journal". It is presented to your attention for the first time.

Strategic defensive operation in Belarus was carried out by troops of the Western Front with the participation of the Pinsk military flotilla in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, is an integral part of the summer-autumn campaign of 1941 and covers military events the first eighteen days of the war from June 22 to July 9.

The purpose of the operation was to repel the invasion of Nazi troops in the western strategic direction and create conditions for the mobilization, deployment of the main forces of the Red Army and their transition to a decisive counteroffensive.

The Western direction, which was one of the main ones even during the preparation for the war against the USSR, as well as after the attack on our country, was given exclusively great importance. The “Barbarossa Plan” provided for the main efforts to be concentrated north of the Pripyat marshes. Therefore, the enemy attached paramount importance to the attack on this shortest direction, leading through Minsk and Smolensk to Moscow.

The German command took into account that the outcome of the first battles would largely determine the subsequent development of military events. Therefore, it sought at all costs to achieve the defeat of Soviet troops in Belarus, primarily in the Bialystok bulge.

The enemy was aware that the retention by the troops of the Western Special Military District of the Bialystok bulge, which jutted deep to the west, could slow down the actions of its troops intended both for the offensive in the Baltic states and in Ukraine. The group of Soviet troops located in the Bialystok ledge could strike both the flanks and the rear of the advancing German troops in the Baltic and Ukrainian directions and disrupt the implementation of the enemy’s plans at the very beginning of the war. It was important for the German command not to give our troops such an opportunity. In addition, and this was the main reason, it believed that by delivering two strikes in converging directions from the Suwalki salient and from the Brest area, it was possible to encircle and then destroy the main forces of the Western Special Military District. Planning a quick defeat of the Soviet troops in Belarus, the Nazis hoped that by solving this problem, they would open the way for the unhindered advance of their armies to Smolensk and, thereby, achieve the most important strategic success in the Moscow direction.

The encirclement and liquidation of Soviet troops in the Bialystok ledge and in the Minsk direction, as well as the development of the offensive on Smolensk and its subsequent advance towards Moscow, was entrusted to Army Group Center(commander Field Marshal F. von Bock). In addition to two field armies (4th and 9th), it included two tank groups (2nd and 3rd) (five motorized corps), i.e. as many mobile formations as there were in Army Groups “North” and “South” combined.

Army Group Center on June 21 was deployed on an area of ​​550 km from Goldap to Wlodawa and included 50 divisions and two brigades. A total of 51 crew divisions, incl. 31 infantry, 9 tank, 6 motorized, 1 cavalry, 3 security and two motorized brigades (1 motorized and motorized SS regiment "Gross Germany"). Army Group Center had 6 infantry divisions in reserve. The armies of this group were reinforced with significant resources from the reserve of the main command. ground forces. They were given a large number of artillery battalions, sapper and construction battalions, pontoon-bridge parks and various parts special purpose. For aviation support of the actions of Army Group "Center" was allocated 2nd Air Fleet(Field Marshal A. Kesselring), who had 1677 aircraft in his air formations.

The concept of Operation Army Group Center was to attack with two large attack groups on the flanks, split the Soviet troops in Belarus, encircle and destroy them between Bialystok and Minsk and further advance to the Smolensk region to create the preconditions for the interaction of mobile forces with Army Group North with the aim of destroying Soviet troops in the Baltic states and in the Leningrad region.

Strike force consisting of the 3rd Tank Group and the 9th Army was concentrated and deployed in the Suwalki salient and in the section from Augustow to Ostroleka with a total length of 270 km. It had the task of breaking through the defenses of Soviet troops northwest of Grodno, rapidly advancing to Minsk and, in cooperation with the southern strike group, destroying Soviet troops between Bialystok and Minsk. In the future, this strike force was supposed to reach the area of ​​Vitebsk, Polotsk and further north in order to prevent the concentration of Soviet troops in the upper reaches of the river. Zap. Dvina and create conditions for subsequent actions of Army Group Center.

Strike force consisting of the 2nd Tank Group and the main forces of the 4th Army was concentrated and deployed from Ostroleka to the southeast and further along the Western Bug to Wlodawa on a section with a total length of 280 km. The group had the task of breaking through the defenses of Soviet troops in the Brest area, quickly advancing with tank formations to Minsk and, in cooperation with the northern strike group, destroying Soviet troops west of Minsk. Subsequently, advancing on Smolensk, the 2nd Tank Group and the 4th Army were supposed to capture the Smolensk area and to the south, prevent the concentration of Soviet troops in the area of ​​the upper Dnieper and thereby create conditions for the subsequent offensive of Army Group Center.

Overall depth of operational location Nazi troops ranged from 15 km in the auxiliary (Bialystok) direction to 120 km in the attack directions of Army Group Center. The latter was created with the expectation of delivering two simultaneous strikes: in the Suwalki-Minsk and in the Brest-Baranovichi directions.

The entire 3rd Tank Group (2 army and 2 motorized corps, consisting of 5 infantry, 4 tank, 2 motorized divisions) and two army corps of the 9th Army were deployed against the troops of the 11th Army of the Baltic Special military district (until June 25, the 3rd Tank Group was advancing in the North-Western Front zone and therefore at the beginning of the operation it was not included in the tables for calculating forces and means, but is considered to have been introduced during combat operations).

The remaining forces of Army Group Center were targeted for an offensive in the Western Special Military District.

The 3rd and 2nd Tank Groups were located on the flanks of Army Group Center, where its strike groups were created. Four of the five motorized corps were in the first echelon of strike forces.

This deployment of troops of Army Group Center was in accordance with the operational plans of the Hitlerite command. IN Directive No. 21 ("Plan Barbarossa") The German High Command noted that this army group “must advance with especially strong tank and motorized formations from the Warsaw area and north of it and split the enemy forces in Belarus.”

When performing the nearest task, German troops of Army Group Center had tasks: number of main attacks - 3, secondary - 1, auxiliary - 1, the depth of the group’s immediate task was from 130 to 350 km, the further - 670 km, the width of the offensive front at the beginning of the operation was 550 km, the offensive front of the main groups was up to 115 km, the total number of divisions in the offensive is 51, of which 31 are infantry, 9 tank, 6 motorized, 1 cavalry, 3 security, one motorized brigade and a motorized SS regiment.

The number of divisions of the main group was 44.5, of which 15.5 were tank and motorized. In the group there were 820 thousand people, the total number of tanks and assault guns - 1765, guns and mortars (excluding 50 mm mortars) - 14390, aircraft - 1677 (bombers - 980, fighters - 530, reconnaissance aircraft - 167). Average operational density There were 7.5 divisions per 1 km of front.

Specifically for tank groups and field armies, immediate and future tasks were distributed as follows:

3rd Panzer Group in cooperation with the troops of the 9th Army, break through the defenses of the Soviet troops northeast of Suwalki and, developing an offensive through Vilnius, reach the Minsk region. The directions of the main attacks are 1, the secondary ones are 1, the depth of the immediate task is 270 km, the further one is 210 km, the width of the offensive front at the beginning of the operation is 35 km, the offensive front of the main group is 35 km. The total number of attacking divisions is 11, of which: infantry - 4, tank - 4, motorized - 3. A total of tanks and assault guns - 955, guns and mortars (without 50 mm mortars) - 3627, supported by more than 600 aircraft 2- th air fleet. The average operational density was 5.5 divisions per 1 km of front, with more than 200 tanks advancing in the direction of the main attack.

The 9th Army would advance with part of its forces after the 3rd Tank Group, consolidate its success, and with the rest of its forces advance in the directions of Lida and Grodno with the task of dismembering and destroying the encircled Soviet troops. The immediate task was from 130 to 190 km, the further task was 270 km, the offensive front at the beginning of the operation was from 32 to 60 km, the total number of divisions in the offensive was 9.5, of which 8 were infantry, 1 security and 1 motorized brigade. Supported (without 50 mm mortars) - 4865 guns.

2nd Panzer Group together with infantry formations, break through the border fortifications north-west and south of Brest and, developing an offensive in the general direction towards Kobrin, Baranovichi, Minsk, connect in the Minsk region with the 3rd tank group and thereby complete the encirclement of the bulk of the troops in Belarus. Directions of the main attacks - 2, auxiliary - 1, the depth of the immediate task is up to 350 km, the further - up to 320 km, the width of the offensive front at the beginning of the operation was up to 105 km, the offensive front of the main groups was up to 75 km, the total number of divisions in the offensive - 16 ,5 of them: infantry - 7, tank - 5, motorized - 3, cavalry - 1 and motorized brigade - 1. The total number of divisions of the main group is 15.5, of which tank - 8.5. A total of 810 tanks and assault guns, 4,737 guns and mortars (without 50 mm mortars), supported up to 1,000 aircraft of the 2nd Air Fleet. The average operational density was 5 divisions per 1 km of front, with more than 170 tanks advancing in the direction of the main attack.

The 4th Army, part of the forces of the army corps, will advance behind the motorized corps of the 2nd Tank Group, consolidating their success, and the main forces will advance in a north-eastern direction towards Bialystok and Volkovysk in order to dismember the Soviet troops in the Bialystok ledge and in cooperation with the troops of the 9th Army. th army to eliminate them. The depth of the immediate task was up to 240 km, the further one - up to 290 km, the width of the offensive front at the beginning of the operation was up to 145 km, the offensive front of the main groups ranged from 3 to 12 km, the total number of divisions in the offensive was 13, of which: infantry - 12 , security - 1. The total number of divisions of the main group is 14.

Directly in the ZapOVO strip(without the 3rd Panzer Group), there were 39 divisions, a motorized brigade and a motorized SS regiment "Great Germany", (considering that a brigade and a motorized regiment are taken as half a division, this results in 40 estimated divisions), a brigade of 6-barrel mortars. In total, in the ZapOVO zone there were 2 field (4th and 9th) armies, 1 tank (2nd) group, 13 corps (rifle - 10, motorized - 3), 40 crew divisions, including: infantry divisions - 27, tank - 5, motorized - 3, cavalry - 1, security - 3, motorized brigades - 1, motorized SS regiment "Greater Germany". This grouping was deployed on the territory of Poland in an area of ​​470 km from the town of Goldap to the town of Wlodawa and included: up to 635 thousand people, guns and mortars (without 50 mm mortars) - 10,763, over 810 tanks and assault guns . From the air, the ground forces of Army Group Center were supported by squadrons of the 2nd Air Fleet consisting of the 2nd and 8th Air Corps. In total, as of June 22, the 2nd Air Fleet had 1,367 aircraft, of which 994 were combat-ready. The ground forces of Army Group Center were subordinated to 224 aircraft, of which 200 aircraft were combat-ready. In total, Army Group Center in the ground forces and in the 2nd Air Fleet together had 1611 aircraft, incl. 1194 combat ready. For the German command, this direction was the main one in Operation Barbarossa, and therefore Army Group Center was the strongest on the entire Eastern Front. 40.2% of all divisions deployed from the Barents to the Black Sea were concentrated here (including 42.8% motorized and 52.9% tank) 1 .

Army Group Center was supposed to carry out a double envelopment of the troops of the Western District, located in the Bialystok ledge, with a strike from Suwalki and Brest to Minsk, after which it would reach the Smolensk area and create “the preconditions for the interaction of large tank and motorized forces with Army Group North.” with the aim of destroying enemy troops in the Baltic states and in the Leningrad region" 2. Therefore, the main forces of the army group were deployed on the flanks. The main blow was delivered south of Brest.

According to the plan, after capturing Minsk, Army Group Center was supposed to quickly advance to the line of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers from Drissa to the mouth of the Sozh, force these water obstacles on the move and continue a further offensive on Smolensk. At the same time, the 3rd Tank Group and the 9th Army were entrusted with the task of advancing in the north-east direction and capturing the Polotsk-Vitebsk region, and the 2nd Tank Group and the 4th Army were entrusted with developing the offensive towards Smolensk. After the capture of Smolensk, the 3rd Tank Group was intended for a joint offensive with Army Group North in the Leningrad direction.

Divisions of the 8th, 20th and part of the forces of the 42nd Corps of the 9th deployed against our 3rd Army German army.

Most of the divisions of the 42nd Corps of the 9th Army, the 7th, 9th Corps and one division of the 13th Corps of the 4th German Army were deployed against the 10th Army of the Western Special Military District.

Units of the 43rd Corps of the 4th German Army and the 2nd Tank Group (47th, 24th, 46th Mechanized Corps and 12th Army Corps) were deployed against our 4th Army. In this sector, the Germans were able to achieve significant superiority.

To enhance the power of the initial strike against the ZAPOVO troops, the command of Army Group Center concentrated the bulk of troops and military equipment in the first operational echelon, which included 28 divisions, incl. infantry - 22, tank - 4, cavalry - 1, security - 1. In defense breakthrough areas high operational densities troops (the average operational density was about 10 km per division, and in the direction of the main attack up to 5 - 6 km). This allowed the enemy to deliver a powerful initial blow and achieve a significant numerical superiority in forces and means over the Soviet troops. This was expressed in the fact that the enemy's superiority in manpower in the main direction was 6.5 times, in the number of tanks - 1.8 times, in the number of guns and mortars - 3.3 times.

The analysis shows that in terms of personnel, the enemy outnumbered the Soviet troops on average by 2.5 times; in terms of tanks, aircraft, guns and mortars, the superiority was on the Soviet side. However in the direction of the main attack in the 4th Army zone, the German superiority was overwhelming.

In the second tier Army Group Center had 11 divisions, incl. infantry - 5, motorized - 3, tank - 1, security - 1, motorized brigade and SS motorized regiment "Greater Germany".

There was one security division in reserve. In the period from June 20 to July 3, it was planned to transfer 6 more infantry divisions from the OKH reserve, but they are not included in the calculation, because will arrive after June 22, were on the way at the time of counting and will be counted as having arrived during the operation.

Western Special Military District (ZapOVO)(Commander General of the Army D.G. Pavlov) covered the direction from the southern border of the Lithuanian SSR to the northern border of Ukraine (Vlodawa), having the task of preventing the enemy from invading the territory of the district, and with the stubborn defense of fortified areas along the state border to cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of troops districts. To cover the 470 km long state border, the district had 3 covering armies in the first echelon - the 3rd, 10th, and 4th. The 13th Army was being formed in the rear of the district. The Pinsk military flotilla (commander Rear Admiral D.D. Rogachev) was promptly subordinated to the district commander. The district headquarters was located in Minsk.

The defense was based on the persistent retention of fortified areas and field fortifications along the state border. The direction of concentration of the main efforts in defense was determined in the following directions: Suwalki, Lida; Suwalki, Bialystok; from the front: Ostrolenka, Malkina-Gurna to Bialystok; Siedlce, Volkovysk; Brest, Baranovichi. According to the plan, the defense was supposed to be active. In the event of an enemy penetration, all defending troops and reserves had to be prepared, on the instructions of the High Command, to launch rapid counter-strikes in order to defeat enemy groups, transfer hostilities to its territory and capture advantageous positions. Based on this task, a group of forces and means was created and prepared, and the territory of the district was equipped. Options for action by the district troops were developed in detail, taking into account the expected directions of the enemy’s attack. A strong offensive group of troops was created in the Bialystok bulge, which included the main forces of the first echelon of the ZapOVO (19 divisions out of 26, including all tank divisions), ready to deliver a crushing retaliatory blow in the event of an enemy attack in accordance with the plan for covering the state border. Most of them were part of the 10th Army, concentrated in the central part of the ZapOVO in the Bialystok bulge.

In terms of cover, 5 options for troop action were carefully developed in the event of an enemy breakthrough through army defense areas. At the same time, first of all, the efforts of the mechanized corps were coordinated with the infantry, artillery, anti-tank brigades and aviation in directions and boundaries (regions).

Directly at the disposal of the district command as reserves were 18 divisions (including 12 rifle, 4 tank, 2 motorized divisions), 3 airborne brigades, 4 fortified areas (UR), 1 artillery-anti-tank brigade, 2 brigades Air defense and a number of individual units.

In total, ZapOVO as part of the ground forces had 44 divisions (including 12 tank, 6 motorized, 3 airborne, 3 artillery brigades, 8 URs, 8 aviation divisions, 2 air defense brigades and other units). ZAPOVO can be described as one of the strongest military districts in the Red Army. In terms of its composition, it was second only to the Kyiv Special Military District. In ZapOVO, together with the Pinsk military flotilla, there were: over 673 thousand personnel, over 14 thousand guns and mortars, about 2900 tanks (of which 2189 were serviceable, including 383 new), 1909 aircraft (of which 1549 were serviceable). This constituted a quarter of the troops concentrated in the western districts. The Pinsk military flotilla included 31 boats, 7 monitors, 4 gunboats, an air squadron (10 aircraft), an anti-aircraft artillery division and a company of marines. In addition, on the territory of Belarus there were 11 border detachments, which numbered 19,519 people. 3 Belarusian Border District and a regiment of operational troops of the NKVD. At the same time, the old state border was guarded, where there was a border barrier zone - 5 border detachments served in it.

IN first echelon of covering armies At a distance of up to 50 km from the state border, 13 divisions were located (12 rifle and 1 cavalry division), the operational density reached 30 - 35 km per division. They were located in areas 15 - 40 km from the border. The remaining 13 divisions (8 tank, 4 motorized, 1 cavalry) were in the second echelons of the covering armies.

Mechanized corps, comprising second echelon of covering armies, were located 50-100 km from the border.

In the ZapOVO reserve (100 - 400 km from the border) there were 18 more divisions, of which 12 rifle and 4 tank, 2 motorized divisions and 4 SD on the old state border. Of this number, 12 divisions did not complete mobilization, and the two newly formed mechanized corps were almost without tanks, with a small number of small arms and were completely unstructured.

The depth of defense was: armies 50 - 75 km, districts 100 - 150 km. Average operational density consisted of a 47 km division of the 1st echelon. Operational Density troops amounted to 30 - 37 km per division.

Troops of the 1st and 2nd echelons of the covering armies occupied permanent deployment points. The front formations were not fully equipped, although in absolute terms the superiority in tanks and aircraft was on the Soviet side. Many Soviet tanks were outdated and faulty; produced back in the 30s, they had not only thin armor and weak weapons, but also a small reserve of engine life. In the first hours of the war, the enemy used artillery and aviation to destroy a significant amount of equipment that had not even entered into battle. Near the border, a few units and units were engaged in the construction of fortifications.

Alerted on the morning of June 22, the district troops found themselves under attack from ground and air force enemy. The forward formations of the 3rd, 10th and 4th armies, not having time to occupy the defensive lines provided for by the plan, were forced to engage in oncoming battles and battles on the move when advancing to cover areas, separately, in parts, without proper operational formation, under continuous strikes by enemy aircraft, and conduct defensive battles in unprepared positions. As a result, troop control was largely paralyzed.

Enemy strike groups, as envisaged by the plan of Hitler’s command, launched an offensive on the flanks of the Bialystok bulge from areas west of Grodno and south of Brest. The right flank of the 3rd Army of General V.I. Kuznetsov was open. In a strip 40 km wide against 3 infantry divisions of the 8th Army Corps of the Germans, one 56th Infantry Division of Major General S.P. Sakhnov was forced to enter into battle.

A difficult situation also developed on the left wing of the Western Front. In the Brest-Baranovichi direction on a 100-kilometer section, where the defense was poorly equipped and did not have time to move out Brest Fortress The 6th, 42nd, right-flank 49th and left-flank 75th rifle divisions of the 4th Army of General A.A. Korobkov, 16 German divisions were advancing, including 5 tank divisions.

Unable to withstand the onslaught of superior enemy forces, the troops of the 4th Army (42nd and 6th Rifle Divisions) were forced to retreat. By the end of June 22, the Pinsk military flotilla advanced to the Kobrin area, but was unable to establish contact either with the headquarters of the 4th Army or with the formations of the 28th Rifle Corps. On the first day of the war, the enemy managed to advance 60 km in the Brest-Baranovichi direction and occupy Kobrin.

From the first days of the war until the 20th of July, for almost a month, being completely surrounded, the defenders repelled the fierce attacks of the enemy Brest Fortress, where the enemy had a 10-fold superiority in forces.

On the very first day of the war, June 22, 26 Soviet airfields, where the most combat-ready aviation regiments were based, were subjected to massive air raids. Having inflicted great damage on our aviation, the enemy seized air supremacy. During the first day of fighting, the Western Front Air Force lost 738 aircraft, of which 528 aircraft were on the ground, which amounted to about 40% of the Western Front's aircraft fleet or 63.7% of all aviation losses on the Soviet-German front on June 22. Having learned about this, the commander of the Air Force of the Western Front, Hero of the Soviet Union, holder of 2 Orders of Lenin and the Order of the Red Banner, Major General Ivan Ivanovich Kopets shot himself.

During June 22, the enemy landed several tactical airborne assault forces in the rear of the Western Front, which caused great damage to rear services and disrupted communications.

By the end of the first day, the enemy strike groups had advanced 35 km, and in some directions up to 70 km. There was a threat of deep envelopment of both wings of the Western Front by enemy tank formations. The troops of the 10th Army operating in the center of the front were under threat of encirclement.

The situation was aggravated by the fact that the front command lost control of the troops. Communication with armies and divisions was systematically disrupted. The fighting, based on fortified areas, was focal in nature. Trying to turn the tide of events, the Soviet command on the evening of June 22 set a task for the front troops: to launch a counterattack with combined arms armies and mechanized corps, with the support of front-line and long-range bomber aviation, and by the end of June 24 to encircle and defeat the invading enemy in the Suwalki area. Moreover, the main attention was focused on the destruction of the infantry formations that had broken through in the Grodno area, followed by an attack on the flank of the Suvalka group of Germans.

Counterattack of the right wing of the Western Front, carried out in accordance with Headquarters Directive No. 03, did not bring the expected result. The scattered nature of the allocated formations involved in defensive battles, the limited time to prepare for offensive actions and organize interaction, the lack of reliable means of communication for control - all this did not allow the troops to be gathered into a single fist in a short time.

On June 23 and 24, bloody battles took place in the Grodno region, in which both sides suffered heavy losses. After the capture of Grodno by the Germans on June 24, the front commander clarified the task of Boldin’s group (6, 11 mk, 36 cd) and the 3rd Army. They were ordered to capture the city and advance 70 km. However, this task did not take into account the real situation. Although Boldin’s group managed to pin down significant enemy forces in the Grodno region for two days and inflict significant damage on them, they failed to capture the city. The counterattack somewhat eased the position of the 3rd Army. The enemy's offensive was delayed. In some areas, German troops were thrown back. However, it was not possible to develop the success. The command of Army Group Center transferred two additional army corps from the reserve and turned back some units of the 3rd Panzer Group of G. Hoth. Enemy aircraft, having seized the initiative in the air, continuously bombed the battle formations of the Soviet troops. Mechanized corps were forced to blow up or burn dozens of damaged tanks on the battlefield, without being able to evacuate them, so that they would not fall to the enemy. To avoid encirclement, the 3rd Army retreated beyond the Neman.

Did not bring noticeable success and was hastily organized counterattack of the 14th mechanized corps of the 4th army on the left wing of the Western Front. The position of the 4th Army, especially in the center, was becoming critical. The gap with the troops of the North-Western Front on the right wing, where the tank group of G. Hoth rushed, and the difficult situation on the left wing, where the 4th Army was retreating, created a threat of deep coverage of the entire Bialystok group from both the north and the south. The commander of the Western Front, General D.G. Pavlov, decided to strengthen the 4th Army with the 47th Rifle Corps, while at the same time the 17th Mechanized Corps was transferred from the front reserve to the river. Sharu to create a defense there. However, it was not possible to create a strong defense along the river. Enemy tank divisions crossed the river. Sharu and on June 25 approached Baranovichi.

By the end of June 23, the Pinsk military flotilla was dispersed along the waterways east and west of Pinsk, but could not establish contact with anyone.

The position of the troops on the Western Front became increasingly critical. Of particular concern was the northern wing, where an uncovered gap of 130 km formed. The front troops were unable to delay the enemy in the border zone and eliminate his deep breakthroughs. Enemy strike groups bypassed the flanks of the 3rd and 10th armies, creating for them real threat environment. Under the onslaught of the enemy, the troops were forced to retreat, fighting rearguard battles.

By the end of the fourth day of the war, tank formations of Army Group Center had advanced deep into Soviet territory up to 200 - 250 km. As a result, more than 60 front-line warehouses and bases with property and weapons, located in a zone from 30 to 100 km from the state border, were either blown up and burned, or abandoned. The front lost from 50 to 90% of the reserves of fuel, ammunition, clothing and armored equipment, and food fodder created in peacetime 4 . This led to the fact that already in the first days of the war there was not enough combat equipment and food both to supply the troops at the front and for the newly formed units and formations.

Soviet troops, holding back the enemy's onslaught, suffered heavy losses. Taking into account the complexity of the situation, the Headquarters of the High Command on June 25 decided to create a defensive line in the rear of the Western Front and to concentrate on this line the Army Group of the Reserve of the High Command (19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd) led by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. .Budyonny. The reserve armies received the task by the end of June 28 to occupy and firmly hold the defense on the line Kraslava - Disna - Polotsk UR - Vitebsk - Orsha - r. Dnieper to Loev, to prevent an enemy breakthrough. Front aviation was strengthened. The front received 2 aviation divisions from the internal districts; until July 9, 452 aircraft with crews also arrived in aviation units and formations. In the interests of the front troops, the 3rd Long-Range Bomber Aviation Corps was brought in.

On June 25, the Headquarters of the High Command ordered Army General D.G. Pavlov to urgently withdraw troops from the Bialystok ledge to the line of fortified areas of the old border. But it was already too late. By the time the directive was received, the troops of the 3rd and 10th armies were already in a semicircle of encirclement. To retreat to Minsk, a narrow corridor no more than 60 km wide remained between the cities of Skidel and Volkovysk, which was under enemy control.

On June 26 - 27, the forward detachments of the 2nd and 3rd tank groups of German troops, striking in converging directions, broke through to the outskirts of Minsk.

Defensive battle near Minsk lasted 4 days.

On June 25, fighting broke out in the Minsk fortified area. Here the enemy lost more than 100 tanks in one day. On June 28, German strike forces broke through to Minsk and captured the city. The retreat routes of eleven Soviet divisions were cut off. West of Minsk, six divisions of the 3rd and 10th armies, three of the 13th army, 2 of front-line subordination and the remnants of other units and formations of the front found themselves in the enemy ring.

On June 30, for loss of command and control of the troops, General D.G. Pavlov was removed from his post, and Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko was appointed in his place. On July 2, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko was appointed commander of the Western Front.

During these days, the Pinsk military flotilla retreated to the Luninets, Mozyr area.

On July 3, the tank divisions of the enemy's 3rd and 2nd tank groups quickly launched an offensive to the east and northeast to the Dnieper and Western Dvina with the task of immediately capturing bridges and crossings on these rivers. Meanwhile, the main forces of the army corps of the enemy's 4th Army were deployed to fight Soviet troops surrounded west of Minsk. Here, the units cut off from the command, deprived of centralized control, supplies and communications, did not lay down their arms and fought stubborn battles behind enemy lines. Outside the encirclement ring, 16 bloodless divisions held back the formations of the 3rd and 2nd German tanks y groups The defeat of the troops of the Western Front led to a breakthrough of the strategic front in the Minsk direction, where a huge gap more than 400 km wide opened in the defense of the Soviet troops. Neither the command of the Western Front nor the five Marshals of the Soviet Union (B.M. Shaposhnikov, G.I. Kulik, K.E. Voroshilov, S.K. Timoshenko and S.M. Budyonny), who arrived here by Stalin’s decision, could correctly assess the situation and appropriately manage available forces. Following them, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, L.Z. Mekhlis, arrived with a special punitive task.

By July 4, the Supreme High Command Headquarters transferred another 4 armies to the Western Front, and now 7 armies began to operate as part of the front. Preparation for defensive actions at the border of the river. Zap. The Dvina and Dnieper were fought in difficult conditions. Many formations and units of the 19th, 20th, and 21st armies (13 divisions) were only approaching the front. By the time the Nazi troops reached the river. Zap. The reserves that arrived here on the Dvina and Dnieper did not have time to concentrate, create defensive positions, and deploy troops in the required battle formation. There were 24 divisions in the first echelons of the armies. They hastily dug trenches and created anti-tank barriers. The defense was prepared in wide bands: from 35 to 70 km per division. In preparation for combat operations, the weak material and technical support of the troops had a negative impact. Units and formations were not fully equipped with personnel, weapons and military equipment. The divisions of the first echelons of the armies had only 145 tanks. The front had only 3,800 guns and mortars, 501 aircraft (of which only 389 were serviceable). 5

The German high command was also in a hurry, wanting to take advantage of the favorable situation that had developed in the western strategic direction and speed up the attack on Moscow. In order to increase the penetrating power of the tank forces, which suffered heavy losses in the first days of the war, and to speed up their offensive, on July 3, the 2nd and 3rd tank groups were united into the 4th Panzer Army, which was led by Field Marshal G. von Kluge. The 4th Field Army was disbanded. Its infantry units were transferred to the 2nd Army, which arrived here from the reserve of the main headquarters of the ground forces (OKH), Colonel General M. von Weichs.

Along with the reorganization, Army Group Center was reinforced with troops. If at the beginning of the war it had over 50 divisions (counting the 3rd tank group), then in early July - 63, of which 28 (12 infantry, 9 tank, 6 motorized and 1 cavalry) were advancing in the first echelon and 35 infantry divisions - in the second. In particular, 10 infantry divisions arrived here from the OKH reserve; 2 infantry divisions were transferred from Army Group North, and a cavalry brigade from Germany 6. The enemy's superiority in manpower and military equipment became overwhelming.

At the beginning of July, stubborn battles broke out in the Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruisk directions. On July 4, the Military Council of the Western Front set a task for the troops: to firmly defend the line of the Polotsk fortified area, the line of the river. Zap. Dvina - Senno - Orsha and further along the river. Dnieper, prevent the enemy from breaking through.

The greatest threat to the Western Front was the Berezino-Mogilev direction, where formations of the 2nd Tank Group were advancing.

From July 1 to July 3, three German tank divisions, with air support, crossed the river. Berezina on a section of 80 km between the towns of Berezino and Bobruisk and began to develop an offensive towards Mogilev. Hitler's command hoped that, having broken through the defenses on the Berezina, Guderian's tank group would reach the Dnieper in one day, after which it would immediately seize crossings near the cities of Rogachev, Mogilev and Orsha. However, on the way to the Dnieper, fascist troops met fierce resistance. The fighting on the Bobruisk-Mogilev highway became stubborn.

The commander of the Western Front, in order to divert enemy forces from the Mogilev direction, ordered the 21st Army of General M.G. Efremov to launch a counterattack and defeat the enemy group in the area of ​​Bobruisk and Bykhov. Going on the offensive, units of the 21st Army crossed the Dnieper, liberated the cities of Zhlobin and Rogachev and, successfully advancing towards Bobruisk, penetrated the enemy’s position up to 30 km.

The attack of Soviet troops in the Bobruisk area, bypassing the enemy's Mogilev group from the west, alarmed the command of Army Group Center. To repel the offensive, it was forced to transfer significant forces - two army corps from the reserve of Army Group Center, and then two more infantry divisions. In total, during the counterattack, the 21st Army pinned down 8 German infantry divisions and inflicted serious damage on them. This significantly weakened the troops of the right wing of Army Group Center. The situation in the Mogilev direction, however, continued to remain very difficult.

In order to delay the German troops and gain time to organize defense, on July 6, the forces of the 5th and 7th mechanized corps launched a counterattack between Vitebsk and Orsha. On the first day of the offensive, the 5th Mechanized Corps reached the area of ​​​​Senno, advancing 30 - 40 km. Units of the 7th Mechanized Corps were also successful. The enemy suffered heavy losses and went on the defensive in this direction. Fierce fighting continued here for four days. The counterattack near Senno, combined with counterattacks by troops in other sectors, made it possible to delay the enemy’s offensive and create a defensive front along the river line by the end of July 9. Zap. Dvina and Dnieper. By the evening of July 9, formations of the German 4th Tank Army approached this line. Their attempts to immediately seize bridgeheads on the eastern bank of the Dnieper were unsuccessful.

Possessing an overwhelming superiority in forces and means, the fascist German troops of Army Group Center overcame the resistance of our advanced units in the Mogilev direction and on July 9 reached the main line of defense.

During the strategic defensive operation in Belarus (June 22 - July 9, 1941), Soviet soldiers showed the highest courage on the Western Front. 19 people were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Pilots of the Western Front carried out 8 air and ground rams on the first day of the war alone, and in the following days from June 23 to July 10 - 4 rams in the air and 6 on ground targets.

One of the first strategic defensive operations The Red Army, which later became known as the Belarusian Army, ended. In 18 days The troops of the Western Front suffered a crushing defeat. Of the 44 divisions that were originally part of the front, 24 were destroyed (rifle - 10, tank - 8, mechanized - 4, cavalry - 2), the remaining 20 divisions lost from 30% to 90% of their forces and assets. The front lost (captured by the enemy, blown up during the retreat by friendly troops, destroyed by enemy aircraft and for other reasons) 32 fuel depots out of 45 and all ammunition depots. The total losses of Soviet troops were: 417,729, and with the Pinsk military flotilla - 417,780 people. Of these: non-refundable - 341,073 people, sanitary - 76,717 people.

The front lost 9,427 guns and mortars, over 4,799 tanks and 1,797 aircraft. Despite this, the pilots of the Western Front destroyed 143 enemy aircraft on the first day of the war, and 708 during the entire defensive operation, which amounted to about 40% of the initial composition of the enemy’s 2nd Air Fleet. Leaving almost all of Belarus, the troops retreated to a depth of 450 to 600 km, creating the threat of a breakthrough on the move to Smolensk.

German losses amounted to about 40 thousand soldiers and officers. Considering that the fascist German troops lost over 100 thousand people in the initial period of the war, the Western Front accounted for 40% of the losses inflicted on the enemy. General F. Halder, on July 4, on the 13th day of the war, noted with concern that 50% of the regular number of combat vehicles remained in service in the 3rd Tank Group. General G. Guderian reported that by July 12, the 2nd Panzer Group had lost 6 thousand people, incl. 400 officers - most of them are commanders and chiefs.

Defensive operation in Belarus gave the first experience in preparing and conducting similar operations of the Great Patriotic War in conditions of limited time, dramatically changing conditions, the use of large masses of tanks, aviation, and a large number of airborne assault forces. Resistance on intermediate lines, counterattacks by mechanized corps and combined arms formations inflicted significant damage on Army Group Center and slowed down the pace of its advance, which made it possible for the Soviet command to deploy troops of the 2nd strategic echelon, which then delayed the advance of German troops into Battle of Smolensk 1941

Commanders of front troops. It was on their ability to manage large military groups that success or failure in operations, battles and engagements depended. The list includes all generals who permanently or temporarily held the position of front commander. 9 of the military leaders on the list died during the war.
1. Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny
Reserve (September-October 1941) North Caucasian (May-August 1942)

2. Ivan Khristoforovich (Hovhannes Khachaturovich) Bagramyan
1st Baltic (November 1943 - February 1945)
3rd Belorussian (April 19, 1945 - until the end of the war)
On June 24, 1945, I. Kh. Bagramyan led the combined regiment of the 1st Baltic Front at the Victory Parade on Red Square in Moscow.

3. Joseph Rodionovich Apanasenko
From January 1941, Commander of the Far Eastern Front; on February 22, 1941, I. R. Apanasenko was awarded military rank army General. During his command of the Far Eastern Front, he did a lot to strengthen the defense capability of the Soviet Far East.
In June 1943, I. R. Apanasenko, after numerous requests to be sent to the active army, was appointed deputy commander of the Voronezh Front. During the battles near Belgorod on August 5, 1943, he was mortally wounded during an enemy air raid and died on the same day.

4. Pavel Artemyevich Artemyev
Front of the Mozhaisk defense line (July 18-July 30, 1941)
Moscow Reserve Front (October 9-October 12, 1941)
Commanded the parade on Red Square on November 7, 1941. From October 1941 to October 1943, he was commander of the Moscow defense zone.


5. Ivan Aleksandrovich Bogdanov
Reserve Armies Front (July 14-July 25, 1941)
With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, he was appointed commander of the front of the reserve armies. Since November 1941, commander of the 39th Reserve Army in Torzhok, since December - deputy commander of the 39th Army of the Kalinin Front. In July 1942, after the evacuation of the commander of the 39th Army, Ivan Ivanovich Maslennikov, Ivan Aleksandrovich Bogdanov, who refused to evacuate, took over leadership of the army and led the breakthrough from encirclement. On July 16, 1942, while escaping from encirclement near the village of Krapivna, Kalinin Region, he was wounded. Having led 10,000 soldiers out of encirclement, he died in hospital on July 22 from his wounds.

6. Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky
3rd Belorussian (February-April 1945)


7. Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin
Voronezh (July 14-October 24, 1942)
South-West (October 25, 1942 - March 1943)
Voronezh (March - October 20, 1943)
1st Ukrainian (October 20, 1943 - February 29, 1944)
On February 29, 1944, N.F. Vatutin, together with his escort, went in two vehicles to the location of the 60th Army to check the progress of preparations for the next operation. As G.K. Zhukov recalled, upon entering one of the villages, “the cars came under fire from a UPA sabotage group. N.F. Vatutin jumped out of the car and, together with the officers, entered into a shootout, during which he was wounded in the thigh.” The seriously wounded military leader was taken by train to a Kiev hospital. The best doctors were summoned to Kyiv, among whom was the chief surgeon of the Red Army, N. N. Burdenko. Vatutin received a through wound to the thigh with bone fragmentation. Despite surgical intervention and the use of the latest penicillin during treatment, Vatutin developed gas gangrene. A council of doctors led by Professor Shamov proposed amputation as the only means of saving the wounded, but Vatutin refused. It was never possible to save Vatutin, and on April 15, 1944, he died in hospital from blood poisoning


8. Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov
Leningradsky (5-mid September 1941)

9. Leonid Aleksandrovich Govorov
Leningradsky (June 1942-May 1945)
2nd Baltic (February-March 1945)


10. Philip Ivanovich Golikov
Bryansky (April-July 1942)
Voronezh (October 1942 - March 1943)

11. Vasily Nikolaevich Gordov
Stalingrad (July 23-August 12, 1942)

12. Andrey Ivanovich Eremenko
Western (June 30-July 2, 1941 and July 19-29, 1941)
Bryansky (August-October 1941)
South-Eastern (August-September 1942)
Stalingrad (September-December 1942)
Yuzhny (January-February 1943)
Kalininsky (April-October 1943)
1st Baltic (October-November 1943)
2nd Baltic (April 1944 - February 1945)
4th Ukrainian (from March 1945 until the end of the war)


13. Mikhail Grigorievich Efremov
Central (7 August - end of August 1941)
From the evening of April 13, all contact with the headquarters of the 33rd Army was lost. The army ceases to exist as a single organism, and its individual parts make their way to the east in disparate groups. On April 19, 1942, in battle, Army Commander M. G. Efremov, who fought like a real hero, was seriously wounded (receiving three wounds) and, not wanting to be captured, when the situation became critical, he called his wife, who served as his medical instructor, and shot him dead. her and yourself. Along with him, the army artillery commander, Major General P. N. Ofrosimov, and almost the entire army headquarters died. Modern researchers note a high spirit of perseverance in the army. The body of M. G. Efremov was first found by the Germans, who, having deep respect for the courageous general, buried him with military honors in the village of Slobodka on April 19, 1942. The 268th Infantry Division of the 12th Army Corps recorded on the map the place of the general’s death; the report came to the Americans after the war and is still in the NARA archive. According to the testimony of Lieutenant General Yu. A. Ryabov (veteran of the 33rd Army), the body of the army commander was brought on poles, but the German general demanded that he be transferred to a stretcher. During the funeral, he ordered the prisoners from Efremov’s army to be put in front of German soldiers and said: “Fight for Germany the way Efremov fought for Russia”


14. Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov
Reserve (August-September 1941)
Leningradsky (mid-September-October 1941)
Western (October 1941-August 1942)
1st Ukrainian (March-May 1944)
1st Belorussian (from November 1944 until the end of the war)
On May 8, 1945 at 22:43 (May 9 0:43 Moscow time) in Karlshorst (Berlin) Zhukov accepted the unconditional surrender of the troops of Nazi Germany from Hitler’s Field Marshal General Wilhelm Keitel.

On June 24, 1945, Marshal Zhukov took part in the Victory Parade of the Soviet Union over Germany in the Great Patriotic War, which took place in Moscow on Red Square. The parade was commanded by Marshal Rokossovsky.

The encirclement of the main forces of the Western Front in the summer of 1941 is one of the greatest tragedies in the history of Russian weapons, ranking alongside the Battle of the Kalka River in 1223 or the death of Samsonov’s army in East Prussia in the summer of 1914. Yes, during the Great Patriotic War we had large losses, but this tragedy happened first, and it was it that largely determined the further unfavorable development of the situation on the entire Soviet-German front...

Recognized that the main blame for the fact that the German attack turned out to be unexpected for the covering troops of the western border districts and for the entire Red Army lies with the country's top leadership. But questions remain. The main one, in my opinion, is the following: where does the responsibility of Stalin and his inner circle end and the responsibility of the lower level - the front-line command - begin? The relevance of the issue is determined by the highest price paid for the mistakes made.

The country's leadership responded to the growing flow of reports about the gathering of German troops to the western borders of the USSR by partially calling up reserve military personnel. About 800 thousand people - out of 5 million planned in the event of full mobilization - joined the divisions of the western districts in May-June. On June 12, People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S.K. Tymoshenko signed directives on the advance to the border of rifle divisions located in the rear areas of the border districts. However, due to the lack of vehicles, they moved extremely slowly. By a Politburo resolution of June 21, 1941, the armies of the second strategic echelon, advancing from the depths of the country to the Dnieper-Western Dvina line, were united into the reserve group of the High Command - the 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd armies.

However, the advancing troops were not equipped with sufficient numbers of people and equipment, and arrived to the west in parts. The worst situation was with the readiness of the covering troops to repel sudden aggression. At the direction of I.V. Stalin, the commanders of the district troops were warned by G.K. Zhukov and S.K. Tymoshenko both about the need to increase vigilance and to avoid reasons for provocation. Any measures that could be interpreted by the Wehrmacht command as bringing Soviet troops to full combat readiness were suppressed by the Kremlin in the strictest possible manner.

The result is known. The troops of the Wehrmacht and its allies, brought into full combat readiness - about 4.4 million people, 4 thousand tanks, 4.4 thousand aircraft, were opposed in the west by a large number of tanks and aircraft - 11 thousand and 9.1 thousand, but not combat ready, a three-million-strong Soviet group that was at the stage of formation and did not have a plan for a deep defensive operation. Defense was presented to the Soviet command as a short-term phase of the initial period of hostilities...

Could the commanders of the troops of the border districts somehow influence the situation and thereby mitigate the tragic consequences of overinsurance and indecisiveness of the top leadership?

By the beginning of the war, the commander of the Western Special Military District, Army General D.G. The commands of the 3rd, 10th, 4th armies, located in close proximity to the border, and the 13th - in the rear area of ​​the district, were subordinate to Pavlov. 678 thousand people, more than 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2,200 tanks and more than 1.5 thousand aircraft. With approximate equality in aircraft, the district was inferior to Army Group Center in men and artillery, but was one and a half times superior in tanks. The 6th mechanized corps of General M. Khatskilevich was considered the most equipped armored formation in the Red Army - 1,022 tanks, of which 352 KV and T-34. However, the majority of tanks were obsolete T-26s and BTs.

Information about the deployment of an offensive group of the Wehrmacht on the other side of the border began to arrive at the headquarters of the Western Military District since the beginning of 1941. On June 4, the head of the intelligence department of the district headquarters, Colonel Blokhin, presented a special message to General Pavlov “On Germany’s preparation for war against the USSR.” As noted, in the second half of May the Germans strengthened their grouping by 2 - 3 infantry, two armored divisions and an SS division. The deployment of air defense and anti-tank weapons was observed at the border. It was established that the Germans were unloading a large number of trains with aerial bombs and gunpowder, and landing large aviation formations at airfields. The movement of the local population in the border zone was reduced to a minimum, and from many areas they were evicted to the “inland areas”. All civilian medical institutions in major cities and villages were turned into hospitals. Intelligence reported that “the hidden mobilization of officials for future positions in western regions of the USSR... In Czech Prague there are parachutist courses, for which members of the Belarusian committee from Warsaw are mobilized. At the beginning of hostilities, they will be thrown into the rear of Soviet Belarus to carry out sabotage missions..."

The following paragraph of the special message attracted attention: “On May 24, 1941, a branch of German intelligence in

The city of Ciechanów sent five agents to the territory of the USSR with the instruction to return no later than June 5, 1941. One of the agents said that he would not have time to return from Bialystok and Grodno by this date. The head of the intelligence post responded to this: after June 5, the outbreak of hostilities with the USSR is possible, so he cannot guarantee the life of the agent..." All agents received, among other things, the following tasks: to establish the percentage of former tsarist officers serving in the Red Army, and the mood of the population living in border areas.

Agent data confirmed that “the Polish population, based on the experience of preparing for Germany’s war with Poland in 1939, and the German soldiers, based on the existing experience of waging war, also consider the outbreak of hostilities with the USSR in the near future inevitable.”

The head of the intelligence department came to the conclusion: “Information about accelerated preparations for the theater and about strengthening the grouping of troops in the zone against ZapOVO deserves trust.”

It is clear that the Kremlin and the General Staff were informed. But how did Pavlov himself react to detailed information about German preparations for war? Materials prepared after the war help us answer this question, when the cases against generals Pavlov, Klimovsky, Korobkov and others began to be reviewed for the purpose of rehabilitation.

Here is what, for example, the former head of the operational department of the headquarters of the Western Military District, Major General B. Fomin, wrote:

“Pavlov carefully monitored the preparation of the theater of military operations... Field defensive lines with bunkers were created along the entire border. As for the levels, they were not built and armed at the beginning of the war. Carefully monitoring the deployment of enemy troops, Pavlov repeatedly raised a question with the People's Commissar of Defense about the redeployment of the district's troops from the depths to the border area... However, the 113th, 121st, 143rd and 50th rifle divisions did not have time to leave for the areas they planned and the war caught them on the march.. .

By the beginning of the war, the district's troops were in the stage of organizing measures. Five tank corps and an airborne corps were being formed... The supply of materiel was slow... The district's aviation was at the stage of training pilots on the new materiel that was arriving, but there were few retrained crews.

Pavlov knew about the Germans’ preparation for a surprise attack (our italics - M.M.) and asked to occupy field fortifications along the state border. June 20, 1941 in a code signed by the deputy. Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff Vasilevsky Pavlov was informed that his request was reported to the People's Commissar and the latter did not allow the occupation of field fortifications, since this could cause a provocation from the Germans..."

General Fomin did not see sabotage, much less betrayal, in Pavlov’s actions and deeds. In his opinion, the front failed for the following reasons: the numerical superiority of the enemy; surprise of attack; insufficient provision of air defense systems; the lack of reserves and a defensive line along the Shchara River at the front and the withdrawal of troops from it on the night from the first to the second day of the war, “as a result of which the enemy, having occupied it without hindrance, created conditions for the encirclement of the troops of the 3rd and 10th armies”; belated occupation of level lines along the old state border by troops

13th Army, illiterate intervention of Marshal G.I. sent by Stalin from Moscow. Kulik at the disposal of Deputy Front Commander I.V. Boldin and the commander of the 10th Army K.D. Golubev, “which led to the inglorious end of the front’s mobile group.”

In the note, Fomin also mentioned the former chief of staff of the front, Major General Klimovskikh, who, in his opinion, was distinguished by “great efficiency and honesty.” However, he noted that the chief of staff lacked “a sober assessment of the enemy and his capabilities. Klimovskikh did not believe that the enemy was able to plan his initial operation so far in advance and launch massive air strikes far into the depths.”

In conclusion, Fomin wrote that all the generals he listed, who were arrested and executed in the summer of 1941, “were cut off from command and control at the moment when, through their efforts, the pace of the enemy’s operation had already begun to fade, and command and control of the troops was being established.”

Fomin’s opinion is worthy of attention, but it, unfortunately, leaves out the question: if Pavlov knew that the Germans were preparing a “sudden” attack, what did he actually do - not in words, but in deeds - in order not to lose all your strength in the first days of the war?

Preserved a note from the former commander of the 3rd Army, Colonel General V.I. Kuznetsova. It said:

“All army commanders, including me, reported to Pavlov about the completely open preparation of the Germans for war. For example, we accurately established the concentration of large German forces in the Augustow forests southeast of Suwalki.

We also had anonymous letters in our hands, which indicated the approximate time of the Germans going on the offensive - June 21, 22, 23. Nevertheless, Pavlov, a few days before the start of the war, ordered all artillery to be sent to artillery firing several hundred kilometers from the front line..."

Further, Kuznetsov said that he considered incorrect the instructions of Marshal Kulik to organize a counterattack on June 24 by army units in the general direction of Grodno - Suwalki in order to provide the northern flank of the front strike group consisting of the 10th Army and the mechanized corps of Khatskilevich. The fact is that the corps then had only one and a half tanks of fuel, the front aviation was destroyed, the front flanks were open. According to Kuznetsov, the most reasonable would be a transition to a “mobile defense” and a counterattack on the rear of Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Group, which was quickly advancing towards Baranovichi from the southwest.

Kuznetsov did not see anything treacherous in the actions of Pavlov or the Klimovskys, but noted that they “simply failed to master and did not cope with the situation in the initial period of the war.”

Indeed, the opinion that Pavlov and his staff “did not master and cope with the situation” in the initial period of the war seems correct. But hardly anyone will undertake to prove the possibility of preventing the defeat of the troops of the Western Front even under another, more strong-willed or more experienced commander. However, it is obvious that the origins of the tragedy of the Western Front were laid in the pre-war period, and General Pavlov did not do everything possible to prevent the worst development of the combat scenario. One example of this is the case of the front artillery, which was withdrawn to the rear for firing just before the war. It can be assumed that Pavlov’s instincts failed him here, but one can also think about a certain negligence shown by the employees of the Western Military District headquarters.

The lack of appropriate demands on the part of the Western Military District command - just like the KVO command - is evident from the example of the construction of operational airfields in these districts. After all, it was precisely because of the lack of a sufficient number of landing sites that the aviation of the Western Front lost about 750 combat vehicles on the first day of the war, which amounted to about 60 percent of all our aircraft destroyed on June 22...

June 18 In 1941, the People's Commissar of Defense issued order No. 0039 "On the state of construction of operational airfields according to the main construction plan of 1941." It said: “The situation with the progress of the construction of operational airfields is shockingly bad. As of June 1 of this year, only 50 percent of the plan approved by me was covered by construction... Construction is especially poorly carried out in the KVO and Western Military District. The main reason is the lack of demands on the part of the district military councils , failure to take decisive and comprehensive measures to use all opportunities on the ground."

It is possible to challenge the accusations made in this document, signed, by the way, by S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov. It is interesting that his last point read: “no additional limits on fuel will be given,” therefore it is necessary to “involve horse-drawn transport and rakes more widely in the construction.” It is known that the commanders were catastrophically short of either the strength or the funds to build airfields, but it should be recognized that they were not responsible for peaceful construction and were not simple administrators. They were responsible for the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. We were talking about the combat effectiveness of aviation, which in case of war was supposed to cover the subordinate personnel and equipment with it... It is no coincidence, apparently, that General Pavlov’s losses in aviation turned out to be much higher than on neighboring fronts. Most of his planes were destroyed on the ground.

Nevertheless, it is hardly productive to compare the degree of competence of one or another commander in the pre-war period or at the beginning of the war. Determining whose mistakes were worse and who behaved more competently is very difficult. KVO - Southwestern Front- met the enemy invasion somewhat more organized than other districts, but it was the most powerful district in the Red Army. The Baltic Military District - the North-Western Front - also managed to retreat without such severe losses as there were on the Western Front, but a smaller group of Wehrmacht troops operated in the Baltics. The German command aimed two tank groups at once to defeat our troops in Belarus, which objectively created the preconditions for encircling our large forces near Bialystok and Minsk.

First of all you need to look common mistakes, allowed by the district commands. Military councils could take more intensive measures aimed at reducing losses in the event of sudden aggression. These include the creation of minefields in the directions of expected enemy attacks, preparations for the explosion of bridges across border rivers, more active construction of airfields and the dispersal of aviation on them, the organization of reliable protection of communication lines - all these measures are purely defensive and could not give rise to a German provocation . Everything turned out differently: German tanks captured the bridges across the Bug undamaged, and the communication lines cut in the first hours of the war brought chaos to the organization of command and control. The high pace of German advance to the east was predetermined from the very beginning.

Troops were not mentally prepared for an enemy attack. They were expecting war, and at the same time did not want to say goodbye to peaceful life. Yes, there was a TASS report on June 14, but there was also a lack of strict discipline in the troops themselves. Demandingness was replaced by complacency, which was immediately evident on the first day of the war. The soldiers and commanders then experienced the greatest shock, which can be judged by the text of the encrypted message from the military council of the Western Front to subordinate troops, sent on the evening of June 22, 1941.

“The experience of the first day of the war,” it said, “shows the disorganization and carelessness of many commanders, including big bosses. They begin to think about providing fuel, shells, and cartridges only at a time when the cartridges are already running out, while the huge mass of vehicles "is busy evacuating the families of the commanding personnel, who are also accompanied by Red Army soldiers, that is, people of the combat crew. The wounded are not evacuated from the battlefield, rest is not organized for the soldiers and commanders, and when leaving, livestock and food are left to the enemy..."

The ciphergram was signed by D. Pavlov, A. Fominykh (member of the front military council), V. Klimovskikh.

Unfortunately, the blame for the panic, confusion, and deviations from the rules of the charter that began on the first day of the war largely lies with the generals themselves who signed this document. But can the punishment that befell them be considered fair? Was not sentencing them to death an attempt at self-justification by the country's top leadership?

Institute of General History RAS.

In the pictures: Army General D.G. Pavlov; they fought to the end.

The 41st Motorized Corps had a limited number of crossing facilities, so the German command ordered the movement routes of the main forces of the 4th Panzer Group to be shifted to the right, closer to Dvinsk. As a result, the right-flank 6th Tank Division in the corps was forced to stretch its front by 45 km - from Livana, 25 km from Jekabpils, to Ilukste, 10 km from Dvinsk. On the right flank of the division moved the battle group "von Seekendorff", on the left - the battle group "Rauth", the gap between them was covered by the 57th tank reconnaissance battalion of Major Linnbrun.

Soviet sappers also managed to blow up the bridge to Lebanon. However, a front of a couple of tens of kilometers in this area was held only by Guryev’s small group - the 10th Airborne Brigade, reinforced by a rifle battalion. Therefore, Routh's tankers were able to cross the Dvina and by June 29 advance 10 km beyond the river.

On June 29, units of the 36th Motorized Division were also able to cross the Dvina and occupy a bridgehead in the Plavinas area. By June 30, German sappers had built two floating bridges in Livani and Krustpilsya, but they had low capacity and could only withstand light tanks. Dvinsk continued to be the main bridgehead.

The command of the Northwestern Front appreciated its importance in time. Already on June 27, the commander of the front troops, Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov, ordered the withdrawal of troops beyond the Western Dvina line, as a result of which catastrophic losses in manpower were avoided and the controllability of the troops was somewhat improved. On June 28, Halder noted in his diary that for the front of Army Group North “characteristically a small number of prisoners along with a very large amount of captured property.”

A combined group of Lieutenant General Akimov was thrown against the bridgehead in Dvinsk - two brigades of the 5th Airborne Corps and two combined regiments assembled from retreating units. However, the hastily prepared counterattack was unsuccessful. On June 27, the front commander reported To the People's Commissar defense:

“In pursuance of your order, yesterday I organized an attack to return Dvinsk. By the evening of June 26, 1941, Dvinsk was returned, but a fierce air raid launched by the enemy, which lasted three hours, with renewed attacks by infantry and enemy tanks, forced the abandonment of Dvinsk again. Tonight I will organize a second counterattack to capture Dvinsk with the introduction of the 46th Tank Division of the 21st Mechanized Corps (has 5 tanks). He singled out two staunch generals for leadership - Akimov and Belov. During the attack on Dvinsk, 7 bombers were shot down and 5 tanks were destroyed, the remaining tanks were driven into the city and disappeared behind the houses.”

In turn, General Akimov described this battle in a report to Kuznetsov even more restrainedly:

“According to your personal order, I organized an offensive to capture the city of Dvinsk from 17:00 on June 26, 1941.

The offensive stalled. Individual platoons and squads penetrated into the city from the northern and northeastern outskirts of the city, but were driven back by the supply of reserves and particularly intensified automatic fire and artillery of the enemy.

The enemy used a mass of automatic weapons, large-caliber machine guns, and tanks as fixed firing points. Masses of fire were used from house windows, attics and trees.

As a result of a three-hour battle, our units were driven back. The main reasons for our failure are the complete absence of tanks on our side and a very small amount of artillery - only 6 guns.”

On the same day, units of the 3rd Motorized Division of the 56th Motorized Corps crossed the Western Dvina north of Dvinsk, seriously expanding the existing bridgehead. Motorized reconnaissance detachments of German units were dropped on Rezekne (where the front headquarters was located) on Dagda northeast and east of Dvinsk, giving the Soviet command the impression that the Germans had landed airborne troops. The front command was forced to relocate to Pskov, which again had a negative impact on troop control.

At 5 a.m. on June 28, a new attack on Dvinsk began. In addition to Akimov’s group, the 21st Mechanized Corps of Major General D. D. Lelyushenko, who arrived here the day before, took part in it.

In fact, it was a corps only in name: by the beginning of the war its formation had not yet been completed. Formally, the corps was 80–90% staffed (that is, it had 28–30 thousand people), but 70% of the fighters were recruits from the April-June conscription, most of them did not even have weapons. Therefore, 17 thousand “fighters” were simply left in the Opochka area to build defensive structures. The corps was only 10–15% provided with motor transport; its units went to the front with a significant shortage of artillery, heavy and light machine guns and automatic rifles, as well as mortars. Most of the 76-mm guns were without panoramas, and the small-caliber anti-aircraft guns were without rangefinders, which were received during the fighting.

Lelyushenko himself, in a combat report dated June 29, characterized it as follows: “The corps units are actually motorized groups formed by old-timers and some young fighters.” The three divisions sent to Dvinsk consisted of about 10 thousand people, 129 45 and 76 mm guns and a number of light and amphibious tanks. On June 24, 105 BT-7 vehicles and 2 T-34 tanks arrived at the corps.

The 46th Panzer Division of the corps attacked from the north, the 42nd Panzer Division from the east, and the 185th Motorized Division moved in the second echelon. By 7 o'clock, units of V. A. Koptsov's 46th Tank Division captured the village of Malinova, 12 km from Dvinsk; Having bypassed it, the tankers broke into the northern outskirts of Dvinsk. However, the advance of the 42nd tank and 185th motorized divisions was delayed - having come under enemy air attacks, they were stopped 15–20 km from the city.

The Germans managed not only to strengthen the bridgehead: on the third day, infantry units already began to approach here. So the 42nd Tank Division in the Kraslava area was forced to engage in battle with units of the enemy 121st Infantry Division that had crossed here. 8–10 km east of Dvinsk, the crossing of units of the 3rd Motorized Division of the Germans was disrupted. According to Lelyushenko's memoirs, during the destruction of the German bridgehead, 285 people were captured, including 10; About 400 corpses, 16 destroyed guns and 26 mortars remained on the battlefield. It should be noted that the report on this battle indicates a much more modest number of prisoners - 37 people; Lelyushenko later reported that in just a month of fighting, the corps took 53 prisoners.

By order of the commander of the 42nd Tank Division, Major, a detachment of Captain Ivanov was sent across the Dvina for reconnaissance - five T-38 amphibious tanks with a small landing force of motorized infantry. This detachment disorganized movement behind enemy lines, according to the commander’s report, destroyed up to a hundred vehicles on the roads, and according to Manstein, even attacked the location of the logistics department of the headquarters of the 56th motorized corps. Then he returned to his shore without loss.

“The outskirts and streets of Daugavpils were strewn with hundreds of enemy corpses, enemy tanks were burning all around, and the barrels of broken guns were sticking out. There were crumpled cars standing there. The commander of the 8th German Panzer Division, General Brandenberger, took refuge with his headquarters in a fortress on the southern outskirts of the city."- this is how D. D. Lelyushenko describes the battle on June 28 in his memoirs.

However, the main forces of the 56th Motorized Corps were already in Dvinsk, so attacks against a superior enemy had no chance of success. By evening, the soldiers of the 21st Mechanized Corps were still clinging to the northeastern outskirts of the city, but to their right, units of the 5th Airborne Corps were driven out of the city by the Germans and thrown back 8–10 km to the north; There was a threat that the enemy would bypass the right flank of the mechanized corps.

As a result, the corps command decided to withdraw the troops to a more convenient defensive line along the line of lakes Rushony and Dridza, 15–20 km northwest of the city. The 46th Panzer Division took up defensive positions at the Beti-Leitani line; 185th motorized division - along the Auleyas, Sakova line; 42nd Tank Division - near the village of Shkipi, Geibi. On the right, north of Dvinsk, the 5th Airborne Corps continued to hold the defense; to the east, along the bank of the Western Dvina, flank detachments of the mechanized corps were located, and to their left were units of the 112th Infantry Division (from the Western Front).

By order of Lelyushenko No. 4 of 20:00 on June 29, the corps formations were given the task: to prevent the enemy from advancing from Dvinsk to Rezekne, Ludza and Sebezh, to inflict maximum losses on the enemy with stubborn defense and “by stubborn defense with the transition to mobile, in cases caused by the situation, inflict maximum defeat on the enemy, using not only short strikes, but also adapting the terrain to paralyze the advance of the enemy’s mechanized units.”

During the day of fighting, the forces of the 21st Mechanized Corps, according to our data, knocked out and destroyed 42 enemy tanks, 34 guns, 32 mortars, about 250 vehicles and up to a thousand enemy soldiers. At the same time, about 300 prisoners were taken - a very good result by the standards of 1941!

For June 28 and 29, corps losses (without the 46th Tank Division, which was transferred to the disposal of Akimov’s group) amounted to 30 people killed, 40 missing and 387 wounded. The chief of staff of the 46th Tank Division, Lieutenant Colonel Avdeev, and the commander of the artillery regiment of the 46th Tank Division, Lieutenant Colonel Karasev, were killed; Colonel Vasilevsky went missing. The commander of the 46th Tank Division, Colonel Koptsov, the political officer of the 42nd Tank Division, Regimental Commissar Churilov, and the commander of the 91st Tank Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Ermonov, were wounded. Equipment losses amounted to 4 tanks, 9 armored vehicles, 24 vehicles and 11 guns. At the same time, the command of the German 56th Motorized Corps reported on 78 destroyed Soviet tanks on July 28 alone!

But even if we assume that the losses of the 46th Panzer Division were no less than in the other two divisions combined, it is obvious that the enemy suffered at least no less damage. Therefore, Lelyushenko had every reason to report that “The mood of the soldiers and command staff, despite the lack of regular equipment, the lack of fuel, ammunition and food, is excellent.”

On June 29, the 21st Mechanized Corps became part of the newly created 27th Army - along with the remnants of the 5th Airborne Regiment, two combined regiments, the 110th Artillery Regiment of the RGK and units of the 16th Rifle Corps, which continued to retreat through the Dvina. However, this army was only in name - throughout all subsequent battles, its total strength did not exceed the size of one German tank division.

Meanwhile, F.I. Kuznetsov reported to Headquarters:

“Dvinsk has our forces: two airborne brigades, of which one actually does not exist due to losses suffered, two combined regiments formed from stragglers, the remnants of the 2nd tank division without a single tank and the 46th motorized division of the 21st mechanized corps - only 1000 people.

Enemy forces in Dvinsk: no less than an infantry division, 100 tanks installed and daily air superiority.

The 21st Mechanized Corps does not have “KB” tanks, which was just confirmed personally by corps commander Lelyushenko and assistant corps commander Brigengineer Katz. Obviously the tanks are on the way. The reinforced rifle regiment of the 112th Infantry Division did not arrive.

On June 28, 1941, the attack at Dvinsk was carried out virtually by our infantry alone, which suffered serious losses. The enemy repelled the attack with artillery fire, flamethrowers and machine guns. Two companies of enemy infantry were destroyed in the attack. Our losses are over 600 people only wounded.

The 1st Aviation Corps did not strike Dvinsk on June 28, 1941. Apparently, it didn’t fly out on June 29, 1941 either. The same goes for the 4th Mixed Aviation Division.

A third attack by our infantry alone will not lead to success; I ask you to report to the People's Commissar of Defense to postpone the attack until the 24th and 41st Rifle Corps have concentrated. I will remain where I am until I receive an answer.”

As we see, the front command had rather fantastic ideas about what had happened, and both our combat capabilities and the enemy’s forces were underestimated. The operational report of the front headquarters from the same day reported the following about the enemy.

“...Dvinsk direction.

...The 226th Infantry Division, reinforced by one artillery regiment and a group of tanks, is participating in the battles.

In the Plavinas area, the enemy concentrated at least an infantry division with tanks and on the night of June 29, 1941 transported up to two infantry regiments with tanks on rafts to the northern bank of the river. Zap. Dvina

Krustpils is occupied by the enemy, from where [he] conducts a further offensive with a force of up to two infantry divisions with tanks.”

This message smacks of panic. In fact, the bridgeheads in the Jekabpils area were initially considered by the Germans to be of secondary importance. Bridges in this area were blown up by Soviet troops, and with the help of improvised floating bridges it was impossible to quickly strengthen the group in the bridgeheads. Two divisions of the 11th Rifle Corps defended in this area, and the 12th Mechanized Corps, which was being transferred from the left bank through Riga, was deployed here. There were quite enough forces for defense in this area. Much more dangerous was the bridgehead at Lebanon, where by the evening of July 30, most of the 6th Panzer Division had already concentrated on the right bank. However, it was to him that the Soviet command paid the least attention.

On June 30, Gepner reported to the commander of Group North that the 4th Panzer Group would be ready to continue the offensive only on July 2. The 6th Panzer Division was supposed to attack from the bridgehead at Livana, the 1st Panzer and 36th Motorized Rifle Division from the bridgehead at Krustpils, delivering an auxiliary attack from Plavinas.

The real balance of forces in the Northwestern Front on July 1, 1941 was as follows.

ENEMY

(Army Group North)

18th Army

291st Infantry Division;

26th Army Corps - 61st and 217th Infantry Divisions;

207 security (Sich.) division;

1st Army Corps consisting of the 11th, 1st Infantry, 21st Infantry;

38th Army Corps (Army Reserve) - 58th and 254th Infantry Divisions.

4th Panzer Group

41st Motorized Army Corps - 1st and 6th TD, 269th Infantry Division, 36th Infantry Division;

56th Motorized Army Corps - 290th Infantry Division, 8 TD, 3 MD;

Motorized SS division "Totenkopf" (group reserve).

16th Army

10th Army Corps - 30th and 126th Infantry Divisions;

27th Army Corps - 122nd and 123rd Infantry Divisions;

2nd Army Corps - 121st, 12th, 32nd and 253rd Infantry Divisions;

13th Army Corps (Army Reserve) - 206th and 251st Infantry Divisions, 281st Security Division.

Army Group Reserve - 281st Security Division.

Thus, Army Group North consisted of 29 divisions - 3 tank, 3 motorized and 23 infantry. In previous battles, the divisions suffered some losses, especially in military equipment, but manning levels continued to remain close to normal (about 15 thousand people in the division).

Armored vehicles of the 4th Tank Group

In addition, the tank group was assigned the 616th tank destroyer battalion (27 Panzerjager I self-propelled guns), and the infantry divisions of the 16th and 18th armies - the 185th battalion and five separate assault gun divisions - for a total of 48 Stug self-propelled guns. III. Thus, the army group had 684 tanks and self-propelled guns, of which 466 were light and 218 were medium.

(Northwestern Front)

8th Army

12th mechanized corps - 23rd and 28th TD, 202nd MD;

3rd mechanized corps - 2nd and 5th TD, 84th MD;

10th Rifle Corps - 10th and 11th Infantry Divisions;

11th Rifle Corps - 48th and 125th Infantry Divisions;

Directorate of the 65th Rifle Corps;

22nd Rifle Division of the NKVD.

11th Army

1st mechanized corps - 3rd TD, 163rd infantry division, 5th mtsp;

16th Rifle Corps - 5th, 33rd and 188th Infantry Division;

Thus, the front commander proposed to urgently begin transferring the 22nd Latvian and 24th Estonian territorial corps, which had not yet been brought into battle due to their unreliability, to the area of ​​Pskov and Ostrov. Here the 1st mechanized and 41st rifle corps transferred to the front were supposed to take up defense along the line of the old fortified areas. Under their cover it was planned to deploy troops withdrawn from the Dvina line. At the same time, Kuznetsov proposed to begin the evacuation of the Moonsund Islands and the withdrawal of troops of the 8th Army from Riga to a new line of defense along the southern border of Estonia.

“You did not understand the order of Headquarters 0096. The current situation requires detaining the enemy at the Western line within the next three to four days. Dvina. Headquarters requires the execution of order 0096. Take all measures [to] prevent the enemy from spreading on the northern bank of the West. Dvina. Use all aviation for systematic bombing day and night of crossings and enemy units crossing. Report the execution."

As we see, the withdrawal of front troops from the line of the Western Dvina was not at all prohibited - but it had to take place in a more organized manner, with the simultaneous retention of the defensive line along the river by covering forces. It is no secret that retreat is the most difficult type of combat operations, where it is important to maintain both the controllability of the troops and the morale of the soldiers and commanders. While the enemy's tank and motorized divisions were pinned down by counterattacks near Dvinsk and Krustpils, the Northwestern Front had time to create a new line of defense at the line of the old fortified areas and along the lines of the Velikaya and Cherekha rivers.

However, there was another reason why it was impossible to retreat from the Dvina. On the southern bank of the river there still remained a large number of scattered Soviet units, retreating randomly towards the river. They had no connection with the command, and, apparently, Kuznetsov simply counted them as already dead - so in a report to the People's Commissar of Defense on June 28, he reported: “The 2nd Panzer Division apparently died. The 11th Army does not exist as a formation. I don’t know the position of the 5th, 33rd, 188th, 128th, 23rd and 126th Infantry Divisions, the 5th Tank Division and the 84th Motorized Division.” Meanwhile, all these troops were retreating to the Dvina, trying to cross it; leaving the river line meant dooming them to death.

And the situation at the front was not as catastrophic as Kuznetsov’s headquarters imagined. Apart from Dvinsk, the enemy failed to capture serviceable bridges across the Dvina anywhere. True, on June 28–29 the Germans managed to cross it in three more places, but along most of the front such attempts were repulsed. Let us note that at the end of September and the beginning of October 1943, the Soviet troops that reached the Dnieper captured up to a dozen bridgeheads only in the zone of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts, but only three of them were “opened” - one in October and two in November

The Germans advanced furthest from the bridgehead at Livana - as we saw above, on July 30, the units of Guryev’s group defending here retreated to Lake Lubana. However, in fact, the troops of the 6th Panzer Division did not advance to such a depth; by the evening it only reached the village of Rudzety, 20 km from the river. The division advanced almost parallel to the Dvinsk-Pskov highway, 30 km west of it. On July 1, the forward detachments of the division marched another 25 km and reached Varaklyany (10 km west of Vilyany).

The forces of the 11th Rifle Corps (48th and 125th Rifle Divisions) and the 12th Mechanized Corps were deployed against the bridgeheads formed on both sides of Jekabpils. On June 30, his 28th Tank Division with the 10th Motorcycle Regiment occupied the defense in the sector from Koaknes to Plavinas, the 202nd Motorized Rifle Division - between Plavinas and Krustpils. The 23rd Panzer Division concentrated in the Ergli area (30 km north of Plavinas) with the task of preparing a counterattack on Plavinas.

During the night of June 30, the enemy tried to cross the river eight times, but all his attempts were repulsed. At 18:00, the corps headquarters sent a reconnaissance group consisting of three tanks and a platoon of motorized infantry to the Lyegrade area (towards Krustils) with the task of reconnaissance of the enemy crossing the Aiviekste River.

By this time, the mechanized corps had about 9 thousand personnel, 50 tanks and 47 guns. As we will see below, in the 11th Rifle Corps on June 4, that is, after a difficult retreat, there were still 8,769 people left - that is, on the 1st the corps numbered at least 10-12 thousand. The 181st division of the 24th Latvian Territorial Corps was also advanced here from Gulbene. Due to the absence of the headquarters of the 12th Mechanized Corps, its troops were subordinated to the headquarters of the 65th Rifle Corps, which did not have its own troops. Even if the forces available here were not enough to throw units of three German divisions that had managed to cross into the river, they were quite sufficient to blockade the bridgeheads.

On the morning of April 30, the enemy managed to capture the bridges in Riga - but a few hours later they were repulsed by a counterattack by units of the 10th Rifle Corps of the 8th Army and were blown up only late in the evening, after the remnants of the 90th Rifle Division and our other troops had crossed from the southern bank.

By June 30, Soviet troops largely continued to hold the defense along the right bank of the Western Dvina. None of the new bridgeheads gave the enemy the opportunity to quickly concentrate troops and go on the offensive - even part of the rear of Reinhard’s 41st Motorized Corps later had to be transported across bridges in Dvinsk. A counterattack against Krustpils was planned for June 1 by the 202nd Motorized and 181st Rifle Divisions.

Manstein, according to his post-war statements, was rushing forward - but the army group command considered it best to hold back the 56th motorized corps until Reinhardt could launch an offensive from the bridgeheads at Krustpils.

In this situation, at 20:45 on June 30, the command of the North-Western Front, not yet having received Zhukov’s prohibiting directive, gave the order to his subordinate formations to withdraw from the Western Dvina line.

First. The enemy continues the offensive in the Krustpils-Pskov and Dvina-Pskov directions. Large columns of motorized troops and infantry were found moving from the Kaunas region in the directions: Panevezys, Jekabpils; Utena, Daugavpils. The enemy, apparently, is trying to break the front at the junction of the 8th and 27th armies and prevent the 8th army from retreating to the east while simultaneously capturing fortified areas before the withdrawal of our troops.

Second. The tasks of the troops of the North-Western Front: to prevent a breakthrough of the occupied front from Krustpils and Daugavpils to the northeast, to firmly consolidate and hold with all forces the Pskov, Ostrovsky and Sebezh fortified areas and to prevent the enemy from breaking through to the northeast and east.

Third. 8th Army on the night of 30.6. on July 1, 1941, begin the retreat to the fortified line. Intermediate milestones:

a) by the end of July 1, 1941 - Cesis. lake Alauksto, Madona, Buzany, southwestern shore of the lake. Lubana;

b) by the end of July 2, 1941 - Dzeni, Gulbene, Jaunkanchi (northern shore of Lake Lubana).

In the future, retreat to the Pskov and Ostrovsky fortified areas.

Include parts of the 12th Mechanized Corps in the Madona area. When retreating, have the main group on your left flank, paying special attention to communication with your neighbor on the left.

Border on the left - Jekabpils, (law) lake. Lubana, (leg.) Island.

Fourth. The 27th Army will continue to stubbornly hold the enemy on the occupied line. The retreat to the fortified line will begin only with the beginning of the retreat of the 8th Army from the line of Dzeni, Gulbene, Yaunkanchi. By the end of July 1, 1941, get in touch with the 8th Army about the lake area. Lubana.

The border on the left is Kraslava, Dagda, (law) Opochka.

Fifth. The 41st Rifle Corps concentrate and occupy Pskov, Ostrov, Exhibition for defense on July 1, 1941, continuing to relentlessly improve fortifications, build fortified areas, anti-tank stations and field positions. The task is to prevent the enemy from passing through the fortified areas to the east and northeast. After occupying the fortified areas, come under the command of the commander of the 8th Army.

Sixth. On the night of July 1, 1941, the 24th Rifle Corps (11th, 181st and 183rd Rifle Divisions) began moving to the area (claim) Ostrov, (claim) Opochka, Novorzhev, where to replenish and reorganize and occupy the defense zone (claim) Ostrov, Opochka... Upon concentration and occupation of the defense zone, place it at the disposal of the commander of the 27th Army.

Seventh. The 1st mechanized corps, arriving from the Leningrad Military District, should concentrate in the Podlozhye region (40 km northeast of Pskov), (leg.) Porkhov, Borovichi (20 km north of Porkhov). The task is additional.

Eighth. To the commander of the 22nd Rifle Corps by the end of July 1, 1941, go to the front of Podseva, Gorki, (law) Porkhov. Parts of the corps should be prepared for stubborn defense on the front to the southwest and south. Prepare passages in your defense zone for the 1st mechanized corps in the direction of Opochka...

The exact time of cancellation of this order is unknown - according to some sources, it was received at army headquarters only on the morning of June 2. In any case, at 7 o'clock in the morning on June 1, the troops of the 11th Rifle Corps of the 8th Army, who were occupying the defense against the German bridgehead at Plavinas, began to retreat to the north. Units of the 48th Infantry Division retreated in the direction of Snyteri, Dukuri Manor, Skuene Manor, Krusta Krogs, the 125th Division - to Madliena, Ranciemi Manor, Ramuli Manor, Amata River. By this time, according to the report of its commander, about 700 bayonets remained in the 125th division.

The command of the 12th Mechanized Corps was not informed about this - apparently, the command of the 11th Rifle Corps and its divisions decided that since everyone had received the order to withdraw, there was no need to warn their neighbor about it. As a result, the enemy struck the flank of the 202nd Motorized Division, which was defending to the left on the Krustpils-Plevinas line.

The 28th Panzer Division located near Pļavinas also found itself in danger of being outflanked after the enemy, advancing from the direction of Krustpils with forces of about an infantry regiment with artillery, crossed the Aiviekste River. The attempt to push the Germans back beyond Aiviekste was unsuccessful; In addition, around noon, an order was received from the commander of the 8th Army to withdraw in the direction of Madon.

As a result, on the evening of June 1, formations of the 12th Mechanized Corps, which had previously successfully repelled all enemy attempts to cross the river, were also forced to begin a retreat, covering it with counterattacks of the 23rd Tank Division.

Already on the afternoon of June 1, counter-orders were sent to the troops. The 8th Army was ordered to attack the flank of enemy troops spreading from the bridgehead at Krustpils and already reaching Madon. The 27th Army was ordered to take up a strong defense and prevent the “opening” of the German bridgehead at Dvinsk. At 17:10, the commander of the 181st Infantry Division was given an order to leave one rifle regiment with an artillery division and two anti-tank batteries in the Madon area, transferring it to the subordination of the commander of the 202nd Motorized Division, and the rest of the units would move to the Island in a forced march.

The next day these orders were confirmed by a new order.

"First. The enemy crossed to the northern bank of the river. Zap. Moved with a force of up to one infantry division with tanks in the Dvinsk area and an unknown number of motorized infantry with tanks in the Jakobschtadt and Friedrichstadt areas, with the goal of disuniting the North-Western Front in the Madona direction.

Second. During July 2 and 3, 1941, the armies of the Northwestern Front destroyed enemy units that broke through to the north of the river. Zap. Dvina, reach the entire front on the river. Zap. Dvina and firmly hold this line...

Fourth. 8th Army with the 181st Infantry Division, holding the occupied front along the river. Zap. Dvina, with your own forces, in the morning of 2.7.41, destroy the enemy who crossed in the Friedrichstadt area, and prevent it from spreading to the north and northeast, for which purpose, have a strong reserve in the Madona area consisting of the 181st Infantry Division and the 12th th mechanized corps.

Subsequently, destroy the Jacobstadt group and reach the river along the entire front. Zap. Dvina and firmly defend it.

The border on the left is Jekabpils, Island.

Fifth. The 27th Army with the 163rd Motorized Division in cooperation with the 12th Infantry Division of the 22nd Army, pinning down the enemy in the center along the Rezekne - Daugavpils highway, strike with the flanks of the army, cover the Daugavpils area from the west and east, encircle and destroy the enemy in the Daugavpils region and northeast."

But the loss of at least two days made this order impossible to implement. "Order - counterorder - disorder." Despite the fact that below Plavinas the right bank of the river was still entirely in our hands, the battle for the Dvina was already lost.

The commander of the 4th Panzer Group, E. Gepner, planned to launch a general offensive at dawn on July 2. In fact, it started a day earlier than planned. On the morning of July 1, the 1st Tank and 36th Motorized Divisions of the 41st Motorized Corps began to advance following the retreating troops of the 11th Rifle and 12th Mechanized Corps. At the same time, units of the 10th Rifle Corps of the 8th Army left Riga.

But the 6th Panzer Division and the 56th Motorized Corps were unable to launch an offensive even on July 2. Routh explains this very vaguely: the poor condition of the roads south of Lake Lubana and the beginning of heavy rain. Apparently, the division lacked heavy equipment, which still could not be transported across the Dvina. By evening, the division had just reached the line of Zoblev and Birzhi. There was practically no resistance from Soviet troops in front of its front, but from the east its flank was constantly attacked by the remnants of the 10th Airborne Brigade.

Manstein in the appropriate place in his memoirs becomes very verbose, but also very vague.

“Finally, on July 2, we were able to set out again after the third mechanized formation arrived in the corps - the SS division “Totenkopf”, and on our left the 41st Panzer Corps crossed the Dvina at Jakobstadt...

However, 6 days have already passed since the sudden raid on Dvinsk. The enemy had the opportunity to overcome the shock that he received when German troops appeared on the eastern bank of the Dvina...

Whether it would be possible to forestall the enemy to the same extent again was at least doubtful... This would only be possible if the tank group managed to direct all its forces to accomplish one task. Precisely this, as will be shown, did not happen, although the enemy did not have enough forces to stop the advance of the tank group.”

In any case, Manstein did not manage to break through the defenses of the 27th Army right away. On the morning of June 1, the commander of the 27th Army N. E. Berzarin (the future commandant of Berlin) received an order from the front command (given at 4:55) to hold out at all costs on the occupied lines until July 5. For this purpose, the 163rd Motorized Division of the 1st Mechanized Corps, transferred from the Northern Front, was transferred to the army's disposal. The division advanced to the Jaunlatgale, Karsava area with the task of covering the gap between the 8th and 27th armies and organizing anti-tank defense along the eastern bank of the Pededze and Aiviekste rivers on the front from the Sita station to Lake Lubana, on the likely route of movement of enemy tanks. Thus, even without intelligence data, the Soviet command correctly determined the route of the 1st and 6th German tank divisions.

By the evening of July 1, the forward detachments of the 1st Tank Division had already reached Madon, 50 km from the Dvina. By order of Kuznetsov, one of the regiments of the 181st division of the 24th rifle corps was urgently sent here from the front. Reinforced by an artillery battalion and two anti-tank defense batteries, the regiment was to come under the command of the commander of the 202nd Motorized Division with the task of preventing the enemy from breaking through from Krustpils to Madona and further to the northeast. The rest of the division was ordered to move by forced march to the Ostrov area, where it would take up defensive positions. At the same time, another order of the 8th Army prescribed “while holding the front of Riga, Jekabpils, with your own forces to liquidate the enemy units that have broken through at Friedrichstadt, protecting your left flank in the direction of Madon from the enemy’s attack and preventing its spread in the northern and north-western directions... be ready with a short strong blow from the area of ​​Art. Luksta in the direction of Pļavinas, in cooperation with the 27th Army, eliminate the enemy units that have broken through from the direction of Jēkabpils to Madona.”

For a counterattack towards Madon, it was proposed to use the remnants of the 12th mechanized corps, concentrated in the area of ​​Luksta station; At this point, only 35 tanks remained in the corps.

At 0:25 minutes on July 2, a pennant was dropped in the area of ​​the headquarters of the 12th Mechanized Corps with an order from the army command to stop the retreat and restore the situation along the right bank of the Western Dvina. That is, at that moment the army headquarters had no other connection with the corps. Having tried to carry out this order, the corps command at 2:50 ordered the 28th Panzer Division to occupy the previous line along the bank of the Western Dvina in the area of ​​​​Koaknes, Plyavinas by 7 o'clock, the 202nd Motorized Rifle Division to hold the occupied line of Madona, Meirany, and the 23rd Tank divisions from the Medzula, Lõezere area to attack enemy units on the northern bank of Aiviekste in the Lõegrade area. By 14:00 on July 2, parts of the corps were even able to take their starting position for the attack - however, the attack never took place, since the 181st and 48th rifle divisions, having not received an order to stop the retreat, had already retreated to the northeast.

Already during the retreat in the Gulbene area, the vanguard of the 645th motorized rifle regiment of the 202nd motorized division attacked an enemy motorized detachment, capturing two serviceable passenger cars and 7 motorcycles. In one of the cars, documents of the 8th Panzer Division of the 56th Motorized Corps (?!) were seized, as well as an extract from the notorious directive of May 13 “On special jurisdiction in the Barbarossa zone” - the same one that Manstein allegedly refused to send to the troops...

Meanwhile, the 27th Army was threatened by a detour from the Madona area, so on the evening of July 1, N.E. Berzarin gave his troops the order to retreat to a new line - from Lake Lubana to Lake Rezna, bending his right flank to the east. Despite the enemy's multiple superiority, the retreat of the 27th Army was carried out systematically. By 17:00 on July 1, army units, according to the operational report of the front headquarters No. 09/op dated 11:45 on July 2, occupied the following position:

“a) the 10th Airborne Brigade during the day, fighting with small groups of the enemy, holds the line of Garvatsainieki, Dekshorn, Prizhevo. Headquarters - Vilany. The brigade was joined by a 76-mm battery of the 9th Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade.

Losses: killed - 3 people, wounded - 4 people.

b) Units of Akimov’s group on July 1, 1941 continued to hold and strengthen the line of Hashish, Bashki, Leitani, Bieshena. Headquarters - Lubana.

c) Units of Lelyushenko’s group during the day of July 1, 1941 put themselves in order at the line: 185th Infantry Division - Bieshena, Kovaleva; 42nd Tank Division - (claim) Kovaleva, Koley, Unguri.

The enemy's 46th motorcycle regiment and the 44th tank battalion were established in battle in front of the group's front. The enemy suffered significant losses. The entire headquarters of the tank battalion was destroyed. The greatest losses were suffered by the 280th Infantry Regiment of the 185th Infantry Division, which lost many guns.”

At the same time, new corps arrived at the front, deploying at the border of the old fortified areas:

“a) 41st Rifle Corps - continues to concentrate in the Pskov, Ostrov area;

b) the 1st Mechanized Corps, consisting of one tank division and a motorized division, concentrated in the Pskov region;

c) 22nd Rifle Corps - concentrated in the area of ​​Porkhov, Podseva, Gory;

d) 24th Rifle Corps - concentrated in the area (claim) Ostrov, (claim) Opochka, Novorzhev.”

In the operational report of Front Headquarters No. 10/op for July 2, the position of the arriving units was as follows:

“a) 1st mechanized corps (without the 1st tank and 163rd motorized divisions) - in the forests and area of ​​the station. Toroshino, Podborovye (18–20 km northeast of Pskov).

b) 41st Rifle Corps (118,111 and 235th Rifle Divisions) p. 1.7.41 began to unload at the station. Pskov, st. Cherskaya. By 18:00 on July 2, 1941, 11 echelons of the 111th Infantry Division, 13 echelons of the 118th Infantry Division and 3 echelons on the way and 6 echelons of control of the 41st Infantry Corps arrived. Transportation is very late.

At the end of the concentration, the corps has the task of defending the Pskov, Ostrov, and Exhibition sectors.

c) 22nd Rifle Corps: the 180th Rifle Division concentrated in the Porkhov area, the 182nd Rifle Division was on the move from the Petseri area to Porkhov from 1.7.41.

d) 24th Rifle Corps: 181st Rifle Division - from July 1, 1941 on the move from the Gulbene region to the Ostrov region, 183rd Rifle Division - on the move from the Cesis region Ostrov."

At this time, the 1st Mechanized Corps (3rd Tank, 163rd Motorized Division and 5th Motorcycle Regiment) had 371 tanks - 26 medium three-turret T-28, 225 light armored vehicles and 120 flamethrower T-26, and also 135 armored vehicles. The corps was staffed close to its full strength, that is, it had 20–25 thousand people. However, even earlier, one tank battalion, an anti-aircraft division and a number of vehicles were removed from the corps

Even on the afternoon of June 1, the headquarters of the Northwestern Front received a directive from the Headquarters, signed by G. K. Zhukov, which required “to carry out an active operation to eliminate the person who crossed to the northern bank of the river. Zap. The enemy’s Dvina river with the aim of gaining a strong foothold in the future on its northern bank.” To carry out the operation, it was allowed to use the 112th Infantry Division of the 22nd Army of the Western Front, as well as the 163rd Motorized Division of the 1st Mechanized Corps, arriving as part of the Northwestern Front.

In pursuance of this directive, at 0:17 on July 2, the front commander gave N. E. Berzarin a new order:

“The 27th Army with the 163rd Motorized Division in cooperation with the 12th Infantry Division of the 22nd Army, pinning down the enemy in the center along the Rezekne - Daugavpils highway, strike with the flanks of the army, cover the Daugavpils area from the west and east, encircle and destroy enemy in the Daugavpils area and northeast. By the end of July 2, 1941, take possession of Daugavpils with mobile units and leave the outskirts. Zap. Dvina".

The corresponding order from the commander of the 27th Army was sent to the troops only at about 8 o'clock in the morning and arrived there by 10 o'clock. The front formations holding the defense were extremely small in number; It is unlikely that they had the opportunity to launch a serious counteroffensive. Moreover, the Headquarters, contrary to the belief of some modern historians, did not require this - remember that Zhukov’s directive of June 30 ordered Kuznetsov only to delay the enemy for 3-4 days and prevent his spread along the northern bank of the Dvina.

Moreover, at 2 o’clock in the morning, even before the arrival of the order from front headquarters, the commander of the 27th Army gave orders for the systematic withdrawal of his troops from Dvinsk:

"…4. The 27th Army's rearguard units would firmly hold the enemy on the occupied line and begin to retreat sequentially, along the lines, only under pressure from a superior enemy, preventing the defeat of the battle formation in parts.

5. Intermediate defensive withdrawal lines: first - lake. Lubana, b. Malta, r. Rezekne to station Kazraji, Tiskudi, Malta, lake. Rezna-ezers, lake Osha-ezers;

second - r. Yoke to Martuzan, Stiglov, Degl-va, Mozuli, Miroedy;

third - Nosova, Augspils, Krasny, Opochka.

6. Sequence of withdrawal: to line No. 1 - by the end of 2.7.41; to milestone No. 2 - by the end of July 3, 1941; to milestone No. 3 - by the end of July 4, 1941.

7. Guryev’s group retreat in its own zone, ensuring a junction with units of the 8th Army. The area of ​​concentration after the withdrawal of Marshavitsa, Soshikhino, came under the subordination of Akimov.

The border on the left is Zhavoronki, Augspils, Baski, Dritseni, (law) Preili.

8. Akimov’s group, retreating in its lane, cover the highway from the breakthrough of motorized mechanized units to the north. Area of ​​concentration - Marshavitsy, Soshikhino.

The border on the left is (legal) Maromokhi, (legal) Krasny, Ludza, Oguretskaya, Bikernieki.

9. Lelyushenko’s group retreat in the indicated zone along the lines; after retreating beyond the SD, concentrate in the area of ​​st. Vereshchagine, Vysotskoe...”

This order turned out to be very timely: at 11 o’clock on July 2, Manstein himself launched an offensive. All day long, army formations repelled attacks by enemy tanks and infantry in the area of ​​Vilana, Preili and at the turn of Aglona station, Leitani, and Lake Sivera.

At 8:09, having finally received an order from the front headquarters, the commander of the 27th Army, with combat order No. 014, again ordered the troops to attack Dvinsk. Fortunately, it was already too late - by the time the German offensive began, this order could not reach the troops.

By the end of July 2, the army continued to hold the front from Lake Lubana through Vilany, Prizhevo, Preili, Aglona station, Leitani to Lake Sivera. The non-existent 226th and 18th infantry divisions, as well as the very real 3rd motorized division, were installed in front of the army front. In addition to it, in reality, the 8th Panzer and units of the 290th and 121st Infantry Divisions, as well as the SS Motorized Division “Totenkopf” operated here. A reconnaissance detachment of this division, numbering about 200 people, broke through our guard along the highway, moved to Sebezh and at about noon broke into the city of Dagda. To the west of the city there was a command post of the 42nd Tank Division and a reserve of the 21st Mechanized Corps - tank and motorcycle battalions. Urgently sent to Dagda, they defeated a German detachment in a short battle; 126 serviceable motorcycles and 34 captured SS men, including two officers, were captured.

The SS men turned out to be unusually talkative - it turned out that the advanced detachment of the division was following the reconnaissance detachment on Dagda. The commander of the 42nd Tank Division, Colonel Voeikov, organized an ambush, as a result of which the Death’s Head reconnaissance battalion, consisting of 10 tanks, 15 armored personnel carriers, 18 guns and 200 vehicles, was almost completely destroyed.

German sources mention this defeat very mutely. Manstein complains that the SS men, despite their courage and excellent equipment, did not have enough experience and suffered too high losses. Popular books on the history of the SS troops and the Death's Head division casually mention that the 1st Motorized Regiment of the Death's Head lost about a hundred people in the battle of Dagda. On the contrary, V. Haupt writes that during these battles, the “Dead Head” lost two-thirds of its (apparently, combat) strength and was consolidated into one regiment.

As a result, despite a significant superiority in forces, during the day of fighting on July 2, Manstein managed to advance only 7–10 km. There has not yet been talk of any breakthrough of the Soviet defense.

By the end of the day, the units of the 27th Army had 3,200 bayonets, 95 guns and 80–90 tanks. Akimov’s group defended on the approaches to Rezekne; the 163rd motorized division of the 1st mechanized corps (529th and 759th motorized rifle regiments) advanced to the Rezekne area, with its participation and with the support of the left flank 112th rifle division of the 22nd Army front command still intended to launch a counterattack in the direction of Dvinsk on the morning of July 3.

During the day, the columns of the 163rd Motorized Division were repeatedly subjected to enemy air raids. The losses were insignificant, but the division's advance was delayed. Only at 20 o'clock the advanced units of the division reached the northern outskirts of Rezekne. Unfortunately, the 25th tank regiment of the division (without the 3rd battalion) was sent from Pskov by rail and, due to untimely supply of trains, began to arrive at the Rezekne station only at 11 o’clock on July 3, when the main forces of the division were already drawn into a fierce the battle south of the city.

On the morning of July 3, the position of the front troops was as follows. Units of the 8th Army occupied the Sigulda line, Luksty station, Madona. In the Pskov direction, the remnants of the 12th Mechanized Corps retreated through Madona and east of it on Gulbene, on the morning of July 3 they defended along the line of Sakstagala, Malta, Luni, and Lake Sivera. To cover Rezekne, in addition to units of the 163rd Motorized Division, a front headquarters guard battalion was sent from the west, which repelled enemy attacks and held the Sakstagal area until the morning of July 3.

The left flank and center of the 27th Army had so far managed to hold their positions, but the right flank was exposed due to the withdrawal of the 12th Mechanized Corps. Back on June 2, after a fierce battle in the Vilyany area, units of the 10th Airborne Brigade, having suffered losses, were scattered by motorized infantry of the 6th Tank Division, operating with the support of a company of tanks. On the evening of July 2, Akimov’s group, under pressure from tanks and motorized infantry of the 8th Panzer Division, retreated to the Malta area (12 km southwest of Rezekne) and since then there has been no news from it. The road to Rezekne was open.

By this time, the command of the Northwestern Front had finally abandoned plans for a counteroffensive. The combat order dated 2:00 July 3 ordered the 27th Army to “holding back the enemy and destroying his presumptuous columns with short counterattacks, preserving manpower and equipment, continue the defense of the direction.” The 163rd Motorized Division was now planned to be used for a counterattack against the forces of the 41st Motorized Corps and to restore contact with Akimov's group south of Rezekne.

Meanwhile, on the morning of July 3, troops of the 41st Motorized Corps reached Lake Lubana, units of the 6th Panzer Division bypassed it from the east, and the 1st Panzer Division from the west. The remnants of our 202nd motorized division, after an unsuccessful counterattack in the Madona area, retreated to the Dzelzava manor area. In total, by this time the following remained in the combat strength of the 12th Mechanized Corps:

“23rd Tank Division - 10 tanks, 150 infantry, no shells;

28th Tank Division - 22 tanks, almost full motorized rifle regiment;

202nd Motorized Division - about 600 people; the motorcycle regiment does not exist."

At 15:00 on July 3, units of the 1st Panzer Division of the 41st Motorized Corps occupied Gulbene, pushing back the remnants of the 202nd Motorized Division defending here. By the evening of the same day, tanks of the 8th Panzer Division of the 56th Motorized Corps broke into Rezekne, where the headquarters of the 27th Army had recently been located. Two regiments of the 163rd Motorized Division and half of the 25th Tank Regiment, which arrived too late, were unable to contain the enemy, although they seriously stopped his advance.

The worst thing was that on the evening of July 3, the forward detachments of the 6th Panzer Division, having bypassed the defense of units of the 163rd Motorized Rifle Division at Karsava along country roads, burst from the west into the town of Gauri on the Dvinsk-Pskov highway, 55 km from Rezekne and in 20 km north of Karsava. At 16:20, a German reconnaissance detachment of 5–6 tanks was discovered on the highway in the Vilaka (Vyshgorodok) area, only 45 km from Ostrov.

As a result, Soviet troops were thrown off the highway by a side impact. The 163rd Motorized Division had to retreat eastward to Krasny Ostrov and the Lzha River. The enemy found the path along the highway towards Ostrov and Pskov open - but, again, the 56th Motorized Corps had no merit in this...

By evening, the Soviet command identified two main directions of the enemy's attack: Krustpils - Madonna - Gulbene and Dvinsk - Rezekne. However, it still had no idea that the Germans were “castling” their motorized corps. The 41st, taking advantage of the open flank of the 27th Army and the absence of organized Soviet troops on its right, reached the Pskov Highway, while the 56th went further east - to the Pushkin Mountains, Sebezh and Opochka.

The 21st Mechanized Corps, which formed the center and left flank of the 27th Army, was thrown back east of the Dvinsk-Pskov highway and could no longer prevent the enemy’s advance towards Ostrov. By the end of the day, the 46th Tank and 185th Motorized Divisions were defending in the Brodaize area east and southeast of Rezekne with a front to the west. The 42nd Panzer Division still held Dagda and the area south of Lake Yesha; to the left of it to the Western Dvina and along the river line to the city of Drissa the 122nd Infantry Division held the front.

On July 4, the enemy's 3rd motorized division, advancing towards Opochka, occupied Ludza. Moving to the right along the Kraslava-Sebezh highway, the SS division “Dead Head” finally captured Dagda and went east of Lake Yesha, finally separating the corps’ formations. Following her was the 121st Infantry Division.

And here the Germans were unlucky again. The withdrawal of the 42nd Tank Division was covered by its 42nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, Colonel A. M. Goryainov. Sensing the weakness of the German infantry, Colonel Goryainov launched a counterattack - and went straight to the headquarters of the 121st Infantry Division. During the short battle, the headquarters was destroyed, and the division commander, Major General Otto Lanzelle, was killed.

By the end of July 5, the 42nd Tank and 185th Motorized Rifle Divisions of the 21st Mechanized Corps retreated beyond the line of the old border to the Sebezh area and were withdrawn to the front reserve; The 46th Panzer Division continued to operate at Opochka.

By this time, the 24th Latvian Territorial Rifle Corps, which had finally arrived here, had actually never taken part in battles before, was transferred to the army. On the afternoon of July 6, the commander of the 27th Army, Major General N.E. Berzarin, reported to the Front Military Council on the condition of his troops:

“The existing corps and divisions bear only this name, but in reality it looks like this:

a) 24th Rifle Corps - completely unprepared units that do not have our equipment, armed with all weapon systems - of all brands in the world. It is impossible to supply them with ammunition and spare parts.

There are no headquarters, no means of communication, the number of command staff is up to 12–15%, the shortage is up to 90%.

Now in this corps (181st plus 128th rifle divisions) there are no more than 8 thousand [people].

b) The 21st Mechanized Corps endured heavy fighting, its special units are being eliminated, and in fact the corps is being eaten by the enemy.

c) the 163rd motorized division, after heavy battles, is completely incapable of combat, having lost people (up to 60%), lost artillery (up to 70%), lost tanks (up to 50%). All this data is only approximate - collection and calculation is currently underway. The division cannot be thrown into battle.

d) 235th Infantry Division (arrived with one 806th Infantry Regiment) - I don’t know where it is and when it will be at our front.

In short, a rather difficult situation has arisen, which can only be corrected by a radical decision - to create a strong defensive line in the depths with fresh units, and to withdraw the entire listed composition behind some kind of barrier and form it for new actions. It must be borne in mind that the army has thousands of examples of courage and heroism of all and many people. But the trouble is that we do not have well-established control, we do not have aviation, and the enemy, taking advantage of our weak points, persistently exploits them... aviation literally terrorizes our units, being unpunished.

Lieutenant General Comrade Akimov, whom I am sending to you as having already completed his tasks, can report in detail on the state of affairs.

I and all of us have enough determination to fight and fight with any forces, but for the common benefit of the country, I would like to guide you with this short note.”

Thus, the front of the 27th Army was broken through only on July 3. It should be noted that this happened as a result of bypassing it from the west and the defeat of the right flank by the forces of the 41st Motorized Corps, which broke through from the Krustpils area to the junction of the two Soviet armies. We have already discussed the reasons for this breakthrough earlier.

It can be stated that the bridgehead at Dvinsk did not play a decisive role in the success of the German offensive. The Soviet defense was broken through by a strike from the 41st Motorized Corps from the bridgehead at Krustpils - and this German success, in turn, was due to the untimely withdrawal of two divisions of the 11th Rifle Corps.

The enemy did not count on success at Krustpils, where he did not have a permanent bridge at his disposal, and placed his main bet on a bridgehead in the Dvinsk region. However, within a week, Manstein was unable to crush the defenses of the opposing units of the 27th Army, which were significantly inferior in numbers and capabilities to his 56th Motorized Corps. And only the mistake of the commander of the North-Western Front, combined with the delay in orders caused by poor communications, led to catastrophic results.

On June 3, F.I. Kuznetsov was removed from office and a week later appointed commander of the 21st Army. The next day, his place was taken by the former commander of the 8th Army, Lieutenant General P. P. Sobennikov, and corps commissar V. N. Bogatkin became a member of the military council. Even earlier (July 1), Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin, former deputy chief of the General Staff, took over as chief of staff of the front.

P. P. Sobennikov recalled:

“On July 3, 1941, after leaving the city of Riga, which was occupied by small units of Germans, I received an order from the front commander, Colonel General Kuznetsov, to assume the post of commander of the forces of the North-Western Front. I received this order with a motorcyclist. On July 3, having arrived in the city of Pskov, I met General Ivanov, who was appointed in my place, at my reserve command post, on the move I oriented him in the situation known to me and, arriving at the front headquarters near the city of Pskov, took command of the front troops on the same date.” .

From that moment on, the fate of the Northwestern Front depended on whether the unfired troops of the 41st, 24th and 1st Mechanized Corps would have time to occupy defensive lines along the old border and the Velikaya River in time and on the number of front forces that could be withdrawn to these lines.

According to the report of the headquarters of the North-Western Front to the General Staff of the Red Army dated July 4, 1941, the total number of front troops was:

8th Army:

10th Infantry Division: command personnel - 52, junior command personnel - 81, privates - 429. Total - 562. Horses - 10. Ordinary rifles - 257, automatic - 76, light machine guns - 5, easel - 3, DP - 6, cars - 9, carts - 3, kitchens - 1.

11th Infantry Division: personnel -1450; heavy machine guns - 6, 45 mm guns - 1, 122 mm - 3, armored vehicles - 1.

48th Rifle Division: command personnel - 336, junior command personnel - 348, privates - 1365. Total - 2049. Horses - 765. Ordinary rifles - 1445, automatic - 198, light machine guns - 45, easel - 26, large-caliber - 3 , anti-aircraft - 6, DP - 89, 45-mm guns - 15, 76-mm - 12, 76-mm anti-aircraft - 3, 122-mm - 23, 152-mm - 1, vehicles - 91, walkie-talkies - 14, tractors - 15.

67th Infantry Division - no information.

125th Rifle Division together with corps units of the 11th Rifle Corps: command personnel - 681, junior command personnel - 550, rank and file - 5489. Total - 6720. Horses - 501. Regular rifles - 6496, automatic - 35, light machine guns - 80, easel - 25, anti-aircraft - 23, DP - 35, 45 mm guns - 5, 76 mm - 12, 122 mm - 10, 152 mm - 46, cars - 292, motorcycles - 1, tractors - 87.

10th Rifle Corps with corps units: command personnel - 170, junior command personnel - 246, privates - 1439. Total - 1855. Ordinary rifles - 850, light machine guns - 63, easel - 11, anti-aircraft - 2, walkie-talkies - 5, 45 mm guns - 1, 76 mm - 2, 76 mm anti-aircraft guns - 26, 122 mm - 26, 152 mm - 9, vehicles - 61, tractors - 42.

12th mechanized corps:

Control and corps units: personnel - 1550, tanks - 32.

23rd Tank Division: command personnel - 384, junior command personnel - 347, rank and file - 2467. Total - 3198. Rifles - 2008, light machine guns - 42, 37 mm guns - 12, 45 mm guns - 10, 122- mm - 7, tanks - 11, armored vehicles - 2, cars - 167.

28th Tank Division: command personnel - 464, junior command personnel - 578, privates - 2692. Total - 3734. Ordinary rifles - 2276, automatic - 2, mortars - 2, light machine guns - 59, anti-aircraft - 2, DP - 41 , 45 mm guns - 0, 37 mm - 6, 76 mm - 1, 122 mm - 2, 152 mm - 1, tanks - 3, vehicles - 384.

9th artillery brigade of anti-tank defense: command personnel - 226, junior command personnel - 356, rank and file - 1549. Total 2131. Ordinary rifles - 1686, automatic - 6, light machine guns - 27, DP - 3, 76 mm guns - 13, 85 mm - 7, cars - 64, walkie-talkies - 12, motorcycles - 3, tractors - 3.

Directorate of the 65th Rifle Corps: command personnel - 63, junior command personnel - 245, privates - 245. Total - 553. Ordinary rifles - 286, light [machine guns] - 3, vehicles - 30, walkie-talkies - 3.

No information was received regarding the 2nd Tank Division, the motorcycle regiment of the 3rd Mechanized Corps.

202nd Motorized Division: command personnel - 114, junior command personnel - 46, privates - 875. Total - 1035. Rifles - 306, light machine guns - 22, DP - 2, 76 mm guns - 2, 122 mm - 6 , T-26 tanks - 5, T-38 - 1.

27th Army:

Army Directorate, 5th Airborne Corps, 112th Tank and 163rd Motorized Divisions of the 1st Mechanized Corps: command personnel - 3715, junior command personnel - 6088, privates - 22,181. Total - 31,984. Horses - 94. Rifles - 16,971, automatic rifles - 1016, mortars - 243, light machine guns - 660, heavy machine guns - 151, large-caliber - 36, anti-aircraft - 23, DP -1747, 37 mm guns - 20, 45 mm - 95 , 76 mm - 48, 76 mm anti-aircraft - 4, 122 mm - 12, 152 mm - 12, tanks - 360, armored vehicles - 73, vehicles - 3632, walkie-talkies - 7.

Directorate of the 22nd Rifle Corps and corps units: command personnel - 400, junior command personnel - 340, rank and file - 1432. Total - 2172. 107 mm guns - 53, 152 mm - 9.

180th Rifle Division: command personnel - 1030, junior command personnel - 1160, privates - 9132. Total - 11,322. Horses - 3039. Rifles - 11,645, mortars - 35, light machine guns - 535, easel - 212, large-caliber - 3, anti-aircraft - 24, DP - 5, walkie-talkies - 0, 37-mm guns - 31, 45-mm - 58, 76-mm - 74, 76-mm anti-aircraft - 4, 122-mm - 14, 152-mm - 12, armored vehicles - 6, motor vehicles - 72.

182nd Rifle Division - no information received.

(From) the 24th Rifle Corps, 181st and 183rd Rifle Divisions, 41st Rifle Corps, 111.48 and 235th Rifle Divisions.

Controls and housing parts 1st Mechanized Corps: command personnel - 216, junior command personnel - 250, privates - 1255. Total - 1721. Rifles - 193, automatic - 1, mortars - 24, light machine guns - 162.

3rd Tank Division: command personnel - 1096, junior command personnel - 1652, rank and file - 6455. Total - 9203. Ordinary rifles - 4847, automatic - 946; mortars - 39, light machine guns - 161, heavy machine guns - 35, 45 mm guns - 5, 76 mm - 4, 152 mm - 12, 203 mm - 12, T-26 tanks - 16, T-38 - 27 , BT-7 - 121, others - 36, armored vehicles - 81, vehicles - ...10.

17th Signal Regiment: command personnel - 92, junior command personnel - 205, privates - 468. Total 765. Rifles - 516, light machine guns - 7.

25th Engineer Regiment: command personnel - 14, junior command personnel - 29, privates - 187. Total - 230. Motor vehicles - 2.

402nd Howitzer Artillery Regiment: command personnel - 155, junior command personnel - 266, privates - 885. Total - 1306. Rifles - 1962, automatic - 4, light machine guns - 5, 122 mm guns - 2, 203 mm - 24, armored vehicles - 0, cars - 112, motorcycles - 12, tractors - 104.

110th Howitzer Artillery Regiment: command personnel - 143, junior command personnel - 190, privates - 1205. Total - 1538. Rifles - 1862, guns 203 - 22, vehicles - 112.

10th Air Defense Brigade: command personnel - 176, junior command personnel - 272, privates - 1774. Total - 2222. 85 mm guns - 24, 76 mm - 37, 40 mm - 16, 37 mm - 16 , heavy machine guns - 2, quad mounts - 16, cars - 95, motorcycles - 8, tractors - 27, radio stations - 9.

12th Air Defense Brigade: command personnel - 114, junior command personnel - 85, privates - 479. Total - 678. No guns, 1 quad mount, 30 vehicles.

14th Air Defense Brigade: command personnel - 81, junior command personnel - 37, enlisted personnel - 252. Total - 370. 85 mm guns - 4, 37 mm - 3, heavy machine guns - 3, quad mounts - 7, cars - 34.

306th separate anti-aircraft artillery division: command personnel - 22, junior command personnel - 39, rank and file - 256, 85 mm guns - 8, quad guns - 3, vehicles - 13.

362nd separate anti-aircraft artillery division: command personnel - 38, junior command personnel - 57, rank and file - 329. Total - 424. 76-mm guns - 7, quadruple installations - 8, vehicles - 33, tractors - 3.

Air Force:

6th mixed aviation division: command personnel - 577, junior command personnel - 1345, rank and file - 1378. Total - 3300. Rifles - 2723, aircraft - 69.

7th mixed aviation division: command personnel - 536, junior command personnel - 1422, privates - 1260. Total - 3218. Rifles - no data. I-16 aircraft - 2; I-15bis - 19; I-153 - 2; SB - 3. Total - 26.

8th mixed aviation division: command personnel - 804, junior command personnel - 678, privates - 846. Total - 2328. MiG-3 aircraft - 14, I-153 - 8, I-16 - 1, I-15bis - 6 Total - 29.

57th mixed aviation division: command personnel - 781, junior command personnel - 667, privates - 693. Total - 2141. I-16 aircraft - 6, I-153 - 18, SB - 5. Total - 22.

According to the 11th Army(16th Rifle Corps, 29th Rifle Corps, 179th and 184th Rifle Divisions, 5th, 33rd, 128, 188, 126, 23rd Rifle Divisions, 84th Motorized Division, 5th Tank Division , 10th Artillery Anti-Tank Defense Brigade, 429th Howitzer Artillery Regiment, 4th and 30th Pontoon Regiments) no information available.

* * *

On July 5, a decision was made to create the Luga defensive line along the Luga, Mshaga, and Shelon rivers to Lake Ilmen. Due to the lack of forces on the North-Western Front, this line was transferred to the command of the Northern Front, which was supposed to ensure that it was filled with troops. The border of the zones of responsibility between the fronts was drawn along the Pskov-Novgorod line, while the defense of Estonia remained under the jurisdiction of the North-Western Front - the 8th Army operating here was transferred to the Northern Front only on the morning of July 14 (by Headquarters Directive No. 2068 of July 13) .

We have already mentioned above that by this time, at the line of the old fortified areas along the Velikaya River, the front reserve - the 41st Rifle Corps - was deployed. In addition, the troops of the 22nd Estonian and 24th Latvian Territorial Rifle Corps were supposed to leave here.

22nd Corps transported from Estonia by rail; According to the operational report of the front headquarters from 22:00 on July 3, by this time only one control echelon of the 22nd Rifle Corps and 3 echelons of the 180th Rifle Division had arrived in the Pskov area, another 7 control echelons and 9 division echelons were on the way. There was no information in the report about the echelons of the 182nd division.

Parts 24th Corps were scattered - the 181st Infantry Division, which arrived first, did not have time to take part in the counterattack against the German bridgehead at Krustpils, and was now defending itself on the Pskov highway in the area of ​​​​Gauri, Vilaka. The 183rd Rifle Division moved to the Island on foot from the Cesis area (on the Riga - Pskov highway).

Troops 41st Rifle Corps were transported to the area of ​​Pskov and Ostrov by rail, but the transport of troops was very slow due to congestion on the road.

The 118th division arrived from Kostroma, the 111th from Yaroslavl and the 235th from Ivanovo. By the time of dispatch, the divisions were almost fully staffed (10–12 thousand people per division), but had a shortage of weapons, ammunition and transport. In addition, conscript personnel were poorly trained.

Corps control - 7 echelons arrived, 13 were on the way;

118th Infantry Division - 20 trains arrived, 2 on the way, 10 on the way;

111th Infantry Division - 29 trains arrived, 1 on the way, 3 on the way;

253rd Rifle Division - 3 echelons arrived, 2 on the way, 28 on the way.

The 111th and 118th divisions were unloaded from echelons in the area of ​​Pskov, Karamyshevo, Cherskaya starting on July 1, but the last echelons arrived only on July 6, and only on that day were all their units able to occupy the designated defense lines. The 118th division (463rd and 527th rifle regiments) was supposed to defend in the Staro-Pskov fortified area on a front of 26 km, and the 111th division with two regiments (399th and 532nd) - in Novo-Pskov. Pskov fortified area at the front 44 km. The 468th Infantry Regiment of the 111th Division was in the second echelon. In the interval between the 118th and 111th divisions, the battalion of the 62nd Infantry Regiment, formed from the units of the 10th Infantry Division, whose main forces retreated to Estonia, occupied the defense. The defensive structures of the fortified areas were occupied by permanent garrisons of the 153rd and 154th separate machine gun battalions. These battalions were fully staffed with personnel, but had only machine gun weapons.

The Ostrovsky fortified area was supposed to be defended by the 235th Infantry Division, but since its arrival was delayed, on July 4 the 398th Infantry Regiment of the 118th Division was moved to the Peskovo and Kholmatka sector.

By this time, units had concentrated in the rear between the island and Pskov 1st mechanized corps- 3rd Tank Division, 5th Motorcycle Regiment and other corps units. On July 4, the division's 3rd motorized rifle regiment was placed at the disposal of the front command and sent to the west. He took up defense along the Liepna line, Kuprava station 50 km from Ostrov, blocking the path of the 36th motorized division of the Germans.

So, the line of the old fortified areas in the area of ​​Pskov and Ostrov was covered by two fresh full-blooded divisions and the “backbone” of the 1st mechanized corps - the 3rd tank division, the 3rd howitzer artillery regiment, the 5th motorcycle regiment and other units of corps subordination.

The main forces of the 181st Infantry Division were also located here, as well as scattered units, mainly retreating from Krustpils and Plavinas - among them were the remnants of the 12th Mechanized Corps, which were being withdrawn for reorganization in the Soltsa area. In the near future, at least three more divisions that did not take part in the battles should have approached Pskov and Ostrov.

Opposing these forces were three divisions of the 41st German Motorized Corps - the 1st and 6th Panzer and the 36th Motorized Corps - and all three were far from at full strength, since the enemy was still on the march. Even taking into account the smaller number and strength of the Soviet divisions, the Germans did not have superiority in strength. At 5 a.m. on July 5, the 3rd Tank Division had 258 tanks - 10 heavy KB, 28 medium T-28, 148 light BT, 30 linear and 42 flamethrower T-26. Unfortunately, some of this equipment was still on the march or was faulty and therefore could not take part in the battle that took place on July 5...

* * *

Meanwhile, the German offensive progressed successfully. On July 3–4, infantry divisions began to cross the Dvina, following the motorized corps. Manstein mentions in his memoirs that the command of the 4th Panzer Group had a plan: to bypass the group of Soviet troops discovered in the Pskov area from the east, and if not encircle it, then cut it off from the forces of the Western Front. The Germans were especially concerned about the presence of the “1st tank corps“-they did not know that the divisions of the 1st Mechanized Corps had already been “gutted” and were being used separately to plug holes in different directions.

As mentioned above, the direction of movement of the 56th Motorized Corps was shifted to the right: the 8th Panzer Division was supposed to leave the Dvinsk-Pskov highway and turn from Karsava to the Pushkin Mountains; to its right, the 3rd Motorized Division was moving through Ludza to Opochka; even to the right and far behind, the SS division “Totenkopf”, having finally broken through the Soviet positions at Dagda, moved along the highway to Sebezh and further to Idritsa

Instead of Manstein's corps, Reinhard's 41st Motorized Corps reached the Pskov Highway. By the evening of July 3, the advance detachment of his 1st Panzer Division, advancing through Lubana and Gulbene, occupied Balvy, and on the morning of July 4 reached the front edge of the Ostrovsky fortified area. The 154th separate machine gun battalion and the 398th rifle regiment occupied the defense in this sector. The 235th Infantry Division has not yet arrived here - its first echelons began to arrive only on July 5. The defending units lacked artillery; there were practically no hand-held anti-tank grenades or anti-tank mines.

On the morning of July 4, the 6th Panzer Division was still held back on the highway by the remnants of the 181st Infantry Division, but to the north-west, part of the 1st Panzer Division was attacked by Soviet troops occupying defenses along the Ostrovsky fortified area. German tanks with motorized infantry in several groups bypassed the defense centers from the north and south; already in the afternoon one of the mobile groups was discovered 6 km west of the island (it was mistaken for an airborne assault).

In the evening of the same day, the advance detachment of the 1st Tank Division reached the Pskov Highway and, without encountering resistance, broke into Ostrov. The highway and railway bridges across the Velikaya River were captured by the enemy undamaged - although they had previously been prepared for an explosion. The combat log of Army Group North for July 4 stated:

“By the evening, the 4th Panzer Group, with the main forces of both corps, overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, approached the Baltic-Russian border. The right flank had already managed to cross it. With a quick rush, the 1st Panzer Division reached the southern part of the Island. The railway and road bridges were found to be in good condition.”

At the same time, the main forces of the enemy’s 36th motorized division, which reached the Kachanovo area 35 km northwest of Ostrov, struck the junction between the 399th and 532nd rifle regiments of the 111th rifle division. Thus, with the first blow, the enemy broke through the Ostrovsky fortified area in two places at once.

The front command responded very quickly - already at 18:00 on July 4, Lieutenant General P. P. Sobennikov ordered the commanders of the 41st Rifle and 1st Mechanized Corps to destroy the enemy who had broken through to the Island, capture the city and throw the Germans behind the line of fortified areas. Having contacted the commander of the 41st Rifle Corps, I.S. Kosobutsky, by telephone, the Chief of Staff of the Northwestern Front, General N.F. Vatutin, demanded:

“Eliminate the incident, destroy the enemy and not give him the opportunity to cross the river. Also destroy all suitable enemy reinforcements. Keep in mind that the liquidation and destruction of the enemy rests with you personally, at your personal responsibility. You are responsible for carrying out this order with your own head.”

The main blow was to be delivered by the 3rd Panzer Division. It already had a motorized rifle regiment, but the attack was supported by the 468th Rifle Regiment of the 111th Division, allocated from the reserve of the 41st Rifle Corps.

On July 5 at 8:50, units of the 3rd Panzer Division, after a short air raid on enemy positions, began an attack. Having passed the infantry battle formations, two battalions of the 6th Tank Regiment and a battalion of the 5th Tank Regiment burst into the city, starting a battle with German tanks. The 8th company of the 6th regiment, having passed through the entire city, reached the bridges over the Velikaya - but due to the lack of infantry, it could not hold out here. At the same time, the 468th Regiment never went on the offensive, as a result of which our tanks were driven out of the city. In addition, at the same time, German reconnaissance detachments (as always, mistaken for airborne assaults) appeared in the Shvanibakhovo and Selikhnovo areas, forcing the corps command to send tank detachments to fight them.

The next attack began at 15:25. This time it was possible to concentrate larger forces for it - in particular, the 3rd howitzer artillery regiment of the 3rd Tank Division (24 guns) and one wound of the 41st Rifle Corps were brought up; There is information that not one, but two rifle regiments took part in the attack. By this time, the city was defended by Colonel Kruger’s battle group, reinforced by the anti-tank division of the 73rd motorized artillery regiment of Major Seth.

Over the next half hour, destroying enemy tanks and artillery, the 5th Tank Regiment again passed through the city and in separate units reached the left bank of the Velikaya River. However, without sufficient artillery support and in the absence of air support, the 3rd Panzer Division suffered heavy losses in equipment and personnel from enemy anti-tank and artillery fire in this battle. There was no infantry to consolidate the occupied line and clear the city of the enemy - only up to one and a half battalions of the 111th Infantry Division followed the tanks; the rest of the division either did not take part in the attack or retreated in disarray, coming under enemy fire.

At 15:55 the enemy, with strong artillery and air support, launched a counterattack. There are allegations that it was at this moment that detachments of the 6th Tank Division approached the city from the south, however, according to Routh’s memoirs, all day on July 5 this division was still fighting a fierce battle with units of the 398th Regiment of the 118th Infantry Division on the Ostrovsky Line fortified area and reached the Island only in the morning of July 6.

The 3rd Panzer Division, having virtually no infantry cover, held back enemy attacks until 17:00, gradually retreating to the outskirts of the city. But under the attacks of artillery and Ju-87 dive bombers, who used incendiary bombs and a combustible mixture, the division was driven out of the city at about 19:00, while the 468th regiment of the 11th Infantry Division abandoned its positions and fled.

Until 7 p.m., the 3rd Panzer Division continued to hold the outskirts of the city, but by evening, under enemy pressure, it was forced to begin withdrawing. The 5th tank regiment retreated to Porkhov, the 6th - to the north, to Pskov. The 3rd howitzer artillery regiment took up firing positions in the area southeast of Lopatino. The division headquarters was located in the B. Lobyanka area, the mechanized corps headquarters was located in the forest area north of Puzakova Gora.

According to the operational report of the front headquarters from 3:55 on July 6, in the battles for the Island, the 3rd Panzer Division lost 7 BT-7 tanks and 3 KB tanks, but in reality the losses were much higher. By the evening of July 5, the division's combat units (although according to incomplete data) had 43 tanks on the move - two KB, one T-28 and 40 BT-7. True, it should be noted that by July 7, the division again numbered about a hundred tanks.

At 8:55 on July 6, the front headquarters received a report from the commander of the 1st mechanized corps, Major General Chernyavsky, that the 3rd tank division had been defeated in the battles for the Island and, under pressure from the enemy tank division, supported by artillery and dive bombers, was retreating in the direction to Porkhov. Apparently, the fighting in the vicinity of the Island continued until the morning of July 6 - at least, in the combat log of Army Group North for July 6 it is written:

“The enemy tried to delay the advance of the 4th Panzer Group with strong rearguards. The fighting was fierce. During July 5 and 6, the 1st Panzer Division destroyed over 140 tanks in the Ostrov bridgehead.”

The reasons for the failure are clear. It was quite obvious that the enemy would concentrate all his mobile forces towards the Island, where there were bridges across the Velikaya River. Nevertheless, the command of the 41st Rifle Corps “smeared” its regiments along the line of fortified areas - and even after the Germans captured the bridgehead, they sent no more than a third of the corps’ forces against it. Meanwhile, General Kosobutsky had 24 hours at his disposal to organize a counterattack, and it was already clear that it was necessary to hold not the fortified areas, but the river line. At the same time, judging by the order of the front command of July 6, Kosobutsky tried to place all the blame for the failure of the attack on Ostrov on the commander of the 1st Mechanized Corps, Major General Chernyavsky.

Nevertheless, the Soviet counterattack delayed the enemy for more than a day. At this time, the 36th Motorized Division, operating to the west, from July 5 to 7, unsuccessfully tried to break through the defenses of the 399th and 532nd Infantry Regiments of the 111th Infantry Division along the line of the Novo-Pskov fortified area. As we can see, in this place the division’s infantrymen acted quite decently, that is, the problem was not with the soldiers, but with the command of the corps and its organization of combat operations.

On the morning of July 6, the enemy launched an offensive from a bridgehead in Ostrov. Units of the 1st Tank Division moved along the highway to Pskov, the 6th Tank Division - further east, to Porkhov. Despite the fact that the rains stopped and the weather improved again, that day the Germans managed to cover no more than ten kilometers.

On the afternoon of July 7, the enemy resumed the offensive in two directions. On the other side of the Velikaya River, the main forces of the 118th and 111th Rifle Divisions continued to hold back the advance of the 36th Motorized Division along the line of the old border, and while the first firmly occupied the defense, the second was forced to gradually retreat to the north, bending its flank under the pressure of the German motorized infantry.

At this time, the 235th Rifle Division, which by this time had already been transferred to the 24th Latvian Rifle Corps, was finishing unloading at the Krasnye Prudy station. If only she had arrived two days earlier! Now, units of the division immediately entered into battle with tanks and motorized infantry of the 6th German Tank Division and, unable to withstand the onslaught, were forced to retreat east of the highway in the direction of Karamyshevo.

By the afternoon of July, the tanks of the 1st Division reached the Filatova Gora, Vydra area and the crossing of the Mnoga River. There were still about 20 km left to Pskov. The front command was forced to throw into battle the remnants of the 23rd Tank Division of the 12th Mechanized Corps - the so-called detachment of Colonel Orlenko, reinforced by the 3rd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 3rd Tank Division, as well as a rifle battalion and a mortar battery from the 118th Rifle Division .

Orlenko’s detachment took up defense on the Pskov highway near the village of Cherekha, covering the road and railway bridges across the river of the same name - the right tributary of the Velikaya, which flows into it several kilometers to the west. Here, near the highway, are the remnants of the 3rd Tank Division, directly subordinate to the commander of the 41st Rifle Corps - the 6th Tank Regiment with the division headquarters, corps control and some corps units. To the left, the 235th Infantry Division and the finally arrived 182nd Infantry Division of the 22nd Estonian Corps, reinforced by the 5th Regiment of the 3rd Tank Division, occupied the defense. The 468th Regiment of the 111th Division defended to the south towards Ostrov and front to the west - the front command did not abandon hopes of once again counterattacking Ostrov from this direction, sending the 163rd Motorized Division and the remnants of the 21st Mechanized Corps here from the south.

As we see, the front command finally managed to build a relatively complete defense in the main direction, having a water line behind it (the Velikaya and Cherekha rivers), behind which newly arriving units could be deployed.

At 17:00 on July 7, the 6th Tank Regiment attacked the flank of the advanced units of the German 1st Panzer Division on the highway south of Cherekha. A real tank battle unfolded, in which at least 200 vehicles took part on both sides.

Meanwhile, to the east, at 17:30, the German 6th Panzer Division attacked the positions of the 182nd Rifle Division. On the German right flank, the tanks of the Raus battle group broke through to the bridge over Cherekha near the village of Shmoylovo, but here they were met by vehicles of the 5th Tank Regiment and were forced to retreat back. Near the village of Cherekha, units of the 1st Tank Division attacked Orlenko’s group along the highway, but were driven back by a tank counterattack, losing (according to our data) 22 tanks and 9 anti-tank guns. Our losses amounted to 12 combat vehicles.

Thus, for the 41st Motorized Corps, the day of July 7 was unsuccessful - it was not possible to break through the Soviet defense anywhere, and the losses were great. Unfortunately, this day also revealed the problems of our troops. The troops of the 41st Rifle Corps were scattered in three directions, interspersed with “alien” units.

At the same time, there were no radio stations in the building at all, and instead of the required 300 km of telephone cable, there were only 36 km of telephone cable, and wired communication lines during battles were constantly disabled by artillery fire and enemy air strikes. Therefore, from the beginning of hostilities, communication had to be maintained the old fashioned way - with the help of messengers. Only on July 5, the corps received one radio station and 160 km of cable in coils, without reels. True, this cable was lost almost immediately - because the communications battalion was thrown into battle by the corps commander to cover the withdrawal of corps units and because of this did not have time to remove the already established lines.

But what was much worse was that the infantry turned out to be completely unsuited and untrained to act against tanks. There were no anti-tank grenades or mines in the units; the soldiers were simply afraid of German tanks, even those attacking without infantry support. In addition, the artillery was short of ammunition; Food was also delivered irregularly to the positions. The corps command justified this by saying that all the roads were clogged with retreating troops and refugees - but it is obvious that a significant share of the blame for the created situation lay with General Kosobutsky.

By the morning of July 8, parts of Colonel Orlenko’s detachment retreated to the northern bank of Cherekha. The tanks were withdrawn to the Kresta area and to the southern outskirts of Pskov. The next day, Orlenko’s group was withdrawn for reorganization to the Soltsy area, where it joined the rest of the 12th Mechanized Corps.

Things were worse in the zone of the 235th Infantry Division, where on the morning of July 8, units of the Seckendorf battle group of the 6th Panzer Division managed to cross the Cherekha using pontoon means. At 9:15, two companies of tanks (or vehicles with motorized infantry) reached the Pskov-Porkhov highway east of Karamyshevo. By Directive No. 24 of July 8, the front command ordered a counterattack here with the forces of the 3rd Panzer Division, gathering less than four rifle regiments to support it.

* * *

From this place the final act of the tragedy began. On the night of July 8, the commander of the 118th Rifle Division, General Glovatsky, arrived at the command post of the 41st Rifle Corps. He reported that all enemy attempts to cross the Velikaya River in the areas of Vydra and Filatova Gora were successfully repelled by units of the 527th Infantry Regiment, after which the bridges in these places were blown up. Enemy tanks did not appear here - and this is not surprising, since there were none in the 36th Motorized Division.

According to the operational report of the front headquarters from 20:30, on the morning of July 8, units of the 41st Rifle Corps occupied the front of Korly, Odvorets (15 km southwest of Pskov on the left bank of the Velikaya River), Vetoshka (15 km southwest of Pskov), Gorushka, Priborok (10 km southeast of Pskov, at the second railway bridge over Cherekha) and further along the northern bank of the Cherekha River. The corps headquarters was located in Luni, 8 km southeast of Pskov, there was no contact with it by the evening, the front headquarters delegates, sent on a liaison plane with the directive of the front commander to establish a stubborn defense at the line of the Velikaya and Cherekha rivers, had not yet returned. The front also had no contact with the 1st Mechanized Corps - either with its headquarters or with individual units.

The 22nd Rifle Corps in the Porkhov direction continued to hold the line of the Cherekha River at the line of Porechye, B. Zaborovye (35 km southwest of Porkhov), Vertoguzovo (40 km southwest of Porkhov), Zhiglevo (40 km north of Novorzhevo) with a front to the west, repelling attempts by enemy reconnaissance groups to penetrate to its front line. His 182nd Rifle Division defended the line Porechye, Vertoguzovo, the 180th Rifle Division - Shakhnovo, Zhiglevo.

Behind the left flank of the corps, the front to the west was defended by the 181st and 183rd divisions of the 24th Rifle Corps and the remnants of the 27th Army, partially holding the line of the Velikaya River in its upper reaches. The 1st Mechanized Corps, having suffered losses in the battles on July 6 and 7, by 4:00 on July 8, withdrew to the Podberezye area, Exhibition, 35 km eastern Pskov, where it put itself in order.

Aviation noted the movement of large mechanized enemy columns from Ostrov in the direction of Porkhov - these were the forces of the 6th Tank Division and units of the enemy 169th Infantry Division advancing after them. In the evening, enemy columns were discovered heading from Ostrov to the west, towards Novorzhev - units of the 3rd Motorized Division of the 56th Motorized Corps were advancing here.

Thus, the enemy still failed to overcome the defense line along the Velikaya and Cherekha rivers, and to the west he was stopped at the line of the Pskov fortified area. The operational report of the headquarters of the North-Western Front dated 10:00 on July 9 indicated that the 235th Infantry Division, defending the line of the Cherekha River in the Staranya, Podberezye sector (35 km east of Pskov), created “bridgehead positions before crossings to Karamyshevo”, then there was an attempt to block the bridgehead of the Seckendorf group on the northern bank of the river. However, on the night of July 8-9, the Raus combat group had already been transferred to the bridgehead.

In the current situation, holding two divisions and units of the Pskov fortified area on the left bank of the Velikaya River lost its meaning - the Germans had only one 36th motorized division here, which was at least not superior in strength to the troops opposing it. Under these conditions, it was logical to leave the Pskov UR, withdraw the troops of the 111th and 118th divisions to Pskov beyond the line of the Velikaya River, and use part of them to strengthen the line along Cherekha.

B. N. Petrov in the article “How Pskov was abandoned” writes that the commander of this division, Major General Glovatsky, proposed to withdraw the forces of the 118th Infantry Division beyond the Great on the night of July 8 at the corps command post. However, based on the operational documents of the front headquarters, it can be assumed that this decision was made by the corps headquarters a little later - after the crisis arose at the crossings near Karamyshevo.

The corps commander did not inform Glovatsky that, in addition to his division and units of the Pskov fortified area, two regiments of the 111th Infantry Division of Colonel I. M. Ivanov should withdraw from the left bank at the same time. For some reason (apparently due to the lack of management of the corps headquarters), the railway bridge across Velikaya, located south of the city, was not used for the withdrawal of the 11th division. This bridge was blown up by a group of sappers led by junior lieutenant S.G. Baikov only when the enemy approached.

The road bridge, located three kilometers north of the railway bridge, was also prepared for explosion by a team specially assigned for this purpose from the 50th engineer battalion of the 1st mechanized corps. Formally, the bridge was in the area of ​​responsibility of the 118th Infantry Division. However, the corps command did not organize a withdrawal and did not give any orders about the order of crossing the river by units of various divisions. As a result, the groups of both divisions approaching the bridge at different times were mixed up, and no one was in charge of the order of crossing and the defense of the bridge. Apparently, when most of the 118th Division crossed the river and the transition of units of the 111th Division began, Major General Glovatsky decided that he was no longer responsible for the bridge - especially since the head of the engineering service of the 111th Infantry Division, Major, had already arrived here I. V. Viktorov.

As a result, the head of the demolition team, military engineer A. A. Spitz, without any specific instructions, data about the enemy or any instructions from his superiors, blew up the bridge when there was no direct threat from the enemy. Again, it is possible that some of the units of the 111th Division approaching the bridge were mistaken for approaching Germans. N. S. Cherushev writes that the bridge was blown up by border guards, and even in the presence of NKVD officers, but this statement is not true. The border guards (who were themselves NKVD employees) could directly guard the bridge as a military facility, but all documents definitely indicate that the subversive group belonged to the 50th engineer battalion of the 1st mechanized corps.

As a result of the premature explosion of the bridge, part of the forces of the 118th and 111th divisions did not manage to retreat across the Velikaya River in time; the fighters were forced to cross on improvised means, under the pressure of the approaching enemy, abandoning their equipment and artillery. As a result, both divisions found themselves disunited and demoralized.

The 1st Panzer Division failed to get through to Pskov from Ostrov; the 36th Motorized Division was detained for some time on the left bank of the Velikaya. However, the matter was decided by the breakthrough of the 6th Tank Division from Karamyshevo, which, given the loss of combat capability of two divisions of the 41st Rifle Corps, turned out to be nothing.

On the morning of July 9, two battle groups of the 6th Panzer Division began an offensive from the bridgehead at Karamyshevo. The Seckendorf group, moving to the right, attacked east, in the direction of Porkhov. The Rous group first advanced north, occupied Zagoska, reached Lopatovo and only here turned east along the highway. Under these conditions, units of the 41st Rifle Corps of the 118th Rifle Division, fearing a detour from the east, left the city of Pskov on the morning of July 9 and began a retreat to Gdov.

The next day, the Rous group was stopped by the stubborn defense of Soviet troops in the Yamkino area, 40 km from Karamyshevo. According to Routh's descriptions, the Soviet troops used heavy KB tanks here extremely skillfully - and the Germans did not have the 88-mm anti-aircraft guns that Manstein had previously taken. As a result, by order of Hoepner on July 11, the 6th Panzer Division was again deployed north to assist the 1st Panzer Division in the attack on Luga. Now on her way to Leningrad, only the Luga line remained in front of the Germans...

* * *

After leaving Pskov, organizational conclusions followed. Already on July 9, a member of the Military Council of the front, corps commissar V.N. Bogatkin, reported to the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army about the unfavorable situation at the front, the lack of organization, the loss of control by commanders during combat operations, and the commanders’ ignorance of the position of the forces entrusted to them. On July 11, the commander of the front air force, aviation major general A.P. Ionov, was removed from his post and arrested. Following him, the commander of the 41st Rifle Corps, I.S. Kosobutsky, was arrested and put on trial - Vatutin’s threat to “answer with your head” was carried out, albeit with some delay. On July 19, the commander of the 118th Infantry Division, Major General N.M. Glovatsky, was arrested, accused of withdrawing troops without orders and surrendering Pskov to the enemy.

During the investigation, Glovatsky pleaded not guilty, stating that the order to withdraw the 118th division was given by the corps commander, and Glowatsky was not informed about the simultaneous withdrawal of the 111th rifle division. Kosobutsky denied these accusations. We do not have the materials of the case at our disposal, and from the very brief presentation of it in Cherushev’s work, it is impossible to understand exactly what charges were brought against each of the commanders and what of them was confirmed by documents.

As a result, on July 26, 1941, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR sentenced N. M. Glovatsky to death, and I. S. Kosobutsky to 10 years in prison. A year later, in connection with a petition for pardon, former General Kosobutsky was released and sent to the Southwestern Front as an assistant formation commander. On October 30, 1943, his criminal record was cleared; he ended the war as commander of the 34th Rifle Corps, receiving the rank of lieutenant general in September 1944. N. M. Glovatsky, like many other generals convicted for cause and not for cause, was rehabilitated by the decision of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of December 8, 1958.

What are the reasons for the defeat of the Northwestern Front? Why were his troops, having several convenient natural and artificial defensive lines, unable to delay the enemy at any of them?

Of course, the German troops had an advantage in manpower and mobility. Only in terms of the number of vehicles, Army Group North exceeded the North-Western Front several times. This superiority was aggravated by the fact that the second echelon divisions arrived at the front gradually, often with long delays due to the situation on the railway, and therefore the enemy had the opportunity to defeat the Soviet troops piecemeal, gaining an overwhelming numerical superiority at each stage of the fighting.

The next group of reasons is the objective state of the Soviet troops. It's no secret that the level of technical equipment of the German troops was significantly higher; given the superiority of German technology, it could not have been otherwise. Soviet tanks could be superior to German tanks in terms of tabulated characteristics, such as the caliber of guns or the thickness of armor, but in practice they were much less reliable and convenient in practical use, often breaking down during marches. Finally, the lack of motorized infantry or vehicles to transport it in mechanized formations did not allow tankers to consolidate their successes even where they were.

In such conditions, deep tank strikes became meaningless - even where it was possible to carry them out. Therefore, the Soviet command was forced to “tear apart” mechanized formations, transferring them to strengthen rifle units and formations, and every now and then creating improvised “combat groups” of tanks and infantry in various areas. Later, in 1944, the Germans would resort to similar tactics.

Separately, it should be said about the state of communication. In this area, the superiority of German technology made itself felt most painfully. In conditions of maneuverable operations, wired communications, especially in forward units, turn out to be unreliable and inflexible; Radio communication is becoming extremely important. However, in the Soviet infantry, mobile radio stations on a vehicle base were available only at the corps level, often they were not even in divisions, and there were no portable radio stations at all. The situation was somewhat better in the tank forces - the vehicles of battalion commanders were equipped with radio transmitters, although at the level of platoons, and sometimes even companies, communication was still carried out by flags or there was no communication at all. However, even here surprises could lie in wait - for example, on July 6, radio communication between the front headquarters and the headquarters of the 1st Mechanized Corps was lost, and it was possible to resume it only after the corps retreated from Pskov. But in any case, tank units could at least report their location to the formation commander and transmit operational or reconnaissance information. The commanders of rifle units and formations could only dream of this.

But even where communication was well maintained, completely unforeseen psychological problems could arise. Thus, Major General P. M. Kurochkin, who was at that time the head of communications of the North-Western Front, tells a completely wild story. The front headquarters had constant radio contact with the headquarters of the encircled 11th Army and received encrypted reports from it. But at some point, the front commander suspected that a “radio game” was being played with him - the enemy destroyed the army headquarters, captured the codes and radio operators, and was now transmitting false information using them. Then a member of the Military Council of the front, corps commissar P. A. Dibrova, decided to call a member of the Military Council of the 11th Army through the PAT radio station as a “clerk” for a conversation. The decision in this situation was quite logical - the Germans really practiced such things, and personal conversation between people who knew each other was the only way to avoid deception. However, this time, at the headquarters of the 11th Army, they suspected a “radio game” - and they themselves stopped contact with the front headquarters...

At the same time, the German troops (primarily motorized) had a well-established wire and radio communication system; their forward and reconnaissance detachments were well controlled “from above” and could promptly inform the leadership about the situation. As a result, the German command had before itself a complete and integral picture of what was happening, while the Soviet command had only fragments of it, in addition distorted by the untimeliness of the transfer of information.

However, the reasons listed are objective. And there were also subjective ones. First of all, this is the combat experience of soldiers and commanders. The enemy had such experience, since the German army had been mobilized since August 1939, and a significant part of the Soviet divisions, especially the second strategic echelon, consisted of conscripts who had not had time to undergo at least some training.

Of course, against this background, the personnel formations - primarily the rifle divisions located along the border, as well as tank units and formations - seriously stood out for their training and combat effectiveness. Alas, the regular border divisions were the first to come under German attack and were either destroyed or forced to fight their way out of encirclement, ceasing to exist as combat formations for some time. Tank units, as noted above, were unable to fight without infantry support. Establishing interaction with “alien” infantry turned out to be quite difficult. And here it is not only the fault of the commanders - from the operational documents it is clearly seen that in small “battle groups”, often made up from the world by a thread and from a forest by a pine, but having a single command and some time for preparation, the interaction of tanks with infantry turned out to be much better.

Already on July 11, the assistant commander of the North-Western Front for tank forces, Major General Vershinin, wrote to the head of the GABTU, Lieutenant General Fedorenko:

“The general impression is that tanks are being used incorrectly: without infantry and interaction with artillery and aviation. The worst thing is that the mechanized corps do not exist, since Colonel General Kuznetsov completely dismantled them, which contributed to huge losses in material, unprecedented in size... All tanks require repairs, but circumstances force them to be kept in battle. In addition, there are still no spare parts.

...The wooded and swampy terrain of the theater and the Germans’ method of action (exclusively on roads, tanks with infantry and artillery) indicate the obligatory need for us in these conditions to often use tanks in small units (company, battalion) [in cooperation] with infantry, artillery and aviation. Large formations are needed only for deep maneuver with the aim of encircling and destroying large enemy groups. Unfortunately, due to poor management and the inability of the infantry to fight, we cannot linger, much less advance.

What do the Germans take? More by the impact on the fighter’s psyche than by any “terrible” means that cause damage. His air power dominates, but it is not so much amazing as it is frightening. So are all military means with it. Often our soldiers retreat without seeing the Germans, only under the influence of aviation, small groups of tanks and often only from German artillery fire. Commanders do not control the fighters, are not responsible for failure to comply with orders, and withdraw at their own discretion. Units where a strong, brave commander, not even brilliant with tactical talents, beat the Germans, only fluff flies. Such, for example, is the motorized regiment of the 42nd Tank Division (commander - Colonel Goryainov).”

At the same time, many mechanized units fought simply superbly. Thus, according to the report of the commander of the 21st Mechanized Corps, D. D. Lelyushenko, to the commander of the 27th Army on July 23, 1941, during the month of the war, the corps’ losses in killed, wounded and missing were:

Command staff - 394 people;

Junior command staff - 830 people;

Enlisted personnel - 5060 people.

The total losses were 6,284 people, that is, 60% of those who took part in the hostilities.

Moreover, during the month of fighting, according to Lelyushenko’s report, the corps captured: 53 prisoners, 95 rifles, 39 motorcycles and bicycles, 12 cars, and 3 guns; In addition, about 10 more guns captured from the enemy were blown up when the shells were used up. According to the corps, a total of 9,575 soldiers and enemy soldiers, 90 machine guns, 86 guns of various calibers, 53 tanks and armored vehicles, 834 cars and 503 motorcycles, as well as 412 horses were destroyed.

Of course, the figures given for enemy losses here are seriously overestimated. However, if all formations of the Red Army had acted with the same efficiency in the summer of 1941, the enemy would hardly have advanced further than Pskov, Smolensk and Kyiv...

It is interesting to compare the actions of Lelyushenko’s corps with the results of the actions of the 12th Mechanized Corps. On June 21, 1941, the 12th Mechanized Corps consisted of 28,832 people (excluding the motorcycle regiment and air squadron). By July 8, that is, for half a month of fighting, its losses in killed, wounded and missing amounted to 11,941 people - and this also includes fighters of units removed from the corps by senior commanders, about whose fate the corps command no longer had news.

Thus, the losses of the 12th mechanized corps during 16 days of continuous retreat from the border itself amounted to about 30%, and the 21st mechanized corps, which retreated slowly, with fierce fighting, and was never surrounded - 60% in just over 20 days ( after July 18, the corps practically did not participate in battles).

It is safe to say that these figures reflect the degree of intensity in the use of mechanized corps, and, accordingly, the effectiveness of their actions. In fact, the 12th Mechanized Corps, which was formally part of the 8th Army, did not have firm and permanent subordination. He retreated to Pskov separately from the main forces of the army, receiving orders from both army headquarters and front headquarters, and periodically losing contact and being left to his own devices. As a result, the corps was torn into divisions, and then into smaller units, which were constantly withdrawn and transferred somewhere and were constantly forced to leave positions without a fight under the threat of being bypassed.

At the same time, the 21st Mechanized Corps was mainly used as a single unit and under a single command and fought more than retreated. Obviously, a considerable share of the credit here belongs to the commander of the 21st Mechanized Corps, Major General D. D. Lelyushenko - as well as his immediate superior, the commander of the 27th Army, Major General N. E. Berzarin. At the same time, we especially emphasize that neither one nor the other mechanized corps was defeated and, in general, both showed a fairly high combat capability. But, as we see, combat capability alone is not enough for success.

Only by taking into account all the factors listed above can we talk about the personal responsibility of certain commanders for the outcome of hostilities. Using the example of the actions of the 21st Mechanized Corps (and the 27th Army in general), we see that the effectiveness of the troops’ actions is primarily determined by their combat qualities and leadership at the level of regiments and divisions. Any directive from Headquarters, any order from the front and army command will remain ineffective if middle and lower level commanders are unable to carry them out.

If the results of the actions of the troops of the North-Western Front against the 56th motorized corps, taking into account the general situation and the balance of forces, turned out to be generally quite good, and against the 41st motorized corps - extremely unsuccessful, then the matter is not only in the command of the front and in problems with communications, but also in local leadership, at the level of armies and corps. Or the reasons lie in the unequal level of leadership on the part of the enemy - but then we will be forced to admit that Manstein’s authority as a brilliant commander and master of maneuver warfare is inflated.

However, let’s leave this extremely interesting hypothesis for now and return to the analysis of the actions of the Soviet command. Let us note right away: in modern near-historical journalism there is a widespread opinion that if there is a lack of strength, the troops should go on a defensive defense, and with this defense it was possible to easily win the 1941 campaign without major problems and losses.

Yes, even at the military department we were taught that a successful offensive requires threefold superiority over the enemy. But for some reason many people forget what is meant here local superiority created by maneuvering troops. To go on the defensive means to deliberately transfer the initiative to the enemy. Having at least a slight superiority in forces (or even not possessing it at all), in the absence of our active actions, the enemy will have the opportunity to freely maneuver his forces, choose a place to strike and secure for himself at least a three-fold, at least ten-fold superiority there.

Of course, there are reserves for this - free forces that quickly move to the point of the breakthrough and deliver a counterattack. However, for a successful counterattack, these reserves must be not too far from the breakthrough site and be strong enough, otherwise they will not be able to do anything. But the enemy also does not sit idly by - he, if possible, disguises the concentration of his forces in the main direction and actively carries out diversionary maneuvers in secondary areas.

It would be good if we figured out the meaning of these maneuvers and determined in advance the location of the impending strike. Well, how can we make a mistake? Silent defense is a constant balancing act on a tightrope: “if we detect it, we won’t detect it,” “if we have time, we won’t have time.” Even if you managed to react without making a mistake nine times, there is no guarantee that you will be able to do it on the tenth...

Let us remember that even in 1943 near Kursk, when the approximate time and approximate place of the German attack was known, and the Red Army had a significant superiority in forces, the high maneuverability of troops and flexibility of control allowed the Germans to achieve local superiority in the direction of the main attack and maintain it in within a few days. When reserves taken from the “quiet” sections of the front approached the Soviet troops, the German offensive floundered - but by this time the enemy had already overcome two defensive lines and was close to breaking through the third.

Let’s not forget what historians of the “revisionist” trend are trying to forget: until 1944, the Wehrmacht significantly surpassed the Red Army in the quantity (and quality) of vehicles, that is, in operational mobility. German divisions (and not only tank and motorized ones) were able to move faster than the retreating Soviet troops, even the “mobile” ones. Thus, the 12th Mechanized Corps, retreating from the Dvina line parallel to the enemy’s 41st Motorized Corps, was able to overtake it only on the approach to Pskov, where German troops were detained for several days.

The best way to avoid the situation described is to counterattack. Any counterattack forces the enemy to worry about parrying it; the very possibility of a counterattack forces him to allocate part of his forces to reserve, thereby weakening the strike force. Enemy troops that have broken through are often easier to stop with a counterattack on the flank than with hectic attempts to create new defenses in their path. Finally, tank and motorized infantry divisions on the offensive, for all their mobility, have extremely vulnerable communications; the entry of even insignificant forces into these communications can disrupt the entire offensive.

Thus, we see that the constant counterattacks of Soviet troops in the summer of 1941 were not at all the result of the incompetence of the command or an incorrect understanding of the situation. Often this was the only way to stop the enemy or at least delay his advance. It was the counterattacks of the 21st Mechanized Corps against the German bridgehead in Dvinsk that not only detained Manstein here for a week, but also inflicted significant losses on the Germans - and this despite the fact that the enemy had superiority in forces here.

It would also be wrong to place all responsibility for the failures solely on the front commander, Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov. Yes, it was his untimely order to withdraw from the Dvina line that caused the collapse of the entire Soviet defense. But Kuznetsov hoped that the divisions of the 1st Mechanized and 41st Rifle Corps transferred to him would have time to arrive in the area of ​​Pskov and Ostrov on July 2–3. Alas, Kosobutsky’s rifle corps completed unloading only on the 6th, and Chernyavsky’s mechanized corps was “gutted” along the way.

Less obvious (but no less important) is that F.I. Kuznetsov initially chose the wrong tactics for controlling his troops. Well aware of the shortcomings of communication, he continued to give orders, which continually canceled each other, and often over the heads of the army and corps command. As a result, orders from the front headquarters came to the troops irregularly; often the later ones could overtake the ones issued earlier, and almost always they no longer corresponded to the changed situation. Probably, in this situation, we should have limited ourselves to only general directives, entrusting their implementation to the commanders of the armies, who were nevertheless closer to the front and had the opportunity to react more quickly to the situation.

The presence of a number of formations, often improvised and with unclear subordination, also made it difficult to lead the troops. Apparently, Kuznetsov himself understood this - hence the attempt to ensure control of the 12th mechanized corps by transferring it to the “empty” 65th rifle corps, which had no other troops. However, under the current conditions, it would be much more effective to place the tankers under the command of the commander of the neighboring 11th Rifle Corps - or to create a more efficient management structure high level, entrusting it with responsibility for the defense of the entire threatened area in front of the German bridgeheads in Livani, Krustpils and Plavinas. By the way, the 27th Army, also created literally “on the knee” from the group of General Akimov and the 21st Mechanized Corps, became just such an improvised association. True, the presence of free control of the army, led by the energetic General Berzarin, played a significant role here.

We should not forget that troubles continued even after Kuznetsov’s removal. If the sudden seizure of the bridges in Dvinsk by the Germans can be justified by the “unconventional” actions of saboteurs, then the equally rapid and effective seizure of the bridges across the Velikaya River near Ostrov has no explanation. True, the bridges across Cherekha were blown up in time, but this river no longer became a significant obstacle. But the bridge across the Velikaya near Pskov, on the contrary, was blown up prematurely - which led to tragic consequences.

Without knowing the details and without having the case materials in hand, it is difficult to determine the degree of guilt of the convicted generals Glowacki and Kosobutski: for the explosion of the bridge, for the loss of command and control of the troops, for the inability to hold Pskov, even with an organized defense at a natural line. However, in the battle for the Island on July 5, two regiments of the 111th Division of the 41st Corps acted extremely passively, failing to support the tank attack, and then unable to withstand even a weak enemy onslaught. If the inability of the infantry to fight can be explained by a lack of experience among recruits and reservists, then the blame for the lack of control in battle falls on the division commander, and responsibility for poor interaction with the tank crews of the 3rd Panzer Division falls on the commander of the rifle corps as the senior commander.

This is how the reasons for the unsuccessful military operations of the troops of the North-Western Front in the Riga-Pskov and Ostrovsko-Pskov directions were formulated in the report of Major General of Artillery Tikhonov to the Headquarters commissioner, Colonel General Gorodovikov, dated July 9, 1941:

“Without going into the root causes of the withdrawal of the troops of the North-Western Front, it is necessary to state the presence of the following shortcomings in the troops today:

1. There is no proper desire to wrest the initiative from the enemy’s hands, both from combined arms commanders, right down to corps commanders, and from fighters...

It is necessary to create a decisive change in this issue. There is only one way - to introduce Suvorov’s rule into the consciousness of the troops from army commander to soldier: “The enemy is weaker - attack, the enemy is equal - attack, the enemy is stronger - also attack.”

This rule applies not only in the offensive, but also in defense, which is especially important for the troops of the North-Western Front at the moment...

2. In defense, commanders and soldiers are unstable, especially losing their presence of mind under artillery, mortar and aviation fire and when attacking tanks.

I had to see many cases when the retreat began without an order from a superior, without pressure from the infantry, under pressure only from tanks or artillery fire or mortar fire.

On the one hand, the reason for this lies in the fact that people do not dig in (a significant part of them do not have shovels), on the other hand, they do not have time to dig in due to lack of time... Occupied lines are often exposed to the enemy before they are equipped (line Western Dvina River, line of the 111th and 235th Infantry Divisions 8/7/41)…

3. In all the operations that we witnessed (Riga-Pskov and Ostrovsko-Pskov directions), there was a complete lack of communication between the highest headquarters and subordinates and the latter among themselves. Sometimes this was due to lack of funds, but more often due to the low demands of the commander and his staff on organizing communications (the 1st Mechanized Corps, having a communications battalion, did not have contact with the 41st Rifle Corps during 5.7.41) ...

4. Reconnaissance is conducted insufficiently, primitively, carelessly. Headquarters do not assign reconnaissance tasks to units in battle. The resulting intelligence data remains unused, proper conclusions are not drawn, often not reported to higher headquarters and, as a rule, lower headquarters and neighbors are not informed at all.

As a result, the troops are working blindly - there is not a single case noted when the commander made a decision having more or less accurate data about the enemy.

Aviation does not work in the interests of commanders of rifle corps and rifle divisions.

5. Front and army reserves are brought too close to the front line, in parts and in parts they are exposed to attack (235th Infantry Division - near Ostrov, 46th Infantry Division - in Pskov).

It is necessary to concentrate reserves at the appropriate (according to the situation) distance from the front and introduce entire formations, in an organized manner, from the march into battle.

6. Interaction on the battlefield between ground forces, within them and with aviation is poorly organized (5.7.41 near Ostrov, the 5th and 6th tank battalions and aviation acted separately in time). Reasons: lack of communication...

7. Target designation by aviation to ground troops is not applied.

In this matter, the enemy has a huge advantage over us, which was reflected in the battles near Ostrov on 5.7.41 and near Cherekh on 7.7.41.

8. Artillery exhibits instability, withdraws prematurely from firing positions, and does not use the full power of its fire.

Concentrated and barrage fire is not sufficiently planned and organized.

Anti-tank guns in defense are also unstable, abandoning their positions prematurely, resulting in enemy tanks commanding the battlefield.

During the offensive, anti-tank guns do not follow the tanks enough, they lag behind, leaving the latter without support to fight with the enemy’s strong anti-tank artillery, which causes large tank losses,

9. Tanks, in the presence of an offensive impulse (6th Tank Regiment) and the determination to smash the enemy, maneuver poorly on the battlefield, tend to operate on crowded roads, do not provide themselves with the suppression of enemy anti-tank weapons, are poorly camouflaged, and as a result suffer heavy losses.

10. Infantry is the weakest point of the troops. Offensive spirit is low. It lags behind the tanks in the offensive and is easily disorganized when exposed to artillery fire, mortar fire and air attacks (on July 5, 1941, the tanks, having occupied the Island, put the Germans to flight. The tanks captured the city. The infantry lagged behind and did not consolidate their success. The tanks, having used up their ammunition, were forced to withdraw with heavy losses).

Some of the command personnel, especially at the level up to the battalion commander, do not show due courage in battle; there are cases of individuals and even subunits leaving the battlefield without orders from their superiors...”

And yet, the main reason for the failures, wrong actions, and erroneous decisions of Soviet commanders in the summer of 1941 can be formulated in just two words: lack of experience. Most corps and division commanders, army and front commanders have not yet had the opportunity to take part in a modern war - maneuverable and mechanized, at the same time characterized by a high density of troops and the duration of operations. The experience of the Civil War could be of little help here; the experience of Spain, Khalkhin Gol and even Finland was also not comprehensive, and only a minority of Soviet military leaders were able to obtain it.

Not everyone manages to learn from victories - some have to be content with the experience gained in defeats.

Main literature

Collection of combat documents of the Great Patriotic War. Issue 33. M.: Voenizdat, 1957.

Collection of combat documents of the Great Patriotic War. Issue 34. M.: Voenizdat, 1958.

Russian Archive: Great Patriotic War. VGK rate. Documents and materials. 1941 M: TERRA, 1996.

Drig E. Mechanized corps of the Red Army in battle. M.: ACT, 2005..

Lelyushenko D. Moscow - Stalingrad - Berlin - Prague. M.: Nauka, 1975.

On the Northwestern Front. 1941–1943. M.: Nauka, 1969.

Kolomiets M. 1941: fighting in the Baltic states. June 22 - July 10, 1941. KM Strategy, 2002 (“Front Illustration”, 5-2002)

Irinarkhov R. S. Baltic Special... Minsk: Harvest, 2004.

Petrov B. N. How Pskov was abandoned // Military History Journal, 1993, No. 6.

Rous E. Tank battles on the Eastern Front. M.: ACT, 2005.

Haupt V. Army Group North. 1941–1944. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2005.

Halder F. War diary. Volume 3, book one. M.: Voenizdat, 1971.

Manstein E. von. Lost victories. M.: ACT, 2007.

Thomas L. Jentz. Panzertruppen. The Complete Guide to the Creation & Combat Employment of Germany’s Tank Forces. 1933–1942. Shiffer Military History, Atglen PA, 1996.

WESTERN FRONT,

1) the operational-strategic unification of the Russian army in the western strategic direction during the 1st World War. Formed on August 4(17), 1915 as a result of the division of the North-Western Front into two - Northern and Western. The Western Front at various times included the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 10th armies. In August - October 1915, front troops fought heavy defensive battles for Vilna (now Vilnius), eliminating the breakthrough of the 1st and 6th cavalry corps of German troops in the area of ​​​​the city of Sventsyany. In the spring of 1916, troops of the Western Front carried out an offensive operation in the area of ​​​​Dvinsk and Lake Naroch. During the June offensive of 1917, the troops of the Western Front, having occupied the first position of German troops in the Vilna region, under the influence of the Bolsheviks [by October 1917 there were about 21.4 thousand members of the RSDLP (b) and over 27 thousand sympathizers in the front troops] refused to continue the offensive and returned into their trenches. On October 27 (November 9), 1917, the Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC) of the Western Regions and the Front was created on the Western Front. The Military Revolutionary Committee removed the front commander, Infantry General P. S. Baluev, loyal to the Provisional Government, and appointed Lieutenant Colonel V. V. Kamenshchikov in his place. The congress of representatives of the front troops on November 20 (Z.12), 1917 elected the Bolshevik A.F. Myasnikov as commander of the troops of the Western Front. At the beginning of December 1917, the demobilization of troops on the Western Front began. Despite this, in February 1918 his troops (about 250 thousand people) took part in repelling the offensive of German troops in the RSFSR. Since 29.3.1918, the Western section of the curtain detachments, formed by the RVSR to defend the demarcation line in the western direction from a possible invasion of German troops, was operatively subordinate to the command of the Western Front. Disbanded on April 18, 1918, about 15 thousand people from the front joined the ranks of the Red Army.

Commanders: Infantry General A. E. Evert (August 1915 - March 1917), Cavalry General V. I. Gurko (March - May 1917), Lieutenant General A. I. Denikin (May - June 1917), General Lieutenant P. N. Lomnovsky (June - August 1917), Infantry General P. S. Baluev (August - November 1917), Lieutenant Colonel V. V. Kamenshchikov (November 1917), A. F. Myasnikov (November 1917 - April 1918 ).

2) The operational-strategic unification of the Red Army in the western and northwestern strategic directions during the Civil War of 1917-1922 in Russia. Formed in accordance with the directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army I. I. Vatsetis on February 19, 1919 on the basis of the field control of the Northern Front. The Western Front at various times included the 3rd, 4th, 7th and 12th, 1st Cavalry, Western (1Z.3-9.6.1919 - Belarusian-Lithuanian, from 9.6.1919 - 16th) and Estonian armies, Mozyr Group of Forces, Army of Soviet Latvia (from 7.6.1919 - 15th Army) and the Dnieper Military Flotilla. The troops of the Western Front conducted military operations on a front stretching over 2 thousand km: against the armed formations of the White movement and Entente troops in the Murmansk direction; against Finnish troops - in the Petrozavodsk and Olonets directions and the Karelian Isthmus; against the troops of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian bourgeois governments, the White armies, German and Polish troops in the Baltic states and Belarus. Under pressure from superior enemy forces, the troops of the Western Front were forced to retreat from the Baltic states by July 1919. In the July Operation of 1920, troops of the Western Front defeated the main forces of the Polish North-Eastern Front. During the Warsaw operation of 1920, front troops reached Warsaw, but were defeated and were forced to withdraw from Poland. Western Front troops took part in the suppression Kronstadt uprising 1921.

8.4.1924 The Western Front was transformed into the Western Military District.

Commanders: D. N. Nadezhny (February - July 1919), V. M. Gittis (July 1919 - April 1920), M. N. Tukhachevsky (April 1920 - March 1921, January 1922 - March 1924), I. N. Zakharov (March - September 1921), A. I. Egorov (September 1921 - January 1922), A. I. Kork (March - April 1924), A. I. Cook (April 1924).

3) Operational-strategic unification of Soviet troops in the western strategic direction during the Great Patriotic War. Formed on June 22, 1941 on the basis of the Western Special Military District as part of the 3rd, 4th, 10th and 13th combined arms armies. Subsequently, the Western Front at various times included the 5, 11, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 39, 43, 49, 50, 61, 68th combined arms , 1st Shock, 10th and 11th Guards, 3rd and 4th Tank, and 1st Air Armies. Front troops in 1941 participated in the strategic defensive operation in Belarus, in the Battle of Smolensk 1941, in the Battle of Moscow 1941-42.

During the Rzhev operations of 1942-43, troops of the Western Front, together with troops of the Kalinin Front, liquidated the enemy bridgehead on the left bank of the Volga in the Rzhev region (July - August 1942) and the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge in the defense of German troops (March 1943). In July - August 1943, the troops of the left wing of the front during the Battle of Kursk 1943, together with the troops of the Bryansk and Central Fronts, participated in the Oryol strategic operation to eliminate the enemy’s Oryol group. At the same time, the main forces of the Western Front, taking advantage of the advantageous enveloping position, in August - September, together with the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, carried out the Smolensk operation 1943. At the end of 1943 - beginning of 1944, front troops, advancing in the Vitebsk and Orsha directions, reached the eastern regions of Belarus. 24.4.1944 The Western Front, based on the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command dated 12.4.1944, was renamed the 3rd Belorussian Front, and 2 of its armies were transferred to the 2nd Belorussian Front.

Commanders: Army General D. G. Pavlov (June 1941); Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko (June - July 1941); Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko (July - September 1941); Lieutenant General, from September 11, 1941 Colonel General I. S. Konev (September - October 1941 and August 1942 - February 1943); Army General G.K. Zhukov (October 1941 - August 1942); Colonel General, from August 27, 1943, Army General V. D. Sokolovsky (February 1943 - April 1944); Colonel General I. D. Chernyakhovsky (April 1944).

In German military-historical literature, the Western Front refers to the areas of combat operations of German troops in Western Europe against British, French and American troops in the 1st and 2nd World Wars.

Lit.: Military personnel of the Soviet state in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. (Reference and statistical materials). M., 1963; Directives of the High Command of the Red Army (1917-1920): Sat. documents. M., 1969; Directives of the command of the fronts of the Red Army (1917-1922): Sat. documents: In 4 vols. M., 1971-1978; Strokov A. A. Armed forces and military art in the First World War. M., 1974; History of the First World War. 1914-1918: In 2 vols. M., 1975; History of the Second World War. 1939-1945. M., 1975-1977. T. 4-8; Rostunov I.I. Russian Front of the First World War. M., 1976; Civil war in the USSR: In 2 vols. M., 1980-1986; Red Banner Belarusian Military District. 2nd ed. M., 1983; Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections: In 2 volumes, 13th ed. M., 2002; Fronts, fleets, armies, flotillas of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945: Directory. M., 200Z.